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TEXT
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a comprehensive account and detailed 
analysis of the forces that led to the emergence and consolidation of the 
Syrian-lranian alliance during a turbulent decade in the modern history of the 
Middle East. The alliance between the two states, which has now lasted over 
twenty years, has proved to be an enduring feature of the political landscape of 
this troubled region. Moreover, since its inception, it has had a significant 
impact in terms of moulding events and bringing about major changes in the 
contemporary Middle East.
The thesis sets out to demonstrate that, contrary to prevailing views (due in 
large part to the authoritarian nature of the Syrian and Iranian regimes and 
their unpopularity in the West), the alliance between them has been essentially 
defensive in nature. It emerged in response to acts of aggression orchestrated 
by Iraq (1980) and Israel (1982), in both cases with the tacit support and prior 
knowledge of the United States. As a result of the research undertaken for this 
thesis, three distinct phases in the evolution and institutionalization of the 
Damascus-Tehran axis can be discerned. One chapter is devoted to each of 
these phases, constituting the three core sections of the thesis.
A brief introduction sets out to provide a conceptual framework for 
understanding the genesis and evolution of the Syrian-lranian nexus. The first 
core chapter, covering the emergence of the alliance between 1979 and 1982, 
demonstrates that, while the initial impetus for the birth of the relationship came 
from the overthrow of Iran's conservative, pro-Western monarchy in 1979, the 
Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980 served as a major catalyst in bringing 
Syria and Iran closer together, with Syria providing valuable diplomatic and 
military assistance to help Iran stave off defeat. The second core chapter 
covers the period between 1982 and 1985, when Israel launched an invasion of 
Lebanon and challenged Syria in its backyard. Here, Iran lent its support to 
Syria to drive out Israeli and Western forces during the period 1983-1985. The 
third core chapter deals with a critical, and perhaps the most problematic, 
phase in the development of the alliance. By the mid-1980's, both parties had 
developed conflicting agendas, contributing to tensions between them. 
However, continued consultations between the two allies, and their ability to 
prioritize their respective interests and redefine the parameters for cooperation, 
led by the late 1980s to the maturation and consolidation of their relationship. 
Finally, the conclusion looks at the reasons why the alliance lasted beyond the 
1980's.
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INTRODUCTION
The study of alliances is central to the analysis of international relations. The formation of alliances 
among tribes, clans and small communities for security purposes dates back to the dawn of 
civilization. As several of the earliest civilizations emerged in the Fertile Crescent and the Nile River 
Valley, alliances have been a common feature on the political landscape of the Middle East for 
thousands of years, starting with the ancient empires of the Egyptians, Hittites, Assyrians and 
Persians.1 The recurrent struggles involving the various regional powers, and later extra-regional 
actors such as the Greeks, Romans and Mongols determined the course of Middle East history for 
more than two millennia until the rise of modem nation-states in the region during the early half of 
the twentieth century.
In the decades preceding and following the Second World War, the rise of modem 
nationalism in the region, the gradual retreat of Britain and France and the onset of the Cold War 
ushered in a period of intense political and ideological rivalry among the various radical and 
conservative states in the Middle East. The Arab defeat in the 1948-49 Palestine War at the hands 
of the newly-created state of Israel, the appeal of radical Arab nationalism and archaic political 
systems only served to exacerbate and polarize the situation. Furthermore, the region's vast oil 
reserves, and its geopolitical importance - lying at the crossroads between Europe, Africa, Asia, and 
the Indian subcontinent - increased the significance of the Middle East in the eyes of the 
Superpowers, leading to continued outside interference in the area. Concomitantly, many regional 
actors were eager to cultivate close ties with the Superpowers and to exploit the bipolar system in 
order to jockey for influence and aid to boost their own power and position, both in regional and 
international terms. Besides allying themselves with either Washington or Moscow, many states 
tried to enhance their security by forging alliances with other regional actors, at times to minimize 
foreign penetration of the Middle East.
In his landmark study on alliance theory and alliance formation in the Middle East, The 
Origins of Alliances (1987), Stephen M. Walt identified 33 different alignments in the region from 
1955 to 1979 alone.2 The general trend has been that regional actors have primarily aligned 
themselves in order to diminish a threat posed by another regional power or alliance. They have for 
the most part overcome ideological differences in recent decades to ally themselves if an immediate 
threat exists. Ideological factors assume some significance if they are not confronted with a major 
security challenge. In addition, the record clearly shows that they will align themselves with extra- 
regional actors that are willing to support their political objectives. Interestingly enough, ideological 
factors have been more salient in alliances between Middle Eastern states and their Superpower 
patrons - as the record during the Cold War era clearly demonstrated.
In the 1950's and 1960's, for the most part, conservative, pro-Western monarchies formed 
defense pacts to strengthen their position vis-a-vis radical, nationalist, republican governments which 
emerged in Syria, Egypt and Iraq. The latter prematurely attempted to form political unions and 
assumed a confrontational stance against Israel and its allies. However, the Arab defeat in the 1967
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Six-Day War discredited the radical camp, diminishing the importance of ideology and regime 
structure in alliance formation, and eventually giving way to more pragmatic alignments against 
common threats. This was epitomized by the formation of the shortlived "Arab Triangle" consisting 
of Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia in the early 1970's, and its bid to demonstrate Arab dissatisfaction 
with the post-1967 status quo and US policy, by launching the 1973 October War. However, one of 
the most fascinating and enduring examples over the past two decades has been the emergence 
and evolution of the Syrian-lranian alliance in the aftermath of the 1979 Islamic Revolution. 
Subsequent to the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy, the new revolutionary Islamist regime and the 
secular, Arab nationalist government in Syria cultivated close bilateral relations and eventually 
aligned themselves with each other in response to direct challenges posed to them by Iraq, Israel 
and the United States in the Levant and Persian Gulf between 1980 and 1988.
The genesis and evolution of the Syrian-lranian axis during its first decade was one of the 
most intriguing developments in modem Middle East politics. During the turbulent decade of the 
1980's, the nature and longevity of the Tehran-Damascus partnership baffled many scholars and 
observers. Many were quick to write it off as a short-term, opportunistic alignment, or describe it as a 
marriage of convenience that would dissolve rapidly. Pointing to many differences in their 
respective ideologies, as well as their social and political foundations, most analysts expressed 
surprise as to how a revolutionary, pan-lslamic theocracy such as Iran could ally itself with a secular, 
pan-Arab socialist republic like Syria.3 Moreover, while Bathi Syria claimed to be an ardent 
supporter and the rightful leader of the pan-Arab cause, revolutionary Iran advocated Islamic 
univeralism, and during the Khomeini era rejected the concept of the nation-state.4 In addition, in the 
sphere of relations with the Superpowers, although Syria traditionally maintained strong ties with the 
Soviet Union, and was a primary recipient of Soviet military assistance in the 1980's, Moscow's 
relations with Tehran's ruling clerics were strained intermittently after the establishment of the Islamic 
Republic.5
The purpose of this thesis is to provide a detailed analysis of the forces that led to the 
emergence and consolidation of the Syrian-lranian alliance during a turbulent decade in the modem 
history of the Middle East. The alliance between these two states, which has now lasted over twenty 
years, has proved to be a persisting feature on the political landscape of this troubled region. 
Moreover, since its inception, it has had a significant impact in terms in terms of moulding events 
and bringing about major changes in the contemporary Middle East.
This thesis sets out to demonstrate that, contrary to prevailing views (due in large part to the 
authoritarian nature of the Syrian and Iranian regimes, and their unpopularity in the West and in 
certain parts of the Arab world), the alliance between them has been essentially defensive in nature, 
and emerged in response to acts of aggression orchestrated by Iraq (1980) and Israel (1982), in both 
cases with the prior knowledge and tacit support of the United States. As a result of the research 
undertaken for this study, three distinct phases in the evolution and institutionalization of the 
Damascus-Tehran axis can be discerned. One chapter is devoted to each of these stages, 
constituting the three core sections of the thesis.
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This brief introduction sets out to provide a general conceptual framework for understanding 
the genesis and longevity of the Syrian-lranian nexus. The first chapter, covering the emergence of 
the alliance between 1979 and 1982, seeks to demonstrate that, while the initial impetus for the birth 
of the relationship came from the overthrow of Iran's conservative, pro-Western monarchy in 1979, 
the Iraqi invasion of Iran in September 1980 served as a major catalyst in bringing Syria and Iran 
closer together, with Syria providing valuable diplomatic and military assistance to help Iran stave off 
defeat. The second core chapter covers the period between 1982 and 1985, when Israel launched 
its second invasion of Lebanon and challenged Syria in its backyard. Here, Iran lent its support to 
Syria, in part by mobilizing Lebanon's Shi'ites, to drive out Israeli and Western forces during the 
period 1983-1985. The third core chapter deals with a critical, and perhaps the most problematic 
phase in the development of the alliance. By 1985, the two allies had developed conflicting 
agendas, therefore contributing to tensions between them. However, continued bilateral 
consultations, and their ability to prioritize their respective objectives (without impinging on the 
interests of the other), and to redefine the parameters of cooperation, led to the maturation and 
consolidation of their relationship by the late 1980's. Finally, the conclusion looks at the reasons why 
the alliance has lasted beyond the 1980's.
Although two studies in recent years, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, by Hussein J. 
Agha and Ahmad S. Khalidi (1995), and Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional 
System, by Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond A. Hinnebusch (1997) shed light on certain 
aspects of the alliance between the two countries, they focus primarily on its continued importance in 
the post-Cold War era, and provide a general overview of the formative years of the Tehran- 
Damascus nexus. This thesis aims to serve as an in-depth study, tracing the origins and 
development of the strategic partnership between Damascus and Tehran from the toppling of 
Mohammad Reza Shah in eariy 1979 to Syrian-lranian intercession to halt Amal-Hezbollah clashes 
in Beirut and the end of the First Persian Gulf War in mid-1988. Besides putting forth an empirical 
survey with a chronology of events, the analytical content is intended to distinguish the three phases 
in the evolution of the alliance and their significance, in terms both of how they affected bilateral 
relations between the two states, and of their regional implications in the volatile environment of 
1979-1988.
With regard to the research methodology and material used, this thesis relies primarily on 
secondary sources (books, periodicals, newspapers), along with transcripts of radio broadcasts, 
official government statements, and also on personal interviews with former government officials 
and Middle East experts. In view of the closed and often secretive nature of the Syrian Bathi and 
Iranian Islamist regimes and their decision making, coupled with the importance and sensitivity of 
cooperative ties between them, it is highly improbable that responsible officials would have engaged 
in frank discussions on these matters or provided first-hand knowledge about their bilateral relations. 
Indeed, inaccessibility to primary sources and interviews with current government officials in 
Damascus and Tehran continue to be the main obstacles to providing a complete and accurate 
picture of the nature and extent of Syrian-lranian collaboration during the first decade of the alliance.
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The opacity of political decision making among key figures and bodies in the Syrian and Iranian 
regimes, including the role, importance and views of the various leaders and councils, along with 
limited information on their bilateral consultations, pose a formidable challenge to any outsider 
attempting to understand the inner workings of these two authoritarian governments and the Syrian- 
lranian relationship. Due to the aforementioned problem, this study tries to compensate for this 
serious limitation through an exhaustive survey and analysis of the available secondary sources, and 
also attempts to fill in some of the apparent gaps and clarify certain inconsistencies by obtaining first­
hand information from former senior government officials. These include former Iranian President 
Abolhassan Bani-Sadris account of the extent of Syrian military assistance to Iran in the eariy years 
of the Iran-lraq hostilities (1980-1981) and Tehran's policy toward the Syrian Muslim Brethren, and 
former US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy's insight on the degree of Syrian-lranian 
involvement in attacks on American assets in Lebanon between 1983-1984.
Since this study focuses primarily on the genesis and development of the Tehran-Damascus 
nexus during its first decade, one may come away with the impression that the maintenance and 
augmentation of their strategic bilateral links was the first and foremost foreign policy consideration 
on the minds of Syrian and Iranian leaders between 1979-1989. In some respects and in certain 
instances, this was definitely the case for both partners, especially for Iran. The seizure of the 
American embassy in Tehran by Iranian militants in 1979 (which plunged US-lranian relations into an 
abyss and led to Iran's international isolation), and the Iraqi invasion of Iran in 1980 meant that 
Ayatollah Khomeini's regime was extremely dependent on Hafez Assad’s diplomatic and military 
support. This was needed in order to stave off defeat and to avoid regional isolation at a time when 
Saddam Hussein held the initiative, occupying large swathes of Iranian territory and trying to depict 
the war as an Arab-Persian conflict. With the expulsion of Iraqi forces from most of the areas they 
held in Iran by mid-1982 and the concurrent Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the pendulum swung the 
other way, with Syria requiring Iranian assistance to keep Iraq in check and mobilize Lebanon's 
Shi'ites to expel Israeli and Western forces from its backyard between 1982-1985. As the Israeli 
threat receded with the withdrawal of Tel Aviv's troops to the self-declared security zone by mid-1985 
and Arab disenchantment grew due to Iran's persistence in continuing the Gulf War, Iran once again 
became more dependent on Syrian cooperation and goodwill in order to maintain its foothold in the 
Levant and avoid total regional isolation. This continued to be the case until the cessation of 
hostilities with Iraq in 1988. Overall, Tehran valued its strategic alliance with Syria more between 
1979-1982 and 1985-1988, particularly in the backdrop of the poor state of US-lranian relations 
throughout the 1980's and the erratic nature of its ties with the Soviet Union and Western Europe 
during this period. For Syria, the three years from 1982 to 1985 represented the height of its reliance 
on Iran in order to undo the achievements of its foes in Lebanon. Concomitantly, on the international 
level, Syria continued to put great emphasis on its close links with the Soviet Union during the first 
half of the 1980's due to the tetter's Superpower status and in its capacity as the primary provider of 
military and economic assistance to Syria. However, with the rise of Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and 
the gradual cooling of Soviet-Svrian relations in the second half of the 1980's, a subtle shift occurred
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in Syrian perceptions of Moscow. Damascus realized that it would have to diversify its political and 
economic ties internationally, and in concurrence, rely more heavily on regional allies and proxies 
such as Iran and Lebanon's Shi'ites to achieve its strategic and military objectives and to keep Israeli 
and Iraqi power in check. While this study's main focus is the evolution of the Syrian-lranian 
alliance, it also attempts to put the bilateral relationship within the proper context of the changing 
regional and international environment during the 1980's, and how both Syrian and Iranian 
policymakers viewed the evolving situation around them and how they tried to utilize their strategic 
partnership to achieve their objectives.
This thesis highlights the fact that during 1980-1981 and 1986-1987 there were differences 
of opinion within the Iranian leadership about the extent and utility of cooperative ties with Syria, and 
also that Rifat Assad had serious reservations about the strategic alliance with Iran by 1984. 
However, it does not concentrate on domestic factors such as the views of various officials, the 
impact of internal political developments and domestic public opinion about the Syrian-lranian axis 
between 1979-1989 for three major reasons. First and foremost, based on the available evidence, it 
is clear that throughout the 1980's most of the key political decision makers in Tehran and Damascus 
firmly believed that perpetuating and strengthening the alliance was a centerpiece in their foreign 
policy. Secondly, as previously mentioned, in view of the opaque nature of decision making within 
the two regimes, even today, it is highly problematic to ascertain and reveal the true opinions of 
various members of the Syrian and Iranian leadership about their alliance during its first decade. 
Whenever there were major rifts and differences of opinion about their bilateral relations, these 
ultimately manifested themselves in some form in their domestic or regional policies, and are 
mentioned in this study, based on press accounts that appeared at the time in the Arab and Western 
media. Thirdly, the existing evidence and the authoritarian nature of the Syrian Bathi and Iranian 
Islamist systems clearly indicate that domestic opinion was never considered to be a prime factor 
when Syrian and Iranian leaders decided about major issues affecting their bilateral ties. In fact, it 
was a non-issue, particularly for the Syrian government. In spite of the unpopularity among the 
Syrian Bath Party and the Syrian masses of the policy to support Iran during its eight-year war with 
Arab Iraq, Hafez Assad and his inner political circle did not feel obliged to alter their position in order 
to gain Party approval or win domestic support.6 With regard to Iran, after the Islamist regime began 
oil deliveries to Syria and also expelled the Iraqi army from much of Iranian soil in 1982, the public 
gradually began to question the wisdom of crude shipments to Syria at a time when the Iraqi threat 
seemed to have receded and also opposed the continuation of the Gulf conflict. By the mid-1980's, 
with Syria failing to make timely payments for its oil purchases and the acute economic situation in 
Iran, some members of the Iranian parliament became quite vocal in their opposition to continued 
shipments and even the logic of alliance with Syria. However, in the final analysis, despite some 
tensions in bilateral relations, Ayatollah Khomeini and his lieutenants would not be swayed, and were 
determined to preserve links with their only significant Arab ally.7 Such is the nature of authoritarian, 
doctrinaire regimes. Overall, the emphasis of this thesis lies in the output and policies that emerged 
from the black box of Syrian-lranian decision making.
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In general, a wealth of information and analysis about the evolution of the Syrian-lranian 
alliance during its first decade exists. Through careful research and study, this thesis attempts to put 
the various pieces together, to provide insight, and to shed new light on crucial events and decisions 
that were made in Tehran and Damascus during one of the most turbulent periods in the 
contemporary history of the Middle East. These include: the impact of the Israeli invasion of 
Lebanon in June 1982, and the outcome of the Syrian-lranian consultations that ensued on Tehran's 
decision to invade Iraq in the weeks that followed; and secondly, how US-lraqi operations against 
Iran in the Persian Gulf during the spring of 1988 designed to turn the tide of the Gulf conflict 
prompted Tehran to throw its weight behind Hezbollah in its confrontation with the rival, pro-Syrian 
Amal movement (albeit in a calculated and limited manner), and to try to maintain its precarious 
foothold in Lebanon. This consequently put the Syrian-lranian alliance to the test since Tehran was 
overtly defying Damascus in its own backyard.
Before delving into the specific aspects of the genesis and development of the Syrian- 
lranian alliance, it is useful to identify and elaborate on several general concepts and theoretical 
explanations to understand the strength and longevity of the cooperative ties between revolutionary 
Iran and Bathi Syria. Firstly, the alliance consists of only two members: it has never been a broad 
coalition of states with various and divergent interests. Since it is small, it is therefore more viable.8 
In the words of Holsti, Hopmann, and Sullivan, 'The smaller the alliance, the more cohesive and 
effective it is, and the more important the contribution of each member."9 Secondly, it has primarily 
been a defensive alliance aimed at neutralizing Iraqi and Israeli offensive capabilities in the Gulf and 
Near East respectively, and thwarting American encroachment in the Middle East. In general, 
alliances which have set and limited objectives are more stable and durable.10 According to George 
Liska and Stephen M. Walt, defensive alliances are less fragile than offensive ones. In the latter 
case, once the opponent has been attacked and vanquished, the rationale for maintaining the 
alliance ceases to exist for the members, and they subsequently fall out over the fruits of their 
victory.11 Thirdly, the priorities of the two partners differ in the two arenas where they cooperate. For 
Iran, the Gulf region is the main area of concern, whereas for Syria, the Levant is the primary focus 
of its attention. Over time, through continuous consultations and modification of their aims, the two 
allies have come to recognize this reality, and in the process have tried to coordinate their policies 
and accommodate one another, while concurrently furthering their own interests.12 In other words, 
between 1985 and 1988 Iran finally acknowledged that Syrian interests took precedence in the Arab- 
Israeli theater, and Syria in return deferred to its Iranian ally when vital matters regarding Gulf 
security were at stake for the Islamist government. Although not all their interests converged, 
through continuous consultations, Tehran and Damascus gradually harmonized their positions so 
that their interests would complement one another to the degree possible. As George Liska posits in 
Nations in Alliance, the more complementary the interests of alliance members, the more easily 
intra-alliance compromises can be achieved.13 Furthermore, the fact that Syria has carried the 
greater part of the burden in checking Israeli power, while Iran's main role has been to serve as a 
bulwark against Iraqi expansionism in the Gulf and beyond, has meant that the two partners fulfill
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different functions, consequently reinforcing the rationale and utility of their strategic links. In other 
words, the more pronounced the differentiation of functions of the members, the greater the 
cohesion of the alliance.14 Fourthly, the mere fact that the alliance has endured for so many years 
(especially by the standards of the Middle East) gives it considerable weight and importance. 
Interestingly enough, Robert L. Rothstein argues in Alliances and Small Powers, "Once an alliance 
has been created, there is positive value placed on continuing it, even if it seems to perform very 
few functions.”15 Furthermore, Morton A. Kaplan builds on this point by postulating that longstanding 
alliances are characterized by greater unity and legitimacy.16 It is also noteworthy that when an 
alliance has become institutionalized, if a member wishes to abandon it, it is more prudent to find 
another viable arrangement that has at least equal utility. In other words, it will pay an opportunity 
cost unless it joins or forges some form of alternate arrangement that is at least equal in utility to the 
previous alliance.
Finally, another general point needs to be made with regard to the role of ideology in the
maintenance of the alliance. Ironically, an extremely crucial factor in the longevity of the Syrian-
lranian axis is that both states have differing ideologies. Herein lies the paradox. Quite often,
alliances between states which espouse the same transnational, universalistic ideology are less likely
to endure than those where ideology plays a minimal role. This has been particularly true in the
Middle East, where authoritarian regimes predominate and frequently use ideology as a tool to boost
their political legitimacy and support base both domestically and in neighboring countries.
Revisionist ideologies such as pan-Arabism and Islamic fundamentalism have frequently been quite
divisive since they have been used to project power and influence and destabilize rival states. In the
Middle East, the record clearly shows that states sharing a common ideology have competed for the
mantle of leadership rather than form durable alliances. Each state may claim to be the legitimate
leader, and demand that others relinquish their rights and sovereignty to form a single political entity.
The most poignant example of this phenomenon was the failure of the various unity schemes during
the 1950's and 1960's involving Nasserite Egypt and the radical regimes in Syria and Iraq. Stephen
M. Walt supports this view in The Origins of Alliances. He asserts that alliances among Arab states
and Communist countries that have sought to form a single centralized movement have been
extremely unstable and shortlived. In the final analysis, common ideologies have often served as an
obstacle to unity, prompting states to compete with one another rather than form durable alliances.17
Fred C. Ikl6 also recognized this point in How Nations Negotiate, when he opined that, in certain
instances, alliances not characterized by doctrinal unity will more easily resolve internal differences
18without disrupting the partnership.
When one studies the case of the Syrian-lranian alliance, it is apparent that Iran - a non- 
Arab nation - is not attempting to be a champion of Arab nationalism like its Syrian partner, that 
considers itself "the beating heart of Arabism." Syria for its part is not vying for leadership of the 
Islamic revivalist movement in the Middle East or elsewhere. Moreover, Iran refrained from 
supporting the Syrian Muslim Brethren in their ill-fated effort to overthrow the Bathi regime in 
Damascus during the eariy 1980's. In general, there has been no ostensible competition on the
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ideological level (except in Lebanon during 1985-1988), nor fear that one partner might upstage the 
other, precisely because of their distinctly different ideological platforms. According to Herbert S. 
Dinerstein, ideological dissimilarities will not disrupt alliance cooperation if none of the members is 
intent on political revolution in the others.19
Both Bathi Syria and Islamic Iran have been fiercely independent states and, through the 
years following the toppling of the Pahlavi dynasty in Iran, found it expedient to cooperate to thwart 
Iraqi and Israeli designs in the region, and to frustrate American moves that implicitly or explicitly 
supported Tel Aviv and Baghdad. In addition, Damascus and Tehran were wary of Washington's 
attempts to advance its own agenda and make inroads in the Middle East at their expense. During 
1982-1985, Syrian President Hafez Assad was determined to resist the Reagan administration's 
effort to bring Lebanon within the US-lsraeli orbit, and to push for a piecemeal approach to resolve 
the Arab-lsraeli conflict. Khomeini's Iran also shared Syria's concerns in the Levant, and sought to 
punish Iraq for its invasion of Iran in 1980, and after 1982, much to the consternation of Washington 
and its Arab allies, tried to oust Saddam Hussein from power.
In the following chapters it will be demonstrated that Syrian-lranian cooperation during the 
formative years of the alliance had a major impact on shaping the course of events in the Middle 
East and transformed the region. The joint policies pursued by Tehran and Damascus also had a 
profound effect on the actions of the Superpowers in the Middle East. Not only did Assad and 
Khomeini succeed in inflicting one of the very few foreign policy defeats that Ronald Reagan 
experienced during his two terms in office, but they also proved adept at enlisting Soviet support on 
a number of occasions to attain their objectives. Furthermore, they frustrated the regional designs of 
Saddam Hussein and Menachem Begin. Careful, well-crafted strategies eventually led to the 
expulsion of the Iraqi army from Iranian territory by 1982, the withdrawal of American troops from 
Beirut in 1984, and the retreat of Israeli forces from most of the Lebanese territory they occupied by 
1985. At the same time, in spite of their impressive achievements, their were limits to Syrian-lranian 
power in the region. As two middle powers that did not enjoy the backing of most regional states, and 
only received some qualified from the Soviet Union, they were unable to alter the regional status quo 
in their favor and determine the outcome of events on their own in the Levant and the Persian Gulf. 
Although the Syrian-lranian axis possessed limited offensive capability in regional terms, let alone on 
the international level, nonetheless, it was a force to be reckoned with during the 1980's - one that 
has left an enduring mark on Middle East politics at the end of this century.
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THE EMERGENCE OF THE SYRIAN-1 RAN IAN AXIS: 1979-1982
INTRODUCTION
The 1979 Iranian revolution was undoubtedly one of the most important milestones in modem 
Middle Eastern history. Not only did the overthrow of the Pahlavi dynasty bring about major changes 
within Iran, but it also ushered in a new era of politics on the regional level. The new regime under 
the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini radically altered the content and form of Iranian foreign policy. 
Overnight, imperial Iran, which had once pursued a strongly pro-Western, status quo foreign policy 
was transformed, into a new republic committed to a purportedly universalistic religious ideology, 
and bent on changing the political map of the Middle East.
The revolutionary changes in Iran during 1978-1979 sent tremors throughout the region, the 
Arab world in particular. While it alarmed many regimes which had previously enjoyed close ties 
with the imperial government, it was enthusiastically welcomed by many non-aligned and pro-Soviet 
governments. Moreover, it also gave a major boost and served as a powerful source of inspiration 
for various Islamic, Third World, and revolutionary movements and political parties in the region and 
beyond.
A natural outcome of the toppling of the Pahlavi throne was the reversal in the pattern of 
Iran's alliances and enmities. With one major stroke, the country's new leadership terminated Iran's 
long-standing alliances with the United States and Israel. Consequently (although not inevitably), 
Iran's relations with the pro-Western Arab states suffered. As a result of the changing nature of 
Arab-lranian relations, inter-Arab political configurations and alliances were reconsidered and 
reshaped to meet the requirements or challenge of Iran's new Islamic revolutionary ideology and 
foreign policy.1
Prior to the fall of the Shah, most Arab governments viewed the existing political order in the 
Middle East as a predominantly Arab one. Non-Arab actors such as Israel and Iran were constricted 
and played a marginal role in mainstream Arab politics. This was particularly tme in the heydays of 
Arab nationalism in the 1950's and 1960's, during the Nasser era. Tel Aviv and Tehran both 
perceived radical Arab nationalism as a major threat to their national security and existence. They 
therefore aligned themselves to counter the "progressive Arab Front" under Nasser’s leadership. 
However, the devastating Arab defeat in the 1967 Arab-lsraeli war and Nasser’s demise three years 
later sounded the death knell of the radical period in mainstream Arab politics, and marked the 
beginning of a new era of political pragmatism. This was clearly exemplified by the ascendance of 
new leaders such as Anwar Sadat in Egypt, and Hafez Assad in Syria, who put less emphasis on the 
role of ideology and made realpolitik a hallmark of their diplomacy in the decade that followed.
By the time the revolt against the monarchy erupted in Iran, the Arab political order was in a 
state of disarray and weakness. The failure to derive any tangible benefits from the limited success 
of the 1973 Arab-lsraeli war, the impasse with the Palestinian issue, the lingering domestic conflict in 
Lebanon, incessant inter-Arab feuding, and Egypt's "defection" with the signing of the Camp David 
accords in March 1979, had thrown the Arabs into total confusion. It was within this context that the
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Iranian revolution occurred.
As a major watershed in the history of the Middle East, the Iranian revolution and unique 
circumstances in the Arab world at the time dramatically altered the course of events in the Middle 
East. The ideology of revolutionary Iran and its new foreign policy posture posed important 
challenges and opportunities for a number of Arab regimes (depending on their structure and 
orientation), particularly Iraq and Syria. Consequently, the interplay between the events unfolding in 
the Arab world and Iran heavily influenced Saddam Hussein's decision to go to war against Iran in 
September 1980. Ironically, what was expected to be a swift Iraqi victory turned into the bloodiest 
and longest war in modem Middle Eastern history. Concomitantly, the conflict transformed the 
emerging Syrian-lranian entente into a formal alliance - probably one of the most durable regional 
alliances - which has lasted to this day, despite all odds and predictions to the contrary.
With the outbreak of the First Persian Gulf War on September 22, 1980, many observers 
expected Syrian President Hafez Assad to join the many other Arab leaders who rallied to aid Iraqi 
strongman Saddam Hussein in his effort to deliver a major blow against non-Arab Iran and blunt the 
intrusive edge of its Islamic revolution.2 At the very least it would have been expected that Assad 
would declare his neutrality, because of the recent rupture in Syrian-lraqi relations and the looming 
possibility of a serious confrontation with Israel in Lebanon, now that Egypt was no longer a frontline 
state. Indeed, Damascus could have opted to avoid having enemies on both its eastern and western 
flanks in view of its precarious regional position. Such expectations were partly based on the 
structural and ideological similarities between Assad's and Hussein's regimes. Both leaders had 
risen to power in military coups orchestrated by the Bath Party in their respective countries, and 
espoused a pan-Arab, socialist ideology. However, to the dismay of many, the war led to the 
consolidation of the emergent Syrian-lranian axis by 1982.
There has been a great deal of debate among scholars and analysts concerning the 
motivations which prompted Damascus and Tehran to seal this so-called "unholy alliance" by the 
spring of 1982. Many observers have reduced the reasons behind this peculiar partnership to one 
primary negative interest, namely their common enmity with Iraq.3 Although there is no doubt that 
their mutual animosity towards Baghdad provided major impetus for the formation of the Tehran- 
Damascus axis, it would be a gross oversimplification to consider their enmity with Bathi Iraq as the 
only important factor which contributed to the development of the Syrian-lranian connection. Careful 
analysis would reveal that, despite their differences and certain discrepancies, the birth of the Syrian- 
lranian entente between 1979 and 1982 can be viewed as much more than an alliance of 
convenience against Iraq.
The purpose of this chapter is to provide an accurate chronology of events, and in-depth 
analysis of the chain of events and the forces which moulded and influenced the beginnings and 
eventual formalization of the relationship between the winter of 1979 and the spring of 1982. It is 
important to note from the outset that Syria's decision to mend fences with Iran after the success of 
the Islamic revolution must be observed through the prism of inter-Arab politics, Assad's leadership 
ambitions, and revolutionary Iran's new foreign policy orientation and ideology.
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SYRIAN-1 RANIAN RELATIONS BEFORE THE 1979 REVOLUTION
Under the Shah, bilateral relations between the two states had been anything but cordial. Despite a 
brief thaw in the mid-1970’s, their relations had fluctuated between outright hostility and cold peace 
throughout much of the 1960's and 1970's. Pahlavi Iran perceived Bathi Syria as a menace in the 
region, due to its close ties with the Soviet Union and its support for radical Arab movements. 
Moreover, Syria's vociferous claims that the Iranian province of Khuzestan (historically and more 
accurately known as Arabestan by the Arabs) was "an integral part of the Arab nation" because of its 
indigenous Arab population, and about the "Arab character4’ of the Gulf, greatly disturbed Iranian 
officials.4 The Shah perceived radical Arab nationalism as a major threat to Iran's regional interests 
and national security.
For Syria's Bathi leaders (who first seized the reins of power in 1963), imperial Iran was a 
primary source of instability in the Middle East, and a dangerous enemy of the Arab nation. They 
resented the Shah's close ties and cooperation with Israel and conservative pro-Western Arab 
regimes. From their perspective, the Shah served as an instrument of American imperialism in the 
region by thwarting Arab aspirations and, more specifically, impeding efforts to liberate Palestine 
from the Zionists.
One of the most striking and recurrent features in the modem history of Syrian-lranian 
relations (since full diplomatic relations were established in 1946) was that the improvement or 
deterioration of bilateral ties was to a significant degree a function of the state of Syrian-lraqi and 
Iranian-lraqi relations, and of the regional environment at the time.5 This was evident in the mid- 
1950's, but became more pronounced following the creation of the United Arab Republic in February 
1958.6 Both Hashemite Iraq, and to a lesser extent Pahlavi Iran, were alarmed by the union between 
Egypt and Syria. King Faisal of Iraq subsequently visited Tehran to resolve outstanding differences 
with the Shah regarding their common borders and other issues. Indeed, Iranian-lraqi relations 
improved noticeably during the period February-July 1958, prior to the overthrow of the Iraqi 
monarchy.7
In July 1960, UAR President Nasser severed diplomatic ties with Iran, after a controversial 
statement made by the Shah at a press conference, indicating that Iran had already recognized 
Israel.8 Therefore, it came as no surprise that, after Syria seceded from the UAR in September 
1961, the Shah welcomed this event and moved to restore full diplomatic relations with the new 
government in Damascus.9 However, following the Bathi seizure of power in Iraq and Syria during 
the period Febmary-March 1963, and the ensuing tripartite negotiations in Cairo in March-April, Iran 
was extremely concerned about the prospect of a union between Egypt, Syria, and Iraq.10 In spite of 
the collapse of this initiative by mid-1963, Iran remained uneasy as the Syrian and Iraqi Bathis 
subsequently initiated steps to create a union between their two countries.11 This process came to 
an abrupt end as the Iraqi Bath was ousted by Abd al-Salam Arif in November 1963.
It is noteworthy that subsequent to the Cairo summit of January 1964, as Baghdad and 
Cairo drew closer and strengthened political and military cooperation, Iraq's relations with Syria and 
Iran deteriorated.12 Both Nasser and Arif were dismayed by the fact that the Syrian Bath seemed to 
be strengthening its grip on power and stabilizing the situation.13 The Syrian Bathis for their part
17
feared being trapped between a "hammer and anvil” and launched an intensive propaganda war 
against Arif.14 In concurrence, the Syrian news media ceased attacks on Iran.15 Damascus seemed 
to have modified its policy towards Tehran in order to avoid needlessly alienating it, in view of the 
emergent Iraqi-Egyptian alliance. Both Damascus and Tehran must have been concerned about the 
visit of the Egyptian Chief of Staff Marshall Abd al-Hakim Amer to Amman in mid-1964 in a bid to 
draw Jordan into the Iraqi-Egyptian orbit.16
Although there was never a marked improvement in Syrian-lranian relations, by 1965 
significant shifts had occurred in the triangle encompassing Syria, Iraq and Iran. As the Shah and 
Arif tried to ease tensions and reach some sort of modus vivendi in the Gulf region, Syrian-lranian 
relations plunged to unprecedented lows as the militant Bathi government of Prime Minister Yusuf 
Zu'ayyin, in an unprecedented move, called for the "liberation" of Arabestan from "Iranian 
occupation" and printed official maps designating it as part of the Arab homeland.17 Iran's riposte 
was to lodge an official protest with the Syrian government and withdraw its ambassador and most of 
its diplomatic staff from the country, leaving only one official representative in Damascus.18
There was a relative improvement in bilateral relations in the aftermath of the June 1967 
Arab-lsraeli war, when Iran's Red Lion and Sun Society (renamed the Red Crescent Society after the 
1979 revolution) sent medical personnel and humanitarian aid to assist Syrian wounded and 
refugees displaced by the fighting.19 While diplomatic relations were upgraded to the charge 
d'affaires level, and trade links improved, there were intermittent tensions. By 1969, the situation 
had degenerated once again as the Syrians uncovered an Iranian espionage network in their 
country, and the number of staff in their respective embassies was reduced.20
During Black September in 1970, as the Jordanian-Palestinian confrontation erupted, 
leading to military intervention by the Syrians and Israelis in Jordan, Iran sent munitions and 
weapons shipments for the Jordanian army.21 In addition, the Shah served as a intermediary 
between King Hussein and the Israelis. Through Iran's good offices, the Jordanian monarch 
obtained guarantees from Tel Aviv that its military intervention was only intended to crush the 
Palestinians and would not aim to destabilize the Hashemite regime.22 Following Hafez Assad's 
successful coup in November 1970, there was no noticeable improvement in Syrian-lranian 
relations. In July 1973, Assad condemned the ill-fated, Iranian-backed attempt by Iraqi Intelligence 
Chief Nadhim Kzar to topple the rival wing of the Bath Party in Baghdad on June 3 0 ,1973.23
Bilateral relations between Syria and Iran improved somewhat during the 1973 Arab-lsraeli 
war and its aftermath. During the conflict, Iran provided logistical, medical and non-military 
assistance to the Arab combatants.24 In the period that followed the war, Iran gave some financial 
assistance and relations warmed up to some degree.25 Less than two months after the cessation of 
hostilities, in December 1973, the process of upgrading relations to the ambassadorial level began 
with a new Iranian ambassador being appointed to Damascus.26 In 1974, as a consequence of 
several ministerial-level exchanges, Iran agreed to provide a US$ 150 million loan and a US$ 50 
million grant to finance a number of industrial and agricultural development projects in Syria.27 High- 
level exchanges between the two erstwhile foes continued, and in 1975 Iran gave an additional US$ 
300 million in loans to Syria.28 The warming of relations between Syria and Iran, and the
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simultaneous deterioration of Syrian-lraqi ties in the period following the 1973 Arab-lsraeli conflict, 
prompted Hafez Assad to undertake his first state visit to Iran in December 1975 to consolidate what 
seemed to be an emerging friendship with the country. He was also determined to prevent being 
outmaneuvered by the Iraqis, who had concluded the Algiers Accord with Iran in March 1975, and 
were in the process of mending fences with their Persian neighbor.29 Assad's four-day state visit 
(December 28-31,1975) paved the way for further ministerial-level exchanges to expand political, 
economic and cultural ties between the two countries.30 However, this process could be best 
described as a limited rapprochement.
In view of the warming of Egyptian-American relations, Sadat's decision to pursue a 
separate peace with Israel, and the Shah's close ties with both Cairo and Washington, Assad had 
hoped to convince the Shah to use his influence in order to convince the Americans to assume a 
balanced approach in their attempts to resolve the Arab-lsraeli conflict. Much to Assad's chagrin, the 
Iranian monarch refused to accommodate his request.31 The Shah instead encouraged Anwar 
Sadat's peace initiative towards Israel32 Consequently, by the late 1970's the rift between Tehran 
and Damascus had become seemingly irreparable. It was therefore quite understandable, when the 
Shah was deposed in February 1979, that Assad considered the change in government to be a 
positive development and deemed it necessary to establish cordial ties with the new revolutionary 
government which seemed sympathetic to the Arab cause and the plight of the Palestinians.
THE SYRIAN EXPERIENCE IN THE REGIONAL CONTEXT
Syria's motivation to establish close links with the new clerical regime can be partially understood 
within the context of the forces at play in inter-Arab and internal Syrian politics. Assad's bitter and 
frustrating experiences in dealing with other Arab states between 1973 and 1979 prompted him to re­
evaluate his regional policies by 1979-1980.33 The Syrians had been outraged by Egypt's betrayal in 
the 1973 Arab-lsraeli war, and her unilateral efforts following the war to work out a separate peace 
agreement with Israel, which eventually resulted in the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian Sinai 
Agreement of September 1975.34 With Egypt out of the picture, the efficacy of any military action on 
the part of the Syrians in response to Israeli aggression was greatly reduced.
Concurrently, in March 1975, Iraq signed the Algiers Accord with Iran, thus resolving the 
border disputes between the two countries, and signifying Baghdad's implicit recognition of Iranian 
superiority in the Persian Gulf region.35 With her eastern borders and her outlet to the Gulf now 
secure, in April 1976, after having failed to reach an agreement over transfer fees with the Syrians 
(for the export of Iraqi oil through the trans-Syrian pipeline), Iraq informed Damascus that she would 
halt her oil-pumping operations via the trans-Syrian pipeline. The Iraqi decision translated into huge 
financial losses for the Syrian regime, which helplessly watched the deterioration of economic and 
political conditions at home, and the decline of its power and prestige abroad.36
Damascus' sense of isolation was further compounded by the evolution of the Saudi-lranian- 
Egyptian axis with the blessing of Washington, Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977, 
and the Camp David Accords in March 197937 Even during the Arab summit held in Baghdad in 
response to the warming Israeli-Egyptian relationship, in an effort to create a united Arab front
19
against Egypt, Syria was left on the sidelines and, to her disappointment, witnessed the formation of
38the Saudi-lraqi-Jordanian entente.
Between October 1978 and July 1979, however, a rapprochement between Syria and Iraq 
seemed to be a distinct possibility.39 The effort for reconciliation was partially motivated by the need 
to forge a credible military alliance to keep Israeli power in check on the western front, thereby 
relieving Syria of some of the pressure, and to bolster the position of Iraq, which was not at ease with 
the chaos and turmoil in neighboring Iran and its potential impact on the Shi'ite population within her 
own borders.40 Nevertheless, the Syrian-lraqi partnership did not materialize. Mutual distrust and 
irreconcilable differences eventually brought the bilateral negotiations to a screeching halt in the 
summer of 1979, when Iraq accused Syria of involvement in a coup attempt to topple the Bathi 
regime in Baghdad, despite Syrian denials 41 Damascus once again found itself isolated and placed 
in a very vulnerable position vis-a-vis Israel and a hostile Iraq. It was therefore no surprise that by 
1979-1980 the betrayals and disappointments of the past had done away with any lingering Syrian 
hope or idea about the wisdom of relying on fellow Arabs42 Hafez Assad subsequently continued to 
cultivate even closer relations with the new revolutionary government in Tehran and watched events 
unravel in Iran with great interest.
THE INITIAL PHASE OF THE SYRIAN-1 RAN IAN RAPPROCHEMENT (FEBRUARY - JULY 1979)
Immediately after the collapse of the monarchical regime, Assad sent Khomeini a telegram on 
February 12, 1979, congratulating him on his triumph over the Shah 43 In the text of his message, 
he praised the "Iranian people's victory," and went on to say;
"We proclaim our support for the new regime created by the revolution in Iran. This 
regime is inspired by the great principles of Islam. The creation of this regime is in 
the Iranian people's greatest interest, as well as that of the Arabs and Muslims."44 
In fact, Syria was the first Arab country to recognize the new regime in Iran45 Countries such as 
Libya, Algeria, South Yemen and the PLO also expressed strong support for the new leadership in 
Tehran. Conversely, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt reacted quite cautiously46 Iraq's foreign 
minister, for example, in reaction to the news of the Shah's overthrow, only went so far as to say that 
"Iran's internal affairs concern the Iranian people only."47 However, it was clear even during the 
winter of 1978-79 that the Iraqi Bath was extremely concerned about the opposition movement in 
Iran, which had assumed a religious character. Baghdad was wary of a Shi'ite revival and its 
potential repercussions on Iraq.48 Even before the toppling of the Pahlavi throne, the Shah's close 
ally King Hussein of Jordan had gone on record by denouncing Khomeini as a heretic49
During the initial weeks after the revolution, Hafez Assad's brother Rifat sent envoys to 
Tehran to discuss possible avenues of cooperation between the two countries, particularly against 
Iraq.50 Tehran followed up on these contacts by dispatching emissaries to Damascus to explore 
various options to lend support to the Iraqi opposition, particularly in the Shi'ite south.51 Rifat Assad, 
who served as commander of the Syrian Defense Brigades (Saraya al-Difa1), apparently was not in 
favor of the Syrian-lraqi unity talks, fearing that they would eventually benefit his leading rival for 
succession to his brother, former air force and intelligence chief Na'ji Jamil, who enjoyed close ties
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with the Iraqi Bath.52
In March, the first senior Syrian official, Information Minister Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad, 
visited Iran, where he met with Ayatollah Khomeini in Qom, and presented him with an illuminated 
Quran as a gift on behalf of Hafez Assad.53 In addition to the fact that bilateral relations between the 
two states started on the right footing, the regional foreign policies of both were strikingly similar. 
Damascus and Tehran perceived and interpreted various regional developments in the same 
manner. This trend reinforced the growing cooperation between the two states. In the case of Iran, 
relations with Arab states which had enjoyed close relations with the ancien regime (i.e. Morocco, 
Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Iraq) gradually deteriorated. Conversely, Arab governments and 
movements which had adopted a hostile stance towards the Shah began to seek favour with 
revolutionary Iran. Close ties were cultivated with the Polisario Front, Libya's Muammar Qadhafi and 
Shi'ite movements in both Iraq and Lebanon.54 It also came as no surprise in eariy May when 
Ayatollah Khomeini instructed the foreign ministry to severe diplomatic ties with Egypt, "bearing in 
mind the treacherous treaty between Israel and the Egyptian Government's unreserved obedience to 
the USA and Zionism."55
Syria also found itself with few reliable allies as events unfolded in eariy 1979. With Egypt 
out of the equation in the Arab-lsraeli conflict, the Syrians had initially pinned their hopes on the 
unification scheme with neighbouring Iraq. Indeed, some progress was made towards the 
implementation of the unity scheme in the winter of 1978-79. However, by April 1979, it had 
become clear that the leadership of the two rival wings of the Bath had quite disparate visions about 
what unification would entail. As progress in the negotiations became painfully slow and finally 
ground to a halt, Assad subsequently began to give careful consideration to the next viable option - 
an alliance with Iran in order to outflank Iraq, bolster Syria's position vis-S-vis the Gulf Arab 
sheikhdoms, and strengthen its hand among the Lebanese Shi'ites.
Following the referendum on the future form of government in Iran, Assad sent another 
message to Khomeini congratulating him on the fact that the Iranian people had finally achieved 
their aspirations. He also expressed confidence that bilateral relations between the two states would 
continue to grow and flourish, both on the official and the mass level.56 The rapprochement between 
the two sides during the spring and summer of 1979 coincided with a marked deterioration in Iran's 
relations with Iraq and the Gulf Arab states. While Tehran encouraged the Iraqi Shi'ite population to 
defy the government in Baghdad, Iraq also conducted a wide range of activities to support 
centrifugal forces on the periphery of Iran, including Kurdish and Arab movements that demanded 
autonomy or independence from the Iranian state. By the late spring, a major insurrection had 
broken out in Iranian Kurdistan, while in the oil province of Khuzestan (Arabestan) local resistance 
movements had begun to mount opposition against the regime, attacking oil installations and 
government facilities. The Iraqi Bath did its utmost to encourage the unrest in these regions in order 
to pin down Iranian security forces, thereby weakening the Iranian state and, in parallel, augmenting 
Iraqi power and influence in the Gulf region.
One should note that Iraq's strategy was not entirely an offensive campaign. In reality it was 
partially a defensive response, designed to neutralize and deter Iranian interference in Iraq's
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domestic affairs by levelling the playing field. By June 1979, the propaganda war between the two 
states was also in full swing. The press and news media on both sides denounced each other. 
While Tehran tried to portray the Iraqi leadership as unbelievers belonging to a Takriti clique," 
Baghdad's propaganda machine described the clerics as "turbaned shahs" who still held on to the 
traditional pre-revolutionary beliefs of Persian racial superiority and the need to expand Iran's 
"lebensraum" in the Gulf region at the expense of the Arabs.
In an editorial which appeared on June 14 in the Iraqi daily Al-Thawrah (The Revolution), 
the author severely criticized the theocratic regime in Tehran and belittled the past achievements of 
Persian civilization, by arguing that:
"...Throughout thousands of years, Persia was liberated from the tyranny of 
emperors only twice. The first time by the Muslim Arabs, who bravely fought 
Anoushiravan, defeated his army and demolished his empire - which was built on 
tyranny and corruption - and spread Islam, the religion of right and justice, in Persia.
The second time the Iranians were able to rid themselves of their tyrannical 
emperor, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, they were only able to do so through Islam - 
for whose advancement and spread among nations, including the Persian nation, 
primary credit should go to the Arabs."57 
As eariy as June of that year, Tehran radio's Arabic service called on the Iraqi people to unite and 
topple the tyrannical regime which was oppressing them.58 In addition to Tehran's "official" policy 
towards its Arab neighbors, various statements made by some prominent clerics who had no official 
capacity within the regime further tarnished Arab-lranian relations. The most notable instance 
occurred at a press conference in Qom on June 15, when Ayatollah Sadeq Rouhani declared that 
Bahrain was an integral part of Iran. His statement provoked a strong reaction throughout the Arab 
world.59 Baghdad and Cairo in particular sharply condemned it. By July, Iran's relations with Iraq 
and many of the other conservative Arab states had degenerated to such a degree that two 
distinguishable camps with conflicting positions on Iran had already crystallized in the Arab world. 
The battle lines of the Persian Gulf War had already been drawn.
Before looking at the numerous developments in Syrian-lranian and Arab-lranian relations in 
the year preceding the outbreak of the Gulf War, it is necessary to present a brief overview and 
analysis of Iran's new foreign policy after the toppling of the Pahlavi throne, and the Syrian reaction 
thereto.
THE NEW ORIENTATION OF IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY AND THE SYRIAN RESPONSE
Once in power, the new regime in Tehran followed up on the policies of Prime Minister Shahpour 
Bakhtiaris government (during the last 37 days of the imperial regime), which broke off diplomatic 
relations with Israel and South Africa, withdrew from the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO), and 
announced that Iran would no longer assume the role of the West's policeman in the Gulf. With 
respect to the Arab-lsraeli conflict, Tehran turned over the former Israeli embassy to the Palestine 
Liberation Organization as an expression of its solidarity with the Palestinian cause.60 Iran not only 
became an enemy of Israel, but also identified with the position of the Steadfastness Front.61
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In light of Iran's new political posture and Egypt's banishment from the Arab fold, Syrian 
officials argued that the loss of Egypt to Israel could be offset by forging an alliance with Persian 
Iran. From their viewpoint, nurturing an Arab-lranian friendship would strengthen the Arab camp. 
Despite the absence of Egypt, a powerful new ally like non-Arab Iran would enhance the ability of the 
Arab states to undermine Israeli power in the region.62 Moreover, they claimed that the loss of Iran 
had been one of the greatest setbacks suffered by the West and Israel since the rise of Nasser in 
Egypt almost a quarter of a century earlier. For the Arabs to merely sit back and not to exploit this 
new opening would be foolhardy.63
Besides the change in Tehran's foreign policy posture, the Iranian authorities took 
substantive measures to harmonize public opinion within the country with the state's new political 
orientation on the international level. In contrast to the Shah who had tried to propagate a 
chauvinistic ideology by glorifying Iran's pre-lslamic history and endeavoured to purify Persian 
culture by ridding it of outside influences (particularly Arab), the revolutionary regime attempted to 
downplay Iran's Persian heritage and instead emphasized her Islamic character. Systematic efforts 
were undertaken by the Iranian authorities to stress the commonality of interest, history and culture 
between Persians and Arabs within the framework of the Islamic ummah (community).64 This 
particular trend, for example, was reflected in the increase of Arabic language instruction and Arab 
studies in the curriculum of schools and universities.65 In addition, some Iranian officials stated that 
the Persian Gulf should be called neither "Persian" nor "Arabian," but instead should be referred to 
as the "Islamic" Gulf.66 Furthermore, Iranian Foreign Minister Karim Sanjabi made statements to the 
effect that the provisional government of Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan would reconsider the fate 
of the three Gulf islands (the Greater Tunb, the Lesser Tunb and Abu Musa) occupied by Iran since 
November 1971, and would possibly turn them over to the United Arab Emirates. Politically, Iran's 
new-found flexibility on issues pertaining to the Gulf and its security were part of an overall effort to 
warm up to the Gulf Arab states. From an ideological perspective, according to the Islamic 
universalist approach, it was argued that territorial disputes and names of bodies of water should not 
drive a wedge between Muslim peoples, regardless of their nationality.
Thus, the Syrians tried to convince their fellow Arabs that the Islamic revolution provided "a 
unique opportunity to end the historic Arab-Persian animosity" and bring Iran into the Arab camp.67 
On the other hand, they knew quite well that, if the Arabs took a hostile stance towards Iran, there 
was a distinct possibility that Tehran would renew its links with Tel Aviv and Washington.68 They 
realized that Iran's revolutionary ideology contained both internationalist and indigenous ideas which 
were incompatible; on the one hand an Islamic universalist ideology, and on the other, Iranian 
nationalism influenced by Ithna Ashari (Twelver) Shi'ism. Historically, these two contending factors 
presented a major dilemma to Iran's policymakers. Like other revolutions which occurred within a 
specific national and international context, the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic could be 
interpreted as the product of a dialectic between Iran's strong affinity with the Arabs due to the 
Islamic faith versus Iranian nationalism, which differentiates her from her Arab neighbors.69
However, many Arab states, including Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt, and Iraq in particular, 
felt threatened by the vitriolic rhetoric emanating from Tehran, and consequently did not share
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Syria's enthusiasm for the Iranian revolution. They did not see the revolution as a historic 
opportunity to end the Arab-lranian rift, but rather as an event which could spark domestic unrest in 
the neighbouring states and threaten regional stability. As it turned out, Iranian-lraqi relations for 
instance were marked by tension and distrust from almost the very beginning.
It is important to note that the failure of the Syrian-lraqi unity talks corresponded in time with 
the emergence of the Islamic Republic in Iran. In fact, the 1979 Iranian revolution sharpened the 
already existing antagonisms and introduced new stumbling blocks on the path towards a Syrian- 
lraqi reconciliation. On almost every issue concerning Iran, whether jt was the Shah, Khomeini, 
Shi'ite fundamentalism or Arab-lranian relations, Damascus and Baghdad had conflicting views. 
While Iraqi-lranian relations had steadily improved under the Shah between 1975 and 1979, Syrian- 
Iranian ties had deteriorated in the same time period. During the 1970's, Syria had provided safe 
haven to the Shah's opponents, while Iraq had expelled Khomeini upon the Shah's request in 
October 1978.70 Assad welcomed the Shi'ite awakening in the Middle East after the Iranian 
Revolution, while Baghdad on the other hand feared that Iran would incite the restive Shi'ite 
population in southern Iraq to rebel against it.71
Overall, while Syria considered revolutionary Iran as a powerful new ally of the Arabs in the 
struggle against Israel, Iraq viewed her as a major threat to the security of the eastern flank of the 
Arab world and the sheikhdoms of the Gulf.72 During 1979-1980, Syria and Iran drew closer to one 
another, Iraq on the other hand distanced herself from the two and assumed a more militant posture 
vis-d-vis Iran as tensions between the two states escalated.
THE EMERGENCE OF THE SYRIAN-IRANIAN ENTENTE AND THE ROAD TO WAR (AUGUST 
1979 -AUGUST 1980)
A month after the collapse of the Syrian-lraqi negotiations amid accusations of Syrian involvement in 
the alleged coup attempt, Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam was dispatched to Iran as 
part of a major diplomatic initiative to expand relations between the two states. Khaddam held talks 
with Iranian Foreign Minister Ebrahim Yazdi and Prime Minister Mehdi Bazargan on increasing 
political and economic cooperation between the two countries.73 He also met with Ayatollah 
Khomeini in Qom, where he declared that Iran's Islamic revolution was "the most important event in 
[our] contemporary history."74 He proudly stated that Syria had assisted the forces which participated 
in the Iranian revolution "prior to its outbreak, during it and after its triumph."75 In the context of the 
Arab-lsraeli conflict and Egypt's defection from the Arab camp, he pointed out that the revolution 
was considered to be a positive "step in restoring the balance in the area against the Zionist 
enemy."76 Furthermore, in subsequent meetings between Syrian Information Minister Ahmad 
Iskandar Ahmad and his Iranian counterpart, Dr. Minachi, it was agreed that the Syrian news agency 
(SANA) would set up an office in Tehran and, similarly, Iran's Pars news agency (later renamed 
IRNA) would open up an office in Damascus.77
Just as Syria had begun to make serious overtures towards Iran, the latter also responded 
positively to the Syrian initiative, in light of the rapid deterioration of Arab-lranian relations in the Gulf 
region. Tehran gradually began to put greater emphasis on its friendship with Damascus. The
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growing tensions in the Gulf were to a large extent an outgrowth of the escalating crisis between Iran 
and Bahrain.
The Deterioration of Iranian-Gulf Arab Ties and the Syrian Mediation Effort 
Although the appointment of an Iranian ambassador to Manama had allayed Bahraini concerns 
somewhat, the detention of a prominent Bahraini Shi'ite cleric, Muhammad Ali al-Akari, upon his 
return from a visit to Iran, sparked demonstrations and unrest. Iran responded by accusing Bahrain 
of persecuting its Shi'ites and demanded the immediate release of all political detainees. The 
escalating cycle of tensions continued with Iran (intentionally or inadvertently) conducting naval 
maneuvers in the Gulf, which Bahrain interpreted as muscle-flexing on Iran's part. By September, 
Saudi Arabia had dispatched two army brigades to the island at Manama's request. Ayatollah 
Rouhani himself subsequently added more fuel to the fire by warning the Emir of Bahrain that, 
unless oppressive measures were discontinued against the people, Iran would encourage the people 
of Bahrain to demand unification with the Islamic Republic of Iran.78
Iran's behavior drew harsh criticism from different comers of the Arab world. In addition to 
sharp words from Bahrain and Kuwait, as a sign of things to come, the Iraqis and Egyptians were 
only too happy to denounce Iranian behavior and express their readiness to protect Arab interests in 
the Gulf region. In fact, Egyptian Vice-President Hosni Mubarak stated that Egypt was prepared, 
upon request, to provide military support to Bahrain or any other Arab state which was the victim of 
foreign aggression.79 Iran in turn lashed out, accusing Baghdad and Cairo of blowing the matter out 
of proportion in order to justify their efforts to fill the vacuum left by the Shah as the new policeman 
in the Persian Gulf.
The ongoing debate and power struggle between pragmatic and radical elements within the 
Tehran government over whether to export the Islamic revolution or to pursue the goals of the 
revolution at home had a direct impact on the country's foreign relations. Iran's neighbors especially 
were disturbed rather than soothed by the mixed signals emanating from Tehran. Coupled with 
historical Arab-Persian and Sunni-Shi'ite prejudices, the stage was gradually being set for a full-scale
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war. The Kuwaiti and Iraqi news media at the time accused Iran of using religion as a front to 
establish a new Persian Empire, and create schisms among the Sunni and Shi'ite Arabs in the 
area.81
Although Iran's image was becoming sullied in much of the Arab world, Syria and other 
members of the Steadfastness Front maintained their loyalty to the Iranian revolution. In 
September, Foreign Minister Yazdi stopped off in Damascus on his way back for the Non-Aligned 
Movement (NAM) summit in Havana. In his meeting with Hafez Assad, he extended an invitation to 
the Syrian leader to visit Iran in the near future.82 This was followed up by the visit of Iranian Deputy 
Prime Minister Dr. Sadeq Tabatabai in early October to discuss the rift between Iran and its Arab 
neighbors. After meeting with Assad and other senior officials, he explained at a press conference 
that revolutionary Iran's foreign policy was based on the principle of non-interference in the affairs of 
its Arab neighbors. However, Iran would not sit idly by in the event of a conflict between the Arabs 
and Israel.83 With regard to Bahrain, he emphasized that neither Ayatollah Khomeini nor any Iranian
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official had ever made any statements claiming Bahrain to be part of Iran. He went on to attack 
Egyptian President Anwar Sadat as a traitor to the Arab cause, who was attempting to fan the fires of 
hatred in the Gulf in order to re-enter the Arab fold in a circumspect manner. Tabatabai also held 
discussions with the Grand Mufti of Syria, who praised the Iranian revolution, stressed the need for 
Islamic unity and declared that there was no difference between Sunnis and Shi'ites.84
In order to defuse the situation in the Gulf, which Iraq and Egypt were using to their full 
advantage, a few days later, Tabatabai, accompanied by Syrian Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim 
Khaddam, flew to Manama to seek an audience with the Emir of Bahrain, Shaykh Isa Bin Salman Al- 
Khalifah. In Bahrain, they held a joint meeting with the Emir, the prime minister, the foreign minister 
and the heir apparent (who also held the post of defense minister).85 Despite the joint Syrian-lranian 
initiative to calm tensions, and subsequent Syrian claims that their mediation efforts had succeeded 
in bridging the differences between the Gulf Arabs and Iran, relations between the two sides 
continued to be uneasy.86
In the meantime, Iraqi-lranian relations sank to new depths in the autumn of 1979. A cycle 
of mutual recriminations, continuous border clashes, incessant interference in the affairs of the other, 
and calls for the overthrow of the other regime, led to the closure of Iranian consulates in Basra and 
Karbala and the Iraqi consulates in Khorramshahr and Kermanshah.87 However, the growing 
tensions with Iraq were temporarily eclipsed by a major confrontation with the United States, after the 
seizure of the US embassy in Tehran by Islamic militants on November 4,1979.
Iran's Confrontation with the United States and Iraq, and Syria's Role 
In the immediate aftermath of the embassy take-over, Syria declared its support for the Iranian 
action, and called on the other Arab states to throw their weight behind Iran. The Syrians went so far 
as suggest that the Arab League take up the issue at its summit meeting in Tunis in late November. 
Foreign Minister Khaddam stated that "the Iranian revolution gave appreciable help to the 
Palestinian cause and it is normal that it should be backed by the Arabs."88 Libya also demanded 
that the Arab League take up the issue of the Carter administration's freezing of Iranian assets in US 
banks and challenge it. However, the Arab League's foreign ministers rejected the Libyan request 
outright89 A flurry of diplomatic activity followed in the meantime. Iran's new foreign minister, 
Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, held extensive talks with Syrian ambassador Ibrahim Yunis on ways to 
broaden the scope of political and economic cooperation between the two countries, while an Iranian 
delegation was dispatched to Tunis to galvanize Arab support for Iran's case against the United 
States. The Iranian representatives subsequently held a series of meetings there with Syrian 
President Hafez Assad, Lebanese Prime Minister Selim Hoss, PLO Chairman Arafat, Libyan Foreign 
Secretary Jallud, and the Algerian delegation.90 Once again only Syria and Libya were at the 
forefront, demonstrating their solidarity with Iran. On November 26, a joint Libyan-lranian statement 
was issued in which the two sides confirmed the need for "Arab-lranian fraternity" and its 
development and consolidation for the good of the Arab and Iranian nations. Moreover, the two 
parties reiterated their commitment to Islamic and Arab liberation movements in "their struggle 
against colonialism, imperialism and Zionism."91 This was followed a few days later by an official
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Syrian government statement emphasizing its support for the Iranian cause and expressing concern 
about the American naval build-up in the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea in response to 
the hostage crisis. Concomitantly, another Iranian delegation led by Dr. Mohammad All Hadi was 
dispatched to various foreign capitals to win Arab backing for Iran's position. The delegation's first 
stop was Damascus, where it held meetings with Assad and Khaddam.92
Two days before the arrival of the Iranian delegation in Damascus, Brigadier-General 
Mohammed al-Khouli, the Chief of Syrian Air Force Intelligence (also Director of Special Operations 
in the Middle East, and a close aide of Hafez Assad) am'ved in the Iranian capital. While in Tehran 
he delivered a message from Khaddam and held extensive talks with Sadeq Ghotbzadeh.93 
Moreover, according to Western intelligence reports, during his visit the two sides entered into a 
secret agreement to conduct joint covert operations against Iraq in order to destabilize Saddam 
Hussein. Al-Khouli held discussions with several of Ayatollah Khomeini's advisers. Apparently, the 
main outcome of the meetings was closer collaboration between the Syrian and Iranian intelligence 
services to assist the activities of the Shi'ite opposition in southern Iraq. In the course of his 
meetings and deliberations, it was agreed that Ayatollah Montazeri's son would serve as the main 
liaison with Damascus on the anti-Iraq operations. Immediately after al-Khouli's visit, two Syrian 
intelligence teams were dispatched to Iran to establish a permanent base of operations.94
The harmonization of Syrian-lranian policies in November and December coincided with the 
erosion of Iran's relations with its two most important Arab neighbors, Saudi Arabia and Iraq. In late 
November, when Saudi Shi'ites in the oil-rich Hasa province tried to hold ceremonies 
commemorating the holy day of Ashura, banned by the authorities, clashes occurred with security 
forces which led to a number of deaths. The incident sparked demonstrations and unrest throughout 
the province. Saudi authorities quickly rushed in twenty thousand troops to restore order. Although 
the Shi'ites had traditionally been a repressed minority in the Saudi kingdom, having been the 
victims of discrimination and poor treatment, and therefore having a legitimate grievance against 
Riyadh, the evidence suggests that Iranian clerics such as Ayatollahs Khalkhali and Rouhani were 
trying to encourage Shi'ite opposition against Riyadh as the Saudis charged.95 Iran subsequently 
denounced the "barbaric repression" of the Shi'ite minority as clear proof of the tyrannical and 
ferocious nature of the Saudi regime.96
In the midst of continuous border clashes between Iran and Iraq, and repeated statements 
by senior officials on both sides calling for the removal from power of their rivals across the border, 
on November 1, Iraq's ambassador to Lebanon held an interview with the Lebanese daily Al-Nahar in 
which he bluntly stated that, as far as Iraq was concerned, relations with Iran could only improve if 
Tehran agreed to revise the 1975 Algiers Accord (relinquishing joint sovereignty over the Shatt al- 
Arab), granted the Kurdish, Arab, and Baluchi minorities in Iran autonomy, and withdrew from the 
Tunb and Abu Musa islands in the Persian Gulf97 His comments prompted a swift response from 
Tehran, which accused Baghdad of serving the goals of Western imperialism by refusing to 
participate in the Steadfastness Front against Israel and the unity scheme with Syria.98 Iran also 
moved in November to restore full diplomatic relations with another of its staunch Arab allies, Libya. 
The ties between the two had been severed nine months earlier due to Iranian suspicions that
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Muammar Qadhafi had been responsible for the disappearance of the prominent Lebanese Shi'ite 
cleric, Ayatollah Musa Sadr."
It is worth mentioning that, within a three-week period during the month of December, 
unidentified gunmen (in all probability Iraqi-backed) twice attacked Syrian diplomatic representations 
in Tehran. In the first instance, they attacked the Syrian consulate general, and in the second, they 
assaulted the Syrian ambassador's residence. In the latter incident at least one Iranian 
Revolutionary Guard assigned to the premises was shot.100
As 1980 commenced, further unrest in the Hasa province of Saudi Arabia, an intensive 
propaganda campaign orchestrated by Iran against the House of Saud, and the realization by both 
Baghdad and Riyadh that Iran's revolution posed a direct threat to their national security prompted 
both sides to coordinate their policies more closely. This in turn led to further attacks on both 
regimes in the Iranian news media, portraying the Saudi-lraqi rapprochement as part of a grand 
strategy masterminded by the West to safeguard their interests in the Gulf region in the absence of 
the Shah.101 Relations between Iraq and Saudi Arabia had grown more cordial since the Baghdad 
summit of November 1978. Moreover, the failure of the Syrian-lraqi unity scheme in mid-1979 and 
Iran's provocative behavior in the area had given additional impetus to the reconciliation between 
Saddam Hussein and King Khaled.102 As early as November 1979, there were reports that Saudi 
Arabia and Iraq had begun secret negotiations to create a collective security arrangement in the Gulf 
region. During the course of these talks, Riyadh seems to have given its approval for the stationing 
of Iraqi forces in Bahrain and Oman, to prevent any unrest instigated by Iran and serve as a 
springboard for military action against the latter.103 Before the Iranian revolution, Iraq had been 
perceived to be the primary revisionist power in the area, bent on upsetting the existing status quo. 
With the toppling of the Pahlavi throne, and the emergence of a revolutionary regime in Tehran, the 
general view among the Arab sheikhdoms was that Saddam Hussein had now assumed the Shah's 
mantle as the guarantor of the status quo in the Gulf.104 Tehran for its part did not shrink from any 
opportunity to denounce the Saudi royal family as puppets of the United States and the Iraqi Bath as 
atheists who adhered to a godless ideology.
The Iraqi Propaganda War and Syria's Utility for the Islamic Republic 
The marked deterioration in Arab-lranian relations was accompanied by a very gradual change in 
Iraqi propaganda against the Islamic Republic. While the Iraqis had previously concentrated on 
tarnishing the image of the clerical regime by portraying them as "turbaned shahs,” by early 1980 
subtle changes could be noticed in the statements of Iraqi officials. The leadership in Tehran was 
described as un-lslamic, and the rivalry between Iran and Iraq was presented as an extension of the 
age-old conflict between Persians and Arabs. Between January and September 1980, an 
unmistakable transformation occurred in Iraqi propaganda, attacking not only the Iranian regime, but 
also Persians as a whole. Therefore, on the ideological level, Iraqi propaganda made it imperative 
for Iran's ruling clerics to cultivate close ties with as many Arab states as possible, particularly those 
that would enable her to counter the Iraqi challenge and also facilitate Iranian participation in the 
Levant in the Arab-Muslim confrontation against Israel. Using the aforementioned criteria, and in
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light of Tehran's warm relations with Damascus, Syria was the ideal candidate.105
In an interview with the Paris-based Al-Watan al-Arabi, in response to Iranian denunciations 
of the Iraqi Bathi as not only being reactionary, but also un-lslamic, Saddam Hussein stated that it 
would be erroneous for the Iranians to think that there was any sort of contradiction between any 
genuine Islamic revolution and an Arab revolution. He posited that The mere supposition or 
expectation that such a conflict or contradiction is inevitable makes the Iranians the enemies of the 
Arab nation."106 Just over a week later, on February 8, Saddam Hussein issued his Pan-Arab 
Declaration, in which he advocated close collaboration among the Arabs against foreign enemies 
and stressed the need for all Arab states to support an Arab country when it is engaged in war 
against a non-Arab entity.107 By the spring, all indications seemed be that Baghdad had come to the 
inevitable conclusion that war with Iran was the only viable option to neutralize the Iranian threat and 
assert its position in the region, especially in the Gulf and vis-a-vis Syria. The Iraqi leadership had 
by then become extremely sensitive to the attitude of other Arab countries towards the Iranian 
revolutionaries, interpreting any Arab sympathy for the clerical regime as betrayal of the greater Arab 
and Iraqi interests.108 Syria on the other hand continued to cultivate strong ties with Tehran (in spite 
of the increasing disillusionment with its policies among the majority of its Arab neighbors). The 
Syrian position was articulated by senior officials such as Information Minister Ahmad Iskandar 
Ahmad, who stressed in an interview that "We appreciate the role of the Iranian revolution and we 
are establishing the closest possible relations with it in various fields...We believe that establishing 
good relations with the Iranian revolution and supporting that revolution so it can settle down and 
devote time to help the Arabs liberate their occupied territories is the duty of every Arab who 
believes that Israel and US imperialism are the danger to be faced."109 Even in light of Iran's 
increasing isolation due to the continuation of the hostage crisis and the imposition of economic 
sanctions, the Syrians seemed adamant in preserving their ties with Iran and, if the opportunity 
arose, to help resolve the dispute with the United States.110
By mid-March, Iraqi-lranian relations had sunk to new depths, as both countries were forced 
to reduce their embassy staffs upon the request of the host government and their ambassadors were 
declared persona non grata. Consequently, relations were reduced to the charg§ d'affaires level.111 
Baghdad blamed Iran for an attempt on the Iraqi foreign minister's life on April 1, and from then 
onwards Iraqi statements assumed a distinctly racist tone. For example, in a speech about the 
incident, Saddam Hussein for the first time drew parallels between the hostilities with Iran and the 
battle of Qadisiyah between the Persian Sassanid and Arab armies 1,400 years ago.112 
Furthermore, a subsequent political commentary described Khomeini as having a distorted 
understanding of Islam and utilizing it against the Arabs to achieve "racist, decadent, and Shu'ubi" 
objectives. It went on to accuse him of wanting to dominate the Arabs and avenge a 1,400-year-old 
Persian inferiority complex. It continued to say that Khomeini wanted to "kill all that is neither 
Persian or Islamic in his devious fashion.Js a racist lunatic. Were Khomeini's regime in a position to 
begin [this] war, it would not hesitate to do [so], despite its consequences...They are sick with their 
Persianism."113 The intensification of the propaganda war coincided with an outright statement of 
solidarity with Iraq by Jordan's King Hussein, and a visit by the Jordanian Chief of Staff to Baghdad
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to assess the military situation.114
These events were concurrent to a meeting between Khomeini and Syria's ambassador to 
Iran, Ibrahim Yunis, who conveyed a message of support for Iran from Hafez Assad. Khomeini for 
his part asked for Syrian cooperation with Iran in its struggle against imperialist and anti-lslamic 
forces, such as the United States and Iraq.115 The escalating tensions between Iran and Iraq 
manifested themselves in different ways throughout the region. In Lebanon, armed clashes began to 
occur periodically between the Shi'ite Amal militia and the pro-Iraqi Arab Liberation Front and 
elements of the Lebanese Bath Party sympathetic to Iraq (for further details on Syrian-lranian 
cooperation in Lebanon see the next chapter).116
In the aftermath of the failed attempt to rescue the American hostages, which resulted in the 
death of eight US servicemen, the Syrian government was quick to condemn the action as "an act of 
piracy aimed against Iran and its people."117 Following the debacle in the Iranian desert, the Syrian 
regime received Iranian Foreign Minister Sadeq Ghotbzadeh, on the first leg of an Arab tour to win 
support for Iran. Ghotbzadeh met with Hafez Assad, Abd al-Halim Khaddam and Rifat Assad. He 
briefed them on the details of the US rescue attempt and other regional developments. During his 
meeting with the Syrian leader, the latter reiterated his support for Iran's stance against Washington 
and Tel Aviv.118 According to diplomatic sources, another topic that was high on the agenda was the 
growing tension between Iran and Iraq and the need for further Syrian assistance.119 Following two 
days of talks, a joint communique was issued condemning the American operation as a clear 
violation of the territorial integrity, independence and sovereignty of Iran, which posed a threat to 
international peace and security.120 In a subsequent press conference, on May 1, Khaddam 
criticized the American onslaught on Iran, emphasizing that any effort directed against the Iranians 
would be considered to be against the Arabs also. He accused Washington of trying to impose its 
will on the Arab world.121
By the middle of the spring, Syria had commenced a major airlift of Soviet-made arms to 
Iran. The purpose of these shipments was to replace Iran's stocks of Western-supplied arms, which 
were rapidly becoming depleted, and also to assist Iran in military operations on the frontier with Iraq. 
Syrian Antonov An-12 cargo planes ferried the arms, which were taken from Syria's own stockpiles, 
to Iranian airfields. The weapons included 23-mm anti-tank guns, mortars, artillery pieces, anti-tank 
missiles, anti-aircraft missiles and ammunition. Damascus had apparently agreed to provide military 
assistance during a secret visit by a personal representative of Iranian President Abolhassan Bani- 
Sadr in April. The emissary had submitted to Assad a detailed list of weapons, ammunition, spare 
parts and medical equipment which Iran urgently needed to counter a possible Iraqi attack. In 
addition to the arms airlift, Syrian military personnel were sent to Iran to train and familiarize Iranian 
troops with the military equipment.123
Syria's Quest for Regional Allies and Inter-Arab Politics
Besides the mutual enmity with Iraq, Syria also had its own reasons for cultivating close ties with 
Iran. Syria's relations with Saudi Arabia and Morocco markedly deteriorated in mid-1980. The 
recognition of the Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (RASD) at the Tripoli meeting of the
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Steadfastness and Confrontation States greatly disappointed the Saudi and Moroccan monarchs. 
The Saudis were also alarmed by the growing friendship between Iran and Syria which, in light of the 
poor state of Iranian-Gulf Arab relations, enabled Syria to play its "Gulf card" in the arena of inter- 
Arab politics. Damascus on the other hand was livid about Saudi Crown Prince Fahd's statements 
on Riyadh's willingness to undertake efforts to bring about a settlement of the Arab-lsraeli conflict 
within the framework of UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, thereby in effect undermining 
the PLO and Syrian positions.124
The motives behind Syrian policy at the time were both defensive and offensive. With 
Egypt out of the picture in the Arab-lsraeli conflict, the possibility of an alliance with Iraq ever more 
remote, and Saudi and Iraqi ambivalence on the Camp David Accords, Assad had decided to bolster 
his position in the Levant and the Gulf by allying himself with Khomeini's Iran. From his perspective, 
a Syrian-lranian axis in the region would strengthen his hand, thereby providing him with the 
necessary leverage to deal with Baghdad, Riyadh and Tel Aviv from a position of strength.125
Another bone of contention between the Syrians and the Saudis was the Tripoli conference's 
recognition of South Yemen as a confrontation state. Much to the Saudis' chagrin, the Syrians 
subsequently went as far as saying that any attack on South Yemen would be interpreted as an act 
of betrayal against the Palestinian cause. In this case, Assad's main intention was to highlight the 
importance of friendship between Aden and Moscow in order to irritate the Saudis and Iraqis. Riyadh 
for its part disapproved of Syrian efforts to push the Soviets center stage as the Arabs' loyal patron. 
Furthermore, it viewed the prospects of an emergent Syrian-lranian-South Yemeni entente with deep 
consternation. By August, several operating axes had appeared in the Middle East, a Saudi-lraqi- 
Jordanian axis, a Syrian-lranian-Palestinian axis, a Syrian-Soviet-South Yemeni axis and an Omani- 
Egyptian-American axis.126
After the expulsion of the Syrian ambassador and his staff from Baghdad on August 18, and 
Damascus' retaliation in kind three days later, Syrian-lraqi relations reached a nadir.127 Surprisingly, 
the marked deterioration provided Syria with another opportunity to diversify its relations and seek a 
new ally when Muammar Qadhafi sent a message to Saddam Hussein and Hafez Assad pleading 
for a reconciliation between the two Bathi regimes and unity in the Arab world.128 In early 
September, Damascus responded to the Libyan call in a positive manner by proposing a union 
between Syria and Libya instead. This eventually resulted in an official state visit by Assad to Libya, 
where the two leaders held extensive talks which culminated in the Declaration of Unity. According 
to the declaration, the two states would take simultaneous steps towards the formation of a single
129political entity mled by a single executive body and revolutionary command.
Qadhafi's decision to call for a union between the two states was motivated primarily by 
political considerations, while in Assad's calculations the merger was intended to bring certain 
economic benefits. The Libyan leader desired to legitimize finally his dubious claim that his country 
was a confrontation state. Since the signing of the Camp David Accords between Israel and Egypt, 
he had consistently argued that nothing stood between Israel and Libya. Syrian-Libyan unity seemed 
to be an effective method to lend some credibility to his position. From Assad's viewpoint, the 
alliance meant that he would be able to secure Libyan petrodollars to finance his amis build-up to
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check Israeli power. Qadhafi, after all, had promised after Camp David to foot the bill for $1 billion in 
Soviet-made arms for the Steadfastness Front. Moreover, the union with Libya should translate into 
a reliable source of oil for Syria, which no longer considered it prudent to rely on Iraq and Saudi 
Arabia, due to the poor state of relations with those two countries. Both parties also believed that a 
union between them would strengthen their bargaining position with Moscow, thereby enabling them 
to convince the Soviets to upgrade their military assistance to the new state.130
Following the Declaration of Unity, the Iranian government expressed its support for the 
alliance and its willingness to cooperate with this new united front against Israel and the supporters of 
Camp David.131 On September 11, Iranian Prime Minister Masood Raja'i sent messages to Assad 
and Qadhafi conveying his pleasure at their moves towards unity, and hoping that they would 
support the Iranian revolution and other progressive movements against foes such as "the
139bloodthirsty Iraqi Bathi regime." Baghdad on the other hand ridiculed the Syrian-Libyan unity 
attempt, stating that it would inevitably fail, since the two parties were not sincere in their unionist 
intentions. The Iraqi media also denounced Damascus and Tehran as enemies of Arabism and 
criticized them for their support of the Amal militia in Lebanon.133
Iraq for its part was also engaged in intensive diplomatic maneuvering and consultations 
with its prospective allies during this period, as it prepared to go to war with Iran. During the summer 
of 1980, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz held secret negotiations in Jordan and Saudi Arabia with 
US officials and informed them of Baghdad's preparations to invade Iran in the autumn. In view of 
the abysmal state of US-lranian relations at the time, the US expressed no objections to the Iraqi 
plan.134 Subsequently, in early August, Saddam Hussein flew to Taif, where he conferred with the 
Saudi monarch and informed him of his decision to invade Iran.135 The following month, the Iraqi 
leader received the Bahraini Prime Minister, Shaykh Khalifah bin Salman Al-Khalifah, and later on, 
the Qatari foreign minister. Both expressed their support for Iraq's policies in the Gulf and 
condemned Iran's behavior. Finally, on September 17, Saddam Hussein convened an extraordinary 
session of the Iraqi National Assembly, where he announced the abrogation of the 1975 Algiers 
Accord with Iran, thus setting the stage for the invasion of Iran five days later.136
SYRIA AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
A few days before the Iraqi invasion, Iranian President Bani-Sadr dispatched a special envoy to 
Damascus to seek diplomatic and military assistance. Bani-Sadr, who had come to the conclusion 
that a full-scale conflict with Iraq was imminent, asked for public statements supporting Iran's 
position, additional arms, and for Syria to hold manoeuvres on the Iraqi border to divert Iraqi forces 
from the eastern front. After prolonged talks and consultations, the Syrian leader refused to make 
any public statements explicitly supporting Iran or to conduct military exercises in the east, for fear of 
the political repercussions it would have on the regime, both domestically and regionally. However, 
Assad agreed to resume arms shipments to Iran as soon as possible. Within a few days after the 
war empted, the Syrians began to airlift weapons, medical supplies and teams of ordnance experts 
and physicians to Iran. The arms shipments consisted primarily of Sam-7 ground-to-air missiles,
137Sagger anti-tank missiles and RPG-7 anti-tank rockets.
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Immediately after the hostilities began, most Arab leaders declared their support for Iraq, 
most notably King Khaled of Saudi Arabia who stated that his country stood "with Iraq in its pan-Arab 
battle and its conflict with the Persians, the enemies of the Arab nation."138 In Amman, an 
emergency meeting of the Council of Ministers was convened by King Hussein, who subsequently 
released a statement urging a unified Arab stand in support of "fraternal Iraq." Only Libya's 
Muammar Qadhafi and PLO chairman sent messages to both Baghdad and Tehran expressing 
regret and pleading for an end to the war, since it only served US and Israeli interests.139 Although 
Syria remained silent, Assad had telephone conversations with the Saudi and Jordanian monarchs 
on the 25 of September, hoping to find a way to stop the hostilities as soon as possible. He 
subsequently sent Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara to Taif to confer with King Khaled. However, all 
indications seem to point to the fact that the mission was in vain.140
Despite significant Arab support for Iraq, Baghdad had committed three major mistakes 
when it decided to initiate a full-scale war. It not only miscalculated its own military capability and the 
resilience of its revolutionary foe, but also failed to secure its western flank by mending fences with 
Damascus before setting out to deal with Iran. Assad's hopes for a ceasefire and a quick end to the 
fighting had been dashed; however, the spectre of a triumphant Iraq prompted him to take drastic 
measures to help avert an Iraqi victory and ensure Iran's ability to fight on. The Syrian regime feared 
that, if Iraq decisively defeated Iran, it would come under direct threat from Baghdad. Furthermore, 
a victorious and confident Iraq would be in a favourable position to openly assist the Syrian Muslim 
Brethren and challenge Syrian interests in the region.141
While the war did not produce any new alignments, it did serve as a catalyst to crystallize 
the already emerging rival camps, thus polarizing the Arab world even further. The most important 
axes in the early phase of the conflict were the Syrian-lranian-Libyan axis and the Saudi-lraqi- 
Jordanian axis. In the case of the former, Syria proved to be Iran's most valuable ally, while Jordan 
played an extremely critical role in aiding the Iraqi war effort. Amman, for example, allowed Iraqi 
military aircraft to be stationed in Jordanian airbases out of harm's way. The Mafraq airbase in 
eastern Jordan was in effect handed over to the Iraqis.142 Jordan also put its Aqaba port facilities at 
the disposal of the Iraqis and mobilized a fleet of trucks and transport vehicles to take the cargo to 
Iraq.143 Furthermore, in early October a 40,000-strong Jordanian force was reportedly moved to the 
Jordanian-lraqi border, ready to intervene in the Gulf war if the need arose.144
Syria for its part remained silent about the war during the first two weeks, anxiously waiting 
to see if Iran would survive the Iraqi onslaught. However, by the first week of October, once it 
became clear that Iran had absorbed the initial blow and was rolling with the punches, Damascus 
finally broke its silence and condemned the Iraqi invasion, calling it "the wrong war against the wrong 
enemy at the wrong time."145 Baghdad's attempts to portray the conflict as an Arab-Persian war and 
a defense of the Arab homeland against the "fire-worshipping racist Persians" were severely 
criticized.146 Assad himself in a speech made a thinly veiled attack on Saddam Hussein's "hollow 
heroics” and highlighted the fact that Syria had the "capacity to inflict fierce punishment" on 
impostors.147 Damascus claimed that fighting Iran would cause divisions in Arab ranks and divert 
their attention needlessly at a time when they should concentrate their energies against the true
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enemy, Israel.148
According to an article that appeared in the Syrian daily AI-Bath on October 5, "fighting the 
Iranian revolution would only make Iran join the camp against the Arabs." It went on to say "we want 
Iran to join the Arab ranks which are hostile to imperialism and Zionism, we want Arab Iraq to remain 
an additional strength for Arabs against imperialism and Zionism, and not against the Iranian 
revolution."149 It clearly stated that the war was neither in the interest of Iran nor Iraq and the Arab 
nation.
Iraq in the meantime continued its intensive propaganda barrage against Syria, accusing the 
latter of betraying the pan-Arab cause by sending troops and weapons to Iran. Despite Iraqi claims 
that Syrian and Libyan soldiers were captured in the fighting, no convincing evidence was ever 
produced.150 Baghdad's campaign to discredit its neighbour prompted Syrian Assistant Foreign 
Minister Nasir Qaddur to summon the Iraqi charg§ d'affaires in Damascus on October 6 to lodge a 
formal protest against the Iraqi accusations.151
Two days later, Assad flew to Moscow to conclude a Friendship and Cooperation Treaty with 
the Soviet Union. The signing of the agreement with Moscow reflected his strategy to bolster his 
position in the region (particularly vis-&-vis Israel and Iraq) by securing Soviet military and economic 
assistance and bringing his superpower patron in on the side of Iran.152 Upon concluding the treaty, 
Assad and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev issued a joint communique indirectly rebuking Iraq by 
supporting "Iran's inalienable right to determine its destiny independently and without any foreign 
interference."153 During their negotiations, arrangements were made to have Soviet arms delivered 
to Iran. The Kremlin also gave its approval for the shipment of Soviet-made arms from Syria, Libya 
and other countries to Iran. Subsequently, Iranian military transport planes began continuous flights 
to Syria and Libya, carrying Soviet-made weapons back to Iran.154 Iranian air force Boeing 707's, 
727's, 747's and Lockheed C-130's flew to Damascus and Tripoli, carrying arms and ammunition 
back to Iran. Furthermore, some of the C-130's brought Iranian casualties to Damascus airport to be 
treated in Syrian hospitals.155 The Syrians played a critical role in maintaining the flow of arms from 
various Arab states to the Islamic Republic. Soviet-made equipment from Libya was shipped by sea 
to Syrian ports, where it was then transhipped by land via Turkey.156 Algeria also commenced amis 
transfers to Iran in May 1981, after having decided to aid the Iranian war effort. These weapons 
were first sent by ship to the Syrian port of Tartus, where the cargo was unloaded and subsequently 
flown to Iran.157
Besides providing war material, the Syrians became a valuable source of intelligence on 
Iraq's capabilities and intentions. The Syrian ambassador to Tehran, Ibrahim Yunis, assiduously 
relayed any useful intelligence to Iranian officials, and was also used as a conduit of information by 
Moscow.158 In order to improve coordination of the joint Syrian-lranian effort to stem the Iraqi 
onslaught, General Ali Aslan, the Syrian Deputy Chief of Staff and Head of Operations, travelled to 
Iran to confer with his Iranian counterparts. He discussed the military situation with the Joint Chief of 
Staff, General Valiollah Fallahi, and General Javad Fakuri, the Defence Minister and Air Force 
Commander. As part of their overall effort to aid Iran, the Syrians agreed to try to procure American-
159made spare parts in Europe for Iran's western-equipped arsenal.
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The war very quickly brought the rifts in the Arab world into sharper focus and deepened the 
already existing cleavages. Relations between members of the pro-Iraqi camp and Iran's other 
valuable Arab ally, Libya, dramatically deteriorated in 1980. Muammar Qadhafi was quick to criticize 
Riyadh's decision to permit a US military presence (specifically AWACS early-warning aircraft) in the 
Kingdom, and to side with Iraq in the war. In a telegram addressed to King Khaled, he stressed that 
it was "an Islamic duty for [them] to be allied with the Muslims in Iran in this confrontation in order to 
face the crusade instead of fighting them in place of America."160 On October 11, Baghdad severed 
its diplomatic ties with Damascus and Tripoli, accusing them of having erected an air bridge to 
Tehran, supplying the "Magi racist clique" with arms to continue their aggression against Iraq. The 
Iraqi foreign ministry declared the Syrian and Libyan embassy staff persona non grata, giving them 
48 hours to leave Iraq. A statement released by the foreign ministry stated that the rulers of the two 
countries were devoid of any Arabism.161
Interestingly, both Syria and Libya denied providing military assistance to Iran even after the 
Iraqi announcement. There is no doubt that Assad and Qadhafi were well aware and sensitive about 
the public mood, both within their countries and in the Arab world, with respect to the Gulf war. In 
their riposte, the Syrians accused Saddam Hussein of serving US interests by launching the war, 
characterizing it as Saddam's "crazy and condemned war against revolutionary Iran and against its 
principled stand with the Arabs."162 Qadhafi's sermons for the "liberation" of Mecca from American 
occupation prompted Riyadh to break off diplomatic relations with Tripoli in late October. The 
Saudis warned Qadhafi to stay out of their internal affairs and (instead of supporting Iran) to remain 
neutral or side with Iraq in the war.163 The intense inter-Arab squabbling in October clearly 
demonstrated that the Arab world was more divided than ever. The eruption of the Gulf War alone 
was not cause enough for two mutually hostile camps to emerge but, with the plethora of other 
politically divisive issues that were confronting the Arabs, the conflict caused even the most ardent 
pan-Arabists to rid themselves of any illusion of existing Arab unity.
While Jordan and Saudi Arabia threw their weight behind Iraq, Iran with the assistance of 
Syria tried to secure as many regional allies as possible. In late October, Prime Minister Raja'i 
visited Algeria and Libya on his way back from a trip to the United Nations in New York. On October 
30, Ayatollah Montazeri, Khomeini's designated successor, met with the Syrian, Libyan and Algerian 
diplomatic heads of mission in Qom, where he expressed "gratitude for the Islamic and revolutionary 
stance adopted by [these] fraternal states and their support of Iran's Islamic revolution."164
Despite Amman's and Riyadh's efforts to assist Baghdad on the diplomatic, economic and 
military front, the Saudi-lraqi-Jordanian axis proved inadequate to meet all of Iraq's military needs 
and requirements. Baghdad eventually had to succumb and compromise its pan-Arab stand by 
dispatching a military delegation to Cairo to secure spare parts and ammunition for its Soviet-made 
arsenal, which was rapidly becoming depleted.165 The marked deterioration of Iranian-Gulf Arab 
relations following the Islamic revolution and the outbreak of the First Gulf War had finally provided 
the Egyptians with a back door not only to gradually improve Iraqi-Egyptian relations but, more 
importantly, to re-enter the Arab political arena.
Similarly, the Syrian-Libyan-lranian axis failed to meet many of Tehran's expectations as far
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as military assistance was concerned. While the Syrian armed forces possessed a Soviet-made 
arsenal, the Iranian military establishment which the clerical regime had inherited from the Shah was 
mainly equipped with American-made arms. Secondly, there were limits to the amount of military 
hardware with which Syria could provide its Persian ally, since its own security situation necessitated 
the deployment of troops along the Golan Heights against Israel, in Lebanon and within Syria itself, 
at a time when the Muslim Brethren were escalating their campaign of terror against the Bathi 
regime in Damascus. Thirdly, the deployment of troops along the Syrian-lraqi border to ease Iraqi 
military pressure on revolutionary Iran was bound to evoke a harsh response from many Arab 
capitals.166 Therefore, Iran was also forced to compromise its political stance by approaching Israel 
for spare parts and equipment to maintain its Western-equipped armed forces. However, while Tel 
Aviv may have made temporary inroads by re-establishing contacts and influence in Tehran, 
Egyptian collaboration in the Iraqi war effort was to have a far greater and lasting impact on inter- 
Arab politics.
Despite certain limitations in Syria's ability to assist Iran militarily, it played an instrumental 
role in preventing the formation of a united Arab front against Iran in November 1980, by provoking a 
major diplomatic crisis and military confrontation with Jordan in the period leading up to the Arab 
summit meeting which had been scheduled to begin in Amman on November 25.
The Syrian^Jordanian Confrontation and the Amman Summit
By the autumn of 1980, Syrian-Jordanian relations had reached a nadir due to differences on a 
whole range of critical political issues. The Syrian Bathi regime was fighting for survival against an 
unrelenting campaign orchestrated by the Muslim Brethren with the aid of Iraq and Jordan.167 In 
addition, with a new American administration scheduled to take office in two months, Jordan's King 
Hussein intended to resuscitate the Middle East peace process by positioning himself in a politically 
advantageous position in order to convince Washington to include the Hashemite kingdom in a new 
peace initiative.168 The Syrians on the other hand, who were still Infuriated by Sadat's defection, 
were intent on preventing such a development, which would further sideline them and weaken their 
position. Iraq's invasion of Iran also drove a wedge between the two states, as Jordan very quickly 
became Saddam Hussein's staunchest supporter in the conflict while Syria lent valuable assistance 
to Iran, albeit in a discreet manner whenever possible.
With the domestic confrontation with the Brethren coming to a head, and Jordan's intention 
to use the Arab summit scheduled to begin in Amman on November 25 to rally support for its 
position in the Gulf war and the Middle East peace process, Damascus set out to thwart the 
Jordanian monarch's efforts, utilizing any possible means on every possible front. Shortly after the 
beginning of the Gulf War, Hafez Assad authorized the Chief of Syrian Military Intelligence, General 
Ali Duba, and the Head of Air Force Intelligence, General Mohammed Al-Khouli, to intensify their 
campaign to subvert the Iraqi regime, and also start targeting Jordanian officials in retaliation for their 
support for the Syrian Brethren.169 Furthermore, in mid-November, the Syrians sponsored the 
formation of a united front of Iraqi opposition groups committed to the overthrow of the rival Bathi 
regime in Baghdad. The grouping, named the National Democratic and Patriotic Front in Iraq (Al-
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Jabhah Al-Wataniyah Al-Qawmiyah Al-Dimuqratiyah Fi Al-lraq) consisted of dissident Iraqi Bathists, 
the Iraqi Communist Party, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, the Arab Socialist Movement, the 
People's Liberation Army Organization and the Democratic Independent Movement.170 The Front's 
charter reflected the diverse goals of its members, such as improved relations with the Soviet Union 
and Iran, autonomy for Iraqi Kurdistan, democratic reforms in Iraq and active participation in the 
struggle against Israel.171
Two weeks before the Amman summit, Damascus made known its reluctance to attend the 
meeting when Foreign Minister Khaddam urged the Secretary-General of the Arab League, Chedli 
Klibi, to postpone the conference. Khaddam warned that at a time of many "disputes and deep 
divisions" among the Arabs the holding of a summit meeting would be futile, since it would only 
underscore the "failure and fragmentation" of the Arab nation.172 Iran also demonstrated its 
displeasure with Jordan's stance and conduct in the Gulf war when the secretary and spokesman of 
the Supreme Defense Council announced that Tehran had decided to reduce its diplomatic relations 
with Jordan from the ambassadorial level to the chaigS d'affaires level.173 Two days later, on 
November 17, Syria and Iran's other ally, PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat, embarked on a tour of 
several Arab countries to persuade them to support Syria's position on the postponement of the 
Amman summit.174
Concomitantly, Iraq's other Arab ally, Saudi Arabia, reacted swiftly in order to prevent the 
political gulf among the Arabs from widening even more by dispatching its foreign minister, Prince 
Saud Al-Faisal, to Damascus. Upon his arrival he held talks with Assad and Khaddam, trying to 
convince them to drop their request for the postponement of the summit meeting.175 However, the 
Saudi foreign minister was not successful in swaying the Syrian leadership, which subsequently 
exacerbated the situation even more by accusing Jordan of mistreating Syrian citizens at border 
crossings between the two states. Tensions were further heightened by a series of incidents in which 
a member of the Syrian Muslim Brethren was assassinated in Amman, and by the apprehension and 
execution of the two killers by Jordanian authorities.176
Foreign Minister Khaddam nonetheless travelled to Amman on November 18, to participate 
in a plenary meeting of Arab foreign ministers and to set the agenda for the summit meeting. 
However, the discussions degenerated into a verbal confrontation when the issue of postponing the 
summit was put forth. The meeting apparently came to an abrupt end amid confusion and sharp 
exchanges between Syrian and Iraqi representatives. Khaddam, adamant that inter-Arab 
differences should be resolved during the foreign ministers' meetings before the commencement of 
the actual summit, warned "if this summit takes place over our objections, it may be the last summit 
held by the Arab League."177 He explained that "unless the present Arab situation were treated 
seriously, it was difficult to imagine the summit achieving anything and its convocation might be a 
catastrophe."178 He later added: "we want to purify the Arab atmosphere and to achieve a concerted 
Arab situation, capable of confronting the challenges threatening the Arab nation from Zionism and 
imperialism... There can be no talk of our participation in the summit before the purification of the 
Arab atmosphere."179
Syrian officials then held a joint strategy session in Damascus with representatives from
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Algeria, Libya, South Yemen and the PLO, and journeyed to Amman to persuade other Arab foreign 
ministers to postpone the conference. The Syrians announced that they wanted comprehensive 
talks on all inter-lslamic disputes, such as the Gulf war and their differences with Iraq, before the 
summit convened. If their demands were not met, they would boycott the conference. 
Subsequently, the PLO stated its intention to follow suit if other members of the Steadfastness Front 
also refused to participate.180 Damascus requested that a smaller-scale summit be held in an Arab 
capital other than Amman. The Syrian request evolved from the fact that there were serious 
differences of opinion among the Arab foreign ministers over the exact agenda of the conference. 
King Hussein's primary purpose was to win a general Arab endorsement for Iraq's war effort. Assad 
on the other hand was determined to restrict the agenda to inter-Arab economic cooperation and the 
conflict with Israel.181
In the meantime, as tensions mounted between Syria and Jordan, Iran also undertook a 
serious initiative to lobby members of the Steadfastness Front to back the Syrian position. In 
conjunction with the Syrian effort, the Speaker of Parliament, AN Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, 
travelled to Algeria and Libya, where he held discussions with government officials. On November 
23, two days before the summit, he flew to Damascus for talks with Syrian leaders.182 The next day 
Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, Lebanon and the PLO announced their intention to boycott the 
Amman summit. Their decision dealt a serious blow to the prestige and plans of King Hussein. 
Furthermore, Syria had clearly succeeded in its attempt to demonstrate that it possessed veto power 
over Arab League deliberations.183 The PLO's decision to stay away from the conference further 
undermined the Iraqi-Saudi-Jordanian gambit to create a pan-Arab front not only against Iran, but 
also against Israel. The absence of Syria, Lebanon and the PLO, three of Israel's major adversaries, 
and other members of the Steadfastness Front underscored King Hussein's failure to push forth his 
agenda, and the fact that the Arabs were in the midst of one of their most serious political crises in 
over a decade.184 In the words of one observer, "the withdrawal of the Syrians and their allies 
reduced the Amman summit conference to little more than a rump session." Syrian Information 
Minister Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad boasted that without Syria and the PLO the conference was 
meaningless.185 King Hussein had hoped to derive benefits for his solid backing of Iraq, which he 
perceived as the emerging dominant power in the Middle East.186 Although Jordan's goal of drawing 
up a joint Arab strategy against the "Zionist entity and the Persian enemy" had been gravely 
compromised, thereby forcing the participants to concentrate on a joint Arab economic development 
policy, Assad did not stop there.187
Early on, Assad had decided to avoid the Arab summit for fear of being castigated by the 
majority of the participants as "un-Arab" for siding with Persian Iran, and "un-lslamic" for defending 
the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (a price he had to pay for consolidating his friendship with 
Moscow). Moreover, he refused to sit at the same table with two of the Syrian Muslim Brethren's 
major supporters, King Hussein and Saddam Hussein.188 Five days prior to the beginning of the 
summit, Assad ordered the deployment of the 1st Syrian Armored Division near the town of Daria, 5 
kilometers from the border with Jordan. As the summit approached more armoured units were 
gradually dispatched to the area. By the second day of the summit, some 20,000 troops and 400
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tanks had been deployed.189 Once the build-up was confirmed, the Jordanians quickly reacted by 
moving the 12th Mechanized Division, stationed in the northwestern region bordering Syria and 
Israel, eastward to counter the Syrian concentration. As a precaution, the 5th Armored Division 
based northeast of Amman was moved 16 kilometers north to the border to cover the 12th's right 
flank. Once both sides had completed their deployments, some 24,000 Hashemite troops were 
facing more than 30,000 Syrians.190 In order to intimidate the Jordanians further, Syrian warplanes 
crossed into Jordanian airspace and overflew the Mafraq airbase in the northeastern part of the 
country.191
Referring to the looming crisis, King Hussein declared during the summit that, if necessary, 
his country would utilize all possible means to defend "every last inch of its territory" against Syrian 
aggression.192 On the last day of the summit, in his concluding address at the conference, King 
Hussein rebuked Assad for his actions by stating that "...an Arab must not support a non-Arab in a 
dispute with another Arab brother. It is a shame indeed that Iraq, which is fighting to regain both 
Arab rights and its own rights and sovereignty over its territory and waters on the eastern flank of the 
Arab homeland, is stabbed in the back by an Arab hand."193 He went on to warn that "we must all 
stand against this, for it establishes a new and dangerous trend for the first time among the Arab 
states. This can bring us damaging consequences."194 Damascus immediately lashed out by 
denouncing the Jordanian monarch's comment, and threatened to attack Syrian Muslim Brethren 
camps which it alleged had been set up inside Jordan.195
The imminent threat of hostilities between Jordan and Syria was enough to prompt Riyadh 
to send Prince Abdullah, the Kingdom's Deputy Prime Minister and Commander of the National 
Guard, as a mediator to defuse the crisis on November 30. After several rounds of talks in 
Damascus and Amman, in early December, Prince Abdullah announced that the Syrians had agreed 
to commence a gradual withdrawal of forces, which was completed by the middle of the month.196 
Amman also ceased its sabre-rattling and dispersed its troops. Although the Saudis claimed credit 
for ending the showdown, it is extremely doubtful that Assad ever wanted to go to war. In all 
fairness, however, Saudi efforts did facilitate the easing of tensions and made it easier for both
• 197parties to climb down the ladder of escalation in a face-saving manner.
The Impact of the Persian Gulf War on Syrian-lranian Relations
The Syrian-Jordanian confrontation was a poignant example of Assad's willingness to take extreme 
measures - almost going to the brink of war to derail the diplomatic efforts of Iraq's staunchest Arab 
ally. Syria's instrumental role in convincing six key Arab players to stay away from Amman and 
military intimidation of the host were undoubtedly appreciated by Tehran. The failure of the Arab 
participants to take decisive steps to resolve inter-Arab feuds exacerbated or produced by the Gulf 
War was greeted with a sigh of relief from the Iranians. On all levels, political, military and 
ideological, Syria's moves and the outcome of the summit represented a major gain for the 
Damascus-Tehran axis. Moreover, the outcome of the events demonstrated to an unprecedented 
degree that non-Arab actors now could play a role in the arena of inter-Arab politics. By the end of 
1980, the Syrian-lranian-Libyan axis had become as much a part of the Middle Eastern and Arab
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political landscape as the Saudi-lraqi-Jordanian camp confronting it.
The continuation of the hostilities between Iran and Iraq consolidated certain trends in Arab- 
lranian relations and introduced new ones. Fear of Iran's brand of Islamic fundamentalism and a 
sense of Arab solidarity prompted Jordan, Egypt and the Gulf Arab states to throw their weight 
behind Iraq.199 Conversely, the war facilitated the transformation of the Syrian-lranian 
rapprochement into a formal alliance.
At a time when many of her Arab neighbors were overtly siding with Iraq and the situation at 
the warfront was anything but favorable, Iran clearly valued her friendship with Syria. Besides 
Damascus' vital role in brokering the Iranian military resupply effort, Tehran considered it a necessity 
to cultivate a close friendship with the Syrian Arab Republic in order to prevent the formation of a 
hostile Arab union against Iran. Iranian policymakers feared the possibility of regional isolation.
They furthermore realized that strong ties with Syria would add a whole new dimension to Iran's
200foreign policy, enabling her to play a more active role in inter-Arab affairs.
Indeed, the maintenance and expansion of cordial relations with as many Arab states as 
possible was of utmost importance, in order to depolarize the situation and dispel any notion that the 
Gulf War was an extension of the historical Arab-Persian conflict.201 This particular objective was 
also of great ideological significance to Iran's religious leaders, who firmly believed that an alliance 
with Syria would lend some credibility to their claim that revolutionary Iran was at the forefront of all 
progressive and anti-imperialist movements internationally, regardless of their national or religious 
character.202
In the aftermath of the Amman summit crisis, Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad Ali Raja'i, 
in an official statement, expressed his gratitude for Syria's unwavering support of the Iranian 
revolution and described bilateral relations between the two states in very favourable terms. It is 
interesting to note that on the subject of the Syrian Muslim Brethren's aims and activities, he 
condemned them as "a gang which masqueraded under the guise of religion and was supported by 
the Jordanian and Iraqi regimes."203
A series of events in the early months of 1981 drove Damascus and Tehran even closer 
together and made the strengthening of bilateral relations a primary goal of both Syrian and Iranian 
diplomacy. In the midst of a brief hiatus in the Syrian-Jordanian confrontation (December 1980 to 
January 1981), Assad travelled to Tripoli to explore avenues for closer collaboration with Qadhafi. 
However, by early February the Syrians came to the bitter realization that their hopes for a union with 
Libya had been dashed. Qadhafi, having buttressed his position through substantial Soviet arms 
deliveries and recent military gains in Chad, demanded the dissolution of the Syrian Bath Party and 
its replacement with Libyan-style popular committees.204 For the leadership in Damascus, with the 
memory of the dissolution of the Syrian Bath and the painful experience of union with Nasserite 
Egypt still in their minds, this was one pill that they refused to swallow for the sake of so-called 
"unity." Thus, relations between Tripoli and Damascus cooled to some degree.
Concomitantly, a second crisis erupted in Syrian-Jordanian relations when twenty armed 
men belonging to a Syrian-backed Palestinian group called the Eagles of the Revolution 
Organization succeeded in abducting the Jordanian charge d'affaires in Beirut, Hisham Moheisen,
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after a thirty-minute gun battle with security forces, which resulted in the deaths of at least two 
Jordanian embassy guards and the wounding of three others, including Lebanese gendarmes.205 
Amman was quick to accuse Assad's brother Rifat and Syrian military intelligence of the kidnapping. 
This incident had been preceded five days earlier by the arrest in Jordan of a team of Syrian agents 
who were planning to assassinate Prime Minister Mudar Badran. Amman made the plot public only 
after the incident in Beirut and once again implicated Rifat Assad206 By the end of the month the 
propaganda war between the two sides was in full swing, with the Syrian press even calling for the 
overthrow of the Hashemite monarchy.207
Iran's relations with several Arab countries also took a turn for the worse during this period. 
In January, Tehran finally severed its diplomatic ties with Amman and Rabat because of their pre- 
Iraqi stance in the Gulf war and at the Islamic summit in Taif208 Saudi-lranian relations also 
deteriorated the following month when Iran accused Riyadh and Kuwait of collusion with Baghdad by 
agreeing to boost their oil production to 1.8 million b/d in the run up to the invasion of Iran to aid the 
Iraqi war effort. Moreover, there were reliable reports that Saudi ports had been used to ship some 
100 Soviet-made T-54/55 tanks to Iraq.209 Subsequently, Iraqi First Deputy Prime Minister Taha 
Yasin Ramadan flew to Saudi Arabia to discuss the Gulf war and Saudi-lraqi ties with King Khaled. 
During his visit, Riyadh publicly reiterated its support for the Iraqi position.210 In late February, an 
Iranian delegation headed by Jalaleddin Farsi arrived in Damascus and held talks with its Syrian
911counterparts.
The growing sense of regional isolation and the imperative to forge closer bilateral links was 
driven home in Tehran and Damascus, and compounded in early April, after revelations about the 
extent of Iraqi-Egyptian military cooperation in the Gulf war. After months of repeated denials by 
Egyptian officials, President Anwar Sadat admitted that an initial agreement worth $100 million had 
been reached in December between the two parties. Under the terms stipulated in the agreement, 
some 4 thousand tons of ammunition, spare parts, missiles and rockets were delivered to Iraq, while 
another 8 thousand ton shipment was being prepared to be sent eventually via Jordan.212
The Raid on Al-Walid
Probably the most notable instance of Syrian-lranian cooperation against the Iraqi war effort in the 
early stages of the conflict occurred in the spring of 1981. On April 4, eight Iranian F-4 Phantom 
fighter-bombers took off from Nojheh (formerly Shahrokhi) airbase near Hamadan. The aircraft 
carried full payloads of bombs. Their mission was to attack the Iraqi military and petroleum complex 
at Al-Walid (also known as H-3), which consisted of four installations.213 This was the first such raid 
against Al-Walid, which had not been the target of any Iranian air attacks so far, unlike all other Iraqi 
airbases. The base was in the westernmost region of Iraq, situated only 50 kilometres east of the 
Iraqi-Jordanian border (just west of the town of Al-Rutbah).214 Up until then, the base had been 
effectively out-of-range for Iranian aircraft. The main significance of Al-Walid at the time, which 
made it a high priority target, was that it was the home base for the bulk of the Iraqi strategic bomber 
force (Tupolev TU-16 Badgers, TU-22 Blinders) and transport aircraft (llushyin ll-76's, Antonov An- 
12's)215 During the initial phase of the war, the Iranian air force had succeeded in achieving air
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superiority by launching an intensive air campaign against Iraqi airbases and flying air superiority 
missions. Unable to make effective use of its bombers, and fearing their destruction at bases in 
eastern Iraq, the Iraqi High Command had moved them to Al-Walid out of harm's way, to be utilized 
later at an opportune moment.
In order for the Iranian warplanes to reach Al-Walid, during the planning of the operation, the 
Syrians agreed to allow them to fly through Syrian airspace, where they would be refuelled in the air 
on both legs of the mission by Iranian air force Boeing 707 and 747 tankers. The Iranian Phantoms 
flew at low altitude over Iraqi airspace near the Turkish border, attempting to evade Iraqi radar, 
crossing then into Syria and proceeding southwest towards the Iraqi panhandle, where they re­
entered Iraqi airspace flying at low levels to escape detection. The attack succeeded in catching the 
Al-Walid defenses off-guard.216 During the course of the attack some forty-six Iraqi aircraft were 
destroyed on the ground217 After discharging their payloads they returned to Iran by flying the same 
route back. Apparently, one of the Phantoms was damaged by Iraqi anti-aircraft fire during the raid. 
It was forced to make an emergency landing at a Syrian airbase near Dayr al-Zawr, where the two-
518man crew was taken back to Damascus, and from there back to Tehran.
The raid on Al-Walid was significant in several respects. Militarily, in a single stroke, Iran 
was able to annihilate most of Iraq's strategic bombers without incurring any losses. Furthermore, 
the loss of the aircraft meant that in one operation approximately 15-20% of the Iraqi air force had 
been destroyed. Politically, the attack demonstrated the lengths to which the Syrians were willing to 
go to assist the Iranian war effort against Iraq, without directly involving their own military personnel 
in an attack on a fellow Arab country. The operation would not have been feasible without Syrian 
collaboration. The raid on Al-Walid was a one time shot, since the Iraqis quickly learned from their 
mistakes and took the necessary precautions to guarantee that they would never again incur losses 
on such a magnitude. However, both militarily and politically the raid was extremely important and 
an impressive feat, one which has been often ignored or downplayed in Arab and Western circles, 
because of the authoritarian nature and unpopularity of the Syrian Bathi and Iranian clerical regimes.
Stalemate, Power Struggle in Tehran, and Regional Developments
By the spring of 1981, despite some sporadic fighting and occasional incidents such as the Al-Walid 
raid, the situation at the warfront had reached an impasse. The Iraqis were unable to make any 
further advances and were now trying to consolidate their gains from the initial offensives in late 
1980. Iran had attempted an ill-conceived offensive in January to push the Iraqi forces back, but the 
operation turned out to be a disaster because of the political bickering between Iranian President 
Abolhassan Bani-Sadr and the radical clerics of the Islamic Republican Party (IRP), as well as Iraqi 
military preparedness.219 During the spring and summer the political power struggle between the two 
factions intensified, halting military operations at the front and curtailing important diplomatic 
initiatives while the future course of Iran's revolution was being fought out in Tehran among the 
leadership.220
Irrespective of the political power struggle, the continuation of the war led to extensive 
cooperation among members of the pro-Iraqi bloc in the Arab world, and further Iranian efforts to
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preserve close relations with its Arab allies, particularly Syria and Libya. In April, Saudi Arabia and 
Kuwait announced that they had agreed to lend Iraq $6 billion for the reconstruction of war-ravaged 
areas. This seems to have been part of a larger $14 billion aid package put together by the Gulf 
Arab states.221 The pro-Iraqi bloc continued to be very critical of Iran and its main Arab allies, Syria 
and Libya.
In the aftermath of the Al-Walid raid, numerous reports were circulated in the Arab and 
Western media about a secret agreement between Syria and Iran on the conduct of the air war 
against Iraq. According to the reports, during a secret visit by the Iranian defense minister to 
Damascus, an understanding was reached to put Syrian airfields at the disposal of Iranian warplanes 
to conduct raids into Iraq, and for Syrian MiG-23 aircraft to provide close air support for Iranian 
planes on bombing missions222 Overall, these reports seemed somewhat suspect. The evidence 
indicates that Syrian airbases were used by Iranian warplanes on some occasions, although it is 
highly improbable that Syrian warplanes provided support for the Iranian air force sorties inside Iraqi 
airspace, since in the event that a Syrian plane had been shot down, it would have had enormous 
repercussions for the Assad regime at home and in the Arab world. Furthermore, with the exception 
of Al-Walid, most of Iraq's airfields were located in the eastern part of the country along the Tigris- 
Euphrates valley, much closer to the Iranian border. It would make very little sense for Iranian 
warplanes to take a longer route from Syria without escaping detection to raid Iraqi military 
installations in the east. The only plausible case would be for Iranian warplanes to use airbases in 
northeastern Syria, near the adjoining Turkish-lraqi border, to attack Iraqi strongholds in Iraqi 
Kurdistan.223
Syria's continued support for Iran, and incessant Arab criticism of its stance and conduct in 
the Gulf War at a time when the Syrian Muslim Brethren were intensifying their campaign within the 
country, meant that Iranian officials occasionally, albeit somewhat reluctantly, also had to take a 
stand on the unrest in Syria by making public statements expressing their "wholehearted solidarity" 
with Hafez Assad. The Iranian state-controlled media in general refrained from providing any 
coverage of the events in Syria.224 In late April the leader of the Islamic Republican Party, 
Jalaleddin Farsi, told a SANA correspondent that the IRP could not condone the actions of the 
Syrian Brethren against the Syrian Bathis at a time when Assad was trying to confront imperialist 
agents in the region such Israel,Egypt and Jordan. Farsi praised Syria's ardent support of the Iranian 
revolution against the Iraqi aggression.225
Despite the mutual animosity of both Tehran and Damascus towards Baghdad, this did not 
prevent them - at least officially - from paying lip-service and condemning the Israeli raid on the Iraqi 
nuclear reactor site at Osiraq on June 8, 1981. In a public statement, Iranian President Bani-Sadr 
posited that "the uncompromising opposition to the Iraqi regime and the brave and intense battle with 
the aggressor does not stop the Muslim nation of Iran from seriously condemning the airstrike by 
Israel."226 Concomitantly, the Syrian Foreign Ministry issued a statement declaring that "the Syrian 
Arab Republic was not taken by surprise by the criminal operation suffused with treachery and rancor 
which was carried out by the Israeli air force against the Iraqi center for generating nuclear energy for 
peaceful purposes."227 However, Iran's relations with most of its Arab neighbors remained tense.
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The situation was further exacerbated by Iranian air attacks into Kuwaiti territory in mid-June, which 
the Iraqi media were quick to depict as part of the "Zionist-Persian" conspiracy, in light of the Osiraq 
raid and the appearance of various press reports about Israeli arms shipments to Iran, and their 
public denunciation by Iraqi and Jordanian officials throughout this period.
Furthermore, in mid-June a heavy earthquake struck the town of Golbaf in the Kerman 
region, resulting in serious loss of life and extensive damage. Syria, along with Algeria, responded 
by sending food and medical supplies for the victims. Assad also sent a message of sympathy to 
Ayatollah Khomeini.228 Once the political power struggle in Tehran came to an end with the ouster 
of President Abolhassan Bani-Sadr, and the election of Mohammad Ali Raja'i as the country's new 
president in early August, Assad congratulated him wholeheartedly, expressing his conviction that 
the ties between the two states would be strengthened "in the interest of the two peoples' struggle 
against imperialism and Zionism."229
Iran's Autumn Offensives and Syria's Assistance
With the outcome of the power struggle in Iran now determined, the new leadership set out to expel 
the Iraqis from occupied territories and expand cooperation with Syria. Regular contacts between 
Syrian and Iranian officials were resumed to coordinate their activities on political and military 
matters.230
A series of events in the inter-Arab arena and the Gulf War in the autumn of 1981 gave 
further impetus to the need for increased contacts and collaboration between Tehran and Damascus. 
The unprecedented involvement of Persian Iran in inter-Arab politics was highlighted in September 
by its presence at the Steadfastness Front conference in Benghazi as an observer and guest of 
Qadhafi's Libya.231 At the same time, as the war dragged on, the pro-Iranian camp appeared to be 
gradually coming apart. Apart from the outspoken support of Syria and Libya, Algeria was more low- 
key about its position, while South Yemen and the PLO distanced themselves from their earlier 
position.232 These noticeable shifts made it imperative for the Islamic Republic to maintain cordial 
ties with its two most valuable Arab partners, Syria and Libya (the former in particular), at a time 
when it finally seemed that a continuation of the hostilities would be to Iran's advantage.
In late September, the Iranians achieved their first major battlefield success when elements 
of the 92nd and 16th Armored Divisions managed to push the Iraqis back across the Karun River, 
thereby breaking the siege of Abadan 233 The breakthrough at Abadan could be partially attributed to 
the assistance of the Syrians, who provided five French-built Aerospatiale CT-20 aiidrones. This 
significantly enhanced Iran's reconnaissance capability with photography of the disposition of Iraqi 
forces in the Abadan area prior to the commencement of the operation.234 Some members of the 
pro-Iraqi camp, notably Saudi Arabia, went so far as to credit the lifting of the siege mainly to Syrian 
and Libyan military assistance.235 According to the available sources, this would seem to be an 
exaggeration of the extent of their involvement and importance in the battle for Abadan.
Tehran's newly regained confidence was also reflected in the bombing of Kuwaiti oil 
installations. Despite Iranian denials, this action was clearly aimed at intimidating Kuwait (viewed as 
the weak link among Iraq's Gulf Arab allies, who were bankrolling the Iraqi war machine). Kuwait
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reacted by recalling its ambassador to Tehran.236 The Iranian action was condemned by Baghdad, 
Amman, Cairo, San'a and Abu Dhabi as a further indication of the clerical regime's anti-Arab 
disposition. The Saudis also denounced the Soviet-lranian rapprochement that had been evolving 
for sometime with Assad's blessing 237 The pro-Iraqi camp again turned up the pressure on Syria by 
carrying stories in their media about Iranian warplanes being stationed in Syria in order "to stab Arab 
Iraq in the back."238 Recurrent accusations made in the Arab media and by Iraqi officials (for 
example Information Minister Latif Nassif Jassim) aroused the sensitivities of Syria, which responded 
by calling for an Arab military commission of inquiry to investigate the Iraqi charges.239
With respect to the Arab-lsraeli dispute, Tehran and Damascus both greeted the news of 
Anwar Sadat's assassination with great enthusiasm.240 Moreover, they strongly deplored Saudi 
Prince Fahd's eight-point peace plan, which Hafez Assad made sure did not get off the ground 
during the Arab summit at Fez in November.241 Syria's successful drive to frustrate Arab initiatives 
undertaken by members of the pro-Iraqi camp were greatly appreciated by the ruling clerics in 
Tehran. Saudi-lranian relations plunged to new depths at this juncture due to Iran's denunciation of 
the continued presence of US AWACS aircraft on Saudi territory, the Fahd initiative and Riyadh's 
staunch support for Saddam Hussein.242 These points of contention inevitably led to a dramatic 
escalation in the war of words between the two sides. Tensions finally reached new heights in 
December with the uncovering of an Iranian-sponsored coup attempt intended to unseat the ruling 
Al-Khalifah family of Bahrain. Manama immediately expelled the Iranian charge d'affaires. The 
North Yemenis followed suit as a gesture of support.
In response to the menacing threat from across the Gulf, Riyadh took a series of decisive 
measures to protect the Gulf Arab states and strengthen ties with members of the pro-Iraqi bloc in an 
effort to isolate and deter Iran. After the initial news about the coup attempt broke, the Saudi 
Minister of the Interior, Prince Nayif Bin Abdul Aziz, declared that "the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
considers the security of Bahrain and the Gulf countries the security of the Kingdom."243 The Saudis 
followed through on their words by signing a bilateral agreement on internal security cooperation with 
Bahrain on December 20. Similar agreements were concluded with Oman, Qatar and the United 
Arab Emirates in the weeks that followed. Upon sealing the agreement with Bahrain, the Saudi 
interior minister berated the Iranians severely by stating that "after their revolution, they [the Iranians] 
did not want to be the policeman of the Gulf, they have become the terrorists of the Gulf."244 He 
added that "Our stand must be an Arab stand in support of Iraq; at the same time we must work to 
bring about an end to the war."245 The Gulf Arab states, led by Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, 
subsequently embarked on an all-out effort to buttress the Iraqi position. Within a week of the Saudi- 
Bahraini security accord, Riyadh signed an agreement with Baghdad resolving a sixty-year-old 
border dispute. The agreement settled differences over their 500-mile (800 kilometre) common 
frontier.246 Kuwait also announced a $2 billion loan to Iraq, bringing the total Gulf Arab contribution 
to Iraq to at least $16 billion by the end of 1981,247
Iraq itself, having suffered a number of recent setbacks, tried to take full advantage of these 
events. In late November, the Iranians had launched Operation Tariq al-Quds, the prime objective 
being the recovery of the key border town of Bostan. The operation turned out to be a success;
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however, allegations of Iranian atrocities committed against Iraqi prisoners in the aftermath of the 
battle were played up by Baghdad to enrage Arab opinion.248 Increasingly, Iran's most ardent 
supporter, Syria, found itself in a very difficult position, struggling to defend its stance in the conflict.
Throughout the latter half of 1981, both Syria and Libya continued to provide Iran with 
military assistance of various kinds. In the summer, the first group of Iranian tank crews returned 
home after being trained to operate Soviet-made tanks in the Libyan desert. Shortly after their 
return, a shipment of 190 Soviet-manufactured T-54's, T-55's and T-62's arrived in Bandar Abbas 
from Libya.249 By December, some 250 Iranian tankmen had received training in Libya, and 300 
Soviet-made tanks had been shipped to Iran.250 Libya and Syria continued to airlift East Bloc 
weaponry to Iran. The Syrians especially played a vital role in the transhipment of weapons to Iran 
throughout the year.251 In Lebanon, the Syrian and Iranian intelligence services collaborated closely 
to weaken Iraqi power and influence as much as possible. As part of their overall strategy, a number 
of pro-Iraqi Bathists and Iraqi diplomats were assassinated. However, the coup de grace came on 
December 16, when the Iraqi embassy in Beirut was totally demolished by a car bomb which killed 
30 embassy employees including the Iraqi ambassador.252
The defection of Arab states to the pro-Iraqi camp, the continued struggle against the 
Muslim Brethren and the looming crisis with Israel led Assad to the conclusion by the end of the year 
that serious efforts should be made to defuse the situation in the Gulf and to ask for Arab support 
against Israel. He therefore took it upon himself to visit the Gulf sheikhdoms in late December to 
request their assistance.253 During his visit, Gulf Arab leaders made their assistance conditional 
upon Syria's abandonment of her pro-Iranian stance in the conflict.254 Following the completion of 
his visit to the Gulf states, the Syrian and Kuwaiti governments announced a joint initiative to end the 
Gulf war.255 Damascus radio announced that the opportune moment had arrived for terminating the 
hostilities between Iraq and Iran "in the interest of conserving Arab and Islamic energies to counter 
Israel's expansionist designs."256 During his meetings with Saudi officials, Assad also gave his 
approval to Prince Fahd's plan to resolve existing differences between Syria and Iraq. Furthermore, 
Fahd was given the green light to mediate between Syria and Jordan.257
In the midst of these developments and diplomatic posturing by various Arab states, Tehran 
responded to the flurry of events by dispatching Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati to Damascus on 
December 30, to hold talks with Assad and Khaddam. Once the negotiations were concluded, it 
became quite apparent that the Iranians had rejected any attempt to intercede between the two 
combatants. They had decided to rebuff the Syrian-Kuwaiti initiative and determine the outcome of 
the war on the battlefield.258 By the beginning of the new year, Tehran undoubtedly believed that the 
scale had tipped in its favor. Between December 12th and 16th, Iran had launched its third 
consecutive offensive in a three-month period, this time near Qasr Shirin. The operation 
codenamed Matla al-Fajr had resulted in the recovery of 100 square miles of Iranian territory.259 At a 
press conference held on January 1, after his deliberations with the Syrian leadership, Velayati 
explained: "...the fate of the Iraqi-imposed war on Iran will be determined by the corps and 
combatants of Islam on the battlefronts." He denied that the issue of mediation between Iran and 
Iraq was ever raised at his meetings in Damascus. Velayati enumerated Iran's conditions for the
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cessation of hostilities; (i) unconditional withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Iranian territory, 00 
determination of the aggressor by a competent and impartial international body, and (iii) payment of 
war reparations by the aggressor to the victim of the aggression.260 As a gesture of solidarity in 
response to Israel's annexation of the Golan Heights, Iran offered to send Revolutionary Guards to 
fight against Israel261
Despite the failure of the Syrian-Kuwaiti initiative, Assad's moves in the Gulf had not been 
completely in vain. He managed to ease tensions with Riyadh after the debacle at the Fez summit 
where he had obstructed any meaningful progress on Fahd's peace proposal. In addition, Assad was 
able to mend relations between Saudi Arabia and Libya, leading to the resumption of diplomatic ties 
between the two states on December 31,262
Iraq's "Pan-Arab Struggle” and Iran's Growing Regional Isolation
The Islamic Republic's outright rejection of the Syrian-Kuwaiti offer did not adversely affect its 
relations with Bathi Syria. Iran could ill-afford to drive away its most valuable Arab partner at a time 
when it was clearly alienating many of its Arab neighbors and former allies. On January 12 Khaled 
al-Hassan, a member of the PLO's Central Committee, criticized the Iranian attempt to subvert the 
regime in Bahrain, characterizing it as "irresponsible" behaviour and underscoring the poor state of 
Palestinian-lranian relations263 On the same day, the North Yemenis expelled the Iranian charg6 
d'affaires in San'a, accusing him of involvement in subversive activities.264 Earlier in the month, Iraq 
and South Yemen agreed to upgrade their diplomatic ties to the ambassadorial level.265 Iraq in the 
meantime also aggressively lobbied in Arab circles for the severance of diplomatic relations between 
Iran and all Arab states. It attempted to portray the Gulf war as a pan-Arab effort against "Persian 
expansionism."266 In order to facilitate the Iraqi effort, King Hussein of Jordan announced that the 
Jordanian Arab Yarmuk Forces would accept volunteers to fight against Iran.267 The response was 
overwhelming: hundreds of young Jordanians filed into recruiting stations to enlist in the Yarmuk 
Forces268 Syria and Libya were quick to denounce the Jordanian move. Al-Bath condemned the 
establishment of the force to wage war on Iran, pointing out Jordan’s neglect of the threat emanating 
from Israel269 Damascus described King Hussein's decision "a worthless political stunt designed to 
distract attention from the Arab-lsraeli conflict...trying to provoke Syria and inventing a marginal 
battle useful only to the enemies of the Arab nation."270 Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi also 
adopted a similar line, declaring: "we thought that the call for volunteers by King Hussein would be 
aimed at liberating Palestine and Holy Jerusalem which is a stone's throw from King Hussein's 
residence, and not for the purpose of fighting against Iran."271
Iran reacted to the Jordanian action swiftly by announcing the formation of a battalion of 
Iraqi volunteers and former POWs to be sent to fight against the Israelis. The unit would be called 
the Golan Battalion.272 The Iranian foreign ministry issued a statement highly critical of the 
Jordanian decision, characterizing it as "a direct and clear" proclamation of war against Iran.273 With 
the intensification of the anti-Iranian camp's efforts to describe the war as an Arab-Persian conflict, 
and to wean away pro-Iranian Arab states, Iran explored various options to convince the Arabs that 
the war was not about conflicting nationalisms but disparate ideologies with different visions of a "just
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Middle Eastern Order." In order to underscore the importance of the Palestinian cause in Iran, and 
to discredit the propaganda of the pro-Iraqi bloc, Iranian President Hojjatolislam Ali Khamene'i took 
the additional step of promising direct Iranian military intervention in the Arab-lsraeli conflict once the 
war with Iraq had ended. In a message to Hafez Assad, the Iranian leader claimed on behalf of the 
Iranian people that the occupation of Jerusalem and the Golan was "as an occupation of our 
lands."274 Concurrently, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati toured Libya, Algeria and the Western 
Sahara to reaffirm Iran's friendship and desire for future cooperation with its North African Arab 
allies.
As Iraq's allies, especially Jordan, tried to arouse Arab patriotic and nascent anti-Persian 
sentiment, Iran's partners heightened their efforts to discredit them as tools of Zionism and Western 
imperialism in the region.275 Baghdad itself used every available opportunity to demonstrate that 
Arab states were backing the Iraqi war effort and showing solidarity. In late February, the North 
Yemeni President, Colonel Ali Abdullah Salih, made a state visit to Iraq. The Iraqi media gave the 
maximum possible coverage to this event, which included the inspection of a battalion of North 
Yemeni volunteers at a training camp by the two heads of state. During the tour of the camp, 
President Salih stated: "the danger of intransigence would have never been stopped in the Arab 
homeland and the Islamic land had it not been for the steadfastness of Iraq, Iraq's army and its 
leadership."276
The ever widening rift in Arab ranks came into sharper focus in this period. Iran's and Iraq's 
Arab allies took drastic measures to ensure that the combatants they supported would be able to 
prosecute the war at a time when it seemed that the tide of the war was finally turning in Iran's favor. 
A case in point was the Kuwaiti parliament's decision to cancel its financial contribution towards the 
maintenance of the Syrian Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon. The Kuwaitis angrily lashed out at the 
Assad regime, accusing it of pursuing its own agenda in Lebanon, carrying out repressive policies at
577home and betraying the Arab cause by backing Iran in the Gulf war.
Hafez Assad, having just survived a major political confrontation with the Syrian Muslim 
Brethren which culminated in the crashing of the fundamentalist opposition in the city of Hama, now 
set out to deal a devastating blow to the Arab backers of the Brethren and assist the Iranians by 
cementing his budding alliance with Tehran. The Iranian military at this point in time was also 
planning a series of offensives in the early spring aimed at the recovery of the territories occupied by 
the Iraqi army.
THE FORMALIZATION OF THE SYRIAN-1 RANIAN AXIS AND IRAN’S SPRING OFFENSIVES
Both sides stepped up their diplomatic efforts to seal the emergent Syrian-lranian alliance. This 
process culminated in the visit of a high-ranking 48-man Syrian delegation headed by Abd al-Halim 
Khaddam (then the deputy prime minister and foreign minister) to Tehran in March 1982.278 The two 
sides signed a number of important agreements, among them a trade protocol and an oil 
agreement.279 According to the terms of the latter, Iran would export nine million tons of oil to Syria 
annually. In return, Syria would provide 300-400 thousand tons of phosphates (required for Iran's 
petrochemical industry) for a period of one year. Afterwards, Syria would increase her annual
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phosphate exports to one million tons, an amount equivalent to Iran's domestic needs.280
At the time, Iranian officials stated that approximately 2.7 million tons of Iran's oil exports to 
Syria would be on a barter exchange basis, and the remaining 6.3 million tons would be paid for in 
cash281 However, one year later, Western sources revealed that Syria was importing 100,000 h/d of 
Iranian oil at the low rate of $28 per barrel, an additional 10,000 b/d in a barter deal, and 20,000 b/d 
for free. This was at a time when the official OPEC price was still $34 per barrel.282
During his visit to Tehran, Khaddam reportedly also signed a secret arms deal with his 
Iranian counterpart. Reports indicated that in early April several shiploads of heavy war material, 
including 130mm howitzers, ZSU-23 anti-aircraft guns, tank engines and ammunition left the ports of 
Tartus and Latakia bound for Iran. Furthermore, several planeloads of weapons also arrived in Iran 
from Syria. These deliveries coincided with a series of successful Iranian offensives in the spring of 
1982, which resulted in the expulsion of Iraqi forces from much of the Iranian territory they had 
occupied.283
The bilateral agreements signed in Tehran formalized the Syrian-lranian axis. The 
conclusion of the agreements and the setbacks suffered by the Iraqi army on the battlefront 
encouraged Damascus to intensify its efforts to assist the Islamic Republic. With the tide of the war 
turning and the possibility of the collapse of Saddam Hussein's regime on the horizon, Syria resorted 
to various means to put pressure on Iraq.
Less than a week after the conclusion of these agreements, on March 22, the Iranian armed 
forces launched Operation Fatah al-Mobin (Clear Victory), aimed at driving back the Iraqis in 
Khuzestan province. The operation lasted only 8 days, but the results were so astounding that they 
even exceeded the best expectations of the Iranian High Command. By March 29, some 850 
square miles of territory had been liberated, resulting in the destruction of three Iraqi divisions284 
The Iraqi defeat sounded alarm bells throughout the region. One day after the end of Fatah al- 
Mobin, King Hussein arrived in Baghdad with his Chief of Staff to confer with Saddam Hussein. 
There was a great deal of speculation at the time that Amman might commit its own regular forces in 
the Gulf conflict.285 Although this never materialized, the magnitude of the Iraq's reverses was 
significant enough to warrant decisive action on the part of her allies. On the day of King Hussein's 
arrival in Baghdad, King Khaled telephoned Saddam Hussein to discuss the events at the 
battlefront.286 The gravity of the situation prompted the Saudi monarch to send his defense minister, 
Prince Sultan, to Baghdad for consultations with the Iraqi leader287
On April 8, Syria closed her borders with Iraq.288 Two days later, Syria shut down the trans- 
Syrian (IPC) pipeline to Tripoli and Banias, after having stored 1.5 million barrels of Iraqi oil.289 The 
closure of the pipeline had major economic repercussions and compounded Iraq's predicament, at a 
time when the country faced mounting problems. The Syrian action reduced Iraqi oil exports by half 
to a mere 600 thousand b/d, which translated into $17 million in lost revenues daily (approximately 
$6 billion annually).290 Iraq's only remaining oil export route was the Kirkuk-Dortyol pipeline (which 
possessed a capacity of 600 thousand b/d).291
The shutdown of the trans-Syrian pipeline heightened Baghdad's sense of insecurity. Iraqi 
officials very quickly came to the realization that they were still vulnerable to Syrian economic
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warfare. In order to diminish their dependence on the Syrian pipeline, steps were taken to expand 
the Dortyol pipeline to one million b/d. Plans were also drawn up to have alternate pipelines 
constructed, linking Iraqi oil facilities with the Saudi port of Yanbu and the Jordanian port of 
Aqaba.292
During April 1982, Syrian military units were deployed along the border with Iraq, while 
Syrian military aircraft periodically violated Iraqi airspace293 Syria's military activity along Iraq's 
western frontiers was part of an overall strategy to exert pressure on Bathi Iraq and aggravate her 
sense of insecurity. The spectre of Syrian military intervention forced Iraq to dispatch some military 
forces to her western borders294 The Syrian military deployment was of substantial benefit to Iran in 
several ways. On the military level, troops which could have been used to resist the Iranian 
offensives during this period were now tied down along the Syrian-lraqi frontier. Furthermore, Syrian 
pressure had a profound psychological impact on the Iraqis, who feared the possibility of a two-front 
war and economic strangulation.
Iraqi trepidations and concerns were magnified by Damascus' growing support for a number 
of Kurdish separatist movements and opposition groups operating within Iraq. The Syrians as well 
as the Iranians provided military and financial assistance to the National Progressive and Democratic 
Front; a coalition of various anti-Bathi organizations (which, as mentioned earlier, included the 
Marxist Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the United Kurdish Party (UKP), the National Democratic 
Party, the United Kurdish Socialist Party and the Iraqi Communist Party (ICP)).295 In fact, in early 
1982, Iraq's oil export capability was temporarily crippled when Kurdish guerrillas blew up the Kirkuk- 
Dortyol pipeline.296 This was a serious blow for a country already $20 billion in debt.297 Hafez 
Assad's assistance to the Kurdish rebels was intended to encourage the insurgency in the northern
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provinces and tie down additional Iraqi troops in this region.
According to Syrian and Iranian calculations, the combination of maintaining military 
pressure, waging economic warfare and aiding the Kurdish insurgency would lead to the 
deterioration of domestic conditions and the introduction of austerity measures by the regime. This 
would lead to the erosion of internal support for Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Bath, eventually 
sparking domestic unrest and bringing about the overthrow of the government. The Iranians in 
particular believed that this would be the most practical method to score a political victory, without 
ever having to carry the war into Iraqi territory.299
Iran's military successes in April and May 1982, which culminated in the recovery of the 
Iranian port city of Khorramshahr, strengthened Syria's resolve to stand by and cooperate with her 
Persian ally. When it became evident that Iran would reject Arab peace offers and possibly invade 
Iraq, many Arab states called for a unified stand against Iran. However, Damascus prevented the 
convening of an Arab summit conference for this purpose in May 1982.300 Iran's refusal to accept a 
negotiated settlement drew criticism from different comers of the Arab world, prompting even Algeria 
to distance herself from Tehran.301 As the Islamic Republic became increasingly isolated in the 
Middle East, Iranian officials came to put greater emphasis and value on their relationship with Syria. 
Although Damascus declared that it would not endorse an Iranian invasion of Iraq, and threatened to 
re-evaluate its stance on the Gulf War, no shift occurred in the existing alliance.302 In fact, after the
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Israeli invasion of Lebanon on June 7, 1982, and Iran's decision to cany the war into Iraq the 
following month, the Syrian-lranian alliance entered a new phase, which would mark the zenith of 
Syrian-lranian cooperation in the Middle East.
CONCLUSION
Despite ethnic dissimilarities and ideological incompatibilities, in the final analysis, it should come as 
no surprise that upon their ascent to power Ayatollah Khomeini and his inner circle cultivated close 
ties with the Syrian Bathi regime. Due to the poor state of Syrian-lranian relations in the latter half of 
the 1970's, Assad had allowed the Shah's opponents to use Syria as a base for their activities. 
These included a number of individuals who eventually became some of Khomeini's close advisors 
and held senior positions in the revolutionary government. Following the ouster of the Shah, the 
Syrian-lranian rapprochement was given further impetus by a convergence of interests and striking 
parallels in the foreign policies of both states. In a break from previous Iranian policy, the clerical 
regime drew closer to the radical Arab camp at a time when the Arab world was becoming more 
polarized and divided over issues such as the Camp David Accords and the Iranian Revolution. 
Similarly, Syria's relations with many of the moderate, pro-Western Arab states cooled. Links 
between Tehran and Damascus were further strengthened by the fact that the relations of both 
capitals with the United States deteriorated markedly in the period 1979-1980. Concomitantly, closer 
ties were developed with the Soviet Union.
The failure of the Syrian-lraqi unity talks in mid-1979 and the growing tensions between Iran 
and Iraq facilitated the emergent Syrian-lranian alliance. From the perspective of officials In Tehran 
and Damascus, close coordination of their policies was imperative, in order to contain Bathi Iraq. 
The showdown between Iran and Iraq, which eventually led to the outbreak of the First Persian Gulf 
War in September 1980, was the single most important factor the formalization of the Tehran- 
Damascus axis by early 1982. The conflict also radically transformed the calculus of power within 
the relationship. While Syria was more dependent on its links with Iran before the eruption of 
hostilities, in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion Iran found itself dependent to varying degrees on 
Damascus' diplomatic and military assistance.303 Although the alliance became somewhat 
asymmetrical during the period 1980-1982, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 brought 
about some shifts in the power relationship and enhanced the position of both states in the Middle 
East (see Chapter 2 for more details and analysis). However, by the spring of 1982, the Syrians had 
not only succeeded in determining the extent and limits of cooperation in most spheres of common 
interest, but had also managed to extract tangible economic and political benefits from the Islamic 
Republic, to facilitate their realization of regional dominance. The Iranians, on the other hand, had 
even stronger incentives to continue their liaison with Syria, since the latter had been instrumental in 
turning the tide of the war against Iraq through the provision of war materiel, intelligence and 
operational bases, and the obstruction of a united anti-Iranian front through Syria's assiduous 
diplomatic efforts and posturing. In addition, the alliance had provided them with greater access to 
the Arab-lslamic world, broadened their narrow constituency and enabled them to dismiss 
accusations that Persian or Shi'ite interests were the primary forces shaping their foreign policy.
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THE ACHIEVEMENTS AND LIMITS OF SYRIAN-1 RANIAN POWER: 
THE STRUGGLE FOR THE MIDDLE EAST 1982-1985
INTRODUCTION
By the end of May 1982, the Syrian-lranian alliance entered a new phase, which would be marked by 
close cooperation and intensive efforts to respond to new challenges not only in the Gulf region, but 
also and more importantly in the eastern Mediterranean. This period can be delineated 
approximately from June 1982 to March 1985 - a three-year period which was one of the most 
critical periods in the modem history of the Middle East.
In reality, this particular phase can be characterized as the zenith of the Syrian-lranian axis 
in the region, but also paradoxically as one of lost opportunities - which demonstrated the limits of its 
power and sowed the seeds of decline for the Tehran-Damascus partnership. The month of June 
1982 was an extremely critical period in the historiography of the contemporary Middle East - for it 
was at this vital juncture that Israel invaded Lebanon and engaged the Syrian armed forces in what 
became the fifth Arab-lsraeli War, and concurrently Iran, having succeeded in turning the tide of the 
Persian Gulf War in its favor (with the expulsion of the Iraqis from most of its territory), decided in the 
same month to cany the war into Iraq.
Despite the wealth of literature on these two conflicts, very little research and analysis has 
been done on the interconnection between the events and decision-making processes which went on 
in the spring of 1982 in Baghdad, Tel Aviv, Damascus and Tehran. It will be demonstrated in the 
following analysis that policymakers in Tel Aviv and Baghdad hoped that an Israeli-Syrian 
confrontation would result in the diminution of Syrian power in the region. However, Hafez Assad's 
brinkmanship in the aftermath of the Israeli invasion not only thwarted Israeli and Iraqi calculations, 
but also hindered the Reagan administration's policies in the Middle East. Therefore, much to the 
chagrin of his opponents, Assad's prestige and influence grew noticeably. In addition to frustrating 
Israeli and American designs in the area, the Lebanon War drew Syria and Iran closer than before - 
contrary to the hopes and expectations of the Iraqi leadership. It is highly improbable that Iran would 
have altered its decision to invade Iraq in July 1982 if the Israelis had not initiated hostilities in 
Lebanon. On the other hand, it will be argued that, had events played out differently, Tehran might 
have reconsidered the wisdom of continuing the Gulf War and instead might have dispatched a 
sizeable military force to Lebanon to fight alongside the Syrians. In the words of Iran scholar R. K. 
Ramazani "the truism that all things in the Middle East are interconnected is one that statesmen and 
scholars alike ignore at their own peril."1
The purpose of this chapter is provide a detailed chronology of the events and in-depth 
analysis of the impact of the Lebanon War on the evolution of the Syrian-lranian alliance. It will set 
out to explain how policymakers in Damascus and Tehran coordinated their policies in as much as 
they could, and took up the challenge to expel the Israeli and Western forces from Lebanon between 
1982 and 1985. Furthermore, it will be demonstrated that, once the Islamic Republic of Iran carried 
the war into Iraq, it had only a brief window of opportunity to defeat its foe decisively on the
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battlefield. The argument will be put forth that this chance was lost by early 1984, due to the drastic 
shifts in the configuration of forces in the Middle East. The US-lraqi rapprochement, Egypt's 
reintegration into the Arab world and the emergence of the Baghdad-Amman-Cairo axis (all having 
been motivated to varying degrees by the success of the Syrian-lranian axis and its potential to exert 
even greater regional power and influence) ensured that, at the very least, Iraq would be able to 
stave off defeat in the Gulf War. The lack of consensus within Iran's political and military leadership 
regarding the conduct and objectives of the invasion of Iraq also had an enormous impact on Iran's 
failure to exploit fully Iraq's vulnerability between 1982 and 1983. By the time of Iran's first major 
offensive in February 1984, the calculus of power had shifted in Iraq's favor. Although the 
constellation of forces arrayed against the Tehran-Damascus axis succeeded in checking its power 
by 1985, the foundations and mechanics of the alliance were firmly in place. Both partners provided 
invaluable support to one another in two consecutive crises: Syria assisted Iran in stemming the Iraqi 
invasion of 1980, enabling its ally to turn the tables on the invader, and subsequently Iran 
collaborated with Syria to frustrate Israeli and American designs in Lebanon. Therefore, despite the 
eclipse of the alliance and the tensions among the two members after mid-1985, the partnership was 
now firmly in place. Having withstood major challenges and the test of time, contrary to the 
expectations of many, it had been transformed into one of the more durable features on the political 
landscape of the Middle East. Overall, the Lebanon War served as a major catalyst in the 
expansion and intensification of Syrian-lranian collaboration in the region to prevent the realization of 
Tel Aviv and Washington's designs.
IRAQI STRATEGY TO WEAKEN THE SYRIAN-1 RANIAN AXIS AND THE ORIGINS OF THE 
LEBANON WAR
By late May 1982, Iraq was in dire straits. Its gambit to defeat revolutionary Iran and propel itself to 
the position of the Arab world's undisputed leader had failed miserably. The invasion of Iran in the 
autumn of 1980 had not only helped the Khomeini regime to consolidate its position, but had also 
enabled the clerical leadership to mobilize the Iranian masses in order to oust the Iraqis from much 
of the territory that they had captured in the initial stages of the war. The liberation of the key port 
city of Khorramshahr by Iranian forces on May 24 marked the culmination of Iran's military effort to 
dislodge the Iraqis from their last major stronghold on Iranian soil. The Iraqi forces in Iran had been 
decimated within a period of two months.2 Saddam Hussein had very little to show for his efforts - 
his grand design had come to naught, and now he had to brace himself for a possible Iranian 
invasion of Iraq. Baghdad's position had become even more precarious because of the Syrian- 
lranian alliance which had been formalized two months earlier. The closure of the trans-Syrian (IPC) 
pipeline and Syria's support for the Iranian war effort and Iraqi opposition groups had compounded 
Iraq's predicament. Baghdad looked for ways to prevent the Syrian-lranian pincer from crushing it. 
The failure of the uprising in the Syrian city of Hama by the Iraqi-backed Muslim Brethren (February
1982), and Iran's success in routing the Iraqi army (March-May 1982), prompted Iraq to focus on 
Lebanon, where the political situation was extremely volatile and ideal for foreign manipulation.
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In the period leading up to June 1982, the Likud government of Prime Minister Menachem 
Begin had begun to make preparations for a massive military operation in Lebanon to expel the 
PLO, inflict a humiliating defeat on the only remaining major Arab confrontation state, Syria, and 
create a new political order in Lebanon which would be conducive to establishing strong political links 
with the Jewish state. However, Tel Aviv needed some sort of internationally-recognized 
provocation in order to launch the invasion of Lebanon, codenamed Operation Peace in the Galilee. 
The excuse was furnished on June 3, when an attempt was made on the life of the Israeli 
ambassador to Britain, Shlomo Argov. Ironically, the attempt was earned out by agents of the Iraqi- 
backed Abu Nidal organization, uncompromising foes of Yasser Arafat's PLO. In the past, the Abu 
Nidal organization had primarily focused its efforts on eliminating high-ranking PLO officials. 
Therefore, the attempt on Israel's top representative in London was a major departure from their 
standard operational norms. In reality, Iraqi intelligence masterminded the attack in order to provoke 
an Israeli military response in Lebanon. Baghdad was well aware of the Israeli plan to crush the PLO 
in the south. The Iraqis calculated that a major Israeli military incursion into Lebanon would be to the 
detriment of the Syrians, regardless of the course of action they adopted. From the Iraqi 
perspective, if Assad took up the gauntlet by challenging the Israelis militarily, his forces would be 
annihilated, and even if he did not confront the Israeli forces, he would lose face and credibility at 
home and throughout the Arab world. For Saddam Hussein either scenario would be a source of 
great satisfaction. It also provided a way to settle the score with Menachem Begin for having 
ordered the bombing of the Osiraq reactor, just a year earlier.3
THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT AND ISRAELI PERCEPTIONS
According to the view of some scholars, the Israeli government's decision to invade Lebanon was 
partially based on the new realities in the region and the Reagan administration's foreign policy 
agenda (specifically checking Soviet power and outmaneuvering it in the Middle East). As Defense 
Minister Ariel Sharon saw the situation, the toppling of the Pahlavi throne in Iran represented a major 
loss for both Israel and the United States. However, the absence of an American foothold in Iran 
meant that Israel's strategic value had increased significantly in the eyes of US policymakers. In the 
aftermath of the Iranian revolution and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Washington hastily 
sought to create some sort of new security framework in the region and hold the Soviets at bay. 
However, the new US administration had few options, since it was highly doubtful that countries such 
as Saudi Arabia could effectively fill the vacuum left by the Shah or would demonstrate a willingness 
to cooperate with Israel on regional security matters. Sharon apparently believed that in the final 
analysis, despite some reservations, Washington would not object to an invasion of Lebanon, which 
would deal a severe blow to the Soviet-backed PLO and Syria and concomitantly lead to the 
installation of a pro-Western Maronite regime in Lebanon.4 Such a move would not jeopardize the 
Camp David Accords since the Israelis had completed their withdrawal from the Sinai in April 1982, 
and their southern flank was now secure.
An additional argument which has been put forth to underscore the interrelationship between
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the Lebanon War and the Gulf War is that even the timing of the Israeli invasion was influenced by 
events in the Persian Gulf. The Israelis calculated that the fact that their invasion coincided with the 
series of defeats suffered by the Iraqis in the Gulf and the imminent Iranian invasion of Iraq would 
deflect a great deal of attention in Washington and Arab capitals from the Israeli operation.5
SYRIAN-1 RAN IAN CONSULTATIONS ON THE LEBANON AND GULF WARS
On June 7,1982, a day after the commencement of Operation Peace in the Galilee, a high-ranking 
Iranian military delegation headed by Defense Minister Colonel Salimi, Army Commander Colonel 
Seyyed-Shirazi and Revolutionary Guards Commander Mohsen Reza'i arrived in Damascus to offer 
assistance against the Israeli assault in southern Lebanon. Upon arrival, the delegation held talks 
with Hafez Assad and delivered a message from Iranian President Ali Khamene'i. The Iranian 
leadership expressed its readiness to dispatch forces to repel the Israeli invaders and assist in the 
struggle against "Zionism, the battle to liberate the occupied territories, and the occupation of 
southern Lebanon."6 Apparently, an agreement was reached to have Iranian troops sent to Lebanon 
to participate in the fighting against the Israelis.7 Two days later, at a news conference in New York, 
Iranian Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati stated that "we consider this matter one of our foremost 
duties. It is part of the strategic aims of the Islamic Republic to fight against the Zionist regime. At 
present, the Defense Minister, the Ground Forces Commander and the revolutionary Guards Corps 
Commander...are in Syria to assess the amount of assistance required and the mode of its dispatch. 
In this matter we shall not hesitate. If our brothers in Syria and Lebanon request it, we shall enter 
the war."8
On June 11, Iraq announced a unilateral ceasefire and indicated it was prepared to withdraw 
its forces to the international boundaries within a two-week period. Concomitantly, after the return of 
the Iranian military delegation from Syria, a meeting of the Supreme Defense Council (SDC) was 
convened to discuss the Iraqi proposal and the situation in Lebanon. As a subsequent outcome of 
the deliberations within the Iranian political and military leadership, Tehran responded by demanding 
free passage for its armoured units through Iraq to assist the Syrians in the melee - as a new 
condition for terminating the state of hostility between Iran and Iraq.9 Iranian Prime Minister Mir 
Hossein Musavi described this stipulation in light of the new circumstances in the Arab-lsraeli conflict 
as "one of the prime rights of an Islamic country."10
Iraq's riposte, which followed almost immediately, accepted the new Iranian demand and 
expressed its readiness to discuss transit arrangements for the Iranian forces as soon as Tehran 
agreed to a ceasefire, thereby ending the state of hostility between the two countries.11 Curiously, 
Iran did not respond to the Iraqi proposal in any way during the next several days. All indications 
seem to point that there was a fundamental difference of opinion within the regime about what 
course of action to pursue next: whether to accept the Iraqi ceasefire proposal, send an 
expeditionary force via Iraq to Lebanon and mend fences with Baghdad, or on the other hand to 
continue the Gulf War by launching an invasion of Iraq, thus relegating the Syrian-lsraeli conflict in 
Lebanon to a secondary position (perhaps only sending a token force as a symbolic gesture of
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solidarity). Various accounts suggest that Ayatollah Khomeini and Speaker of Parliament Rafsanjani 
were in favor of taking the war into Iraq, while President Ali Khamene'i, Prime Minister Musavi and 
the top brass of the Iranian military were against prolonging the conflict with Iraq. The latter group 
argued that the emphasis from then on should be on rebuilding the country and safeguarding the 
revolution at home.12 While the debate brewed in Tehran, Iran airlifted three contingents of 
volunteers to Damascus. Within a week, at least several hundred volunteers had been flown to 
Syria.13 By all accounts, it was unclear exactly how many Iranians transited through Syria for
Lebanon. Most reports indicated several thousand in three or four contingents. Damascus only
acknowledged the presence of 400, while the Israelis and some foreign diplomats in the Syrian 
capital claimed that the number was as high as 3,000.14 In a speech to a group of local 
representatives from Tabriz, Rafsanjani boasted:
"Since the day our forces arrived in Syria, the situation has changed. That is, the
name of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its youth have such a reputation that
according to Syrian and Lebanese assertions, the value of the few planeloads of 
Iranian combatants is far more than if 10 divisions had come from the Arab 
countries."15
In addition to dispatching fighters, Iran's Red Crescent Society shipped substantial amounts of 
medical supplies and field hospitals.16 While popular sentiment and domestic pressure grew for a 
more active Iranian role in the Lebanon War, the debate over the continuation of the Gulf War and 
the scope of Iranian participation against the Israelis remained unresolved within the Islamic 
regime.17 On June 17, a senior Iranian political-military delegation headed by Foreign Minister 
Velayati and Defense Minister Salimi arrived in Damascus to explore various avenues of 
cooperation between the two allies in Lebanon. Discussions were held with Syrian Deputy Prime 
Minister and Foreign Minister Abd al-Halim Khaddam, Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas and the Head 
of the Political Directorate of the Syrian Armed Forces, Major-General Hassan al-Turkumani.18 The 
Iranian delegation put forth proposals to assist the Syrian forces and the Amal movement in the 
Lebanese theater of operations.19 The Iranians apparently offered to send some 40,000 regular 
troops with heavy armor and another 10,000 lightly-equipped Revolutionary Guards and volunteers 
to fight in Lebanon under Syrian command. A similar proposal had been put forth by the Iranian 
military a week earlier, but on both occasions Hafez Assad flatly rejected them. It seems that 
officials in Damascus had been somewhat irked when Tehran initially criticized them for accepting 
the June 11 ceasefire.20 However, this does not explain why Assad turned down a generous Iranian 
offer at a time when the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) had resumed the advance north towards Beirut 
and were engaging Syrian forces in the process. The answer lies in how the battle unfolded in the 
first week of the Lebanon War, the prospects for an Iranian invasion of Iraq and Assad's 
interpretation of these two factors.
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SYRIAN PERCEPTIONS OF DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LEBANON AND GULF CONFLICTS
Although Damascus had anticipated an Israeli military incursion into Lebanon in the period leading 
up to June 6, it had underestimated the scope and scale of the IDF attack. Even until the third day of 
the invasion, the Syrians still believed that the primary Israeli objective was only to destroy the PLO's 
bases and infrastructure in south Lebanon. They simply assumed that the IDF thrust would not go 
beyond the south. However, by June 8, it had become painfully clear that the Israeli scheme was 
much more ambitious than previously thought. During the next three days, the Syrian forces in 
Lebanon engaged the IDF in what turned out to be the bloodiest fighting since the 1973 Arab-lsraeli 
War. Despite the determined resistance and commendable fighting of the Syrian army, the Israelis 
inflicted heavy losses on their hapless opponents. By June 11, when the Begin government 
announced a unilateral ceasefire on the Bekaa front, Assad eagerly announced his acceptance since 
it would provide him with a brief respite to rush more units to the front from Syria and eastern 
Lebanon to beef up defenses along the central and western sectors of the front along the Beirut- 
Damascus highway and Shouf mountains. The Israeli forces continued their advance towards 
Beirut, determined to annihilate any Syrian and Palestinian resistance they encountered. Though 
facing a much larger, better-equipped force, and lacking aircover, the Syrian troops put up stiff 
resistance and made the Israelis pay dearly as they advanced towards Beirut in the two weeks that 
followed. By June 25, the IDF had reached Beirut and laid siege to the city. Although it took the 
Israelis less than three weeks to reach the Lebanese capital, within the first few days of the invasion, 
the Syrians had come to the bitter realization that their conventional forces could not conduct a 
convincing defensive action against the enemy, let alone counterattack and launch offensive 
operations to roll back the Israelis. In this context one has a better understanding of why the Syrians 
turned down a generous Iranian offer - at a time when their ally was still in a state of war with Bathi 
Iraq. Damascus knew that the participation of the Iranian forces would probably not be enough to tip 
the scale in their favor.
Moreover, a major pre-requisite for a significant Iranian involvement in the Lebanese theater 
was the cessation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq. Such a development would mean loosening 
the Syrian-lranian noose around the neck of Saddam Hussein and giving him a new lease on life. 
From Assad's perspective, this type of scenario was far from desirable since it would translate into 
coming under pressure not only from the Israelis in the west, who had just decimated a substantial 
part of the Syrian armed forces, but also from his uncompromising foe to the east, Saddam Hussein. 
In light of Iran's impressive military victories in the spring of 1982, Assad calculated that even if an 
Iranian invasion of Iraq would not result in the overthrow of his Bathi rival in Baghdad, at the very 
least the Iraqi military machine would be pinned down by his Iranian allies - preventing Saddam 
Hussein from focusing on his western flank.
While the Syrians did not look favorably on a large scale Iranian military intervention in 
Lebanon favourably, it would seem that the Iranian "doves" in the Gulf War debate saw a limited 
Iranian role in the Lebanon War as a more secure alternative than an invasion of neighboring Iraq. It 
would provide an outlet for the revolutionary and activist fever of the radical clerics, entail less risks,
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allow the army to partially demobilize and enable the regime to begin the reconstruction of the 
country. However, Assad's refusal to accept Iranian troops and probable insistence on the 
continuation of efforts to unseat Saddam Hussein undoubtedly weakened the position of the Iranian 
doves and strengthened the resolve of the hawks, who were riding high on the wave of success and 
trying to build on the momentum which had started in March.
On June 20, the Iranian military delegation returned to Tehran. That same day, Foreign 
Minister Velayati announced that Iranian forces already in Lebanon had completed reconnaissance 
missions in that country and would subsequently engage the Israelis.21 Concurrently, Saddam 
Hussein declared the commencement of a unilateral Iraqi withdrawal from Iranian territory, which 
would be completed in ten days, in order to "eliminate an important pretext being used by the 
suspect regime in Tehran to continue the war, and to put the regime to a decisive test to disclose the 
rest of its real intentions."22 Two days later, on June 22, a meeting of the Iranian SDC was convened 
to discuss the course of action in the two wars. Afterwards, President Khamene'i stated that the 
leadership had decided that a sizeable military force would not be sent to Lebanon until the war with 
Iraq was successfully terminated. The Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Command 
issued a statement on the exact same day declaring that it was "a binding duty to continue the war 
until the complete downfall of the Bathi-Zionist regime in Baghdad."23 In the end, Ayatollah 
Khomeini had overruled the more cautious members of the regime. These included not only 
President Khamene'i, Prime Minister Musavi and Foreign Minister Velayati, but also high-ranking 
military figures such as Defense Minister Salimi, Armed Forces Chief General Ghassem Ali Zahir- 
Nejhad and Army Commander Colonel Seyyed Shirazi. The decision to cross into Iraq was also 
unpopular with the officer corps and conscripts, who had hoped for early demobilization after the 
liberation of Khorramshahr.24
Overall, the proponents of launching an invasion seem to have won out for several reasons. 
Firstly, the string of impressive victories over the Iraqis between March and May had exceeded the 
most optimistic predictions of the Iranian High Command. The results boosted expectations about 
the efficacy of any future offensive - even if it meant invading Iraqi territory. Khomeini and his 
supporters smelled blood, believing that one more decisive battle in Iraq would prove Saddam 
Hussein's undoing. Secondly, on the ideological level, since victory seemed within grasp, the 
prospect of establishing an Islamic regime in Baghdad was quite attractive. Thirdly, Khomeini's 
personal animosity towards the Iraqi leader must have figured to some degree in his final decision25 
Fourthly, from an ethical standpoint, the continuation of hostilities made sense, because the 
aggressor had not been punished. The war had assumed a moral dimension, portrayed as a "just 
war" in order to secure peace in the future. Taking into account the recently consolidated Syrian- 
Iranian alliance, which now had an economic stranglehold over Iraq, and Assad's decision to refuse 
major Iranian participation in the Lebanon war, the resumption of offensive operations against the 
Iraqis seemed to be the logical plan of action - both for pragmatic and ideological purposes. Syria's 
refusal to allow Iran to carry out an Islamic crusade against the Israelis in Lebanon meant that only 
through the continuation of the Gulf War would Iran have a means and outlet to export its revolution
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and channel its missionary zeal. Despite reports and official statements made by Syrian officials that 
they would reconsider their relationship with Iran if Arab Iraq was invaded, such declarations seem 
highly suspect. In all likelihood, they were hollow words to allay the Arab fears that Damascus was 
supporting a non-Arab country's intention to invade another Arab state.
THE IRANIAN INVASION OF IRAQ AND SYRIAN REGIONAL DIPLOMACY
The available evidence clearly indicates that there was a strong difference of opinion within the 
Iranian leadership about the wisdom of continuing the Gulf War. Furthermore, one can only 
speculate about the nature of the deliberations between Syria and Iran between June 7 and 17, and 
the critical meeting of the SDC on June 22. If Damascus had consented to a large-scale Iranian 
intervention in the Lebanon War, the position of the "doves" in the Gulf War debate definitely would 
have been strengthened, and the course of history in the region might have been totally altered. 
Moreover, considering Hafez Assad's cool-headedness and meticulous approach to formulating and 
implementing policy even in times of crisis, he must have had strong reservations about the 
usefulness of Iranian participation in the Lebanon War and known that denying Tehran a prominent 
role in Lebanon would bolster the position of the Iranian hardliners who advocated the toppling of 
Saddam Hussein and the Iraq Bath. It is interesting to note that the majority of statements made by 
Iranian officials between June 6 and 22 about Tehran's posture towards Iraq and Israel were quite 
vague. Immediately following the crucial SDC meeting on June 22, Iranian policymakers made 
numerous declarations explicitly stating and articulating their future policy in the Gulf and Lebanon.
On June 29, Saddam Hussein announced that all Iraqi forces had been withdrawn from 
Iranian soil and had taken up defensive positions in Iraq. (In reality, they still occupied at least 550 
square miles of Iranian territory in certain areas in order to prevent possible Iranian thrusts towards 
Baghdad and southern Iraq).26 On the same day, the Iranian foreign ministry issued a statement 
explaining that Iran would "continue its honourable war against Saddam's regime... until the sources 
of fire of the Iraqi forces are silenced and an honorable peace is secured."27 Following a meeting 
with Iranian Speaker of Parliament Rafsanjani, the Soviet charge d'affaires and the head of the 
Libyan People's Bureau (on the exact same day), the Syrian ambassador in Tehran stated that 'The 
President of Syria agrees with the recent remarks by the Imam [Khomeini] about the Iran-lraq war, 
namely that the problem with Iraq should be sorted out first and then it will be the turn of the Zionist 
regime..."28
Preparations were already underway to launch a major offensive in southern Iraq. On July 
6, just one week before the first major operation in Iraq, Defense Minister Colonel Mohammad Salimi 
declared that "a push into Iraqi territory had become inevitable."29 In light of the events in Lebanon, 
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ahmad Azizi justified the decision by positing that the only way for 
Iranian forces to reach Lebanon and fight the Israelis was to cross Iraqi territory once the enemy had 
been defeated - thereby ensuring the security of Iran against any possible future aggression.30 
Echoing a view similar to that held by the Syrians, Azizi also severely criticized Soviet "silence" and 
inaction towards the crisis in Lebanon.31
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As Iran made preparations to take the offensive once again, there was a flurry of diplomatic 
activity in the pro-Iraqi camp to cement ties between Baghdad, Cairo and Amman. On July 5, Iraqi 
Justice Minister Mundhir Ibrahim al-Shawi paid a visit to Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Cairo. 
During their talks, the Iraqi envoy officially extended an invitation to the Egyptian leader to attend 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit, which was scheduled to be held in Baghdad between 
September 6 and 10.32 Jordan's King Hussein flew to Baghdad a few days later to coordinate 
activities and improve avenues of cooperation with the Iraqis.33
Finally, on July 11, in a very telling interview with the Islamic Republican Party daily, 
Jomhuri Islami, Prime Minister Musavi clarified the official government position with regard to the 
Gulf War by enunciating that:
"we have a right to take any measure deemed necessary to protect our country, 
create real security and obtain reparations for war damages. It is a religious 
obligation for us to fight against injustice and aggression. If the Islamic Republic 
were to sue for peace at a time when none of our conditions are fulfilled, [it] would 
be like strangling the revolution with our own hands."34 
Two days later, on July 13, Iran launched its first major offensive into Iraqi territory. The operation, 
codenamed "Ramadan al-Mubarak" (Blessed Ramadan), was executed in three phases and lasted 
until August 3. The primary objective was to breach the Iraqi defenses east of Basra, seize the key 
port city and count on a spontaneous Shi'ite uprising in the south against the Bathi government. 
Despite inflicting heavy losses on the Iraqis and occupying some 180 square miles in the southern 
sector, the offensive proved to be a disaster35 The Iranians failed to overwhelm the Iraqis, who 
stood their ground on the outskirts of Basra and repulsed the invaders. In addition to suffering 
substantial losses, the clerical establishment in Tehran was greatly disappointed by the fact that 
there was no Shi'ite rebellion.36
When the offensive began in mid-July, Baghdad also reported border skirmishes between 
Iraqi and Syrian ground forces and renewed Syrian air force activity along their common frontier37 
The failure of Operation Ramadan came as an immense disappointment to officials both in Tehran 
and Damascus. It prompted them to redouble their efforts to destabilize the Iraqi regime internally. 
In order to orchestrate their joint strategy, the Chief of Syrian Air Force Intelligence, General 
Mohammed al-Khouli, and two high-ranking military intelligence officers were dispatched to Tehran 
to coordinate their activities with Iranian officials and representatives of the Iraqi Al-Dawa party. Al- 
Khouli's two companions remained in Iran in order to facilitate planning and cooperation with their 
Iranian counterparts and the Iraqi opposition.38 This led to the intensification of sabotage and 
subversion in Iraq and abroad. In early August the Iraqi Ministry of Planning in Baghdad was 
carbombed, while the Iraqi embassy in Paris was also attacked.39 A primary goal of this joint Syrian- 
Iranian effort was to create an unsafe atmosphere in Baghdad in order to prevent the convening of 
the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) summit.40
Both regionally and internationally, Operation Ramadan was a major political watershed 
since it transformed the whole nature of the conflict and how it was perceived by various actors. It
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demonstrated that the Islamic Republic was bent on exporting its revolution, toppling the Iraqi Bath 
in the process and radically altering the political map of the Middle East. It forced the moderate Arab 
states, France and the United States to throw their weight behind Iraq even more, and forced the 
Soviet Union to critically reassess its pro-Iranian stance and realign itself in order to prop up Saddam 
Hussein. On the domestic level, Iran's failure to capture Basra clearly demonstrated the resilience of 
the Iraqi armed forces in rising to the occasion to defend their homeland, rallied popular support 
around the Bath and illustrated that the Iraqi Shi'ites were unwilling to collaborate with their Persian 
co-religionists in the conflict.41
The fall of Khorramshahr had initially caused the Gulf Arabs and Egyptians to become 
somewhat reluctant to aid Iraq and be outspoken in their support for their Arab brethren. However, 
the successful Iraqi defense of Basra changed the situation.42 In an interview with the London-based 
daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat in Riyadh, immediately following the Iranian defeat in Phase I of Operation 
Ramadan, Egyptian Deputy Minister and Foreign Minister Kamal Hasan Ali said that Cairo would 
continue to provide military hardware and supplies to Iraq. He went on to criticize Syria's conduct in 
the Lebanon and Gulf conflicts43 As early as mid-July, Iraq's staunchest ally, King Hussein of 
Jordan, referring to the Israeli invasion of Lebanon and the Iranian invasion of Iraq, called for an 
emergency Arab summit meeting to discuss "the fateful challenges facing the Arab nation." He 
lashed out at Iran, accusing it of complicity with Israel. He denounced Iran's Operation Ramadan, 
claiming that it gave Israel a carte blanche to do as it wished in Lebanon.44
Indeed, Jordan and other Arab states concerned about Iran's intransigence were presented 
with a golden opportunity to voice their concerns and urge greater inter-Arab cooperation and 
solidarity at the Fez II summit in September. In the period leading up to the summit meeting there 
was some degree of diplomatic activity among members of the anti-Iraq bloc. A few days prior to 
the summit, Hafez Assad received Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ahmad Azizi and discussed 
regional developments and bilateral ties. Concurrently, Algerian Foreign Minister Dr. Ahmed Taleb 
Ibrahimi arrived in Tehran and held talks with Iranian officials.45 The purpose of these meetings 
seems to have been to harmonize positions on regional issues. Before discussing Syria's 
participation at the Fez conference and Syrian-lranian cooperation in the closing months of 1982, it is 
necessary to look at Syrian policy in Lebanon during the summer.
SYRIA'S CONFRONTATION WITH ISRAEL AND IRAN'S LEBANON POLICY
As mentioned earlier, although Damascus had observed the Israeli military build-up along the 
Lebanese border in the two months preceding the invasion, it was clearly surprised by the scale and 
scope of the attack. Only on June 8, the third day of Operation Peace in the Galilee, did the Syrians 
finally decide to make a stand and fight against an advancing Israeli armoured speartiead at the 
strategically-located crossroad town of Jezzine (dominating the axes leading to the Shouf Mountains, 
the Bekaa Valley, Sidon and southern Lebanon).46 In the three days that followed, there was intense 
fighting between the Israeli and Syrian forces along the three major axes of the Israeli thrust north, 
and in the air. By June 11, when Menachem Begin finally accepted an American ceasefire proposal,
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and subsequently announced a unilateral cessation to hostilities, the Syrian forces in Lebanon had 
suffered an enormous blow. Within a 72-hour period, the IDF had knocked out some 400 Syrian 
tanks, 90 combat aircraft, 100 artillery/missile batteries and 70 armoured vehicles, and inflicted 
about 1,900 casualties.47 Assad knew that both qualitatively and quantitatively he was outmatched. 
Despite incurring heavy losses, the Syrians had not been routed. The bulk of their forces remained 
intact.48 Assad's decision to engage the Israelis had been a carefully calibrated response, to avoid 
the two possible scenarios that Saddam Hussein had hoped would materialize. Avoidance of a 
confrontation with the invading army would have enabled him to save most of the Syrian forces in 
Lebanon, but would undoubtedly have brought an end to Syrian dominance over the country and 
greatly diminished Assad's prestige and influence both at home and throughout the Arab world. On 
the other hand, if he had committed the majority of his forces to battle and waged a total war against 
the Israelis (as the Iranian clerics had advocated), the Syrian army would have been annihilated and 
would have permanently lost its foothold in Lebanon.49 Moreover, the latter was not considered to 
be a viable option since total war could have led to an Israeli invasion of Syria through the Bekaa 
Valley and the Golan Heights, thus resulting in the loss of Syrian territory and the collapse of the 
Syrian Bath regime itself. Assad's Iranian allies had initially advocated a total war against Israel with 
Iranian participation.50 Assad strenuously objected to such suggestions and instead pursued an 
alternate course of action to preserve Syrian interests in Lebanon as much as possible, and deliver 
limited blows to the Israelis in the process.
The June 11 ceasefire gave Assad some breathing space to regroup and reinforce his 
troops. Immediately, the elite Third Armored Division, which was equipped with advanced Soviet- 
made T-72 tanks, was moved into Lebanon and took up defensive positions in the Bekaa. Once the 
deployment was complete, the IDF never again attempted to make further advances along Its 
eastern front. Furthermore, Damascus' decision to bring crack commando battalions into the fray in 
the early days of the invasion stymied Israeli efforts to reach the Shouf and the Beimt-Damascus 
highway by the June 11 ceasefire. Overall, the IDF's inability to achieve its objectives rapidly and 
the unexpectedly stiff resistance of the Syrian defenders persuaded Israeli military planners to shift 
their forces away from the east and concentrate on pushing towards Beirut and the Beimt-Damascus 
highway along the western and central axes.51 Between June 12 and 25, the IDF resumed its 
advance towards Beirut and the international highway (on the pretext that the Palestinians and 
Syrians had violated the ceasefire) and eventually succeeded in gaining control of the highway and 
laying siege to the Lebanese capital. According to some reports, some Iranian soldiers were fighting 
alongside Palestinian units in West Beirut52 There were claims by Tel Aviv that several hundred 
were also involved in clashes with the IDF in the Syrian-held Alei (Alayh) district, southeast of Beirut 
in the central sector.53
On June 25, the Israeli government again announced a unilateral ceasefire due to pressure 
from the Reagan administration and the fact that Tel Aviv had attained its operational objectives by 
reaching Beirut. The primary goal now was to eliminate the PLO infrastructure in Beirut and facilitate 
the establishment of a Maronite government in Lebanon (freed from the shackles of Syrian and
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Palestinian dominance) which would be willing to sign a peace treaty with the Jewish state.54 The 
IDF subsequently commenced a siege and simultaneous bombardment of the city to achieve the 
desired outcome. Trapped within West Beirut were some 14,000 Palestinian fighters, Syrian troops 
and Shi'ite Amal militiamen. The Syrian forces were primarily composed of the 85th Infantry 
Brigade, together with the Palestine Liberation Army's Hittin and Qadisiyah brigades. Ayatollah 
Khomeini spoke out against the "deadly silence” in the Arab world, and the failure of many Arab 
states to send troops to stem the Israeli invasion. He called on them to join the ranks of Syria, Iran 
and the PLO to defend the dignity of Islam in the face of the "Zionist" onslaught.55
Despite massive artillery and aerial bombardment by the Israelis, which lasted until mid- 
August, the defenders put up an unexpectedly determined resistance. With a ceasefire in effect on 
all other fronts, Damascus took advantage of this period to rebuild and upgrade its armed forces with 
the assistance of the Soviet Union. In addition, Assad was content to see the IDF tied down in a 
brutal campaign of trying to force the defenders into submission by destroying parts of the city and 
killing civilians - in the process bringing international condemnation of its actions.56 Finally, in mid- 
August, US envoy Philip Habib hammered out an agreement between the two sides for the 
withdrawal of the Palestinians and Syrians from Beirut under the supervision of a multinational force 
comprised of Western troops. The evacuation began on August 21, and was complete by the end of 
the month. While most of the Palestinians departed for other Arab countries by sea, the six 
thousand remaining Syrian and PLA soldiers withdrew via the Beimt-Damascus highway to the 
Bekaa and Syria.57
By the beginning of September, Assad's fortunes were at a low point; within a period of three 
months his power and influence had plunged to new depths. A significant portion of the Syrian 
forces in Lebanon had been destroyed - clearly demonstrating the inferiority of its conventional 
capabilities, large parts of the country had been lost to the enemy, and Syria's prestige and image 
had been severely tarnished. To make matters worse, on August 23, the pro-Israeli Phalange party 
leader Bashir Gemayel was elected as the new Lebanese President. Furthermore, to add insult to 
injury, US President Ronald Reagan enunciated the Reagan Plan, which proposed the creation of a 
Jordanian-Palestinian confederation that included the West Bank and Gaza Strip. No mentioned 
was made of Syria or the Golan Heights. Having been rendered militarily impotent by the Israelis, 
faced with a political fait accompli in Lebanon, and isolated in the Arab world, Assad drew up a 
strategy to recoup his regional power and standing. The first step was to attend the Fez II summit in 
early September.
THE FEZ II SUMMIT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES
As discussed in the previous chapter, Syria had boycotted the Amman summit in November 1980 
and only sent a low-level delegation to the Fez I summit the following year. However, due to its 
weak and vulnerable position after the initial phase of the Lebanon War, Syria felt obliged to attend 
Fez II in order to avoid the risk of even greater criticism and isolation in the Arab world.58 The 
highlight of the summit was a four-hour meeting on September 8, attended by Hafez Assad and
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Saddam Hussein at the behest of King Hussein, King Fahd, King Hassan of Morocco and the Emir 
of Kuwait, all of whom were present at the meeting. It resulted in Assad's acceptance of a strongly- 
worded pro-Iraq resolution on the Gulf War and agreement to meet again with the Iraqi leader (in the 
presence of the Saudi monarch) within two months.59 Syria's acceptance of the resolution reflected 
its weak and awkward position due to its painful predicament in Lebanon and "deviant" behavior in 
supporting Persian Iran.60 Although both the state-controlled Syrian and Iranian media omitted all 
references to this particular section of the final statement, the Iranian foreign ministry nonetheless 
condemned the Arab summit, since it claimed that the final statement recognized the Jewish state.61
Immediately after the summit, Hafez Assad dispatched his close aide and political confidant, 
Information Minister Ahmad Iskandar Ahmad, and Deputy Foreign Minister Nasir Qaddur to Tehran 
to reassure the Iranian leadership of Damascus' commitment to the alliance and continued support 
for Iran's "firm and principled stand." They met with President Khamene'i, Speaker of Parliament 
Rafsanjani and other officials over a two-day period. Ahmad apparently defended Assad's decision 
to meet with Saddam Hussein by describing the meeting as mere protocol and politically 
insignificant.62 In an official statement, before his departure from Iran, he declared:
"We consider the Iranian revolution the most important event in the second half of 
the 20th century. We also consider it a positive development in this age. This 
revolution has turned the Iranian people and capabilities from an alliance with Israel 
and enemies into an alliance with the Arabs, struggling with us against Zionism and 
US imperialism for the sake of liberating holy Jerusalem."63 
The overall tone of his statement seemed somewhat apologetic. He admitted that Iran's 
denunciation of the Fez resolution was justified and said that the mutual animosity between Baghdad 
and Damascus left no room for dialogue or compromise until one of the two Bathi regimes had been 
overthrown.64
In general, Syria's participation and conduct in the Fez summit demonstrated the degree to 
which its political clout and room for maneuver had decreased since the defeat in Lebanon. 
However, at the very least it needed to play an active role in Arab political fora to prevent a further 
slide into isolation - and perhaps banishment from the Arab fold. Its military inferiority and political 
isolation in the Arab world meant that it now needed revolutionary Iran more than ever in order to 
undo Tel Aviv's achievements in Lebanon. Political exigencies in the region necessitated even 
closer cooperation with the Islamic Republic, now that its Persian ally on the ascendant had taken 
the war into Iraqi territory. Syria's collaboration with Iran was no longer for the purpose of enabling 
the latter to stave off defeat in the Gulf war, but to maintain pressure on Bathi Iraq and utilize Iranian 
support and influence in Lebanon to thwart Tel Aviv's ambitions.
SYRIA'S "SWORD AND SHIELD" STRATEGY IN LEBANON
By September 1982, Assad was facing numerous obstacles which apparently seemed 
insurmountable. Having tasted bitter defeat in his military confrontation with Israel, waging a 
conventional war was no longer a viable option. At the same time, he was now confronted with a
80
sizeable Israeli military presence in Lebanon, a new government in Beirut which did not share his 
goals and concerns and an American administration which perceived him as a Soviet puppet and 
was vehemently opposed to Syrian policy in the region in every respect. Despite the complexities of 
the situation, Assad devised a simple two-pronged strategy which would seek to minimize the risk of 
further escalation or a direct military confrontation with Israel and the United States, and 
concomitantly roll back the IDF. Assad's policy consisted of two components (one for offensive 
purposes and the other for defensive aims), hereafter referred to as the "Sword and Shield" strategy, 
which was very much dependent on the goodwill and assistance of Syria's two primary allies - Iran 
and the Soviet Union.
The political linchpin of the "sword and shield" strategy to buttress Syria's position vis-3-vis 
the Bashir Gemayel regime, Israel and the United States was Syria's special relationship with its 
superpower patron, the Soviet Union, and its main regional partner, Iran. From September 1982, the 
Syrians embarked on a policy to use Iran's influence over the Lebanese Shi'ite community and 
collaborate with their two Shi'ite allies to wage a campaign of terrorism, subversion and guerrilla 
attacks against their mutual opponents. The use of unconventional warfare as an offensive 
instrument served as the "sword" in Syrian strategy. Damascus took advantage of its role as 
Moscow's only major ally in the region to demand Soviet-made conventional arms to replenish its 
losses from the war and achieve "strategic parity" with Tel Aviv over the long term. Thus, the Soviet 
re-supply effort for the modernization and expansion of the Syrian armed forces was aimed at 
building a conventional deterrent, which would acted as the "shield" in the overall scheme. In 
addition to putting their ties with Iran and the Soviet Union to good use, the Syrians also mobilized 
other political and sectarian groupings within Lebanon to wage war against the Israeli forces. In the 
words of Patrick Seale:
"His [Asad's] first priorities were to encourage guerilla harassment of Israel in 
Lebanon, while racing to rebuild Syria's own armed strength. He was not ready for 
an immediate confrontation. In preparing to subvert Israel's designs, he had to lie 
low and lull his opponents into believing he was finished."65 
The first significant incident occurred on September 14, when a tremendous blast ripped through the 
headquarters of the Phalange Party, killing President Bashir Gemayel and more than thirty of his 
associates. Subsequent events revealed that the explosive device had been planted in the building 
by a clandestine member of the Syrian Social Nationalist Party who had been activated by Syrian 
intelligence. The assassination came as an immense shock to the Israeli leadership, who had 
pinned much hope on establishing a close working relationship with the new Lebanese President. 
With one stroke, one of the main pillars of the Pax Hebraica, which Menachem Begin had 
envisioned, was dismantled. Although not known for possessing pro-Israeli credentials, Bashir 
Gemayel's brother, Amin, who was elected a week later, was the best the Israelis could hope for 
under the circumstances. By now, though, the process of gradually denying the Israelis the fruits of 
their initial military victory had been set into motion. Syria's patient planning and close collaboration 
with Iran and the Lebanese Shi'ites, coupled with egregious acts committed by Israel and its allies,
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encouraged the Shi'ites to resist the imposition of an Israeli-Maronite diktat.
The Syrian-lranian Axis and the Lebanese Shi'ite Community
Ironically, in the initial phase of Operation Peace in the Galilee, the majority of Lebanese Shi'ites 
were relieved by the expulsion of the Palestinians from the south, and indeed welcomed the Israelis 
as liberators. Palestinian heavy-handedness and arrogance throughout the years had alienated 
many of their Shi'ite "Arab brethren," who by 1982 had lost sympathy for the plight of the 
Palestinians.66 In fact, in the early days of the invasion the mainstream Shi'ite Amal movement 
denounced the Israeli attack, but did not call for a military confrontation or a popular uprising against 
the IDF.67 As a consequence of the destruction of the PLO's infrastructure in the south and the 
evacuation of its forces from Beirut in August 1982, the Shi'ite militias were able to strengthen their 
presence in West Beirut and other parts of the country. Amal in particular was able to maintain a 
powerful and disciplined force.68 Two major developments in this period, however, turned the Shi'ite 
community against the IDF and the Gemayel government. Firstly, once it became clear that the 
Israelis intended on staying indefinitely, coupled with their brutal conduct in areas that they occupied 
(which were predominantly Shi'ite), local resistance slowly began to grow with Syrian and Iranian 
encouragement.69 Secondly, following the Israeli withdrawal from Beirut (which had been a pre­
condition for the return of the Multinational Force) in late September, the American-supported 
Lebanese Army entered West Beirut to reassert control over the remainder of the city. However, its 
mistreatment of the Shi'ite inhabitants led to ferocious clashes with Shi'ite militiamen.70 Guerrilla 
activity against the IDF began to increase in south Lebanon, the most notable instance being the 
destruction of the IDF staff headquarters in the southern city of Tyre on November 11, when sixty- 
seven Israelis were killed.
By now, there was a clear convergence of interest between Damascus and Tehran to 
mobilize the Lebanese Shi'ite community against their pro-American Maronite overlords in Beirut 
and their Israeli occupiers. Syria's relationship with Iran began to pay dividends, since the need to 
"unsheathe the Lebanese Shi'ite sword" overlapped with Tehran's mission to export the Islamic 
revolution and deal a decisive blow to "Zionism and American imperialism."71 By this juncture, there 
were reported to have been some 2,000 Iranian Revolutionary Guards stationed in the city of 
Ba'albek in the Syrian-held Bekaa valley region. They made their presence felt when, on November 
22, a contingent of 300 men took over the town hall in Ba'albek and attacked the Lebanese army 
garrison in the town.72 Lebanese Foreign Minister Elie Salem summoned the Iranian ambassador, 
Hojjatolislam Musa Fakhr-Rouhani, and lodged an official protest, demanding an immediate Iranian 
pull-out from the area and threatening to sever diplomatic ties.73 The Iranian ambassador flatly 
denied any Iranian involvement, and Iranian President Khamene'i subsequently insisted that the 
Revolutionary Guards would remain in Lebanon.74 By now, the Iranian Revolutionary Guards had 
forged close links with radical Shi'ite groups in the area, particularly with Hussein Musawi's Islamic 
Amal organization. Musawi, a Lebanese of Iranian descent, had previously been the military 
commander of the parent Amal movement.75 In the aftermath of the Israeli invasion, he broke away
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and formed his own group in the Bekaa with Syrian and Iranian support. He differed with Amal 
leader Nabih Bern over the ideological orientation of the movement. While Berri espoused the 
traditional Shi'ite position of loyalty to the Lebanese state and religious plurality within the framework 
of the existing political system, Musawi saw the Lebanese political structure and identity as 
fundamentally flawed and artificial. Instead, he advocated the mass mobilization of the Shi'ites 
towards the fulfillment of an Islamic revolution and the emulation of the Iranian theocratic state 
model.76
Contrary to the wishes of the Gemayel government, Tehran eventually bolstered its 
presence by dispatching more Revolutionary Guards to the Bekaa via Syria. They subsequently set 
up a radio station and intensified their efforts to proselytize and indoctrinate Lebanese Shi'ites. None 
of this could have taken place without, at the very least, the tacit cooperation of Damascus.77 The 
Iranians and Islamic Amal also succeeded in spreading their influence to the Shi'ite neighborhoods of 
West Beirut.78
As Tehran sought to expand its foothold in Lebanon with the assistance of the Syrians and 
Shi'ite radicals, Damascus concomitantly mobilized many of the other political parties that could 
prove to be beneficial in the struggle against Begin's grand strategy. These consisted of some of the 
key players in Lebanese politics, such as the Druze Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Lebanese 
Bath Party, the Lebanese Communist Party and the various other Shi'ite groups.79 While the result 
of these efforts was not immediately noticeable, they would have an enormous impact on the course 
of the political struggle in Lebanon the following year.
SYRIAN-IRANIAN COOPERATION AND THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
Although the Syrians had cautioned their Iranian allies that they would not condone an Iranian 
invasion of Iraq and would seriously reconsider their ties with Tehran, Syrian policy did not change in 
the aftermath of Operation Ramadan. In fact, Syria continued to send Soviet-made weapons to 
Iran.80
In the aftermath of Fez II, which brought strong Arab condemnation of Iran, the clerical 
regime in Tehran continued to nurture its friendship with Damascus, despite some disappointment 
with Assad's impotence and lackluster performance at the Arab summit81 From the Iranian 
perspective, with victory within grasp and Iraq's incessant attempts to portray the war as a historical 
continuation of the Arab-Persian conflict, it was imperative to maintain cordial ties and a close 
working relationship with Arab Syria, for both ideological and practical purposes. Moreover, this was 
also necessitated by the growing cooperation between Iraq and Egypt in military affairs, and the poor 
state of relations between Iran and many of the Gulf states, particularly Saudi Arabia. Saudi-lranian 
relations suffered during the Hajj season, when Iranian pilgrims were involved in clashes with Saudi 
security forces in the holy city of Mecca. There were mutual recriminations, and bilateral relations 
deteriorated even further82
After a two-month lull on the warfront, Iran finally resumed the offensive on October 1, when 
Operation Muslim Ibn Aqil was launched in the central sector (near the town of Mandali), aimed at
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advancing towards the Iraqi capital. Again, the Iraqis held their ground and blunted the Iranian 
assault.63 During the Iranian offensive, the Sudan, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and North Yemen 
expressed their solidarity and support for Iraq. Furthermore, a high-level Jordanian delegation 
headed by King Hussein visited Baghdad in the midst of the hostilities to discuss various avenues of 
cooperation between the two sides.84 With Iran determined to prosecute the war to the very bitter 
end and Israel's ostensible victory in Lebanon, the Amman daily AJ-Dustur, in an article on October 
25 reflecting opinion in official government circles, called for ending Egypt's banishment from the 
Arab fold since it was detrimental to Arab interests and would only benefit the enemies of the Arab 
nation.85
On November 1, the Iranians undertook their last major offensive operation of the year, in 
the south. Codenamed "Muharram al-Harram," the main objective of the attack was to cut the 
Baghdad-Basra highway and establish a bridgehead to serve as a springboard for further offensive 
operations against Basra. In spite of some success in capturing the Bayat oilfield and destroying an 
Iraqi armored brigade, the attackers failed to attain their primary goal, advancing only five miles in 
seven days of heavy fighting.86
Meanwhile the war of words between Tehran and Riyadh intensified. For example, in a 
radio broadcast from Riyadh on November 10, the commentator tried to arouse nationalist and 
religious sentiments by arguing that:
T h e  only factor in the continuation of this war is Iran's insistence and stubbornness 
in continuing the fighting...Today, Iraq stands in firm confrontation with plans that 
have been made by the enemies of Arabism and Islam who have chosen the 
Iranian regime to implement them. There is no way to thwart those plans and foil 
them, except by supporting Iraq financially and militarily in order to destroy the 
Iranian war machine..."87
Iranian ripostes broadcast on Tehran's Arabic service bitterly criticized Saudi Arabia's "unlimited 
support" for Saddam Hussein, accusing it of being a lackey of the United States in the region.88 A 
propaganda campaign was also waged against the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, claiming 
that since the outbreak of the Gulf War they had rewarded Baghdad with financial aid to the tune of 
$45 billion.89 In an editorial which appeared in the Iranian daily Ettela'at on December 1, the GCC 
was characterized as a military security pact for propping up decadent, repressive regimes, which 
served as a substitute to CENTO to further Washington's interests.90
Tehran's growing isolation from its Arab neighbors in this period required forging closer links 
with its few remaining Arab allies - namely, Syria and Libya. During a visit by Libyan Secretary for 
Foreign Liaison Abd al-Ati al-Ubaydi to Tehran in early December, he declared that the "least 
punishment appropriate for Saddam is his overthrow," and that Libya would assist Iran in the war "in 
any way necessary."91
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THE DETERIORATION OF SOVIET-IRANIAN RELATIONS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE SYRIAN- 
IRANIAN ALLIANCE
As mentioned in the previous chapter, despite an operative Treaty of Friendship with Iraq, the Soviet 
Union had not favored that country's invasion and occupation of Iranian territory in September 1980. 
Consequently, Moscow suspended arms shipments to Iraq soon after the outbreak of the war. The 
Kremlin also perceived this as a golden opportunity to win over Iran, the key strategic prize in the 
Persian Gulf area.92 However, with the expulsion of Iraqi forces from Iran by mid-1982, and the first 
Iranian offensive against Basra in July, Moscow expressed its displeasure with Iran's continuation of 
the conflict. The Kremlin's subsequent failure to persuade the Iranian regime to accept a negotiated 
settlement led to the resumption of Soviet arms deliveries to Iraq.93 This resulted in a marked 
deterioration in Soviet-lranian relations. By the autumn of 1982, Iraq began firing Soviet-built Scud- 
B and Frog-7 surface-to-surface missiles at Dezful, Ahwaz and other Iranian border cities.94 Iran's 
state-controlled media carried scathing criticisms of the Iranian Communist Party (the Tudeh) and 
Soviet foreign policy.95
During the same period, the Soviet vice-consul in Tehran, Vladimir Kuzichkin, defected to 
British intelligence with documents revealing the extent of Soviet and Tudeh penetration of Iran. The 
British subsequently provided this information to the Iranian government. The Tehran regime 
eagerly embarked on a massive crackdown to destroy the Soviet-Tudeh network.96 By February 
1983, the entire leadership and hundreds of members of the Tudeh Party were arrested and charged 
with spying for the Soviet Union 97 In April, 18 Soviet diplomats were summarily expelled. By the 
following month, the Tudeh had been officially banned and the Soviet embassy staff had been 
reduced by half. In December of the same year, ten top members of the Tudeh were executed, after 
being tried and charged with infiltrating the armed forces and providing military secrets to the Soviet 
Union.98 Within a matter of a few months, the entire Tudeh infrastructure and the painstakingly 
developed Soviet network were destroyed.99 Besides the internal crackdown on pro-Soviet 
elements, the government continued its anti-communist media campaign and started to provide 
substantial amounts of aid to the Afghan guerrilla movements.
The marked deterioration in Soviet-lranian relations during this period also affected Syria's 
ties with both its superpower patron and its Iranian ally. While Assad's dependence on Moscow grew 
noticeably in the aftermath of the defeat in Lebanon, he was able to strengthen his position vis-a-vis 
the Kremlin and demand additional military assistance due to the rupture in Soviet-lranian relations 
at a time when Soviet-lraqi ties were just beginning to thaw. Furthermore, the Kremlin could ill afford 
to ignore the plight of its only major regional ally at a time when Washington was pursuing an activist 
policy in the Middle East and supporting Israel in order to diminish Soviet power and influence in the 
area.100 The breakdown in cooperation between the USSR and the Islamic Republic also increased 
the value and utility of the Syrian-lranian axis from Tehran's viewpoint. Iranian enmity towards both 
superpowers meant that greater emphasis would have to be put on forging even closer ties with 
regional allies such as Syria. Concomitantly, Damascus' role assumed even greater importance in 
both Tehran and Moscow since it could serve as an intermediary between the two parties.
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The Syrians for their part undertook efforts to prevent any further worsening in Soviet- 
lranian relations, partly to avoid being trapped in an awkward position between their two closest 
friends.101 Indeed they embarked on a policy to bring about a Soviet-lranian rapprochement. 
However, by March 1983, their efforts proved to have fallen short of initial expectations.102 Syrian- 
Iranian relations became somewhat strained by Damascus' decision to grant some Tudeh members 
political asylum in Syria. Furthermore, the revolutionary clerics in Tehran did not look kindly on 
Moscow's attempts to reconcile existing differences between Syria and Iraq.103
THE EMERGENCE OF THE EGYPTIAN^JORDANIAN-IRAQI AXIS AND SYRIA'S REGIONAL 
DIPLOMACY
By the end of 1982, there were unmistakable signs that Egypt was gradually making inroads into the 
Arab world. Major steps were taken towards cementing relations with Jordan and Iraq. On 
December 9, Egyptian Foreign Minister Boutros Boutros-Ghali visited Amman, bearing a message 
from Hosni Mubarak for King Hussein.104 Concomitantly, in a statement published in the Egyptian 
daily Al-Ahram on December 28, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz declared that "the Arab structure 
could not be straightened without Egypt." He went on to explain that the enemies of the Arab nation 
had failed in their efforts to isolate Egypt and underscored Baghdad's willingness to restore 
diplomatic relations with Cairo.105 Furthermore, Aziz announced that he would be prepared to meet 
high-ranking Egyptian officials in Cairo, Baghdad or anywhere else to discuss the resumption of 
bilateral relations. This elicited a positive response from the Egyptians. From their perspective, an 
Egyptian-lraqi rapprochement was an important stepping stone towards their eventual reintegration 
into the Arab world.106
Indeed, in the latter half of 1982, the continuation of the Gulf conflict and Iran's incessant 
attempts to penetrate deep into Iraqi territory proved to be the single most important catalyst for 
Egypt's gradual return to the Arab fold. Besides the growing cooperation between Cairo and 
Baghdad, and the material assistance given to Iraq, both sides tried to portray their mutual 
coordination to thwart Iranian ambitions in terms of pan-Arab interests and condemned renegade 
Arab states such as Syria for stabbing the Arab nation in the back. For example, in his Army Day 
speech, Saddam Hussein bitterly criticized Syria's "collusion with the [Arab] nation's enemies" and 
warned that Iran's actions to prolong the war were "not only a plot against Iraq, but against the Arab 
nation, Arab civilization and the Arabs' entire security and future.''107 In an interview which appeared 
in the Arab press, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak also denounced Iran's Arab allies - Syria and 
Libya. He singled out Syria in particular, pointing out that "it is unbecoming of Syria to stand with 
Iran against Iraq. The Syrians at least should have played the role of mediators."108 Concurrently, in 
mid-January, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah undertook an initiative to bring about a Syrian-lraqi 
rapprochement, shuttling between Baghdad and Damascus. His objective was two-fold: to convince 
Syria to change its stance in the Gulf War to one of benevolent neutrality, thereby reopening the 
trans-Syrian pipeline and consequently boosting Iraq's position economically and, secondly, denying 
Iran its most valuable Arab ally - translating into a major psychological and political blow to Tehran.
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According to Saudi calculations, delivering such a coup de grace could induce Iran to accept a 
ceasefire.109 In the meantime, King Hussein also visited Iraq and other Gulf Arab states in order to 
rally support for Baghdad's cause, while Syria's foreign minister toured the Gulf sheikhdoms to 
prevent the emergence of a sizeable Arab bloc to neutralize the Tehran-Damascus axis.110 During 
his talks with King Fahd, Khaddam rejected outright an offer from the Saudi monarch to mediate and 
arrange a meeting between the Syrian and Iraqi heads of state. Moreover, a generous Saudi offer to 
make a $2 billion payment in return for the reopening of the trans-Syrian (IPC) pipeline was also 
turned down.111
Instead, to the chagrin of Riyadh, Syria organized a high-level meeting in Damascus in late 
January, intended to rally some Arab support for Iran's position in the Gulf war.112 On January 20, 
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati and Libyan Justice Minister Muhammad al-Zouai arrived in 
Damascus for a tripartite meeting to harmonize their policies and positions on a whole host of 
issues.113 Upon his arrival,, Velayati immediately went into conference with Hafez Assad.114 
Meetings were also held between Syrian Foreign Minister Khaddam, his Iranian counterpart and the 
Libyan emissary. After three days of talks, a joint Syrian-lranian-Libyan communique was issued on 
January 23, calling for Arab solidarity with Iran and the overthrow of Iraqi President Saddam 
Hussein.115 Moreover, it once again reiterated Syrian and Libyan support for the Islamic Republic 
and emphasized the need to reactivate the Steadfastness Front, to "confront instigations by 
imperialism and Zionism," and the vital contribution of Iran to its cause.116 In addition, the strongly- 
worded communique condemned the invasion of Lebanon and stated the authors' intention to 
provide financial and material support to the Lebanese resistance to terminate the Israeli 
occupation.117 The participants also denounced "all attempts aimed at forcing the PLO to make 
concessions diametrically opposed to the just struggles and legitimate objectives of the 
organization...[and] attempts by imperialism and Zionism to create a Baghdad-Cairo axis in order to 
confront the revolutionary forces in the region."118 The tripartite declaration opposed any actions to 
resuscitate the peace process as an extension of the Camp David Accords and any "attempts to 
return Egypt to the Arab fold and Islamic organizations unless [it rejected] the treacherous Camp 
David Accords."119
The tripartite meeting in Damascus undoubtedly came as a major disappointment to Riyadh 
in light of its strenuous efforts to induce the Assad regime to abandon its alliance with Iran. 
However, from the Syrian viewpoint, it made sense to bolster cooperation with Tehran and Tripoli. 
Support for Iran was crucial in order to check Iraqi regional ambitions and ensure that Saddam 
Hussein and the Iraqi Bath did not emerge unscathed from a conflict that they had initiated in the 
first place. Furthermore, Assad was not about to allow Washington to regain the initiative by 
implementing its strategy of hammering out a peace treaty between Israel and Lebanon and drawing 
both the Palestinians and Jordanians into negotiations with Tel Aviv. His intentions were to erode 
Yasser Arafat's power base by propping up rejectionist factions within the PLO who were engaged in 
a power struggle with Fatah, obstruct American plans in Lebanon to secure a peace agreement 
between Beirut and Tel Aviv and block or at the very least weaken the power and influence of the
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emergent Cairo-Amman-Baghdad axis which had Washington and Riyadh's blessing.120
The Damascus Tripartite Communique drew harsh reactions from Baghdad and Amman. 
They accused the Syrian and Libyan regimes of betraying the pan-Arab cause and jeopardizing the 
security of the Arab nation by lending support and encouragement to "a war of expansionist Iranian 
ambitions..."121 Besides attacking Damascus' and Tripoli's stance on the Gulf War, Iraq requested 
the Arab League in Tunis to take measures against Iran's two Arab allies to punish them for their 
collusion with the Islamic Republic.122
At a time when Iranian influence was waning in the Arab world, and more states were 
rallying to Iraq's support, the Damascus Tripartite Declaration represented a limited, but nonetheless 
important symbolic victory for the clerical regime in Tehran, giving it a psychological boost and 
enabling it to dismiss anti-Iranian Arab propaganda about the Gulf War being a continuation of the 
historical Arab-Persian conflict. Syria also took other measures to aid its Iranian ally to prosecute the 
war and preserve its growing presence in Lebanon. Damascus seems to have successfully 
mediated an arms-for-oil deal between Tehran and Pyongyang, and turned down a request by US 
envoy Philip Habib to expel the Iranian Revolutionary Guards operating in the Bekaa valley 
region.123
IRAN’S WINTER MILITARY AND DIPLOMATIC OFFENSIVE AND SYRIA'S ROLE
By early 1983, the hardliners on Iran's SDC led by Khomeini representative Rafsanjani were 
pressing for renewed military operations on Iraqi soil as soon as possible. Despite strong 
reservations expressed by the military high command, the radical camp believed that one more 
decisive engagement would turn the tide of the war. The military commanders were loath to carry 
out an offensive in inclement weather and use unorthodox "human-wave" tactics which would result 
in high casualties and possibly not yield any substantive results. The insistence of the hawks was 
largely based on the domestic conditions within Iraq, which led them to believe that the country was 
on its last legs.
Indeed there was some merit to their aiguments at the time. Inside Iraq, general morale 
was low since the country had lost the initiative in a conflict which it clearly could not win, and was 
now stuck in an endless war against a relentless foe. With a population one-third of Iran's, it could 
not sustain a high rate of casualties. On the economic front, the destruction of its oil installations in 
the Gulf and the inoperability of the trans-Syrian pipeline meant that it could only export just over 
600,000 b/d of oil, while Iranian production had bounced back to 3.2 million b/d in the winter of 
1983.124 In both Baghdad and Tehran, policymakers were convinced that time was on Iran's side. 
Therefore, once again, the hawks on the SDC prevailed over the better judgement of the military 
commanders and, on February 6, the Iranians launched Operation Wal-Fajr (At Dawn) in an attempt 
to seize the southern town of Amara on the Basra-Baghdad highway. After several days of heavy 
combat which cost both sides 7,000 to 15,000 casualties, the fighting ended in defeat for the 
Iranians, who failed to attain their objectives and incurred many more losses than the Iraqi 
defenders.125
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The failure of Wal-Fajr was a significant turning point in this stage of the war, since the 
military brass now forcefully advocated the cessation of major offensive operations and the 
transformation of the conflict into a war of attrition. In the subsequent SDC deliberations the military 
commanders finally prevailed by arguing that exerting steady but limited pressure along the entire 
650-mile front would force the Iraqis to overstretch their already scarce resources to the point that 
they would snap under the strain. In the aftermath of Wal-Fajr, Tehran undertook other offensive 
operations during 1983, but on a much more limited scale as the military had prescribed.126
In the days leading up to the Wal-Fajr attack, Syrian Information Minister Ahmad Iskandar 
Ahmad arrived in Tehran bearing a message from Hafez Assad for Ali Khamene'i. He also held 
talks with Prime Minister Musavi and Speaker Rafsanjani.127 At this juncture, to complement the 
resumption of military operations in early 1983, Tehran also initiated a diplomatic offensive with 
Syrian assistance. Following deliberations with Iranian officials, Syrian envoy Ahmad flew to Riyadh 
to reassure the Saudis that Iran's ambitions did not extend beyond toppling Saddam Hussein. 
Exporting the revolution to the Gulf sheikhdoms was not part of its plans. While Iranian envoys had 
assuaged the concerns of some Gulf states in recent visits, the Saudis had been particularly irked by 
Iran's policies in the Gulf and conduct in OPEC.128 In a speech reflecting the general Iranian position 
towards the Gulf states, Rafsanjani elucidated that:
"the Islamic Republic is generally against aggression against other countries, and 
particularly neighbouring Muslim countries. The concept of exporting revolution is 
not one of resorting to force to impose the revolution on others...[The least we 
expect is for the Persian Gulf countries] to maintain their neutrality if they do not 
want to defend justice... so that we can justify our forgiveness of these sins."129 
In the disappointing aftermath of Wal-Fajr, Tehran and Damascus continued their cooperation and 
attempted to coordinate their actions more closely in order to prevent further erosion in their overall 
regional position. In late February, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Ahmad Azizi was dispatched to 
Damascus by President Khamene'i for consultations with Hafez Assad.130 The following month, in 
light of the rapid deterioration of Soviet-lranian relations, reports indicate that Syria tried to mediate 
between the two parties; however its efforts proved futile.131 With regard to military cooperation 
against Iraq, it is worth noting that by early 1983, Syrian military personnel had established a 
permanent presence at the General Headquarters of the Iranian Ministry of Defense, where they 
gave advice and intelligence on Iraqi military strategy, tactics, planning, training and the use of
4 0 0
Soviet weaponry.
By the early spring, Tehran and Damascus had stepped up their efforts to revitalize and 
intensify their collaboration in various ways. A new oil agreement was negotiated in early April. 
Under the terms of the new deal, Iran agreed to provide 5 million tons of crude oil to be paid for by a 
combination of hard currency and barter, and an additional one million tons of oil free of charge. 
Tehran justified the generous gift as a contribution to the Syrian confrontation with Israel in Lebanon. 
Although the original agreement negotiated the previous year had stipulated that Iran export 8 
million tons of oil to its Arab ally, Syria had been unable to keep up with the payments under the
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terms of the deal.133
Once the agreement had been concluded in Tehran, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati flew 
to Damascus, where he held talks with Hafez Assad on "bilateral relations and issues of common 
interest.” Subsequent reports indicated that Syria allowed Iran to increase its presence in the Bekaa 
area.134 By now, Assad was ready, with the assistance of Tehran, to take decisive action to spoil the 
grand design that Washington and Tel Aviv had in mind for Lebanon. He was determined to resist 
what he perceived as a "US-lsraeli diktat" with the political backing of Iran and the military support of 
the Soviet Union.135
THE CHANGING CALCULUS OF POWER AND THE LIMITS OF THE SYRIAN-IRANIAN 
ALLIANCE
While Iran exerted efforts to mend fences with the Gulf Arab states during this period, Iraq and Egypt 
tried to consolidate their budding friendship. Baghdad for its part lobbied for the readmission of 
Egypt into the Arab League, indicated its willingness to recognize Israel based on conditions laid out 
in the Fez II resolution and signalled its approval of PLO-Jordanian efforts to move the peace 
process forward.136 In a significant move on January 7, the foreign ministers of Egypt and Iraq met 
for the first time in four years. Following their discussions, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz praised 
Egypt for its solidarity and support for his country in the Gulf War.137 A month later, Egyptian 
Foreign Minister Boutros-Ghali and Undersecretary and Director of the President's Office for Political 
Affairs, Dr. Usamah al-Baz, flew to Baghdad (on the last leg of a trip to Amman and Beirut), where 
they were received by Saddam Hussein. Boutros-Ghali conveyed a message from Hosni Mubarak 
"expressing Egypt's solidarity with Iraq in its war against the Iranian regime's aggression, which [had] 
Iraq and the Arab nation as its target."138 Ironically, the more Tehran tried to pursue the military 
option in it war with Iraq, the more impetus it gave for the rapprochement between Egypt and Iraq 
and the formation of the Egyptian-Jordanian-lraqi axis, and consequently led to the gradual 
diminution of Syrian-lranian power and influence in the Middle East.
Tehran's overall policy for the prosecution of the war after the spring of 1982 was essentially 
flawed - on both the tactical and strategic levels. The more radical faction within the government led 
by Ayatollah Khomeini and Hojjatolislam Rafsanjani overestimated Iran's ability to score major 
victories using unorthodox methods of warfare (such as human-wave tactics and tapping into the 
revolutionary fervor of the volunteers and guards), and also Iran's conventional military capability. In 
addition, they underestimated the resilience and determination of the Iraqis to defend their 
homeland. Although one can only speculate in retrospect, if General Zahir-Nejhad's advice to 
launch offensive operations using conventional tactics after sufficient training of recruits and careful 
planning had been heeded, the military situation in 1983 might have been radically different. The 
hastily planned and poorly executed Iranian offensives between July 1982 and February 1983 not 
only proved futile, but more importantly, in the political sense raised fears among members of the 
pro-Iraqi camp, prompting them to take drastic measures in order to avert an Iranian victory. The 
growing Egyptian military assistance had a major impact on Iraq's military capability. Politically, the
90
war served as a catalyst for Iraq, Jordan and, to a lesser degree, Saudi Arabia to put aside their 
differences with Egypt and coordinate policies in response to the challenge posed by the ascendant 
Syrian-lranian alliance. By February 1984, when Iran finally gave up on the war of attrition and 
reverted to launching major offensives, the calculus of power - both politically and militarily - had 
noticeably shifted in Iraq's favor. In reality, Iran's window of opportunity to deliver a decisive blow 
against its foe militarily in set-piece battles had been closed.
Conversely, Syria learned from its costly defeat by the Israelis in June 1982. Between 
September 1982 and April 1983, Assad lay low feigning total paralysis both in the military and 
political sense. He husbanded scarce resources and gradually rebuilt his conventional forces with 
the aid of the Soviet Union in order to assume a credible defensive posture against Washington and 
Tel Aviv. Concurrently, Damascus cultivated ties and forged close links with various groups in 
Lebanon which shared its animosity towards the United States, Israel and the Gemayel government. 
Many of these groups, with Iranian support, would eventually serve as the primary offensive 
instrument to thwart the efforts of their foes in Lebanon, without directly involving the Syrian and 
Iranian regimes in the tug-of-war which followed between 1983 and 1984. By the spring of 1983, 
Assad had strengthened his position to a degree that he felt confident to pick up the gauntlet in 
Lebanon.
THE SYR1AN-IRANIAN STRUGGLE IN LEBANON
Although the Persian Gulf region had been the predominant area for Syrian-lranian activities 
between 1980 and 1982, by the spring of 1983 Lebanon became a major arena for Syrian-lranian 
cooperation against their mutual foes, especially the United States, the Gemayel government, Israel 
and, to a lesser extent, France. While Syrian objectives in Lebanon were quite apparent, Iran's aims 
and ambitions were multi-fold, more complex and less tangible. From the very outset of the Israeli 
invasion, Tehran had been eager to play an active and prominent role in the unravelling Lebanese 
state. The Islamic Republic saw the war-torn land as an appropriate theater to export its revolution 
by proselytizing the local Shi'ite population, fight against Israel and its Western backers, cooperate in 
a meaningful way with its most valuable Arab ally, enhance its bargaining position vis-d-vis Syria 
(since the Syrians had been the dominant partner in the alliance after the Iraqi invasion of Iran) and, 
in terms of bolstering its ideological position and for propaganda purposes, explode the pro-Iraqi 
myth that the Islamic Republic was pursuing policies similar to those of Pahlavi Iran to subjugate the 
Arab nation.
The chief coordinator of Iranian activities in Syria and Lebanon was Tehran's ambassador to 
Damascus, Hojjatolislam Ali Akbar Mohtashami. His main Syrian contact was Brigadier-General 
Ghazi Kan'an, head of Syrian military intelligence (G2 Section) in Lebanon. With Syrian 
acquiescence, Iran was able to maintain some 1,500 Revolutionary Guards in the Bekaa Valley. 
The Iranian contingent worked intimately with local radical Shi'ite groupings such as Hussein 
Musawi's Islamic Amal and Hezbollah (the Party of God), led by Abbas al-Musawi and Sheikh Subhi 
al-Tufayli. In addition to paramilitary personnel, the Iranians brought clerics to the area to expose the
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local inhabitants to their brand of religious and ideological indoctrination.139 Although Bathi Syrians 
did not share revolutionary Iran's vision of turning Lebanon into an Islamic republic, they were 
severely constrained after their military defeat at the hands of the IDF and therefore needed Iranian 
assistance to coopt the largest sectarian group - the Shi'ites - as part of their strategy to wage a proxy 
war against the Israelis in Lebanon.
By March 1983, there were noticeable signs that Shi'ite activity was brewing in the Bekaa. 
In one incident, Islamic Amal militiamen and Iranian Revolutionary Guards clashed with Lebanese 
troops in the town of Brital, in which four Lebanese soldiers, including one colonel, were wounded.140 
The Iranian Revolutionary Guards and their Shi'ite Lebanese allies also attacked the Lebanese 
Army barracks in Ba'albek.141 Concomitantly, some Iranian and Islamic Amal personnel infiltrated 
the Shi'ite suburbs of Beirut, where they commenced operations against the Western powers 
supporting the Lebanese regime.142 Pro-Iranian Shi'ite militiamen skirmished intermittently with 
troops of the Multinational Force (MNF), particularly members of the American and French 
contingents. The number of these instances increased in March and April.143 However, the coup de 
grace came on April 18 when a truck laden with explosives blew up the US embassy in Beirut, killing 
at least 63 people. Among the dead were the senior CIA Middle East expert, Robert Clayton Ames 
(Director of the CIA's Office of Analysis for the Near East and South Asia), the CIA station chief, his 
deputy and other agency personnel and support staff. Apparently, a secret meeting of CIA officials 
and agents was in progress when the blast occurred. In all, some nine CIA personnel - virtually the 
entire intelligence team in Beirut - was annihilated in one stroke.144 Ironically, Ames, who had been 
a former CIA station chief in Beirut and was visiting Lebanon to investigate the new phenomenon of 
Shi'ite political activism and terror, ended up an unwitting victim of it.145
Although an unknown group called Islamic Jihad (Holy War) claimed responsibility for the 
attack, the consensus among the diplomatic community in Beirut and in Western capitals was that it 
had been perpetrated by radical pro-Iranian Shi'ites supported by the Syrian and Iranian 
governments.146 Tehran was quick to deny any involvement, but most of the evidence which 
emerged subsequently revealed that the operation had been masterminded by Iran with Syrian 
complicity.147
The bombing of the US embassy did not have an immediate impact on the course of events 
in Lebanon. However, both symbolically and psychologically it unnerved the US government (and 
boosted the confidence of its foes), since the incident clearly demonstrated that the main foreign 
benefactor of the Gemayel regime and Israel could not effectively protect its own interests in the 
war-torn land. The death of Robert Ames, who had served as US Secretary of State George 
Shultz's right-handman on Middle Eastern affairs, was a major loss for the Reagan administration. 
Without his key adviser, Shultz was uncertain about the future course of action and overall policy to 
safeguard and promote US interests in the region.148 While the Reagan administration's primary 
objective was to broker a bilateral peace agreement between Israel and Lebanon, Assad was 
determined to throw as many obstacles as he could in Washington's path to prevent the fruition of a 
deal. By now the whole thrust of Assad's diplomacy - and Soviet Premier Yuri Andropov's, for that
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matter - was to force the US and Israel to accept their view that peace could only be achieved 
through collective bargaining and a comprehensive settlement involving all parties, not "piecemeal" 
measures such as bilateral treaties.149 Indeed, the fact that Washington went to extensive lengths to 
enable the Israelis to achieve their goals in Lebanon, and its tendency to view and interpret regional 
developments through the prism of Cold War politics, coupled with Syria's military defeat at the 
hands of the IDF and the deterioration of Soviet-lranian relations, prompted Andropov to take 
decisive steps to prop up his Arab ally militarily, as the possibility of another Syrian-lsraeli 
confrontation began to loom on the horizon.150
Following the Israeli-Lebanese Peace Agreement on May 17, Assad reacted by raising the 
stakes in the confrontation against Israel. Syrian ground forces held maneuvers near the Golan 
Heights, and other units near the Israeli and Lebanese borders were put on alert. In addition, the 
Syrian military presence in Lebanon and near the Bekaa was beefed up to 50,000 men. Damascus 
vehemently opposed the agreement, charging that it rewarded Israel's aggression in Lebanon by 
granting it political and security concessions.151 Assad deliberately upped the ante by daring the 
Israelis to assault his new protective "shield." Concomitantly, he unsheathed the "sword" by 
unleashing pro-Syrian Lebanese and Palestinian guerrillas against the IDF in Lebanon. There was a 
significant increase in the number of armed clashes between the Israelis and the pro-Syrian fighters 
in the month of May. Compared to the previous month, IDF casualties doubled from about 40 to 80. 
Assad was now fighting a war of attrition in Lebanon on his terms, determined to bleed the IDF 
gradually at a time when public opinion within Israel was becoming more and more disillusioned with 
the war and the wisdom of maintaining a military presence in Lebanon.152
As the proxy war intensified during the summer, on the political front, Syria took certain 
measures to bring about a coalition opposed to Amin Gemayel. These efforts culminated in the 
formation of the National Salvation Front on July 23, composed of Walid Jumblatt's Druze 
Progressive Socialist Party (PSP), the Maronite ex-president Suleiman Franjieh and Sunni leader 
Rashid Karami. The new front would soon prove to be a vital instrument for the Syrians in their bid 
to dislodge the Lebanese Army from Mount Lebanon, once the IDF had withdrawn from the region to 
the Awali river in the south.153 The inability of the Israeli forces to prevent the outbreak of recurrent 
clashes between Druze and Christian militias in the Shouf Mountains and their failure to broker a 
ceasefire between the warring parties left Tel Aviv with no recourse but to withdraw to more 
defensible positions twenty-two miles south of Beirut along the Awali river in early September.154 
Powerless to affect the outcome of the fighting or secure an agreement with the Druze for the 
replacement of the IDF presence by the pro-Gemayel Lebanese Army, Israel's decision to redeploy 
its forces signified the crumbling of another pillar of its grand strategy in Lebanon.155 The withdrawal 
also coincided with renewed attempts by the Gemayel regime to reassert its control over West Beirut 
and the suburbs in the south. These efforts were vigorously resisted by the Shi'ites, who were 
subsequently joined by Druze and Sunni militiamen, in fierce clashes against the US-backed army 
units. The fighting, which was described as the largest engagement in the history of the Lebanese 
army, lasted four days, resulting in the partial rout of the anti-government militias. Although the army
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was able to restore control over the heart of West Beirut, It was unsuccessful in driving the Shi'ite 
fighters out of the southern sections and suburbs of the city.156 The Shi'ite Amal militia, which by 
now boasted some 10,000 seasoned fighters, was well supplied with arms by Syria, Iran and, 
indirectly, by the Soviet Union.157 The battle for West Beirut marked a major turning point in the 
character of the conflict in Lebanon; the Shi'ites were now at the forefront of the struggle against the 
central government.158
At this juncture, Assad clearly sensed that the tide was turning and seized the initiative to 
reassert control over Lebanon through his various proxies and allies. With the IDF withdrawal from 
the Shouf mountains, the Druze launched a full-scale offensive to neutralize the Christian militias in 
the region that had been armed during the occupation by the Israelis and re-establish control in an 
area which they had traditionally viewed as part of their domain. The Druze, with the support of 
Palestinian, Syrian and Iranian fighters and heavy equipment provided to them by the Syrian army, 
were able to overwhelm the Christian militias very rapidly. The Lebanese Forces of Samir Geagea - 
the main opponents of the Druze in the "Mountain War" - were forced to retreat in haste. The only 
serious effort to resist the Dmze onslaught was at the town of Behamdoun, where again the positions 
of the Christian forces were quickly overrun.159 Within a matter of days the Dmze and their allies 
had scored an enormous victory by seizing the Shouf and Alei regions (to the south and east of 
Beirut). Alarmed by the Dmze victory, the government dispatched the predominantly Christian 
Eighth Brigade of the Lebanese Army, commanded by General Michel Aoun, to hold the key town of 
Souk el-Gharb on the southeastern approach to East Beirut and the presidential palace at Ba'abda. 
Having reached the outskirts of the capital, the Dmze subsequently provided artillery support for the 
Shi'ite militiamen who were still fighting the Lebanese army units in the southern and western
districts of the city.160 A convergence of interest among the Dmze and the Shi'ites, along with Syrian
161encouragement, led to the emergence of a Dmze-Shi'ite alliance in a very short time. During the 
first week of September, Damascus raised the stakes by announcing its intention to call for a 
complete political, economic and military boycott of the Gemayel government at the next Arab 
summit conference.162
As the fighting intensified in the early half of September, the Dmze artillery batteries shelled 
MNF positions in Beirut, resulting in the death of four American and French soldiers. Paris reacted 
angrily, threatening to retaliate by striking at the Dmze artillery emplacements in the mountains, and 
accused Damascus of indirect involvement in the attacks. Washington also expressed concern for 
the safety of its marines and pointed the finger directly at the Syrians for fomenting hostilities against 
the MNF contingents.163 In the immediate aftermath of the shelling of the Marine barracks at the 
Beirut International Airport, US Navy ships off the coast of Beimt shelled Dmze positions in 
retaliation on September 8.164 This led to an escalating spiral of violence as Dmze batteries 
promptly responded once again by bombarding US Marine positions in the same area in the days 
that followed.165
By the middle of the month, the fighting was primarily focused around the strategic town of 
Souk el-Gharb, still held by the Lebanese army. As the battle for this key position raged on, with
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repeated assaults being repulsed by the Lebanese government forces, the Dmze were reinforced by 
pre-Syrian Palestinian, Iranian and Syrian fighters. In one particular clash, a 90-man army unit of the 
crack 82nd Brigade was overwhelmed by a much larger force of Syrians, Palestinians and 
Iranians.166 By the time the melee had ended, two-thirds of the Lebanese army unit had been 
annihilated. Reports that Syrian army troop carriers were transporting hundreds of these fighters 
from Ba'albek to the frontlines to assist the Dmze greatly alarmed officials in Washington and Paris, 
who now were considering air strikes to prevent the fall of Souk el-Gharb.167 Moreover, news that 
the Dmze had penetrated the town's defenses caused panic among American and Lebanese 
officials, prompting them to take drastic measures to prevent its capture.168
In the aftermath of airstrikes by the Lebanese air force against Dmze forces in the vicinity of 
Souk el-Gharb which proved to be ineffectual, American warships shelled anti-government 
strongholds in the same area between September 17 and 21.169 With the United States now a de 
facto co-belligerent in the conflict, tensions rose to new heights as Syria threatened to retaliate if 
American forces continued to attack its allies in Lebanon.170 As the fighting in and around the capital 
intensified, the French also joined the fray after six of their soldiers were wounded in two separate 
incidents. Super Etendard aircraft from the earner Foch, off the Lebanese coast, bombarded artillery 
batteries behind Syrian lines.171 Concurrently, US warships continued to pound anti-government 
positions as they maintained their pressure on the Lebanese Army and the American marine 
contingent near the airport.172 Eventually, the escalating cycle of attacks and counterstrikes was 
broken through the mediation of Saudi envoy Prince Bandar bin Sultan. The cessation of hostilities 
on September 25 paved the way for the convening of the National Reconciliation Conference in 
Geneva.173
In many respects the three-week battle for the Shouf was the turning point in the Syrian 
struggle with Israel and the United States for control of Lebanon. Unable to achieve its goals or 
stomach further losses, Tel Aviv's decision to withdraw from the region immediately created a 
political vacuum which was quickly exploited by Assad and his allies. By September 24, pro-Syrian 
forces were in control of virtually the entire Shouf. The expulsion of the Phalange Party and the 
Lebanese Forces from their strongholds in the area, and the failure of the Lebanese army 
intervention to tip the scale, sounded the death knell of the US-lsraeli scheme in Lebanon. 
Abandoned by the Israelis, the Gemayel regime was left to fend for itself in Beimt with the partial 
backing of the MNF.174 The Syrians took advantage of the ceasefire to reinforce their proxies in 
Lebanon.175
Hopes for the beginning of a national reconciliation were quickly dashed as former President 
Suleiman Franjieh made the cancellation of the May 17 Israeli-Lebanese Agreement a pre-condition 
for attending talks between the warring factions. The other members of the pro-Syrian National 
Salvation Front - Walid Jumblatt and Rashid Karami - had only demanded that the abrogation of the 
agreement should be at the top of the agenda, not a pre-requisite for peace talks. Concomitantly, in 
early October, there were renewed clashes in southern suburbs of Beimt between the Lebanese 
Army and pro-Iranian Shi'ite fighters.176 The fighting intensified as the month progressed with the
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pro-Iranian militiamen targeting the Lebanese army and MNF troops. Recurrent attacks on the US 
Marine positions at the airport resulted in nine American casualties within a period of four days. By 
now both the US Marine Commander, Colonel Geraghty, and the Lebanese government pointed the 
finger at the pro-Iranian group, Hezbollah.177
Since September 17, when the guns of the USS Virginia had opened fire on pro-Syrian 
forces in order to avert the fall of Souk el-Gharb, the US forces had in effect become an involved 
party in the civil war. No longer fulfilling their role as peacekeepers, they were drawn into the conflict 
even further. By this stage, Washington was no longer perceived as an impartial mediator but, 
instead, as one of the main architects of the treaty with Israel and the primary outside power trying to 
perpetuate Maronite domination in Lebanon.178 America's active involvement in the conflict now 
provided Syria, Iran and their Lebanese allies with an irresistible opportunity to cooperate closely to 
deliver a devastating blow to American power and prestige in the Lebanon, and concomitantly 
aggrandize their own position at the expense of their foes. On October 23, a suicide bomber drove a 
truck filled with explosives into the US Marine compound at Beirut airport in the early morning hours 
while most of the troops were asleep. Two hundred and forty-one American military personnel were 
killed in the what was later assessed to be the biggest non-nuclear explosion since the Second World 
War.179 A few minutes after the blast, the headquarters of the French MNF force in Beirut was also 
demolished in a similar fashion, taking the lives of fifty-seven French paratroopers. Washington was 
quick to pin the blame on Tehran and Damascus. US Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger 
suggested that 'There is a lot of circumstantial evidence...but there is much that points to the 
direction of Iran."180 US Secretary of State George Shultz went a step further the day after the 
bombing, when he told a closed-door Senate meeting: "Iranian elements in Lebanon operate from 
behind Syrian lines and are allied with Syria. Syria must bear a share of the responsibility for any 
Iranian actions in Lebanon whether or not Syria knew of any specific terrorist plans."181 By the end of 
the month, President Reagan confidently declared: "I think the evidence that I have is sufficient that 
this last horrendous act involved Iranian terrorists and they were facilitated in their entry and in the 
provision of munitions by the Syrians."182
Both Iran and Syria were quick to deny involvement in the bombings, and instead attributed 
them to the "heroic resistance of the Lebanese people" against the US Marines and the MNF, who 
were waging "a real war against the Lebanese national forces..." Although the Islamic Jihad 
organization, which had carried out the bombing of the US embassy, claimed responsibility for the 
two attacks, most observers were convinced that Hussein Musawi's Islamic Amal had orchestrated 
the bombings.184 Days after the incidents, US intelligence officials identified Islamic Amai as the 
main perpetrators, with the backing of Syria and Iran. Concurrently, the Lebanese security forces 
began a manhunt for the spiritual leader of the pro-Iranian Hezbollah, Sheikh Fadlallah, since reports 
were circulating that he had blessed the two men who participated in the two suicide missions.185
Despite the steadfast denials of Damascus and Tehran, subsequent revelations clearly 
demonstrated that the two operations were planned and executed with Syrian and Iranian assistance. 
According to the information disclosed, a $50,000 payment was made by the Iranian embassy in
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Damascus to an obscure Lebanese courier named Hassan Hamiz in order to finance the 
operations.186 While the evidence indicated that the head of Syrian military intelligence (G2 Section) 
in Lebanon, Colonel Ghazi Kan'an, was aware of the whole affair, one of his associates, Lieutenant- 
Colonel Diyab, was one of the overall coordinators of the attacks.187 Three days before the 
bombings, a meeting was held at the Soviet-Palestinian Friendship House in Damascus, where the 
details were discussed. One of those present was none other than Sheikh Fadlallah.188
With regard to the Iranian connection in the matter, the intelligence was somewhat sketchy, 
but several figures seem to have been associated with providing support for the activities of radical 
Shi'ite groups in Lebanon. Besides the instrumental role of Iran's ambassador to Damascus, 
Hojjatolislam Ali Akbar Mohtashami, in overseeing Iranian activities in Syria and Lebanon, Deputy 
Foreign Minister Hussein Sheikholislam was involved in the supervision of the bombings against the 
US embassy and the MNF barracks. The fact that he appeared in Damascus two days before the 
bombing of the US embassy in Beirut, and again four days prior to the attacks on the MNF 
contingents, could not have been sheer coincidence.189 Although the official purpose of 
Sheikholislam's visit in October was to discuss the Syrian-lranian oil trade, he is suspected of having 
gone to Lebanon to visit the Iranian Revolutionary Guards and give final approval to Hussein Musawi 
for the planned attack on the MNF forces, apparently with the full knowledge and cooperation of the 
Syrians.190 He was scheduled to stay in Syria until at least October 24; however, he abruptly 
departed for Iran on October 22 - one day before the Beirut bombings.191 Reports also suggested 
that a shadowy Iranian figure who had been sent to Lebanon in 1982, codenamed "Abu Muslih”, 
engineered the suicide attacks with Syrian assistance.192 Other Iranians who may have had some 
role in the planning of the explosions were Iran's military attach^ in Damascus, Hussein 
Ahromizadeh, who served as the main liaison between the embassy and the Iranian bases in 
Ba'albek and Zebdani (the latter being in Syria), and Ayatollah Khomeini's personal representative in 
Syria, Seyyed Ahmad Fehri, who enjoyed close and intimate links with Syrian officials and Lebanese 
Shi'ite activists.193
An important Lebanese Shi'ite militant who played a key role in these activities was Abu 
Haidar Musawi (perhaps a relative of Islamic Amal leader Hussein Musawi). According to US 
military sources, he had close links with Damascus and Tehran and provided logistical support for 
the October attacks.194 Not surprisingly, following the bombings, Hussein Musawi held a press 
conference, where he denied having any role in the attacks, but praised the two "martyrs" for their 
actions against the American and French forces.195 Hezbollah leader Sheikh Mohammed Yazbek 
also saluted the suicide bombers for delivering a decisive blow against American and French might 
and arrogance.196
By early November, the political situation in Lebanon had come to a head, with a military 
showdown of some sort clearly inevitable. Syria's obstinacy on the need to abrogate the May 17 
Agreement and indirect harassment of the MNF prompted Washington to augment its naval force in 
the eastern Mediterranean to a total of 30 warships and 300 earner-based aircraft. The Reagan 
administration, convinced that Musawi's followers had orchestrated the suicide bombings with Syrian
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and Iranian complicity, now conferred with the Gemayel government and its other allies about 
various options for retaliating against pro-Iranian and Syrian forces in Lebanon.197 With the prospect 
of a military confrontation with the United States seemingly imminent, Syria assumed a war footing 
by calling up its reserves as part of a general mobilization.198 The Iranian foreign ministry also 
issued a statement underscoring its support for Syria in light of the overt threats made by the United 
States and Israel to use force in Lebanon. According to the statement:
"Iran once again emphasizes its unstinting support for the fraternal country of Syria 
and all the Muslim and revolutionary Lebanese and Palestinian forces, and 
announces that...side by side with her Syrian, Palestinian and Lebanese brothers, it 
will defend their legitimate rights with all its power and remain at their side until the 
last aggressive soldier has been expelled from the region."199 
In addition to the growing confrontation between the Syrian-lranian axis and the US-French- 
supported Gemayel government, tensions gradually rose to new heights in southern Lebanon 
between the Israelis and the Shi'ites. A unique situation emerged, which was once again exploited to 
the maximum by Damascus and Tehran from late 1983 onward. As the constellation of forces 
arrayed against the Gemayel government and his backers gradually began to overwhelm them, the 
tide was also turning against the Israelis in the south. On October 16, while some 50,000 Lebanese 
Shi'ites were commemorating Ashura - the martyrdom of the Prophet's grandson Hussein - in the 
town of Nabatiya, violence erupted when an IDF convoy made an ill-timed and clumsy effort to cut 
through the enormous procession. The deaths of some of the mourners at the hands of the Israelis 
only added insult to injury. Incensed by the incident, the Shi'ites of the south stepped up their 
guerrilla activities against the IDF in the weeks that followed, slaying some 40 Israeli soldiers by the 
end of the year.200
In the most notable instance, on November 4, a truck crashed through the gate of the IDF 
headquarters in Tyre and blew up the building. In all, some twenty-nine Israeli soldiers were killed. 
Once again, the finger was pointed at pro-Iranian Shi'ite radicals operating from behind Syrian 
lines.201 In an uncharacteristic manner, retribution did not follow swiftly after the attack. Tel Aviv 
finally decided to conduct air strikes against two training camps in the Bekaa Valley used to train 
Shi'ite militants on November 15.202 The Israelis claimed that retaliatory raids were initially 
postponed due to their assumption that the United States was planning to hit radical Shi'ite 
strongholds to avenge the deaths of the US Marines.
In the aftermath of the Israeli raids, US officials stated that it was highly improbable that the 
US would take similar action, since the Israeli operations made the need for such measures by the 
United States superfluous. Moreover, they tried to make an unconvincing case that Washington had 
no prior knowledge of Israeli intentions and that Tel Aviv was not partially acting on their behalf.204 
By all accounts, American inactivity at this crucial point could be attributed to the divergence of 
views within the US administration about the wisdom and efficacy of air strikes. In light of the recent 
US invasion of Grenada, Washington's stance on the deployment of Pershing missiles in Western 
Europe and the growing involvement of the US MNF in the Lebanese civil war on the side of the
98
Maronite-dominated central government, those who had advocated caution had prevailed - at least 
for the moment - over the more hawkish elements who argued for launching air strikes. The 
administration did not want to give its Western allies the impression that it was all too willing to use 
military force in every international crisis, and furthermore did not want to give members of the Arab- 
Islamic world the impression that it was their primary enemy.205
Some 36 hours after the Israeli raids, fourteen French Super Etendard and Crusader fighter- 
bombers from the carrier Clemenceau bombed the Sheikh Abdullah barracks on the outskirts of 
Ba'albek, and the Khawwam hotel in the town housing Islamic Amal militiamen and Iranian 
Revolutionary Guards. Although Paris had vowed to avenge the deaths of its paratroopers 
immediately after the bombing of the French MNF headquarters, the French Defense Ministry 
justified the air strikes as a pre-emptive measure to deter further attacks on its forces in Lebanon.206 
Tehran subsequently admitted that 14 Revolutionary Guards had been killed in the Israeli and 
French raids. However, no accurate details were ever revealed about the number of the Lebanese 
Shi'ite casualties.207
The escalating spiral of hostilities in the latter half of November only served to strengthen 
the Syrian-lranian entente, thereby hastening the formalization of a US-lsraeli strategic partnership 
which had been underway for some time. Washington had initially hoped that it could convince 
Lebanon's warring factions to accept the May 17 Agreement and force the Syrians to withdraw from 
the war-torn land. Within a period of three months, there had been a dramatic reversal of fortune for 
Washington and its regional allies. With the Shouf now under the control of the pro-Syrian Druze 
forces, and the Shi'ites mounting a formidable challenge to the Lebanese Army in Beirut's suburbs 
and intensifying their efforts against the IDF in the south, the position of the Gemayel government 
and the MNF became more precarious as the days passed. By mid-November, the central 
government controlled less than 20 percent of Lebanon, while some 200 US Marines were 
withdrawn from Beirut to naval vessels of the Sixth Fleet offshore.208 As the American position in 
the Middle East began to unravel, the administration scrambled to recoup its losses. US Secretary 
of Defense Caspar Weinberger blamed much of the happenings in Lebanon on the Islamic Republic 
and Bathi Syria. On the subject of the attacks on US forces, he explained that those responsible 
were "basically Iranians with the sponsorship, knowledge and authority of the Syrian government."209
Indeed, as the crisis in Lebanon reached boiling point, Tehran became more vocal in its 
support for Damascus and took substantive measures to harmonize policies between the two allies 
to a greater degree. At a press conference in Tehran on November 21, Foreign Minister Velayati 
emphasized that 'W e regard defending the people of Syria, Palestine and Lebanon in their fight 
against Israel and the imperialist forces as our duty and as one of the strategic objectives of our 
foreign policies."210 A few days later, a delegation headed by Presidential Advisor Mir Salim left for 
Syria and Lebanon to hold talks with Hafez Assad and leaders of pro-Iranian Lebanese groups211
Washington's initial reluctance to risk a major confrontation with Syria, and the diminution of 
the Gemayel regime's power, meant that a new formula would have to be adopted to offset the 
challenges posed to American policy in the region. The Reagan administration took decisive steps
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within a matter of weeks to restore its position.
THE SYRIAN-1 RANIAN CHALLENGE AND THE US RESPONSE IN THE MIDDLE EAST
From the vantage point of US policymakers in the closing months of 1983, the situation in the Middle 
East seemed to be spiralling out of control. By the end of October, the Reagan administration was 
greatly alarmed by a number of important developments, and became painfully aware of the limits 
on American power to directly influence the course of events in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf. 
Damascus' ability to frustrate American policy in the Levant and Tehran's obduracy in continuing the 
war with Iraq prompted the Reagan administration to reformulate certain aspects of its policy, and 
concomitantly accelerated certain trends which had been underway for sometime. In the closing 
months of 1983, Washington pursued a two-pronged approach by cementing its ties with Tel Aviv 
and thawing relations with Baghdad in an overt attempt to confront and effectively neutralize the 
Syrian-lranian threat in the two political arenas.
In reality, after the Shouf mountains had been overrun by pro-Syrian forces, and the 
subsequent demolition of the US Marine barracks by Syrian-lranian agents, the Reagan 
administration critically reassessed its policy and adopted a more defiant political and military 
posture, confident that the Syrians and their allies would eventually back down. The new strategy 
which was articulated in National Security Directive - Number 111 (NSD #111) was the brainchild of 
Secretary of State George Shultz and National Security Advisor Robert McFariane. it was officially 
approved by Ronald Reagan on October 29, despite the objections of Secretary of Defense Caspar 
Weinberger and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.212
It is important to recognize that, in light of the steady stream of advanced Soviet weaponry 
to Syria, the presence of some 7,000 Soviet military advisors in that country and the Reagan 
administration's obsession with viewing the Lebanese crisis through the prism of Cold War politics, 
US interests were now virtually identical to those of Israel.213
Not surprisingly, the first manifestation of the response was the signing of a memorandum of 
understanding with Tel Aviv on strategic and political cooperation on November 29, while Israeli 
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir and Defense Minister Moshe Arens were visiting Washington. The 
agreement between the two long-time allies was more of symbolic significance, aimed at 
demonstrating to Damascus the importance the United States attached to its special relationship with 
the Jewish state. It was also an implicit signal that the Reagan administration was not about to back 
down from its previous position on the Israeli-Lebanese accord and would not exert pressure on the 
Israelis to withdraw their forces from Lebanon before the Syrians, as stipulated in the agreement.214 
The visit by Shamir and Arens was immediately followed by the arrival of Amin Gemayel in 
Washington on December 1. Administration officials could do very little directly to bolster Gemayel's 
position. By this stage, both parties had few cards to play to avert further setbacks. Indeed it was 
little consolation for Gemayel to be informed that he should rely more on the IDF to extend his 
authority over other parts of Lebanon.215
in order to demonstrate clearly US-lsraeli resolve, within a week of the signing of the
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memorandum of understanding, on December 3 and 4, Israeli and American warplanes bombarded 
Syrian troop dispositions east of Beirut. Although the Reagan administration denied any collusion 
with the Shamir government, and justified the attack as an appropriate response to attempts by 
Syrian air defense units to shoot down US reconnaissance aircraft which had overflown the Syrian 
positions, it was quite apparent from the sequence of events that Washington intended to provoke 
the Syrians and subsequently make a clear show of force in order to intimidate them.216 The raids 
were meant to deliver a carefully calibrated blow to Damascus so it would bow to military force and 
accept the US-lsraeli diktat in Lebanon.
Although the US aircraft involved in the attack hit their designated targets, the loss of two 
aircraft, brought down by Syrian air defenses, and the capture of an American airman transformed 
what was considered a successful military operation into a major political and psychological 
achievement for the Syrians, indeed, the incident signified a symbolic defeat for the American 
military establishment. In its first direct military confrontation with the Syrians, US forces had 
incurred losses. Not since the Vietnam War had the United States lost combat aircraft in 
hostilities.217 US vulnerability was further highlighted in the immediate aftermath of the attacks, 
when Druze artillery shelled the US MNF compound, killing eight marines.218 The loss of the two 
warplanes and that of an Israeli aircraft in an earlier incident evinced that Damascus had markedly 
improved its anti-aircraft capability with Moscow's assistance.219 Subsequent reports revealed that 
US and NATO intelligence specialists had underestimated the efficacy of Syrian air defenses.220 By 
now, it had become quite apparent that Assad's "shield and sword" strategy was paying significant 
dividends.
Despite heavy bombardment of Druze positions by US naval warships, the events on that 
fateful day revealed that Washington's gambit to raise the stakes in its confrontation with Syria and 
its allies had failed. The correlation of forces had shifted to Syria's advantage in almost every 
respect; offensive operations by pro-Syrian forces were slowly bleeding the Gemayel government 
and its backers, while Damascus' conventional shield was now unquestionably operational. 
Moreover, Assad was willing to sustain far more casualties than his opponents could stomach221 
Finding itself politically checkmated and left with no meaningful alternative course of action, the 
Reagan administration discontinued air attacks in Lebanon, limiting military operations to the 
occasional naval bombardment of enemy strongholds.
The United States was subsequently greatly alarmed and shaken by a series of suicide 
bombings on December 12, which targeted the US and French embassies in Kuwait and a number 
of other installations. Again, a shadowy organization known as "Islamic Jihad" claimed responsibility 
for the attacks.222 Washington was quick to point the finger at pro-Iranian Arab elements in Kuwait 
who were opposed to French and Kuwaiti support for Iraq in the Gulf conflict, and the overall thrust of 
US and French Middle East policy - particularly in the Lebanon War. It interpreted the bombings as 
part of a broad campaign waged by Tehran and Damascus to unnerve the allies of the Gemayel 
government and Bathi Iraq.223 The day after the Kuwait bombings, Iran's ambassador to the United 
Nations, Said Raja'i-Khorrasani, bluntly stated that continued American involvement in Lebanon
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would result in "further retaliations." He put the blame for the escalation of hostilities squarely on 
Washington and Paris and emphasized that the two powers had "lost whatever claim they had to 
maintaining peace and order there."224
Buoyed by their recent success, the Syrians struck a more defiant posture, again firing on 
US reconnaissance aircraft overflying their positions in Lebanon on December 14. US warships 
responded immediately by pounding Syrian anti-aircraft batteries for several days.225 In the 
meantime, Abd al-Halim Khaddam reiterated his government's demand that the May 17 Israeli- 
Lebanese Agreement should be abrogated before political reconciliation could commence in 
Lebanon. Khaddam met twice with US envoy Donald Rumsfeld, who had been dispatched in order 
to defuse the potentially explosive situation and ease Syrian-American tensions. However, his efforts 
proved to be in vain226 In a clear indication of the weakening of US resolve, Ronald Reagan stated 
for the first time in mid-December that US forces would be withdrawn if Amin Gemayel failed to end
y y j
the factional strife in the country.
The US Overture Towards Iraq in the Overall Equation
It is not incidental that the event which provided major impetus for the Syrian-lranian rapprochement 
- namely, the 1979 Iranian Revolution - also served as an important catalyst for bringing US-lraqi 
relations out of the cold affecting them since the 1967 Arab-lsraeli war. Immediately after the 
overthrow of the Shah, Washington had indicated its willingness to mend fences with Baghdad 228 In 
the subsequent period with the seizure of the US embassy in Tehran and the outbreak of the First 
Gulf War, both sides drew closer together.229 By the end of 1982, with the Iraqi regime locked in a 
struggle for survival with an intractable foe, the Reagan administration had made palpable gestures 
by providing Baghdad with $480 million in agricultural credits and satellite intelligence on Iranian 
troop movements.230 This was followed by a meeting between US Secretary of State George Shultz 
and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz in Paris in April 1983, where the latter urged greater American 
involvement in the Gulf to impede Iranian efforts to prosecute the war.231
It is clear, that by the autumn of 1983, Iraq figured prominently in the formulation of the 
Reagan administration's Middle East policy. The renewed interest and importance attached to Iraq 
could be attributed to a new conception and critical reassessment of American strategy in the region 
in light of a series of major setbacks and alarming developments during this period. In the closing 
weeks of 1983, it had become painfully clear that Washington's bid to impose its own order in 
Lebanon had failed. The Gemayel regime seemed to be on the brink of collapse, Tel Aviv could do 
very little to alleviate the situation, and Washington now seriously began to look for a way to 
extricate itself from the Lebanese quagmire in a face-saving manner. Syria, with Soviet and Iranian 
assistance, had regained the initiative. American power and prestige had suffered a number of 
consecutive blows: the destruction of the US embassy in Beirut, the bombing of the US MNF 
compound and the loss of two warplanes.
While the Reagan administration was desperately scrambling to reformulate policy in the 
Levant, much to its consternation, events in the Persian Gulf also seemed to be taking a turn for the
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worse. With the delivery of the French Super Etendard aircraft to Iraq (which were equipped with 
AM-39 Exocet missiles used to devastating effect by the Argentine airforce against British vessels in 
the Falklands War), Iran threatened to close the Strait of Hormuz if Baghdad attacked Iranian 
shipping in the Gulf (after repeated efforts to dissuade France from proceeding with the deal). In 
November, French officials confirmed that the Iraqi air force had taken possession of the warplanes 
the previous month. The prospect of the war now spilling over into the Gulf itself and causing 
disruptions to the flow of oil to world markets was quite unsettling to US officials. The growing sense 
of helplessness and panic in official Washington circles was reinforced by the Kuwait bombings. 
From the United States' perspective, Iraq could serve as a vital component in its overall Middle East 
strategy to check Iran's revolutionary expansionist tendencies and simultaneously exert pressure on 
its Bathi rival, Syria. US officials were also amenable to a US-lraqi rapprochement due to 
Baghdad's role in facilitating the reintegration of Washington's main Arab ally - Egypt - into the Arab 
camp, its endorsement of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement and its moderation on issues pertaining to 
the Arab-lsraeli peace process.
Although some observers were puzzled by the move, it should have come as no surprise 
that, after failing to ease tensions with Syria following two days of talks in Damascus, US special 
envoy Donald Rumsfeld flew to Baghdad on December 19 to thaw relations with the Iraqi regime. 
Upon arrival, he immediately held talks with Tareq Aziz and subsequently delivered a written 
message from Ronald Reagan to Saddam Hussein. Rumsfeld expressed American readiness to re­
establish full diplomatic relations with Baghdad.233 Washington itself admitted that one of the aims 
of the visit was to wage "discreet psychological warfare" against Syria, which was impeding the 
successful resolution of the Lebanese civil war.234 In addition, the warming of US-lraqi relations was 
intended to "bring the Syrians a little closer to the edge of their seats."235 The move was also 
another means of increasing the pressure on Damascus to withdraw its 40,000 troops from Lebanon 
and expanding American influence among certain Lebanese factions sympathetic to Iraq.236 
Apparently, the discussions also focused on US support for the proposed construction of an Iraqi oil 
pipeline to the Jordanian port of Aqaba to compensate for Syria's closure of the IPC pipeline in April 
1982 237
The Rumsfeld visit was an important historical milestone in the evolution of US-lraqi 
relations which paved the way for the resumption of full diplomatic relations in 1984. Within less 
than a month, Washington had taken decisive measures to strengthen ties with its long-time ally, 
Israel, and subsequently forge closer links with its new Arab ally, Iraq, in order to recoup its waning 
position in the region vis-S-vis the Syrian-lranian axis. The American diplomatic offensive at the end 
of 1983 did not translate into any immediate gains, but laid the groundwork for a new American-led 
strategic consensus in the Middle East which would eventually limit the power and influence of the 
Tehran-Damascus partnership.
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THE FINAL PHASE OF THE SYRIAN-1 RANIAN STRUGGLE AGAINST THE UNITED STATES IN 
LEBANON
While armed clashes continued in Beirut, the Shi'ite resistance in southern Lebanon stepped up its 
activities against the IDF in the latter half of December. The Israeli riposte was to conduct a 
bombing raid of the Sheikh Abdullah barracks in Ba'albek in the early hours of December 21. On the 
same day, two violent explosions rocked the headquarters of the French MNF contingent and a bar 
frequented by US serviceman, resulting in thirteen French casualties.238 An anonymous caller 
contacted the AFP bureau in Beirut claiming that Islamic Jihad had carried out the attacks and 
warned that, unless the French and US forces were evacuated within ten days, "the earth would 
move under their feet."239 Despite this incident, the next day, the French government disclosed that 
it would send a large arms shipment to the Lebanese army which included some 100 AMX-13 tanks, 
10 Gazelle helicopter gunships and Puma transport helicopters.240 The move was intended to 
demonstrate to the opponents of the Gemayel government that incessant attacks on French forces 
in Lebanon would not sway the policy of the Quai d'Orsay. The Mitterand government believed that 
France, due to its historical involvement in Lebanon, enjoyed a unique and advantageous capacity to 
bring about a national reconciliation with Gemayel still at the helm. The French were determined to 
frustrate Syria's aspirations to maintain its hegemony over Lebanon and hoped that their activist role 
in the Levant would provide the Arabs with an alternate ally, instead of turning only to the US or the 
Soviet Union241
By the end of 1983, the United States had failed to bring the various parties involved in the 
Lebanese civil war to the negotiating table. Although Secretary of State Shultz and National Security 
Adviser McFarlane insisted on maintaining their course of action, Assad's "sword and shield" policy 
had paid handsomely. The momentum was now indisputably with the Syrians.242 With the situation 
in Lebanon coming to a head and the date of an Islamic summit conference in Rabat drawing closer, 
Tehran dispatched Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Sheikholislam to Damascus on January 3, 
1984, to deliver a message from President Khamene'i to Hafez Assad and discuss recent 
developments.243 In their deliberations, Sheikholislam informed the Syrian leadership of Iran's 
intention to boycott the Rabat conference due to the poor state of Moroccan-lranian relations and 
King Hassan's "blatant" pro-Iraqi stance in the Gulf conflict. One outcome of the talks seems to have 
been a hardening of the Syrian-lranian position in Lebanon and an upsurge of activities against their 
common foes. This manifested itself in the assassination of the President of the American 
University of Beirut, Malcolm Kerr, and the kidnapping of the Saudi Consul General, Hussein Farraj, 
by Islamic Jihad in mid-January.244
Available evidence suggests that Islamic Jihad was initially a front used by members of the 
Islamic Amal movement to obscure their true identity and enable them to carry out operations 
against their enemies with impunity. By the end of 1983, Tehran had grown disenchanted with 
Hussein Musawi's failure to mobilize support among the Shi'ites in the Bekaa region and turned 
instead to a number of activist Shi'ite clerics to accomplish the task.245 Islamic Amal eventually 
dissolved itself and joined Hezbollah 246 However, Musawi continued to head the action wing of
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Hezbollah, which still used the name "Islamic Jihad."247 The United States also braced itself for 
more attacks against its interests in the Middle East. In reference to the looming threat, US 
Secretary of State Shultz posited: "we see these things increasingly originating in Iran and taking 
place with the acquiescence of Syria."248 Alluding to earlier statements by his Syrian counterpart, 
Abd al-Halim Khaddam, that his country was succeeding in wearing down the United States and a 
collapse of the American position was imminent, Shultz was adamant that Washington would not 
bow to Syrian-lranian-sponsored terrorism by withdrawing the US Marines from Beirut.249
The Teh ran-Damascus axis was dealt a limited blow in late January at the Islamic summit 
conference in Rabat. The final resolution invited Egypt to rejoin the ICO, despite Syrian efforts to 
rally support against such a move. In the end, the resolution was passed 31 to 10, with the Syrian 
delegation walking out after the vote.250 Although the non-Arab members had played an important 
part in the passage of the resolution, it was another significant step towards reintegrating Egypt into 
mainstream Arab politics. Against the backdrop of the rift between the PLO and Syria, the budding 
friendship between Cairo, Amman and Baghdad and Hosni Mubarak's historic meeting with PLO 
Chairman Arafat in December 1983, the ICO resolution underscored Egypt's gradual return to major 
Arab-lslamic political fora and its status as an essential actor251 Indeed, with the impending collapse 
of the Pax Americana-Hebraica which Washington and Tel Aviv had envisioned earlier in Lebanon, 
and the Egyptian-Jordanian-lraqi axis still in its infancy, the early months of 1984 marked the triumph 
and zenith of Syrian-lranian power and, concomitantly, its limits. The subsequent decline, which 
became apparent only a year later, could be attributed first and foremost to the prolongation of the 
Gulf conflict and Iran's inability to achieve a decisive victory, thereby magnifying Arab demands for 
an activist Egyptian role and, secondly, the emergence of a new Egyptian-Jordanian-lraqi 
counteraxis, with the encouragement of Washington and Riyadh, in light of Syrian-lranian gains in 
the Levant.
On January 25, a Syrian delegation led by Deputy Prime Minister Abd al-Qadir Qaddurah 
arrived in Tehran carrying a message from Hafez Assad for Ali Khamene'i. During the two-day visit, 
the Syrian representatives also met with Prime Minister Musavi and Parliamentary Speaker 
Rafsanjani to discuss the situation in Lebanon, Egypt's re-entry into the ICO and the need for closer 
economic cooperation.252 Although omitted from their official statements, there is no doubt that the 
Syrians informed the Iranians of their intention to deliver a decisive blow against the Gemayel 
government. Tehran for its part advised its Arab ally of its plan to launch its first major offensive 
against the Iraqis in over a year in the coming weeks. Before departing for Damascus, Qaddurah 
declared:
"...We are side by side with our brothers and our Muslim Iranian friends, more than 
ever before. Both Iran and Syria are the hope of all the free and honest people of 
the world and our enemies intend to extinguish the light of God, but they shall never 
succeed."253
In early February, intense fighting broke out in Beirut between the Lebanese army and the Shi'ite 
Amal militia. The hostilities spread rapidly throughout the capital and the outlying areas. The
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Shi'ites called for the removal of Amin Gemayel and the resignation of all Muslim cabinet members, 
prompting Prime Minister Shafiq Wazzan and other Muslim ministers to resign.254 Without any 
remaining Muslim support, and with the US reluctant to involve itself, Gemayel was now left to fend 
for himself, hoping that the army would be able to hold its ground. Rearmed and reequipped with 
supplies provided by Syria and Iran, the Amal and Druze militias, backed by Syrian, pro-Syrian 
Palestinian and pro-Iranian Shi'ite forces, launched a coordinated offensive in the Shkhar area 
(between the Damour River and Beirut) and in the southern and western suburbs of the capital to 
wrest control from the Lebanese army. In Shkhar, the Druze fighters swiftly overran the position of 
the Fourth Brigade, while Amal fighters seized control of the remaining Beirut suburbs under 
government control255 Thousands of Muslim and Druze Lebanese army personnel heeded a call by 
the opposition to lay down their arms. As a result of the defections, within a matter of days the 
strength of the 37,000-man Lebanese army was reduced by more than half.256 Two-thirds of Beirut 
and 80% of the country (excluding the Israeli-occupied south) came under the control of anti- 
Gemayel forces.257
As the fighting raged on for six days, on February 6, US President Reagan announced that 
the US Marines would be withdrawn from Lebanese soil before the end of the month and 
"redeployed" on ships off shore.258 With Damascus clearly on the ascendant, Syrian officials 
reiterated that there would be no progress towards a political settlement unless the May 17 
Agreement was abrogated, and all "foreign" troops had been withdrawn from Lebanon. However, 
they added that, from their viewpoint, Amin Gemayel could remain in power if he took substantive 
steps to reconcile differences with the Lebanese opposition.259 Weakened and isolated, Amin 
Gemayel accepted an eight-point peace plan crafted by Saudi Arabia, which called for a full 
ceasefire, the replacement of the MNF by a UN force, the resumption of negotiations between the 
various factions in Geneva and agreement in principle on the simultaneous withdrawal of Syrian and 
Israeli troops. However, the main concession made by Gemayel was the abandonment of the May 
17 Agreement. In exchange, according to terms stipulated in the proposal, Gemayel would be 
allowed to stay in office260 The events of early February put the Shi'ite Amal militia center stage as 
the most powerful political grouping in the country. With a decisive blow having been dealt to 
Gemayel's government, Amal leader Nabih Bern now demanded his removal261 However, on 
February 19, Bern went to Damascus to hold talks with Assad and other Lebanese opposition 
leaders (including Walid Jumblatt) whose presence had been requested by the Syrian leader262 
Having gained the upper hand, Assad was determined to impose a Pax Syriana in Lebanon by 
creating a new consensus among his allies. Consequently, with events unfolding rapidly, it was 
deemed necessary to adopt a common position in response to the Saudi initiative.
Finally, on February 29, Amin Gemayel, desperate to preserve his remaining power, made 
a historic "pilgrimage" to Damascus for deliberations with Hafez Assad. He agreed to abandon his 
pro-Western orientation, abrogate the Lebanese-lsraeli treaty and appoint the pro-Syrian Sunni 
Moslem leader, Rashid Karami, as the new prime minister. Four days after concluding his visit to 
Syria, Gemayel announced the annulment of the agreement with Israel.263 A jubilant Assad
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telephoned Amin Gemayel to congratulate him on his bold move, which he described as "a victory 
for the Lebanese and Syrian people, as well as the entire Arab nation."264
Much had been gained by Assad since the defeat of 1982. Thanks to Soviet support, 
neither the United States nor Israel dared risk a full-scale war with Syria, while effective use of 
proxies had enabled Damascus to deny Tel Aviv the fruits of its earlier success in the Lebanon war. 
The achievements of the Syrian-lranian counter-offensive of 1983-84 were quite impressive in 
several respects. For the first time, the limits of Israeli military power had been revealed, the 
Reagan administration suffered its worst foreign policy setback ever, and a precedent was set 
whereby an Arab state rescinded an agreement reached with Israel under American auspices. Not 
surprisingly, by the spring of 1984, in the words of one observer, "in Damascus there [was] an 
intoxication of victory accompanied by much caution."265 The Syrians could take pride that, in the 
face of what seemed to be insurmountable odds, they had turned the tables on their foes in Lebanon. 
On the other hand, they were well aware of the fact that they had only achieved a defensive victory. 
They were unable to end the sectarian strife and affect the outcome of events in the Lebanese civil 
war, which raged on for another six years. The limits of Syrian influence in the seamless web of 
Lebanese politics and the continued Israeli occupation of the south meant that the alliance with Iran 
still had a great deal of utility for Damascus. Iranian assistance would be essential to mobilize the 
Shi’ite population of the south (which had already become radicalized by the prolonged Israeli 
occupation) in order to wage guerrilla warfare against the IDF. Indeed, the day after the abrogation 
of the May 17 Agreement, an editorial in the Syrian daily Al-Ba?h elucidated:
"Now that the US-lsraeli shadow has been removed from Lebanon by the 
abrogation of the agreement, the battle has become very clear. All efforts must be 
pooled to save Lebanon from Israeli occupation so that Lebanon can restore its 
independence, sovereignty and role in its Arab environment...and strip the Zionist 
entity of the gains it obtained through invasion and aggression."266 
The way was open for the next phase of the struggle against Israel, namely, the campaign to drive 
the IDF from its last remaining foothold in Lebanon.
SYRIAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS AND THE GULF WAR
As the war dragged on in the Gulf region, Iran decided to resume the offensive in mid-summer by 
launching a series of limited offensives to wear down the Iraqi defenders. This was part of Tehran's 
overall strategy to prosecute the war of attrition. Less than a week before the beginning of the first 
attack (Operation Wal-Fajr 2 in Iraqi Kurdistan), Syrian Minister of State for Foreign Affairs Faruq al- 
Shara arrived in Tehran and held talks with President Khamene'i on regional developments and 
ways to improve bilateral cooperation.267 Exactly a week after the commencement of Wal-Fajr 2, a 
second offensive (codenamed Wal-Fajr 3) was begun in the south near the strategically positioned 
town of Mehran. Both operations proved to be limited successes for the Iranians.268
In view of Iraq's inability to influence the course of events in the ground war, Baghdad 
decided to improve the capability of its air force and threaten to disrupt the flow of Iranian oil out of
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the Gulf unless Iran sued for peace. The French had agreed to provide Iraq with five Super 
Etendard aircraft in January 1983, thereby enhancing the Iraqi air force's ability to attack Iranian oil 
facilities and tankers. On August 12, the Iraqis declared a specified area in the northern Persian Gulf 
(including Kharg island) to be an exclusion zone, warning all foreign shipping to stay away. Despite 
thinly veiled threats and much bravado, Iraq received the Super Etendards only in October, and 
finally began to use them in March 1984 - once they had been properly integrated into the air force 
and were operational.269
As tensions gradually increased with the prospect of Iraq unleashing its air power, Iranian 
officials were greatly disturbed by a GCC attempt to mediate between Iraq and Syria. Concurrent 
with the French announcement that the Super Etendards had departed from France, on October 10, 
the United Arab Emirates revealed that a delegation headed by UAE President Sheikh Zayid bin 
Sultan al-Nuhayan would visit both Baghdad and Damascus "within the framework of current Arab 
efforts to clear the Arab atmosphere." The UAE delegation was also accompanied by Qatari Foreign 
Minister Suhaym bin Hamad al-Thani270 They met with Saddam Hussein on October 9, and then 
held talks the following day with Hafez Assad. Concomitantly, Tareq Aziz conferred with Abd al- 
Halim Khaddam in New York during the UN General Assembly session. This was the first high-level 
exchange between Iraqi and Syrian officials since the meeting of the two heads of state at the Fez II 
summit in September 1982. Besides attempting to thaw Syrian-lraqi relations, another primary 
objective of the mediation effort was to persuade Damascus to re-open the trans-Syrian (IPC) 
pipeline. Such a move would not only represent a major blow to Iran's economic warfare against 
Iraq, but would also substantially ease Baghdad's financial woes and enable the GCC states to cut 
back on their monetary assistance to the Iraqi Bathi regime. In response to the flurry of Arab 
diplomatic activity, Tehran dispatched an emissary to Damascus on October 18 to win guarantees 
from the Syrians that they would not be swayed by pressure from the anti-Iranian camp. The Iranian 
deputy foreign minister discussed the situation at hand with Hafez Assad and subsequently travelled 
to Libya, Algeria and South Yemen to rally some Arab support for Iran's position. The GCC initiative 
proved to be in vain, since no discernible change occurred in Syrian policy271
Operation Kheiber, the Tanker War and the Syrian Mediation Effort (February - May 1984)
By early 1984, Ayatollah Khomeini and the hawks on the SDC (including Khomeini's personal 
representative, Rafsanjani) had become impatient with the lack of success in the war of attrition. 
They consequently pushed for the resumption of major military offensives against Iraq as soon as 
possible. Over a quarter of a million men were mobilized and, on February 22, after a series of 
limited probes and diversionary attacks (Wal Fajr 5 & 6), the Iranians launched their greatest 
offensive since 1982 - Operation Kheiber, north of Basra. The main thrust was directed at the 
Hawizeh marshes in order to gain a substantial foothold on Iraqi territory and cut off the Baghdad- 
Basra highway. The hostilities, which were some of the bloodiest in the war, raged on for more than 
two weeks. Eventually, when the fighting died down, the Iraqis had successfully repulsed the Iranian 
onslaught and inflicted enormous losses on the invaders.272 Although the failure of Operation
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Kheiber represented a major strategic triumph for the Iraqis, Iran was able to claim a limited, but 
nonetheless important tactical victory when it seized (and resisted numerous Iraqi counterattacks to 
regain) the oil-rich Majnoon Islands in the marshes during the offensive.273 However, the overall 
failure of the offensive once again created dissension and led to some squabbling within the ranks of 
the Iranian leadership. While the hawks led by Rafsanjani advocated the resumption of full-scale 
military operations, President Khamene'i, Prime Minister Musavi and Foreign Minister Velayati urged 
caution, disavowing such a course of action for the time being274
Operation Kheiber prompted Baghdad to step up its air offensive (which it had already 
initiated in January on a limited scale with occasional raids on Iranian oil facilities and shipping in the 
Gulf). As the fighting raged on in the Hawizeh marshes, on February 27, the Iraqi air force bombed 
Kharg Island. Between February 25 and March 1, seven ships were hit in the Gulf275 Overall, the 
Iraqi High Command's decision to initiate the 'Tanker War4' was based on four major considerations:
a) To cripple the Iranian military machine by denying Tehran vital oil revenues needed to finance the 
war effort.
b) To internationalize the conflict in order to rally Gulf Arab and foreign support against Iran's 
recalcitrant stance.
c) To force Syria to reconsider its relationship with Iran once Arab diplomatic pressure was brought to 
bear and the flow of Iranian oil to its Arab ally was disrupted.
d) To utilize the air force as an effective offensive instrument against the Iranians, in recognition of 
an inability to conduct any effective land or naval operations. At the time it was the only viable 
military option.
In short, from Baghdad's perspective, it made perfect political, economic and military sense to 
expand the conflict into the waters of the Gulf.
Parallel to the escalation of the Tanker War and in the wake of the battle for the Majnoon 
Islands, on March 7, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz requested the urgent convocation of Arab 
foreign ministers in Baghdad "to discuss the serious situation endangering the entire Arab region in 
the light of the escalation of Iran's aggression."276 He insisted that "Iraq's sacrifices in defending the 
region's security should be met with an effective Arab stand."277 In response, a meeting was 
convened on March 14 with thirteen foreign ministers and one deputy foreign minister present. Syria 
and Libya refused to send any representatives, while Algeria, Tunisia, Lebanon and South Yemen 
sent low-level delegations. The result of the meeting was a reiteration of the 1950 Joint Arab 
Defense Agreement and a condemnation of Iran's intransigent policy of "continuing aggressions" 
against Iraq 278 The Iranian reaction could be summed up by the comments of Prime Minister 
Musavi, who warned that "reactionary" states in the region supporting Iraq would be dealt with in an
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"appropnate" manner. In general, Iran's renewed offensives in early 1984 and the emption of the 
Tanker War had the net effect of generating regional and international pressure on Syria to 
reconsider its position in the conflict, galvanizing GCC support for Iraq and highlighting the need for 
the return of Egypt to the Arab fold, due to its political weight and military prowess.
It is worth noting that, following a visit to Syria in late February by Saudi Crown Prince
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Abdullah, Rifat Assad, who opposed many of his brother's policies, mounted a direct challenge to his 
elder brother's authority by demanding the dismissal of Prime Minister Raouf al-Kasm and a number 
of other cabinet members, including the President's close aide and confidant, Defense Minister Tlas. 
The Syrian leader responded immediately in a resolute fashion by calling loyal army units into the 
capital and arresting one of the senior commanders of the Defence Companies (Saraya Difa'a), 
Colonel Selim Barakat, for insubordination. The upper echelons of the officer corps were 
subsequently re-shuffled to weaken Rifat's power base. Many observers were convinced that Saudi 
Arabia had precipitated the showdown in Damascus since Rifat, who enjoyed close ties with Riyadh, 
objected to Syrian policy towards Iran, the PLO and the Soviet Union.280
From the early stages of the Gulf war, the Saudis had been the main financial backers of 
Saddam Hussein. By 1984, they were bankrolling the Iraqis to the tune of $7-8 billion per annum. 
Riyadh was undoubtedly frustrated by Syria's consistent refusal to reopen the IPC pipeline, which 
would have substantially eased the Saudi financial burden. Despite their displeasure with Syria's 
posture, the Saudis continued to disburse $750 million annually to Damascus, as had been agreed 
under the terms of the 1978 Arab summit agreements. The financial assistance was seen as a way 
of having some leverage and influence over Syrian policy, even if in only a limited sense281
Ironically, in the aftermath of Rifat's failed putsch, the Kremlin also launched a major 
initiative to bring about a Syrian-lraqi rapprochement and convince Syria to reopen the IPC pipeline. 
In a series of visits, Soviet First Deputy Prime Minister Geidar Aliyev and the Soviet Communist 
Party Central Committee's top Middle East expert, Karen Brutents, attempted to persuade 
Damascus to allow the Iraqi oil to flow through the pipeline as a first step towards a genuine 
reconciliation between the two rival wings of the Bath Party. The Syrians rebuffed Moscow's 
overtures, arguing that Syrian-lraqi relations would have to be rebuilt on totally new foundations 
before they could contemplate such a move.282
The successive failures of Moscow and Riyadh to induce Damascus to realign Itself with 
Iraq and the anti-Iranian camp augmented Syrian power and prestige both on the regional and 
international level. The inability of its superpower patron and a main Arab aid donor to translate their 
influence into an effective tool to sway it according to their wishes boosted Syria's confidence and 
provided greater room to maneuver in the political arena. Syria's steadfast position and unwavering 
support for its Persian ally were certainly noted and appreciated by officials in Tehran. At this 
particular juncture, during March and April, when Iraqi raids resulted in as much as a 50% drop in 
Iranian oil exports for some days, and the regular shipment of oil from Kharg to the Syrian port of 
Banias became highly problematic, Syria resorted to purchasing Libyan oil to make up for the 
shortfall.283 Damascus remained stalwart in its backing of Iran, despite coming under pressure from 
many fronts. However, within a matter of weeks, it became apparent that the Iraqi air force was 
incapable of totally disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to the international market. At best, it could only 
achieve brief sporadic cuts in Iranian exports. Tehran, for its part, acknowledged and rewarded the 
loyalty of its Arab ally in late April, when it renewed its previous arrangement (during the visit of a 
Syrian delegation led by Oil Minister Ghazi al-Durubi) to continue the delivery of 150-160 thousand
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barrels per day of Iranian crude oil to the refineries at Horns and Banias. Under the deal, one million 
of the 7.6 million tons of oil exported to Syria would be free of charge, while the remainder would be 
priced at $25 per barrel - $3 below the official OPEC price.284
The reciprocal moves by Tehran and Damascus to reinforce their ties and cooperation 
came at a time when both had become fully aware of the gradual shifts and the emergence of new 
political blocs in the region that were hostile to the Syrian-lranian camp. In a significant move, 
Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hassan Ali visited Baghdad in late March to maintain the 
momentum of the Iraqi-Egyptian reconciliation which had been underway for some time. In 
Baghdad, he met with his Iraqi counterpart, Tareq Aziz, on ways to normalize and expand 
relations.285 At a press conference before his departure, he expressed complete support for Iraq in 
the Gulf war and stated that Egypt was ready to intervene militarily in the conflict if Iraq requested 
assistance.286 Shortly afterwards, Jordan's King Hussein flew to Baghdad to confer with Saddam 
Hussein on regional developments and coordinate policy, particularly vis-^-vis Syria and Iran.287
With the final withdrawal of the US Sixth Fleet from Lebanon's territorial waters in the early 
spring, the Syrian state-controlled media boasted about the triumph over the United States and 
Israel. Indeed, while the Lebanese venture proved to the biggest foreign policy debacle of Ronald
Reagan's first term, the blow was cushioned and fears in Washington were somewhat allayed by the
genesis of the Egyptian-Jordanian-lraqi counteraxis289 Despite the collapse of the US-lsraeli 
"condominium" in Lebanon, Assad still needed Iran to inspire and mobilize the Shi'ites to expel the 
IDF from the south and counterbalance the emergent Arab camp hostile to Syrian designs in the 
area290 Thus, in a television interview broadcast both in Syria and the United States, Assad 
reasserted that:
"We consider the Islamic revolution in Iran a great victory for us, the Arabs...there is 
no contradiction between Arab nationalism and Iranian nationalism. Furthermore, 
there is no contradiction between Arab nationalism and Islam.Jran is a 
neighbouring Muslim country where a revolution erupted against a previous 
situation that did not express the Iranian people's interests. This revolution stands 
at the Arabs' side in their struggle against the Israeli invasion and for regaining the 
Palestinians' rights..."291
As the Iraqis intensified their air campaign in the Persian Gulf, on March 27, they finally unleashed 
the much vaunted Super Etendards, which hit three tankers in the vicinity of Kharg. A series of raids 
and counterraids ensued, finally compelling the Iranians to take action by attacking Saudi and 
Kuwaiti tankers in early May.292 From Tehran's viewpoint, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were not neutral 
states in the conflict, but close allies of Bathi Iraq. This perception was reinforced by Saddam 
Hussein's admission in an interview with Kuwaiti journalists that Saudi AWACS had provided Iraq 
with valuable data and intelligence on Iranian troop movements during Operation Kheiber293 Iranian 
leaders had for months warned the Gulf Arab sheikhdoms to desist from their support of Iraq or face 
the consequences. In a sermon on May 18, Rafsanjani declared that the fact that Kuwait and Saudi 
Arabia sold oil on Iraq's behalf made them de facto co-belligerents in the war294
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The escalating tensions and the widening rift between Iran and the Gulf Arabs led to the 
convening of an Arab foreign ministers conference in Tunis on May 19 to discuss Iranian attacks on 
Saudi and Kuwaiti shipping. After some deliberations, a resolution was passed condemning Iranian 
attacks on Gulf shipping and imploring the UN Security Council to take appropriate action to prevent 
destabilization of the area. The resolution was passed over the objections of the Syrians and 
Libyans.295 It is interesting to note that only Libya expressed a formal reservation; Syria was not as 
vocal in its protestations. The Syrians were afraid that the Iranians were falling into the trap that the 
Iraqis had set for them, meaning that, by attacking ships from non-combatant states, Iran was further 
alienating the Gulf states and the international community and concomitantly providing the West with 
the necessary pretext to establish a naval presence in the region. Furthermore, with the 
transformation of the Jordanian-lraqi partnership in 1980 into what was emerging as a pro-American 
Egyptian-Jordanian-lraqi-Saudi bloc by mid-1984, Damascus wanted to prevent becoming 
completely sidelined and isolated in inter-Arab politics.296 This did not signify a shift in Syrian policy 
towards Iran, but was rather an indication of Damascus' displeasure with Iranian strikes on tankers 
belonging to the Gulf Arab littoral states and the awkward position in which it placed the Syrian Arab 
Republic. Therefore, the Syrians deemed it necessary to defuse the potentially explosive situation 
as soon as possible in order to prevent further polarization and American interference in the Gulf.
The opportunity came soon after the Tunis conference on May 22 when Saudi King Fahd 
dispatched the Deputy Commander of the Saudi National Guard, Sheikh Abdul Aziz Tuwaijeri, to 
Damascus requesting Syrian intercession in the Tanker War. Assad responded promptly the next 
day by sending the newly-appointed Vice-President, Abd al-Halim Khaddam, and Foreign Minister 
Faruq al-Shara on a peace mission to Tehran.297 The Syrian emissaries went into session almost 
immediately with President Khamene'i, presidential assistant Mostafa Mir-Salim, Foreign Minister 
Velayati and Minister of State for Executive Affairs Aghazadeh. Khaddam conveyed a message 
from Assad impressing on the Iranian government the need to ease tensions and prevent any further 
escalation in the Gulf War, since the "grave situation" threatened the entire region and "help[ed] 
imperialism and Zionism to achieve their ambitions in the region."298 On the same day as the arrival 
of the Syrian envoys, the Iranian parliament (Majles) passed a bill approving the continuation of oil 
deliveries to Syria and the rescheduling of Syria's oil debt, which by now amounted to $993 
million.299 Recent shortfalls in Iranian oil production and the steady accumulation of a massive 
Syrian debt compelled the government to seek parliamentary approval before proceeding with more 
oil deliveries to its Arab ally. Foreign Minister Velayati argued in favor of the bill, asserting that "we 
have the responsibility to aid such a government in its path, especially at a time when the reactionary 
governments of the region, because of Syria's refusal to come to an agreement with the Iraqi 
regime, have cut off their aid to Syria." He added: "we must support Syria in its struggle against the
300United States, Israel and Iraq, which is the correct path." On the second day of their visit, 
Khaddam and al-Shara met with Khomeini's representative on the SDC and Speaker of Parliament, 
Rafsanjani. They once again reiterated their support for the Islamic Republic in the war, but 
cautioned that further escalation and expansion of the war must be avoided. Rafsanjani explained
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that, if the Gulf became insecure for Iranian shipping, other regions would become unstable.301 At a 
Majles session later that same day, he repeated Iran's previous threat to close the Straits of Hormuz 
if it was unable to use the Gulf.
Damascus was eager to use the mediation effort as a justification for its close ties with 
Tehran. According to its logic, in light of the crisis in the Gulf, the Arab world needed an effective 
channel of communication with the Islamic Republic to voice Arab concerns. Assad was gambling 
that, after having been put in an extremely awkward position with the eruption of the Tanker War, he 
could gain a political victory by defusing tensions and portraying himself as an Arab savior.303 
However, Baghdad was determined to prevent Syria from exploiting the situation to achieve a 
diplomatic victory. As Khaddam and al-Shara left Tehran for Jeddah to brief King Fahd on the 
results of their negotiations, Iraqi warplanes struck two tankers near the Iranian coast. The Iranian 
riposte was swift, with an attack on a vessel in Saudi waters. Thus, initial hopes that the tensions 
might decrease were quickly dashed after a week-long lull in the Tanker War. Saddam Hussein also 
promised to continue attacks on Iranian shipping and render Kharg Island useless.304 Baghdad 
sought to discredit Syria and its alliance with Iran in the eyes of the Arabs, using every possible
305means.
As far as the Iranian leadership was concerned, following the failure to score a major 
battlefield victory in Operation Kheiber, and the significant recurrent shortfalls in oil exports due to 
the efficacy of Iraqi attacks on Kharg Island, their only viable option to retaliate for the raids and 
deter Gulf Arab support for Iraq was to pursue in the Tanker War.306 The Syrians, for their part, 
consistently argued that, during their deliberations with Tehran, Iranian officials had emphasized that 
Iraq had initiated the Tanker War, and they had no desire to escalate the conflict and threaten the 
Gulf sheikhdoms. Moreover, they stated their commitment to extend military assistance to the GCC
307members in the event of Iranian aggression. Despite its assurances to Damascus and its desire to 
avoid the expansion of the conflict, Iran still felt compelled to strike back at Gulf Arab shipping in 
retaliation for Iraqi raids. Tensions were heightened on June 5, when Saudi F-15 fighters, assisted 
by US-manned AWACS, shot down an Iranian F-4 hunting for ships in Saudi territorial waters. 
Tehran decided to refrain from responding militarily in the Gulf, for fear of drawing outside parties 
into the conflict. However, an Iranian riposte came two days later in Lebanon, where an explosive 
device went off outside the Saudi consulate in Beirut, and Islamic Jihad gunmen stormed and 
occupied the Saudi embassy for thirty minutes.308
IRAN'S INTERNATIONAL ISOLATION AND GROWING DEPENDENCY ON SYRIA 
The continuation of the Tanker War and the growing rift between Iran and many of its Arab 
neighbors prompted Tehran to launch a diplomatic offensive in the summer to mend fences with 
non-regional states. During early June, the Iranian foreign ministry dispatched Director-General for 
European and American Affairs Mohammad Sadr to Moscow in an attempt to thaw relations with the 
Soviet Union. This was followed by the visit of a high-level Soviet delegation to Tehran a few weeks 
later.
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Tehran found it prudent to make an overture towards Moscow at a time when Iraq was 
succeeding in cultivating close ties with both the United States and the Soviet Union. Iranian officials 
were particularly perturbed by Baghdad's ability to forge close ties with both Superpowers at a time 
when they were acutely aware of their own isolation and vulnerability. The US-lraqi rapprochement, 
which was paving the way for the eventual restoration of full diplomatic relations between the two 
countries, was quite unsettling from the Iranian perspective. Despite American claims of neutrality in 
the Gulf War, the Islamic Republic was far from convinced about the official US position. In late 
June, Dr. Kamal Kharrazi, Director of the War Information Headquarters of the SDC, announced that 
Iran had reliable evidence showing the US had delivered several shipments of chemical weapons to 
Iraq in January, before the commencement of Operation Kheiber.309 Iranian frustrations were further 
compounded by reports that Saudi Arabia had agreed to finance $2.5 billion worth of Iraqi arms 
purchases from the Soviet Union and attempts by the United Arab Emirates to induce Syria to 
reopen the IPC pipeline.310 The overall success of Iraq's political and military strategy and the 
ascendancy of the moderate Arab camp on the regional scene underscored the need for greater 
cooperation between the main rejectionist states. Consequently, on July 10, Iranian Foreign Minister 
Velayati and the Secretary of the Libyan People's Bureau for Foreign Liaison, Dr. Abd al-Salam al- 
Turayki, arrived in Damascus for consultations with their Syrian counterpart, Faruq al-Shara. 
Velayati also delivered a message from President Khamene'i to Hafez Assad and held discussions 
with Vice-President Khaddam and Defense Minister Tlas. The Syrians once again stressed the need 
to prevent the hostilities from spilling over in order to avert the deployment of US naval forces in the 
Gulf. Velayati assured the Syrian leadership that Iranian policy precluded the spread of "turmoil'' in 
the Gulf and the annexation of Iraqi territory.
In an interview with the Lebanese magazine Al-Kifah al-Arabi, on July 23, the Syrian Foreign 
Minister elaborated on the outcome of the meetings with Velayati by explaining:
"we and Iran have developed a complete understanding on the need to avoid 
expanding the area of the Iran-lraq war, on preventing the involvement of any Gulf 
state in this war, on rejecting US intervention in the region's affairs, and refraining 
from attacks on oil tankers in the Gulf if Iraq stops its attacks on tankers...The 
Iranians have emphasized to us more than once that they have no ambitions 
against any inch of Arab territory."
He went on to point out that Iraq had initiated the Tanker War and had also attacked some Arab oil 
tankers in the Gulf; ultimate responsibility for the situation in the Gulf and the complications arising 
from it lay squarely with Baghdad. Throughout the summer, Syrian officials attempted to play down 
Iran's war strategy and objectives, trying to shift the blame onto Iraqi recklessness in 
internationalizing a conflict which it had begun and could no longer finish on its own terms. For 
example, in an interview published on August 4 in Al-Majallah, Syrian Defense Minister Tlas 
elucidated Syria's desire for a termination of the war. He mentioned that Damascus had obtained 
personal assurances from Ayatollah Khomeini that Iran would "not violate the sovereignty of any 
Arab country."
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Iranian policy at this juncture was the pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of trying to 
strengthen relations with its Arab allies, and with non-regional actors which it perceived were of 
some importance, and concomitantly exerting greater pressure through various means on Iraq's 
primary backers. While the Islamic Republic avoided raising the stakes in the Gulf by adopting a 
less aggressive posture (for fear of alienating Syria and drawing in the United States), it tried to strike 
back at Iraq's allies and paymasters by mining the Red Sea. Early in the spring, when Baghdad 
declared the naval exclusion zone in the northern Gulf region, the Iraqi navy had mined the Iranian 
ports of Bushehr and Bandar Khomeini (formerly Bandar Shahpour). In reality, Iraq's mining 
campaign had damaged and sunk more ships than the aerial attacks by its air force. On August 1, 
Islamic Jihad claimed that it had laid 192 mines in the Red Sea. In the days that followed, a Turkish 
ship was damaged when it hit a mine, while a Liberian vessel sank after it struck another mine. On 
August 7, Tehran radio praised Islamic Jihad for its actions in the Red Sea. Although some 
members of the Iranian leadership issued numerous statements subsequently denying any 
involvement or link with Islamic Jihad, the inconsistency in Tehran's position seems to have been a 
reflection of the split within the regime on the conduct of the war and foreign affairs. This was clearly 
demonstrated on August 11, when the newly-elected Majles dismissed five cabinet ministers, 
including the minister of defense. However, the available evidence clearly suggests that Iran 
conducted the mining operation to create unease in the backyard of four of Iraq's main supporters, 
Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Egypt and the Sudan. Two Iranian ships had passed through the Suez Canal 
on July 26, while Majles Speaker Rafsanjani had made statements earlier threatening to wage war 
against the pro-Iraqi camp in a new theater of operations and to attack oil installations in the Red 
Sea region. Egyptian Defense Minister Abu Ghazalah stated that Cairo was "seventy percent" 
certain that Iranian and Libyan ships had laid the mines. The Iranian state-controlled media denied 
any involvement in the affair and, along with Syria and Libya, pinned the blame on the US, arguing 
that Western imperialism had precipitated the crisis in order to return to the region after its disastrous 
defeat and expulsion from Lebanon.
In the midst of the brewing crisis in the Red Sea, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah al- 
Ahmad al-Jabir arrived on a mission in Damascus to solicit Syrian support for an end to the Gulf 
War. He met with Khaddam and al-Shara and later delivered a letter from the Kuwaiti Emir to Hafez 
Assad. His visit coincided with the arrival of the Iranian Minister of the Revolutionary Guards Corps, 
Mohsen Rafiqdoust. Rafiqdoust met initially with Defense Minister Tlas and Deputy Chief of Staff 
General Ali Aslan and subsequently delivered a message and held further discussions with Hafez 
Assad. The deliberations centered around the Tanker War and the situation in Lebanon. 
Rafiqdoust reaffirmed Iran's commitment to continue the Gulf War until the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein and cooperate with Syria in the struggle against Israel. However, he assured the Syrians 
that the Islamic Republic would not aggravate the situation in the Gulf and had no ambitions on Arab 
territory. After his deliberations in Damascus, Rafiqdoust departed for Libya to harmonize positions 
and coordinate policy with the Qaddafi regime.
Iranian shuttle diplomacy in July and August was a direct result of the clerical leadership's
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immense disappointment with the failure to achieve a major breakthrough in the Gulf W ar after two 
years, and the gradual drift towards isolation both in the regional and international arena. Iran's 
overtures towards the Soviet Union, Germany and Japan did not have an immediate or direct impact 
on its ability to successfully prosecute the war with Iraq; however, they enabled Tehran to strengthen 
its economic links in order to prevent a rapid deterioration in domestic conditions and continue a war 
of attrition against its formidable Arab foe. Iran's obstinate stand on the war, particularly in the 
aftermath of Operation Kheiber and the outbreak of the Tanker War, polarized the situation, thereby 
widening the gulf between Iran and many of its Arab neighbors. Conversely, Iran became more 
dependent on the ideological level of its relationship with Syria and Libya. Although it could not 
remain passive to Iraqi attacks on its shipping in the Gulf, it nurtured its friendship with Damascus by 
means of a generous oil deal and attempted to accommodate Syrian demands in Lebanon to the 
best of its ability.311 The decision to pursue the war, punish Iraq's allies and maintain a defiant 
stance against an ever growing anti-Iranian coalition raised the value of the Syrian-lranian alliance 
enormously in the eyes of the clerical regime. From 1984 onward, with the expulsion of the MNF 
and the phased withdrawal of the IDF from Lebanon, the raison d'etre and utility of close Syrian- 
lranian cooperation in the Levant was rapidly diminishing, especially from the Syrian perspective. 
However, on the ideological level, the Tehran-Damascus axis provided Iran's revolutionary leaders 
with an avenue to continue their activities against the "Zionist entity" and dismiss pro-Iraqi 
accusations that the Gulf War was a historical extension of Arab-Persian rivalries. By now, the 
conflict with Iraq and a continued presence in Lebanon had assumed enormous ideological 
significance in the eyes of the Iranian leadership. Regardless of the financial, material and human 
costs, the government had decided to embark on a path to realize its revolutionary designs. The 
alliance with Syria had become a vital component - an adjunct to the pursuit and realization of those 
ideological objectives.
For instance, during the May parliamentary debate on the rescheduling of Syrian debts and 
renewal of the oil agreement, Foreign Minister Velayati pleaded emphatically for the passage of the 
bill in ideological terms:
"[Syria has] deep difference with Iraq... we must grab this opportunity to help keep it 
on the path of righteousness...! must stress that under the current circumstances 
the only way we can fight the Zionist regime is through our aid to Syria, to the 
Palestinians and to the Muslim groups in Lebanon who are determined to fight on.
If we fail in this, we will be ridiculed all over the world as do-nothing phrase­
mongers."312
Iranian efforts during the month of August to perpetuate and bolster the Syrian-lranian axis coincided 
with an Iraqi initiative to boost relations with Egypt and Jordan. On August 12, Iraqi Foreign Minister 
Tareq Aziz arrived in Cairo to hold talks with Egyptian officials on ways to broaden their cooperative 
activities, particularly in military matters. First Deputy Prime Minister Taha Yasin Ramadan was also 
dispatched to Jordan to promote the expansion of commercial and economic links between the two 
states. Despite its failure to launch offensive military operations in the land war, Baghdad's ability to
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put up a formidable defense against Iranian incursions and enlist sizeable support from the Arabs 
and both Superpowers gave it a major psychological boost in the life-and-death struggle against its 
intractable Persian foe.313
In the meantime, Iran continued to pursue a systematic campaign of terror and intimidation 
against Iraq's most generous financial backer, Saudi Arabia. The state-controlled media bitterly 
criticized Saudi financing of French and Soviet arms sales to Iraq and Riyadh's close ties with 
Washington and they pinned the blame for the international oil glut on Saudi overproduction. 
Besides trying to target vessels bound for Saudi ports in the Tanker War, and the Red Sea mining 
incident, Tehran enlisted the assistance of pro-Iranian groups on several occasions during the 
summer of 1984 to attack Saudi diplomatic outposts, most notably in Lebanon. On August 24, pro- 
Iranian Shi'ite militants stormed the consular section of the Saudi embassy in Beirut and set fire to 
the building. The demonstrators, some of them armed Hezbollah fighters, tore down the Saudi flag 
in the compound and raised an Iranian flag in its place314 Saudi-lranian relations remained tense 
throughout this period. During the Hajj, Tehran accused Saudi security forces of harassing Iranian 
Sunni clergymen in Mecca and aiding and abetting a large group of Iraqis who assaulted some 
Iranian pilgrims 315
As the rift between revolutionary Iran and many of its immediate Arab neighbors widened, 
Syria and Iran took substantive steps to attune their policy objectives and collaborate more 
extensively in different arenas. This was highlighted by the visit of Iranian President Ali Khamene’i 
to Damascus on September 6. The Iranian head of state, who led a high-level delegation, was the 
most senior-ranking Iranian official to visit Syria since the 1979 Revolution. He was accompanied by 
Foreign Minister Velayati, Commander of the Army Colonel Shirazi and Minister of the Revolutionary 
Guard Corps Rafiqdoust. Discussions primarily revolved around greater political and military 
cooperation in both the Levant and the Gulf. During the three-day visit to Syria, Colonel Shirazi 
made an impromptu visit to Ba'albek under heavy Syrian protection, where he advised Hezbollah 
leaders to accept Damascus' authority in the city and concentrate their efforts on the expulsion of the 
IDF from the occupied south. In an earlier meeting with Hezbollah leaders in the Syrian capital, 
Khamene'i also underscored the necessity for "positive cooperation" with the Syrians and pledged to 
support the Shi'ite resistance in its struggle against the Israelis. In his discussions with Khamene'i, 
Assad expressed concern about the possibility of the Gulf War spreading beyond its present confines 
and drawing the Superpowers into the conflict. In a joint statement issued by both leaders before 
Khamene'i's departure from Syria, the two sides reaffirmed their commitment to assist the Lebanese 
resistance against the Israeli invaders, denounced Baghdad's attempts to expand the scope of the 
Gulf War and reiterated their support for the struggle of the Iraqi people against Saddam Hussein. 
The Iranian delegation subsequently flew to Libya and Algeria to seek their support for Iran's position 
in the Gulf War and the Arab-lsraeli conflict.
Khamene'i's state visit to Syria coincided with the United States vetoing a draft resolution 
submitted to the UN Security Council by the Lebanese government condemning Israel's heavy- 
handed tactics in the occupied south. The Lebanese ambassador to the United Nations expressed
117
"profound regret" over Washington's decision. On September 7, the Iranian Foreign Ministry issued 
a statement condemning American support for Israeli actions which had resulted in the deaths of 
"thousands of innocent Lebanese and Palestinian youths" since the Israeli invasion of June 1982.316 
The next day, anonymous callers informed two foreign news bureaus in Beirut that Islamic Jihad 
would retaliate by striking "an American installation in the Middle East soon." Therefore it came as no 
surprise when a suicide bomber drove a truck laden with explosives into the US embassy annex in 
northeastern Beirut on September 20. An hour after the incident, in a telephone call to the AFP 
office, Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for the attack.317 Despite numerous security measures 
taken by the US State Department and US intelligence following reports of a recent shipment of 
explosives from Iran to Lebanon via Syria, Washington was unable to prevent the attack on its only 
remaining diplomatic outpost in Lebanon.318 At least fourteen people, including two Americans, were 
killed in the blast, while many more were injured319 It was later ascertained that Lebanese 
middleman Hassan Hamiz, who had been involved in financing the bombing of the US Marine 
barracks, was also involved in this operation. US intelligence was able to establish the identity of the 
suicide driver (who had two or three aliases) as a member of Hezbollah 320
There is little doubt from available evidence that this particular bombing incident, just like 
the previous ones, was carried out with the support of Tehran and the acquiescence of Damascus. 
Although tensions between the US and Syria had decreased since the withdrawal of US forces in late 
February, the Assad regime was determined to make the Reagan administration pay for its 
persistent backing of Tel Aviv by any possible means, as long as it was a low-risk strategy which 
would not lead to a direct US-Syrian confrontation. In the case of Iran, the clerical regime had an 
ideological axe to grind, since anti-Americanism was one of the cornerstones of Iran's Islamic 
universalist ideology. In addition, on a more practical level, harming US regional interests was seen 
as a way to demonstrate to Washington that its rapprochement with Baghdad and its stance on the 
Arab-lsraeli conflict were not free of costs. Such attacks also enhanced the credibility of the Syrian 
and Iranian leaders, who consistently tried to portray themselves as the vanguard of progressive 
revolutionaries bent on ousting the American and Western imperialists from the Middle East. Anti- 
Americanism persisted as a common reference point in the ideological outlook and pragmatic 
calculations of policymakers in both Damascus and Tehran.
Although the US suffered many setbacks in the region between 1983 and 1984 at the hands 
of the Syrians and Iranians, by the closing months of 1984, it gradually became apparent that the 
Reagan administration and its Arab allies were making a major comeback in the region. The first 
sign of the shifting balance of power came only days after the bombing of the US embassy annex, 
when Jordan announced its decision to restore full diplomatic relations with Egypt after a five-year 
break. It was the first symbolic, but nonetheless important, step towards the formation of a new Arab 
alliance intended to serve as a counterweight to the Syrian-lranian axis, which had been at its apex 
in the winter of 1983-84. With the Jordanian-PLO rapprochement well underway, Jordan's King 
Hussein believed that the only viable option to resuscitate the Arab-lsraeli peace process and 
simultaneously isolate Syria was to mend fences with Cairo. Despite Egypt's isolation in the Arab
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world, King Hussein judged the resumption of relations to be a prudent move in several respects. 
Egypt still carried tremendous political clout in the eyes of the Americans, Arabs and Israelis, and 
was playing a vital role in sustaining the Iraqi war effort against the Iranians. Furthermore, neither 
Washington nor Tel Aviv could afford to ignore their most valuable Arab ally, particularly at a time 
when Egypt was beginning to assume an activist role in regional politics. Jordan's move was the first 
major milestone in Egypt's gradual reintegration into mainstream Arab politics, which eventually 
became formalized at the November 1987 Amman summit. Its more immediate impact was that it 
served as a major catalyst for the formation of the emergent Egyptian-Jordanian-lraqi-PLO axis. Iraq 
needed Egyptian assistance to build a credible defense against its intransigent Persian foe, while 
King Hussein and Yasser Arafat calculated that, with Egypt's weight behind them, they could adopt a 
more assertive stance in the Levant and neutralize Syrian dominance in the area. Assad's success 
in gaining a high profile in Lebanon, the Arab-lsraeli arena and the Persian Gulf had convinced 
Amman that radical measures had to be taken to reverse the current trend. The triumph of the 
Syrian-lranian alliance had been viewed with much consternation in many Arab capitals. King 
Hussein and Yasser Arafat firmly believed that rehabilitating Egypt's position in the Middle East far 
outweighed the risk of incurring the wrath of Syria and Iran, at a time when they were at the zenith of 
their power.
Both Syria and its superpower patron, the Soviet Union, interpreted the move as a US- 
backed initiative to push the Syrians off center stage and limit the Kremlin's margin for maneuver at 
a time when the Soviets were also attempting to mend fences with Jordan and Egypt. Indeed, due 
to the Reagan administration's fixation with looking at regional events through the lens of Cold War 
politics, US policy aimed to sideline Moscow by thwarting its two-tier approach of capitalizing on 
Syria's gains and simultaneously cultivating links with the moderate Arab states. Furthermore, 
Washington intended to deny Damascus and Tehran the fruits of their earlier victory.
Fifteen days after Jordan announced its intention to re-establish diplomatic relations, 
President Hosni Mubarak arrived in Jordan on a three-day state visit.321 After extensive talks on 
ways to cooperate and expand relations, a joint communique was issued on October 11, in which the 
two parties justified the Jordanian-Egyptian entente as an effective means to "restore the Palestinian 
people's legitimate rights....and bolster cohesion that is essential in supporting fraternal Iraq in its just 
battle..."322 It is worth mentioning that on a symbolic level, the Mubarak visit to Amman was an 
explicit gesture to other Arab states to follow in Jordan's footsteps by extending recognition to Cairo 
and creating a new and formidable Arab bloc 323
Both Damascus and Tehran severely rebuked King Hussein's decision to normalize 
relations with Egypt and Mubarak's subsequent trip to Jordan. In a sermon delivered at Tehran 
University on October 5, Parliament Speaker Rafsanjani delivered a scathing critique of the 
Jordanian move. He passionately argued that:
"...we see the Islamic Republic dealing so decisively with the Israeli issue; Lebanon, 
with the hard work done by Syria and by the Hezbollahi people in Lebanon, 
slapping the USA and global arrogance in the mouth; when the struggles in
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southern Lebanon demonstrate that the people really can fight IsraeL.instead of 
renewing their [Jordan, etc.] vigour and starting to move and follow behind this 
Hezbollahi line of Lebanon, [they] are moving in the opposite direction and in the 
name of bringing Egypt back to the Arab countries' fold are themselves falling into 
the embrace of Israel and the USA."324 
Similarly, an editorial in the Syrian daily, Al-Balh on October 9, analyzed the emergence of "the new 
Arab reactionary alliance" in a disparaging manner. The article explained:
'The concept of this alliance may have been inspired by the US Administration 
following the defeat sustained by Washington's policy in Lebanon at the hands of 
Syria and its allies...Washington realized that it was essential to establish a broad 
regional alliance aimed at confronting this sweeping national rise that is being led 
by Syria in the region against all the US administration's arrangements..."
The rapid pace and direction of political developments in the region greatly alarmed Hafez Assad, 
who decided to visit Moscow on October 15, accompanied by a high-level delegation, to seek certain 
assurances from Premier Chernenko.
THE IMPACT OF SOVIET MIDDLE EAST POLICY ON SYRIA'S FOREIGN RELATIONS
For many months, the Syrians had been dismayed by the new trend in Soviet Middle East policy 
under the leadership of Premier Chernenko. Throughout this period, Damascus had steadily 
become apprehensive about Soviet intentions in the region. Upon his ascension to power, 
Chernenko reformulated Soviet Middle East policy in an effort to lessen dependence on Syria as the 
primary instrument of furthering Soviet objectives in the area and broaden support beyond the 
traditionally pro-Soviet radical Arab camp. In the initial phase, the new strategy proved to be quite 
effective. His overtures towards Amman thawed Soviet-Jordanian relations, resulting in the 
Jordanian Chief of Staffs visit to the USSR in August 1984 to negotiate the purchase of Soviet arms 
and seek clarification on the Soviet peace plan of July 29, which proposed the creation of a 
Jordanian-Palestinian confederation including the Occupied Territories. The Syrians were also 
infuriated by the restoration of Soviet-Egyptian relations during that summer. To add insult to injury, 
Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko met with his Israeli counterpart during the UN General 
Assembly in New York in September 1984, and with PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat in East Berlin on 
October 7.325 The unmistakable reorientation in Soviet Middle East policy coupled with the 
consolidation of the Jordanian-Egyptian entente persuaded Assad to visit Moscow to seek 
clarification about Soviet intentions in the region and obtain additional assistance from the Kremlin.
Assad's trip was the first since his historic visit in October 1980, which had led to the 
conclusion of the bilateral Friendship and Cooperation Treaty. However, on this occasion, the results 
were far from what Assad expected. The Soviets tried to persuade him to adopt a more conciliatory 
approach towards Jordan, Egypt and the PLO. They also stressed that Syria should re-evaluate its 
stance on the Gulf War and abandon its support for Iran. In addition, they advocated the reopening 
of the IPC pipeline as a first step towards Syrian-lraqi reconciliation. Much to Assad's chagrin,
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Chernenko linked any increase in Soviet economic and military aid to a Syrian rapprochement with 
the moderate Arab bloc involved in the peace process. In spite of the failure to reach any sort of 
understanding, Damascus refrained from explicitly criticizing Moscow. The Syrian media 
characterized the visit in very positive terms; however, for the Syrian leadership there were no 
illusions about the decline of Syria's importance from the Soviet perspective.326
The tepid state of Soviet-Syrian relations prompted Assad to put greater emphasis on 
cooperation with his regional allies and in parallel embark on a policy to ease tensions with France. 
Upon his return from Moscow, Assad dispatched Vice-President Khaddam to Libya and Algeria to 
confer with them about the recent moves of King Hussein and the need to maintain a steadfast 
position vis-d-vis the US and Israel.327 In reality, both Damascus and Tehran were extremely 
concerned about the growing momentum behind various initiatives aimed at containing their 
combined power and influence. With American encouragement, Jordan's King Hussein was at the 
forefront of an overall effort to nullify the recent gains of the Tehran-Damascus axis. Less than a 
week after Hosni Mubarak's historic visit, the Jordanian monarch visited Baghdad to discuss the 
Jordanian-Egyptian rapprochement, assistance for the Iraqi war effort and US moves to bolster this 
nascent Arab counteraxis, designed to frustrate Syrian-lranian intentions.328 Much to the 
consternation of Iran, King Hussein's visit coincided with the delivery of eight new French Mirage F-1 
EQ5's to Iraq. The F-1 EQ5 had a longer range than the Super Etendard and earlier versions of the 
Mirage F-1 received by the Iraqi air force. With a combat radius of 700 nautical miles, it was 
capable of hitting Iran's southernmost oil terminal in the Persian Gulf at Lavan Island. Iraq now 
possessed the ability to strike at any Iranian facility along the Gulf coastline.329
In the closing months of 1984, Washington made enormous strides to recoup its losses and 
regain its previous stature in the Middle East. In the run-up to the US presidential elections in early 
November, the US and Egyptian military held joint air and naval exercises in the Mediterranean Sea. 
Moreover, the day after Ronald Reagan's election victory, US Assistant Secretary of State for Near 
Eastern and South Asian Affairs Richard Murphy travelled to Baghdad to finalize arrangements for 
the restoration of US-lraqi relations later that month.
Assad reacted to these developments by sending Vice-President Khaddam and Foreign 
Minister al-Shara to Tehran. The purpose of the visit was multi-fold: with a gradual improvement in 
Franco-Syrian relations well underway, Assad sought to bridge the existing differences between 
Tehran and Paris; furthermore, with the commencement of bilateral negotiations between Israel and 
Lebanon on troop withdrawals, he intended to gain Tehran's assurance that it would not try to
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aggravate the situation in the south and consequently derail the talks. Syrian concerns came at a 
time when the pro-Iranian Hezbollah movement was growing rapidly and attracting a large following, 
in the process eclipsing the more moderate pro-Syrian Amal movement led by Nabih Bern.331 
Furthermore, Assad intended to moderate some of Iran's policies in the Gulf, to prevent further 
polarization in the region, at the expense of the Syrian-lranian camp. Although some press reports 
at the time stated that the Syrians were hoping to persuade the clerical regime to end the Gulf War, 
this seems highly unlikely. During its one-day visit, the Syrian delegation met with Parliament
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Speaker Rafsanjani, Foreign Minister Velayati and Senior Presidential Advisor Mir Salim. In addition 
to discussing issues pertaining to the Gulf War, Lebanon and bilateral ties, Khaddam also briefed the 
Iranian leadership on the results of his deliberations in Libya and Algeria. At the end of the visit 
Khaddam declared:
"Syria gives special priority to the strengthening of relations with Iran and views the 
[recent] visit of the Islamic President of Iran, Mr. Khamene'i, as an important turning 
point in bilateral relations and in the union of the progressive countries vis-3-vis 
conspiracies of imperialism, Zionism and reaction..."332 
After the talks, al-Shara flew on to Riyadh to inform his Saudi counterpart, Prince Saud al-Faisal, on 
the results of the negotiations in Tehran.333 Despite much speculation about a major diplomatic 
breakthrough of some sort leading to a thaw in Iran's relations with the Gulf states or France, no such 
changes occurred. In the period leading up to a state visit by French President Frangois Mitterand to 
Syria, in the closing days of November, Assad held an interview with a group of French journalists in 
which he ardently defended Syria's position in the Gulf War. He vehemently denied that Syria 
supported Iran, but blamed Iraq for starting a conflict which clearly harmed Arab interests. He went 
on to posit:
'The [Iranian] Islamic revolution wants to support the Arabs...[and considers] the 
Palestinian cause an Iranian cause...None of the Arabs can put Iran and Israel on 
an equal footing. We have a certain joint history and a number of ties with Iran.
Iran did not and will not claim possession of Arab territories in Iraq or in any other 
Arab country."334
Several days later, the French President arrived in Damascus to establish what he himself described 
as "more constructive relations" with the Syrians. It was the first time that a French president had 
visited Syria since it gained independence. In light of the historical significance of his arrival, and the 
marked hostility between the two states in the early 1980's, Mitterand made some conciliatory 
remarks by highlighting that "nothing can be achieved in the Middle East or in the Near East without 
Syria."335 Although the visit did not bring about any major political breakthroughs, particularly with 
regard to the situation in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, Franco-Syrian relations did improve to some 
degree as a consequence 336 It was clear that Assad's intention was to jolt the Soviet Union into
being more forthcoming with military and economic aid, by partially feigning a major shift in its
foreign policy orientation. To underscore this point, Damascus announced its intention to acquire 
armaments from France and other Western countries.
During Mitterand's visit to Syria, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz flew to Washington to 
cement relations with the United States. Following a meeting with President Reagan on November 
26, a joint declaration was issued on the resumption of full diplomatic ties, effective immediately. 
Tareq Aziz was then whisked to a series of meetings with Vice-President Bush, Secretary of State 
Shultz, Defense Secretary Weinberger and National Security Advisor Robert McFariane. The move 
came as no surprise: by the end of 1984, the US had provided $450 million in financial assistance to 
Iraq and extended a $663 million line of credit for the purchase of American wheat. Washington had
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also consented to the delivery of 60 Bell military helicopters and several Lockheed military transport 
planes to Baghdad.338 Predictably, the announcement was warmly welcomed by Egypt, Jordan and 
Saudi Arabia, while Libya, Syria and Iran bitterly criticized it as an act of "capitulation” and 
"treachery.” The latter depicted the action as the final step in Iraq's total abandonment of the 
"progressive anti-imperialist" cause in order to join the ranks of the reactionary camp composed of 
Egypt, Jordan, Israel and the United States.
THE BEGINNING OF THE DECLINE OF SYR1AN-IRANIAN POWER
A series of events between December 1984 and March 1985 set into motion the decline of Iran's 
power and its ability to successfully prosecute the Gulf War. At the same time, the reversal of 
fortunes in the conflict and Israel's decision to begin a three-phased withdrawal from Lebanon had a 
profound impact on the calculus of power within the Syrian-lranian liaison. Tehran's failure to 
achieve any impressive gains against Baghdad, its growing isolation in the Arab world and the 
growing harm it dealt to Damascus' agenda in Lebanon contributed to the transformation of the 
partnership into a highly asymmetrical relationship, with Syria as the dominant partner. In fact, the 
expanding power of radical pro-Iranian groups in Lebanon such as Hezbollah became more of a 
liability than an asset, since they were growing at the expense of the more moderate Amal militia 
backed by the Syrians. Iranian policy in Lebanon presented an obstacle to the implementation of 
Syrian designs, especially once it became clear that the IDF was on the retreat in the south.
To some degree the alliance became a victim of its own success. Contrary to the popular 
belief, from its genesis it had been a defensive alliance. Between 1980 and 1982, the Syrians 
provided vital assistance to their Persian allies in order to stem the Iraqi invasion of Iran and turn the 
tide of the war. On the other hand, from 1982 to 1985, Tehran gave invaluable support to Syria and 
the Lebanese Shi'ites to frustrate American and Israeli ambitions in Lebanon and eventually expel 
them from that war-torn land. By early 1985, it slowly became apparent that the Islamic Republic 
had missed a window of opportunity in 1982-84 to bring the Gulf War to a successful conclusion. 
This could be primarily attributed to the dismal failure of Iran's ruling clerics to consider carefully the 
new constellation of political forces arrayed against them and the changing balance of military power 
during these years. Against the better judgement of the senior military commanders, political and 
military exigencies were ignored in futile attempts to score a decisive battlefield victory and 
overthrow the Iraqi Bathi regime. Indeed, Iran's revolutionary fervor and missionary zeal had proven 
to be a double-edged sword. They had been vital in mobilizing the Iranian masses to drive the Iraqis 
out of their homeland, just as they had been instrumental in rallying support among the Lebanese 
Shi'ites to thwart American and Israeli policies in Lebanon. However, the intense determination of 
the clerics to export their revolution blinded their ability to recognize the resilience of their opponent 
and the resurgent power of the pro-Iraqi bloc, which had become unmistakably evident by the winter 
of 1984-85.
By now, the restoration of US-lraqi relations and the gradual crystallization of the Egyptian- 
Jordanian-lraqi axis boosted Iraqi morale and self-confidence. These developments, coupled with
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the steady stream of French and Soviet armaments, enabled Baghdad to alleviate some of the 
country's economic woes and pursue a more aggressive military strategy. Starting in December, the 
Iraqi air force intensified its attacks on Iranian oil shipping in the Gulf. A new prolonged anti-tanker 
campaign was commenced and proved to be quite effective. Within a period of two months, the 
Iraqis struck sixteen tankers in the Gulf, cutting Iranian exports by almost half.339 Iranian 
vulnerability was also magnified in the diplomatic arena by Hosni Mubarak's second visit to Jordan in 
early January. Tehran reacted by dispatching emissaries to its various Arab allies and neighbors in 
an effort to improve its overall regional standing and reverse the slide into isolation. Events were 
unfolding quite rapidly on several fronts in the Middle East, thereby necessitating some degree of 
policy coordination.
In addition to the Iraqi air offensive and the swift pace of Egyptian integration into regional 
politics, the Israeli cabinet's decision on January 14 to begin a phased withdrawal from Lebanon 
required some consideration by the rejectionist states.340 Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein 
Sheikholislam went to Damascus for consultations with Syrian officials and to make the 
arrangements for a meeting of the foreign ministers of Iran, Syria, Libya, Algeria and South Yemen. 
This effort resulted in a joint meeting of the Syrian, Iranian and Libyan foreign ministers in Tehran on 
January 26-27. The tripartite talks centered primarily on the current situation in the region and means 
to expand cooperation. Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shara and his Libyan counterpart al-Turayki also 
held a series of meetings with President Khamene'i, Majles Speaker Rafsanjani and Prime Minister 
Musavi.
As tensions escalated in the Gulf, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia led a GCC initiative to try to end 
the war. On February 2, Kuwaiti Foreign Minister Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Jabir arrived in 
Damascus in an attempt to solicit Syrian support for a peace proposal. Parallel to this visit, Saudi 
Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal visited Baghdad to confer with Iraqi officials. Following the departure 
of the Kuwaiti foreign minister, Khaddam was dispatched to Algiers to consult with President 
Benjedid, who was perceived as an impartial mediator by both Iran and Iraq. The plan called for a 
ceasefire, frontier demarcation and the reopening of the Shatt al-Arab. Suggestions were put forth to 
have the implementation of the peace plan supervised and guaranteed by a four-nation committee 
composed of representatives from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Syria and Algeria.341 The initiative proved 
to be futile due to Iran's uncompromising position. The GCC proposal quickly faded into oblivion as 
Rafsanjani announced, on February 7, that the Islamic Republic would not even accept mediation by 
Syria and furthermore, intended to launch a major offensive against Iraq.342
It seems that, by early 1985, with the Israeli threat receding in Lebanon, and Iranian 
obduracy facilitating Egypt's return to the Arab fold, Damascus was becoming more amenable to a 
negotiated settlement. Throughout 1984, when the Shi'ite resistance in southern Lebanon stepped 
up its activities, there had been an average of 50 attacks on the IDF per month. By February 1985 
the number had doubled.343 Israeli losses amounted to more than 600 dead, and the occupation was 
costing $1 million a day.344 Although the Israelis were on the retreat, Syria's fears that its role might 
become increasingly marginalized in Arab politics was heightened by the PLO-Jordanian agreement
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(in February 1985) to make a joint endeavour to revive the Arab-lsraeii peace process.
Operation Badrand the Formalization of the Egyptian^Jordanian-lraqi Entente 
On March 11, Iran launched its first major offensive since the ill-fated Operation Kheiber the 
previous year. The offensive, codenamed "Badr," was a duplicate of the 1984 operation, although 
on a relatively smaller scale. Once again the Iranians hoped to secure a bridgehead west of the 
Hawizeh Marshes in order to push towards Basra and other towns in the southern part of the Tigris- 
Euphrates Delta. Some eight divisions composed of 55,000 men (primarily Revolutionary Guards 
and Baseej volunteers) participated in the assault. Against the better judgement of senior military 
commanders, hawkish clerics on the SDC led by Majles Speaker Rafsanjani had prevailed in the 
internal debate once more. Initially, the Iranian forces made some impressive gains, cutting off the 
Basra-Baghdad highway, reaching the Tigris and inflicting heavy casualties on the Iraqi defenders. 
However, after absorbing the initial Iranian attack, the Iraqis swiftly regrouped and repulsed the 
invaders, driving them back into the marshes. After a week of heavy fighting, by March 17, the 
battle was over. The remnants of the Iranian force were in full retreat, and all the territory lost by the 
Iraqis in the early stages had been recovered. In strategic terms, it was the worst defeat suffered by 
Iran in the war. Both combatants incurred heavy losses; the Iraqis lost some 2,500 to 5,000 men, 
while Iranian losses were between 8,000 to 12,000. Although Iran had suffered greater losses in 
other battles, this time it had nothing to show for them. Operation Badr was a major fiasco for the 
Islamic Republic. The defeat sent tremors throughout the ruling establishment and eroded the 
credibility of the regime in the eyes of the Iranian masses.
In the meantime, Iraq continued the Tanker War in the Gulf and concomitantly opened up a 
large-scale aerial campaign targeting Iranian cities. The intensity of the air war was such that, within 
a three-day period, the Iraqi air force conducted some 158 sorties. Tehran finally felt compelled to 
target Baghdad and other urban centers in Iraq with Scud-B missiles, which had been supplied by 
Libya, and perhaps Syria. In the final analysis, Iraq had demonstrated its ability to choose and 
dictate the terms of engagement in the air and at sea. Moreover, in the ground war it had displayed 
considerable skill in conducting an effective defense. However, in political and symbolic terms, a 
major blow was delivered the day after the battle ended when, on March 18, Egyptian President 
Mubarak and Jordan's King Hussein flew to Baghdad for deliberations with Saddam Hussein and to 
congratulate him for the impressive victory. Much to the dismay of Iran and its Arab allies, the 
Mubarak-Hussein visit was a coup de theatre in regional and inter-Arab politics. The sight of 
Saddam Hussein in military uniform greeting the two Arab leaders at Baghdad airport and walking 
shoulder-to-shoulder with them had a profound psychological impact, not only on the Iraqis and their 
allies, but also on their opponents. The pictures and television images of the event put beyond 
dispute Egypt's re-entry into the Arab fold, the consolidation of this new and formidable Arab 
counteraxis and the growing perception that the Gulf War was indeed an Arab-Persian confrontation. 
After having reached its zenith in 1983-84, Syrian-lranian power and influence was unquestionably 
on the decline in the spring of 1985.
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CONCLUSION
The period between June 1982 and March 1985 was one of the most important in the modem history 
of the Middle East. The events during these three years drastically altered the politics of the region. 
They ushered in a new era which has left an indelible mark on the international relations of the 
Middle East.
The Israeli invasion of Lebanon strengthened the Syrian-lranian axis, providing it with a new 
theater for cooperation against their mutual foes. Furthermore, the prolonged Israeli occupation 
radicalized the Shi'ite community, which subsequently (with Syrian and Iranian assistance) waged an 
effective unconventional war against the IDF, ultimately forcing the Israelis to cut their losses and 
withdraw from the Lebanese quagmire. Concomitantly, Iran's decision to invade Iraq in July 1982 
polarized the Arab world, facilitating the reintegration of Egypt and the creation of a new moderate 
Arab alliance against the rejectionist states led by Syria and Iran. Furthermore, the Islamic 
Republic's poor conduct in the war and inability to maintain cordial relations with the Superpowers 
resulted in the thawing of Baghdad's relations with both Washington and Moscow. From 1984 
onwards, Iraq figured prominently in American strategy towards the Middle East and played a pivotal 
role in the Reagan administration's overall approach to safeguarding Western interests against states 
such as Iran and Syria. It should be noted that Israel's failure to attain its objectives in Lebanon had 
a profound impact on its self-image and provided the Lebanese Shi'ites with an enormous morale 
booster. However, the Syrians and Iranians only achieved a limited victory on the Arab-lsraeli front. 
Syria was unable to gain full control over Lebanon. The civil strife continued for several years. The 
limits of Syrian power and influence in the Levant were magnified in the winter of 1984-85 by the 
emergence of a loose alliance between Egypt, Jordan and the PLO, while the Syrian-lranian axis 
was gradually undermined by the Baghdad-Amman-Cairo axis, with the blessing of Washington and 
Riyadh.
During this crucial phase, the Islamic Republic of Iran cooperated with the Syrian Arab Republic for 
the following reasons:
*To maintain an economic stranglehold over Iraq.
*To receive military, political, and intelligence support.
*To create a constituency among the Shi'ites in Lebanon to fight the Israelis, Americans and French. 
*To gain some leverage over Syria in its backyard due to the asymmetry in the alliance.
*To dispel the Iraqi claim that the Gulf War was an Arab-Persian war.
*To counter the Baghdad-Amman-Cairo axis.
For the Syrian Arab Republic the liaison with the Islamic Republic of Iran served a variety of 
purposes:
*To check Iraqi power at a time when Syria was confronting Israel and its allies in Lebanon.
*To receive generous Iranian oil shipments to compensate for the shutdown of the IPC pipeline.
*To utilize Iranian influence to forge an alliance arid control the Lebanese Shi'ites.
*To use the Shi'ites as an instrument to expel the Israelis, Americans and French from Lebanon.
*To counter the emergent Egyptian-Jordanian-lraqi axis.
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’T o  serve as a mediator in the Gulf to extract concessions from Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states and 
increase its influence in the area.
However, by early 1985, the new political conditions in the region eliminated much of the 
raison d'etre for the alliance, thereby leading to intra-alliance tensions and the decline of Syrian- 
lranian power in the Middle East. The alliance went through a critical test of strength and durability 
between 1985 and 1988, but managed to survive.
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INTRA-ALLIANCE TENSIONS AND THE CONSOLIDATION OF THE SYRIAN-IRANIAN AXIS:
THE REVERSAL OF FORTUNES 1985-1988
INTRODUCTION
The period between the spring of 1985 and the summer of 1988 was the most turbulent and 
problematic in the evolution of the Syrian-lranian alliance. In almost every respect, clashes of 
interest and disagreements arose in areas where the two states had previously cooperated. In the 
Persian Gulf region, the continuation of hostilities between Iran and Iraq and the gradual 
internationalization of the conflict, whereby Tehran continued to attack shipping bound for the Gulf. 
Arab states (in reprisal for Iraqi raids), put Syria in an increasingly awkward position. Moreover, 
when Iran achieved its most significant military breakthrough (since the expulsion of the Iraqi 
forces from Iran in May 1982) by capturing the strategically-located Faw Peninsula in February 
1986, Syria was at pains to justify its continued support for a non-Arab state which was now 
occupying a sizeable amount of Arab territory. In the Levant, with the completion of the three- 
phased Israeli withdrawal from most of occupied Lebanon to the self-declared "security zone" in 
June 1985, Tehran and Damascus developed conflicting agendas in that war-tom country. With 
the gradual ascent of Hezbollah as a formidable political force (among Lebanon's largest minority - 
the Shi'ites) at the expense of the pro-Syrian Amal movement, the two sides found themselves 
increasingly at odds over the political future of Lebanon. While the pro-Iranian Hezbollah 
movement espoused the establishment of an Islamic republic in Syria's backyard, Amal envisioned 
a secular state within Syria's sphere of influence.
Besides their divergent positions on the most appropriate course of action in these two 
arenas of conflict, Iraq's ability to wage an intensive bombing campaign against Iran's oil facilities 
starting in August 1985, coupled with the oil price crash of March 1986, resulted in Tehran's oil 
revenues being cut by almost 70% within a matter of a few months, thereby adding to its economic 
woes and further complicating bilateral relations with Syria. Iran's refusal to meet Syria's oil 
requirements, along with the latter*s failure to pay off its oil debts, strained the already troubled 
relationship. The Iranian leadership was also greatly alarmed by the growing rapprochement 
between Syria and Jordan in early 1986 and King Hussein's subsequent efforts to resolve the 
differences between Hafez Assad and Saddam Hussein. Jordan's diplomacy received the blessing 
of other Arab states eager to decouple Syria and Iran, mend fences between the two Ba'thi regimes 
and force Iran to accept a ceasefire. These moves were backed by not only Riyadh and 
Washington, but also by Syria's Superpower patron, the Soviet Union.
Throughout the three-year period between 1985 and 1988, enormous effort was exerted, 
and financial and material benefits were offered by both Arab states and the Soviet Union to entice 
Assad to abandon his friendship with Iran. Coupled with the fact that Syrian-lranian relations 
reached a nadir in 1986-1987, one could argue that Assad had strong incentives at the time to
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abandon his alliance with Khomeini's Iran in order to improve his overall position, since he was 
facing several important challenges simultaneously. These included:
a) the need to secure Syria's eastern flank with Iraq in view of the prospect of a conflict with Israel;
b) Syria's marginalization in Arab politics with the consolidation of the Egyptian-Jordanian-lraqi 
axis;
c) the marked deterioration of relations with the West and the international opprobrium brought by 
Syria's alleged involvement in the Hindawi affair;
d) Iranian activisim and interference in Lebanon;
e) Hezbollah's rise as a dominant force in Lebanese affairs at the expense of Amal;
f) growing Arab-lranian polarization due to the continuation of the Gulf war;
g) Iran's refusal to continue oil deliveries to Syria;
h) the dismal state of the Syrian economy; and
i) the gradual cooling of Soviet-Syrian relations during the Gorbachev era, and the subsequent 
abandonment of the quest for "strategic parity" with Israel.
Many observers were baffled why Assad did not distance himself from Iran and join the 
mainstream of Arab politics, in order to minimize the risk of conflict with Israel and the West and 
derive substantial benefits, including oil and financial rewards, from the pro-Iraqi camp. Indeed, 
Syria came under considerable pressure from the Soviet Union, Saudi Arabia and Jordan to sever 
its links with Iran and mend fences with Iraq. Such a move could have mitigated its security 
dilemma with Israel, improved its regional and international standing and ensured the flow of 
economic and financial aid to remedy the dire domestic economic situation.
Overall the evolution of bilateral ties between Syria and Iran during this critical period 
clearly demonstrates the flawed conclusions of those analysts who argued that the alliance was a 
marriage of convenience - a short-term tactical move between two regimes with disparate 
ideologies and objectives. It also exposes the limits of the realist school of thought in explaining 
the behavior of these two states. If immediate security concerns and material aggrandizement had 
been the driving forces in their foreign policies, particular in the case of Syria, the relationship 
would have collapsed. However, both parties had broader, long-term strategic concerns derived 
from their own national security priorities and based on their respective ideologies and worldviews, 
whereby they perceived a unique role for themselves in the region and greater utility in preserving 
the alliance, in order to pursue an independent foreign policy shaping events in the Middle East in 
a desirable manner in the long-term and minimizing foreign influence and penetration of the region.
The aim of this chapter is to explain the sequence of events and put forth a comprehensive 
analysis of the conflicting policies pursued initially between 1985 and 1987 by Damascus and 
Tehran in the Persian Gulf region and the Levant, within the broader context of the rapidly 
changing regional and international environment. In order to meet emerging challenges by trying 
to address their most immediate security concerns and concomitantly balance them with thefc
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respective long-term strategic interests and ideological aspirations, the two sides were forced to 
reassess their priorities, delineate the extent of their influence and activities in the other partner's 
backyard and fine-tune the working mechanisms of the alliance, in order to determine properly the 
parameters of cooperation and unilateral action without impinging on the primary interests of their 
partner. Consequently, the alliance partners had to formulate a new rationale for their relationship 
and redefine their goals and functions. Furthermore, their ability to engage in constant dialogue 
and bilateral consultations, avoid losing sight of long-term strategic interests and modify their 
ideological principles resulted in new foundations being laid for continued cooperation between the 
two parties and, moreover, the eventual consolidation and institutionalization of the Damascus- 
Tehran axis. Consequently, by 1987-88, despite the facts that Amal-Hezbollah rivalry in Lebanon 
was intensifying, Mikhail Gorbachev was radically transforming Soviet Mideast policy by distancing 
himself from Hafez Assad, the United States was intervening in the Persian Gulf W ar as a de facto 
co-belligerent on the side of Baghdad and Iraq was finally seizing the initiative and turning the tide 
of the war, the Syrian-lranian alliance itself was maturing into a stable and durable working 
relationship.
THE SYRIAN-1 RANIAN RESPONSE TO THE "PAN-ARABIZATION" OF THE GULF WAR  
Following Iran's disastrous defeat in Operation Badr and the tripartite summit between Saddam 
Hussein, King Hussein and Hosni Mubarak in Baghdad, Syria and Iran quickly scrambled to 
engage in a damage-control operation aimed at bolstering their respective positions. This effort 
was given further impetus when the GCC Council of Ministers met in Riyadh between March 17 
and 19 and at the end of its deliberations issued a statement affirming its support for Iraq's position 
in the conflict.1 Both Damascus and Tehran adopted a two-pronged strategy to shore up support 
among regional states and advance their own political agenda. For Syria, this entailed rallying the 
rejectionist states behind its position and attempting to dispel the argument of the pro-Iraqi camp 
that the Gulf war had now been transformed into a truly Arab-Persian conflict. Revolutionary Iran 
also pursued a similar two-track policy of trying to maintain the sympathy and support of the 
Steadfastness Front and allay the fears of the GCC states that Iran was bent on exporting its 
revolution to neighboring countries and had designs on Arab territory.
in order to counter the impact of the tripartite summit, and also demonstrate their 
continued displeasure with the Jordanian-PLO peace initiative, the Syrians convened a meeting of 
senior officials from the Steadfastness Front and Iran in Damascus in the days that followed. 
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati was also dispatched to Algiers and Tripoli to confer with the 
Algerian and Libyan leadership on the latest developments; he then proceeded to Damascus, 
where he delivered a message from President Khamene'i to Hafez Assad prior to the opening of 
the talks in Damascus.2 Velayati also met with his Syrian, Algerian and South Yemeni counterparts 
and Libya's Major Jallud during a two-day period. The consultations ended on 21 March with a
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quadripartite meeting of Syrian, Algerian, Libyan and South Yemeni representatives to coordinate 
their policies and "confront the deviationist and capitulationist line being peddled by imperialist and 
Zionist forces."3
Overall, the fact that the main rejectionist states gathered in Damascus for consultations 
enabled Syria to uphold its pan-Arab credentials and partially offset the symbolic effect of the 
tripartite summit in Baghdad. On the other hand, the Steadfastness Front was in a moribund state 
and by now served as nothing more than a talking shop. In sharp contrast to the active military 
support provided by Jordan and Egypt to Iraq, the Syrians were well aware that, in the event of a 
conflict with Israel, there was very little that its Arab allies could do to assist it. Moreover, 
Damascus failed to forge a consensus among the members to schedule a meeting of their 
respective heads of state in order to formally revive the Steadfastness Front.4 Revolutionary Iran, 
for its part, was appreciative of Syria's efforts to associate it with the Arab rejectionist bloc and the 
continued willingness of Syria and Libya to provide it with long-range surface-to-surface missiles 
for use against Iraq in the ongoing "War of the Cities."5
During the last week of March, at the Arab League Council meeting held in Tunis, Syrian 
Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara reiterated his country's commitment to safeguarding pan-Arab 
interests and justified the liaison with non-Arab Iran in terms of guaranteeing the security of the 
Arab East. He elucidated:
"Syria has at least tried to prevent an expansion of the war to include other Arab 
states, because we have seen and felt the real dangers of the war becoming an 
Arab-Persian war - a war that could threaten the national interests of all Arab 
states and constitute a threat to the security and stability of the region...Our 
continuous contacts with Iran have resulted in the Iranian government's 
commitment, despite what has happened, not to entertain any expansionist 
designs on any Arab territory, whether in Iraq or any of the Gulf states. All these 
efforts are a source of pride to us in Syria and should be a source of pride for the 
Arab nation. This is because they stem from pan-Arab stands that are aimed at 
safeguarding the nation's rights and interests."6 
At the conclusion of the meeting, on March 28, a mild statement was issued reiterating the 
solidarity of Arab League members with Iraq in defense of its sovereignty, independence and 
territorial integrity. It also called for an immediate end to the hostilities and a negotiated settlement 
to bring a just and honorable peace. There was no explicit condemnation of Iran's intractable 
stance.7
The Iranian leadership became increasingly conscious that its determination to prosecute 
the war until the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and its ideological imperative to unite Arabs and 
Iranians under the banner of revolutionary Islam were perceived to be contradictory by many 
Arabs. The pro-Iraqi camp was able to exploit growing public disillusionment with Iran by
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portraying the Gulf W ar as a continuation of the age-old Arab-Persian rivalry and depicting Iran's 
ayatollahs as no more than "turbaned shahs" bent on imposing Persian dominance on the Arabs 
under the guise of political Islam. For the Iranian regime, the conflicting currents in its conduct of 
the war and appeal for Arab popular support represented a major dilemma. On the one hand, the 
general aim to ensure the country's future security by defeating the Iraqi military machine and 
toppling the Iraqi Bath had become inextricably linked with the broader revolutionary goal of 
setting up an Islamic republic in Iraq and creating a "Shi'ite axis" from the Persian Gulf to the 
Mediterranean.8 On the other hand, prolongation of the conflict was prompting an increasing 
number of Arab states to join the pro-Iraqi camp or at the very least tilt towards Baghdad, thereby 
resulting in Iran's growing isolation and putting its few remaining allies - Syria and Libya - in an 
awkward position.
The gradual marginalization of Iran in the Arab-lslamic world transformed the Arab-lsraeli 
theater, particularly Lebanon, from the vantage point of Tehran's revolutionaries, into a vital arena 
to demonstrate their commitment to "the pan-lslamic struggle against the Zionist entity" and 
prevent an Arab-Persian schism. Furthermore, the bridgehead in the East Mediterranean was 
essential in order to support Lebanese Shi'ite co-reiigionists, strive for unity among Lebanon's 
Shi'ites and Sunnis and serve as a defender of Palestinian rights within the country. It is 
noteworthy that, because of Tehran's determination to maintain its position as one of the key 
players in Assad's backyard, its growing reliance on Syria and Libya for certain weapons systems 
and its aim to preserve its links with the two main Arab rejectionist states in order to prove its pro- 
Arab stance, the Iranian-Syrian nexus became an asymmetrical alliance, whereby Iran was more 
dependent on Syrian goodwill.9
While Iran's opponents tried to depict the war as a struggle between the "defender of the 
Arab East" and the traditional Persian foe, Iranian leaders tried to transcend the nationalist debate 
and elevate the nature of the conflict to a higher plain, to one of progressive, revolutionary forces 
fighting reactionary nationalists who served foreign masters. In a telling speech by Majles Speaker 
Rafsanjani to a group of visiting theologians from Islamic countries on May 4, he declared:
"We consider the Arabic language as one of the noblest in the world and believe 
that Arabic literature is a divine blessing bestowed upon humanity by the Almighty.
It is the language of the Quran, the Prophet, the imams, as well as our religion 
and history. Our glories in the libraries are all in Arabic...Our prayers and more 
than half of the vocabulary in our literature are in Arabic. So you see that there is 
no anti-Arab sentiment in the Islamic Republic. On the contrary, we hold a pro- 
Arab bias...Nevertheless, the enemies of Islam are raising the issue of the Arabs 
and non-Arabs. Fortunately, such Arab countries as Libya and Syria which are 
alongside us, have thwarted this propaganda of the enemies. If this issue existed 
at all, Syria and Libya would not side with us...You and us in Iran must be
152
examples of cooperation between Arabs and non-Arabs, a model of Shi'ite-Sunni 
unity, and present a prominent example of Muslim unity...If we succeed in keeping 
ablaze this sacred flame lit by the Islamic revolution in Iran and spread it 
elsewhere, then there could be hopes for the salvation of the people and the 
oppressed."10
As Iran's staunchest supporters, the Syrians were well aware of the growing disenchantment in the 
Arab world with Tehran's conduct in the Gulf region, the widening rift between Iran and the GCC 
states as the war against Iraq dragged on and increased chances of the hostilities spilling over to 
engulf the southern littoral states. In the weeks following Operation Badr, Syria engaged in quiet 
diplomacy in a bid to ease tensions between the GCC and Iran. Damascus focused its efforts on 
trying to thaw Saudi-lranian relations. It soon became apparent that both Riyadh and Tehran were 
receptive to the Syrian initiative.
FALSE DAWN: RECONCILIATION ATTEMPTS BETWEEN IRAN AND THE GCC STATES
In order to reverse the deterioration of Arab-lranian relations and dent the unity of the pro-Iraqi 
camp, Tehran went along with Damascus' strategy and also decided to embark on its own "charm 
offensive" to allay the fears of the Gulf Arabs and mend fences to the extent possible. Although 
the Iranians had no intention of easing the pressure on Ba'thi Iraq, they hoped to persuade its 
financial backers to adopt a more balanced posture in the war. The Syrian effort bore fruit, with 
both sides sending positive signals. The ensuing flurry of diplomatic activity led to a series of 
bilateral exchanges between Iran and the Gulf sheikhdoms.11 The most notable achievement was 
the invitation extended by Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati to his Saudi counterpart, Prince Saud 
al-Faisal, and the latteris subsequent three-day visit to Tehran in mid-May. Besides two rounds of 
talks with Velayati, Prince Saud also met with President Khamene'i, Prime Minister Musavi and 
Majles Speaker Rafsanjani. Despite their conflicting positions on the Gulf war, both sides seem to 
have concurred on the need to prevent the expansion of the conflict and strengthen bilateral 
cooperation. On the issue of the Hajj, Tehran promised to refrain from instigating any provocative 
acts during the annual pilgrimage to Mecca and, in return, Riyadh agreed to provide regular 
shipments of refined petroleum products to Iran for domestic use.12 Following the successful 
outcome of the visit, Iran decided to build on the momentum which had been achieved in thawing 
Saudi-lranian relations by bridging differences with other Gulf countries. A delegation headed by 
Velayati's advisor, Ali Shams-Ardakani, toured the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia 
to reassure their governments of Iranian intentions in the war. The GCC states which were keenly 
aware of Iran's attempts to reverse its increasing unpopularity in the Arab world, the stalemate in 
the land war and Iraq's growing assertiveness in the air campaign, concluded that the most 
effective manner to deal with Tehran in order to prevent the Gulf W ar from spilling over and 
attempt to modify Iranian war aims was to engage it in an intensive dialog. The long-term rationale
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for this approach was to prevent the alienation of Iran from its Arab neighbors, provide it with a 
stake in normalization of relations and, in view of the deadlock in the ground war, persuade it to 
accept a negotiated settlement.
Concomitant with their efforts to initiate a constructive dialog with the Islamic Republic, 
throughout 1985, the Arab sheikhdoms and other members of the pro-Iraqi camp sought to win 
over Iran's primary Arab backer, Syria, by trying as a first step to reconcile its differences with 
Jordan and Iraq. Although their efforts bore fruit as the year progressed, the situation initially 
became somewhat convoluted as a result of greater inter-Arab polarization and developments in 
the Gulf W ar which seemed to complicate further the overall equation.
THE INTER-ARAB RIFT, SYRIAN POLICY AND THE CASABLANCA SUMMIT  
During the summer of 1985, the rift between the moderate Arab states and the radical bloc grew 
wider, as the two sides jockeyed for power and influence in the region and tried to discredit each 
other. Two diametrically opposed positions crystallized on the Arab-lsraeli question and Gulf War. 
Jordan and Egypt spearheaded the movement to resuscitate an Arab-lsraeli dialog in order to 
resolve the conflict through peaceful means and advocated pan-Arab support for Iraq, denouncing 
the pro-Iranian Arab camp for betraying the greater interests of the Arab nation. Syria and Libya 
tried to impede their moves at every opportunity and, in parallel with Iranian initiatives, engaged in 
some diplomatic maneuvering to strengthen the rejectionist camp and minimize the perception of 
any Arab-lranian rift. Besides political posturing, both camps intensified their propaganda wars 
against one another.
Syria's and Iran's prestige and power were enhanced in June by their involvement in the 
peaceful resolution of the TWA 847 hijacking in Beirut. The two played a pivotal role in convincing 
the hijackers to release the remaining passengers. Besides helping them to some degree shed 
their unpopular image in the West, their part in ending the TWA 847 affair led to a reassessment of 
US policy towards the two countries, particularly Iran.13 (See section on hijacking.)
Syria's Growing Power and Influence in the Middle East
While Syria's role in the resolution of the TWA hijacking restored some of its credibility 
internationally and boosted its prestige in the region, its Arab adversaries reacted sharply by 
intensifying their propaganda campaign to portray the Assad regime as a sponsor of terrorism and 
betrayer of the Arab cause. Jordan, Egypt and Iraq escalated their war of words to diminish Syria's 
stature and influence in the region. The Jordanians in particular were convinced that Syria was 
behind the numerous attacks on their foreign representations, including diplomatic outposts and 
airline offices abroad, in the months following the joint Jordanian-PLO Declaration of Principles 
(February 1985). Jordanian authorities accused Syria of orchestrating a massive effort aimed at 
destabilizing the Hashemite kingdom.14
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In the aftermath of the completion of the third phase of the Israeli withdrawal from southern 
Lebanon and the peaceful resolution of the TWA hijacking, Syrian power and prestige seemed to 
be at its pinnacle. Coupled with its unswerving support for the Iranian war effort and incessant 
efforts to derail the PLO-Jordanian peace initiative, Damascus' notable gains alarmed the 
moderate Arab states. In view of these developments, an unscheduled meeting between King 
Hussein and President Mubarak took place in the Jordanian city of Aqaba on July 4 to discuss 
ways to counter Syria's growing power. Besides Damascus' potential for filling the power vacuum 
left by Israel in Lebanon, the two Arab leaders were fearful that Assad might have exacted a price 
from the Reagan administration for Syria's role in ending the TWA incident, possibly relating to the 
Arab-lsraeli peace process.15 The Egyptian position towards Syria and its other regional rivals was 
clearly articulated in an interview with Egyptian Prime Minister Kamal Hassan Ali, published in Al- 
Watan Al-Arabi on July 19, in which he openly accused Damascus and Tripoli of involvement in 
terrorist acts and described the Syrian-Libyan-lranian camp as an obstacle to Arab solidarity and 
baneful to Arab interests. The Jordanian news media were also full of reports alleging Syrian 
involvement in terrorism in Jordan, Lebanon, Kuwait and the Gulf region, underscoring Assad's 
treachery by aiding the aggressive Iranian war effort "to kill the Iraqi people."16 Syria's growing 
assertiveness was also manifested in a number of incidents in mid-July, when its warplanes 
crossed into Iraqi airspace in a show of force to intimidate its Ba'thi rival.17
At the same time as maintaining the Syrian-lranian pincer against Iraq, Tehran continued 
its policy to forge new links with the Gulf Arabs and drive a wedge between them and Iraq. In late 
July, a high-level Iranian political-cum-oil delegation arrived in Riyadh to coordinate policy on 
OPEC affairs with the Saudis in order to ensure price stability on the international oil market. The 
Iranian representatives held talks with Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal and also submitted a 
message from Ali Akbar Velayati.18
As divisions in the Arab world were exacerbated by the Gulf W ar and the Arafat-Hussein 
initiative, King Hassan II of Morocco announced his intention on July 27 to host an emergency Arab 
summit in Casablanca to clear the air and restore some semblance of unity among Arab ranks.19 
The meeting, the first of its kind in three years, scheduled to commence on August 7, was intended 
to discuss all aspects of the Palestinian question, including giving King Hussein and Yasser Arafat 
the opportunity to explain how closely their blueprint conformed to the Fez peace plan of 
September 1982.20 While Iraq and the UAE immediately backed the move, Syria was vocal in its 
protestations, denouncing the scheduled summit as a "shameful scheme" which threatened the 
future of the Arab nation.21 Interpreting the event as a vehicle to advance the Jordanian-PLO 
agenda, Damascus immediately signalled its intention to boycott the meeting.22 Syria's traditional 
allies - Libya, Algeria, Lebanon and South Yemen - also boycotted the event.23
As it turned out, the Casablanca summit represented a symbolic victory for the pro-Syrian 
camp, with the sixteen delegations present failing to endorse the Hussein-Arafat peace plan,
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despite an appeal by the Jordanian monarch for Arab support. Instead, following the conclusion of 
the two-day conference, a communique was issued reaffirming the participants' support for the Fez 
peace plan. Irrespective of Syria's absence and Jordan's lobbying, most Arab states in essence 
agreed with Assad's position that the Arabs must negotiate from a position of strength, or were 
reticent to approve the peace plan and consequently incur the wrath of the Syrians. Through a 
combination of his own obstinacy and intimidation, and inaction on the part of his opponents, Assad 
had prevailed on this occasion.24 However, certain decisions were taken at the Casablanca 
summit that would have a profound impact on Syrian-lranian relations over the next two years. 
The participants agreed on the formation of a committee composed of Saudi and Tunisian 
representatives to mediate between Syria and Jordan, and also Iraq and Syria.25
The overall failure of the summit no doubt pleased Damascus and Tehran to varying 
degrees. The Syrian daily, Al-Thawrah, on August 10, denounced the whole affair as a meeting of 
"capitulationists", while Iranian Prime Minister Mir Hossein Musavi posited that "the failure of the 
so-called Arab summit in Casablanca" was to be expected in light of the absence of the 
progressive Arab states.26 In parallel, in order to reaffirm their tripartite cooperation, and as a 
partial riposte to the emergency Arab summit in Casablanca earlier that month, on August 24-25, 
the foreign ministers of Syria, Iran and Libya met in Damascus to discuss their relations, 
developments in the region and harmonization of their positions prior to the forthcoming meeting of 
the foreign ministers of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) in Damascus.27 Following their 
deliberations, a joint statement was issued in which they condemned the PLO-Jordanian 
agreement, and the "capitulationist" Iraqi-Jordanian-Egyptian-PLO axis, described as being to the 
detriment of the Palestinian people and Arab-lslamic interests respectively. To Tehran's 
contentment, they denounced "Saddam Hussein's unjust war against the Islamic revolution in Iran" 
and criticized Iraq's bombardment of cities, attacks on oil tankers and use of chemical warfare.28 
The Syrian and Libyan foreign ministers also declared their satisfaction with Iran's repeated 
guarantees that it had no designs on Iraqi territory and sought good-neighborly relations and 
Islamic brotherhood with the Iraqi and Arab peoples. In conclusion, they announced their intention 
to hold the next tripartite meeting in Tripoli in December of that year.29
In many respects, this was the one of the last trouble-free meetings Syrian and Iranian 
officials were to have until 1988. By the autumn, new developments in the Gulf conflict and inter- 
Arab politics would threaten their alliance and trouble the relationship for almost two years. 
Tensions between the two partners were emerging due to their growing rivalry and disparate 
objectives in Lebanon. The rise of Hezbollah as a key player in the domestic Lebanese power 
game in the winter of 1984-85, coupled with the conflicting visions that Syria and Iran had of 
Lebanon's political future, ushered in a period of competition and recurrent disputes between 
Damascus and Tehran. Already in the spring of 1985, cracks had begun to appear in the alliance. 
Intra-alliance tensions and distrust were soon magnified because of unforeseen events in the Gulf
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conflict and attempts by pro-Iraqi states to persuade Syria to abandon its friendship with Iran. 
Before looking at the events in the Persian Gulf, the changing dynamics of the Syrian-lranian 
alliance need to be reviewed within the context of the evolving situation in Lebanon.
THE BEGINNINGS OF SYRIAN-IRANIAN RIVALRY IN LEBANON
By the spring of 1985, with the Israeli retreat and the emerging power vacuum, both Syria and Iran 
wanted to enjoy the fruits of their common victory by playing a major role in the political future of 
Lebanon. However, they had conflicting visions about how the war-torn country fitted into their 
strategy within the broader framework of their regional foreign policies. Syria, having thwarted the 
establishment of an Israeli-American condominium in Lebanon during 1984-1985, and having 
ousted hostile foreign forces from the country, now had an opportunity to stabilize the situation by 
bringing the entire country into its sphere of influence. Furthermore, in view of its new-found 
prestige and status, Syria was determined to pursue a more activist regional foreign policy to 
frustrate attempts by the moderate Arab states to reach an accommodation with Israel (without 
addressing Syrian concerns) and weaken the pro-Iraq camp by exploiting differences among its 
members so as to extract concessions from them whenever possible.
As far as Iran's revolutionary regime was concerned, its pivotal role in frustrating Israeli- 
Western designs in Lebanon, by assisting its Syrian ally and its Lebanese Shi'ite co-religionists, 
had been one of its crowning foreign policy achievements, particularly in ideological terms. By 
dealing a blow to the "Zionist-Imperialist" camp, it had demonstrated that the struggle to liberate 
Palestine was not the exclusive domain of the Arabs. Although the Islamic Republic was at war 
with a "reactionary" Arab regime in the Gulf, this in no way diminished its sense of solidarity with 
progressive Arab states in their struggle. With the Israeli threat now receding, Iran sought to 
replicate the establishment of a theocratic state in Lebanon as a means of spreading its revolution 
and use it as a springboard to strike against Israel in the campaign to liberate Palestine.
Besides the stark contrast in their ideological objectives in Lebanon, Syria and Iran fell out 
over a number of important issues during the course of 1985. The three main areas of contention 
revolved around the growing rivalry between the Shi'ite Amal and Hezbollah militias, Amal's 
attempts to blockade the Palestinian refugee camps and Syria's confrontation with the Islamic 
Unification Front in the northern port city of Tripoli.
The Rise of the Pro-Iranian Hezbollah Movement
As stated earlier, subsequent to the Israeli government's decision to commence a phased 
withdrawal from most of southern Lebanon in December 1984, Amal and Hezbollah fighters 
stepped up their attacks against the IDF in the occupied areas. Already by January 1985, the 
Israelis had lost over 600 men and the occupation was costing them over $1 million a day.30 The 
two militias intensified their activities in the early months of 1985. Concurrent to the tripartite
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meeting of the Syrian, Iranian and Libyan foreign ministers in Tehran in January 1985, intelligence 
officials from the three countries held talks at the same venue to coordinate their activities in 
assisting the Lebanese resistance roll back the Israelis. As a direct outcome of the deliberations, 
Iran was granted greater access to Lebanon via land routes from Syria that had been previously 
reserved for the Syrian army only. Libya also agreed to finance the purchase of a consignment of 
Soviet-made Grad and Sagger anti-tank missiles by Syria to be utilized by Hezbollah in southern 
Lebanon.31 As clashes intensified between the combatants in the following weeks, the Israelis 
withdrew from Sidon on February 16.32 By March, there had been 1,145 reported attacks against 
the Israelis over a two-year period.33 Soon afterwards, Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres 
promised the Israeli public that the IDF would pull out of Lebanon within ten weeks.34 Furthermore, 
during an interview on April 3, Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin admitted that Tel Aviv had tried on 
several occasions to communicate with the Lebanese Shi'ite leaders in order to reach some sort of 
understanding with them, but "Syria had foiled most of those contacts."35 In a meeting on April 25 
with Lebanese Muslim leaders in Damascus, Syrian President Hafez Assad called on the Lebanese 
resistance to redouble its efforts to expel the Israelis and their allies from Lebanon, declaring that 
"the south has become Israel's Vietnam...no effort should be spared to support the nationalist 
resistance until the Israeli enemy is driven out of all Lebanese territory.''36 By the end of April, the 
IDF had pulled out of Tyre and strategic positions in southeastern Lebanon facing Syrian 
positions.37
Eventually, on June 6,1985 - the third anniversary of the invasion of Lebanon - Major- 
General Ori Orr, Commander of the IDF Northern Command, announced that his forces had 
completed their three-phased withdrawal to the self-declared "security zone" in south Lebanon, 
where its surrogate force, the 3,000-strong South Lebanon Army (SLA) and 1,000 Israeli soldiers, 
were deployed to prevent attacks on northern Israel. By then, the Israelis had lost 750 troops in 
Lebanon. Although they had succeeded in eliminating the prominent PLO presence there, they 
now faced an implacable, fearsome foe that was homegrown - Hezbollah.38
The Israeli withdrawal in the first part of 1985 fundamentally transformed the Lebanese 
equation and the general perceptions of the contending parties inside and outside of Lebanon. 
Besides bringing Syria and Iran into conflict, other players also tried to pursue divergent agendas in 
the Lebanese arena. Domestic groupings such as the Phalangists, the Islamic Unification Front 
and Hezbollah tried to advance their own agendas, even if they ran counter to Syrian wishes, while 
Yasser Arafat's PLO saw the IDF retreat as a major opportunity to re-establish a Palestinian 
foothold in Lebanon in order to strengthen his hand vis-a-vis the Israelis and his Arab rivals, 
particularly the Syrians. While many of their actions ran counter to Syrian interests in Lebanon, 
Iran was sympathetic to varying degrees to the concerns of the Shi'ites, Sunnis and even the 
Palestinians, much to Damascus' chagrin. Rapidly unfolding events and the conflicting goals of the 
concerned parties created an extremely convoluted situation during this period, at times pitting the
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Syrians against their Iranian and Libyan allies. Assad's initiative to establish a Pax Syriana in 
Lebanon and buttress the position of Nabih Bern's Amal militia encountered resistance in many 
comers of the country. The first of a series of crises erupted in the spring of 1985 when Amal tried 
to assert itself in Beirut and its environs.
The Dominance of Amal and Iranian Activities
Despite the ascendance of Hezbollah, the most dominant Shi'ite party in Lebanon in 1984-85 
remained the Amal militia. As Tel Aviv proceeded with its phased withdrawal in April-May 1985 
and Palestinian fighters began to trickle into Lebanon with the assistance of some Lebanese 
parties, Amal tried to assert itself in Beirut and the south. While Amal, with Syrian consent, 
gradually began to clamp down on pro-Arafat Palestinians and their Sunni allies and tighten its 
control over the areas it occupied, Iran embarked on a campaign to bolster the position of its 
Shi'ite allies, consolidate relations with Sunni fundamentalists that it had been cultivating for some 
time and forge close cooperative links between the Shi'ite and Sunni communities in order to 
invigorate Islamic solidarity in the war-torn country. Tehran seems to have sensed that the 
opportune moment had arrived to lay the groundwork for the eventual creation of an Islamic state 
in Lebanon by rallying Lebanese Shi'ites and Sunnis around the banner of revolutionary Islam.39 In 
fact, already at this juncture, Hezbollah enjoyed steadfast support from Sunni fundamentalists. At 
least six prominent Sunni clerics in West Beirut were sympathetic to Hezbollah, while in Sidon a 
Shi'ite cleric, Sheikh Maher Hammoud, who had ties with Iran, undertook efforts to create the 
"Islamic Front,” an umbrella organization for Shi'ite and Sunni clerics who espoused Hezbollah's « 
cause. His activities eventually bore fruit by mid-1985.40 Moreover, in the Sunni-dominated city of 
Tripoli in northern Lebanon, Tehran and Hezbollah succeeded in forging close ties with Sheikh 
Said Shaban, leader of the Islamic Unification Movement (Harakat al-Tawheed al-lslami). While 
he was receptive to the overtures of Iran and its Lebanese allies, Shaban, who governed the city as 
an Islamic fiefdom, had an anti-Syrian bias and opposed pro-Syrian forces in the region.
In order to promote their grand design in Lebanon, in early May 1985, Ayatollah Khomeini's 
representative and head of the powerful Martyrs' Foundation (Bonyad Shahid), Hojjatolislam Mehdi 
Karrubi, led an Iranian delegation to Syria and Lebanon to review developments with Arab allies 
and coordinate their efforts. While touring Lebanon, Karrubi met and conferred with Sheikh 
Fadlallah, Hezbollah's spiritual leader, and the Mufti of Lebanon's Sunni community, Hassan 
Khaled. He himself said the purpose of his visit was to celebrate the triumph of the Muslim 
resistance against the "Zionist occupiers in southern Lebanon" and to lend additional support to the 
strugglers against the "Zionist state."41
There is no doubt that Iran's revolutionary clerics desired to capitalize on the emerging 
situation in Lebanon. With the IDF in retreat and the Lebanese government weak, Tehran sought 
to fill the political void by creating a Shi'ite-Sunni bloc that would dominate the Lebanese political
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scene and toe the Iranian line. Having invested enormous resources in its campaign to establish a 
bridgehead in Lebanon since 1982, Iran's clerical regime was now determined to complete its 
project to export its revolution to an Arab state bordering Israel and maintain its new springboard 
for future endeavours in the eastern Mediterranean. Its determination to implement the project was % 
reinforced by the fact that, after three years of trying to topple Saddam Hussein and establish an 
Islamic state in Iraq, its efforts in Iraq and elsewhere in the Gulf region had come to naught. Only 
in Lebanon had the Iranians been able to achieve some solid accomplishments by gradually 
winning over the hearts and minds of many Shi'ites and Sunnis and sowing seeds in Lebanon's 
fertile ground for the growth of revolutionary Islam. In view of the stalemate in the Gulf conflict, 
Lebanon was the only promising arena for Tehran to channel its missionary zeal. Conversely, 
Syria's intention to stabilize the situation by creating a secular government involving all the various 
sects, and maintaining the country firmly within its sphere of influence, put Tehran and Damascus 
on a collision course. Interestingly enough, Palestinian attempts to make inroads in Lebanon 
precipitated the first major crisis between the two allies in the spring of 1985.
The Beginning of the "War of the Camps" in Lebanon
As PLO fighters continued to return to Lebanon throughout the early months of 1985, infiltrating the 
three main Palestinian refugee camps of Sabra, Shatila and Bourj al-Barajneh in West Beirut, the 
situation eventually came to a head in late May when Amal laid siege to the camps, determined to 
destroy Palestinian armed strength and assert its complete control. By the time the fighting 
erupted on May 20, 1985, it is estimated that some 5,000 PLO guerillas had made their way back 
to Beirut.42 By the end of May, Amal, with the help of the Lebanese army's pre-dominantly Shi'ite 
6th Brigade, had routed Arafat loyalists in Sabra and brought the camp under its control. However, 
much to their surprise and that of their Syrian patrons, in Shatila and Bourj al-Barajneh, PLO and 
anti-Arafat elements joined forces to resist the Amal onslaught. The assault on the camps 
galvanized the rival Palestinian groups. To Assad's dismay, the anti-Arafat, Damascus-based 
PNSF performed a volte-face. George Habash, head of the PFLP, left Damascus in protest, and 
the DFLP's relations with Syria became strained.43 As the siege dragged on, by early June, much 
of Shatila was also occupied by Amal and the 6th Brigade. They demanded that the Palestinians 
give up their weapons and permit the 6th Brigade to oversee security in the refugee districts. Their 
terms were rejected outright by PLO loyalists, and even by the PNSF, which claimed to speak on 
behalf of camp residents.44
Although decisive blows had only recently been dealt against the Israelis and Americans in 
Lebanon, the "War of the Camps" now threatened to undermine Syria's newly-found power and 
prestige as champion of the Arab-Palestinian cause. Furthermore, the war jeopardized its relations 
with the radical states in the region, including Libya, Iran and South Yemen, all of which were 
critical of Syrian conduct.45 Revolutionary Iran found itself in an extremely awkward situation vis-
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a-vis its closest Arab ally. When the fighting broke out, Tehran reacted cautiously, with the foreign 
ministry issuing a vague statement describing the clashes as "a product of a dangerous conspiracy 
intended to divert the struggle of Muslim forces from the real enemy.”46 In terms of Iran's alliance 
with Syria and its interests in the region, the conflict between Amal and the Palestinians came at an 
inopportune moment and was detrimental in several respects. As previously mentioned, with the 
impasse in the Gulf and growing Arab disenchantment with Iran's conduct in the war, it was 
imperative for Tehran to confirm its revolutionary credentials by maintaining harmony in its 
relations with Syria, strengthening its foothold in Lebanon, encouraging Shi'ite-Sunni unity and 
keeping up the momentum in the struggle against the Israelis in order to liberate Palestine and to 
discredit proponents of the PLO-Jordanian initiative. Not only was the fighting straining its relations 
with Damascus, but also creating undesired consequences such as dividing the Shi'ite community, 
exacerbating cleavages between the Shi'ites and Sunnis, diverting attention away from the Israeli 
presence in the south and undermining the position of opponents of the Arafat-Hussein peace plan.
As the hostilities continued, prominent Iranian clerics voiced their displeasure with the 
unfolding events in Beirut. Khomeini's chosen successor, Grand Ayatollah Montazeri, in a meeting 
with Lebanese clerics and theological students in the holy city of Qom on May 28, denounced those 
who were exploiting the Lebanese Shi'ites as a tool for their own political purposes and instigating 
bloodshed between Muslim Palestinian refugees and groups of struggling Lebanese Shi'ite 
Muslims. Montazeri lashed out at them, arguing: "these people must repent and change their 
ways, and end the bloodshed and killing of Muslims which is unfortunately done in the name of 
Shi'ism in Lebanon. They must not provide so much propaganda material for the media of the 
enemies of Islam.''47
Less than ten days after the fighting had erupted, Iran launched a concerted diplomatic 
effort to end the hostilities and exercise damage control. A team from the foreign ministry led by 
Director-General for Political Affairs Hossein Lavasani was dispatched to Damascus in late May, 
where it held meetings with Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara and anti-Arafat Palestinian 
leaders, and then proceeded to Beirut on May 30 to confer with Sheikh Hassan Khaled, the Sunni 
Mufti, and Sheikh Hussein Fadlallah of Hezbollah.48 The following day, the Minister of the Islamic 
Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), Mohsen Rafiqdoust, arrived in Syria, carrying a message from 
Ali Khamene'i for Hafez Assad. Prior to his arrival, Rafiqdoust had been in Libya holding talks with 
Qadhafi on recent developments. Although the ostensible purpose of his mission was to try to 
negotiate an end to the crisis in Lebanon, his main priority seems to have been to obtain surface- 
to-air and surface-to-surface missiles from Tripoli and Damascus to counter the Iraqi air offensive 
and retaliate against Iraqi targets.49 By all accounts, upon his arrival in Damascus, Mohsen 
Rafiqdoust was reluctantly received by Hafez Assad, who voiced his deep displeasure with the 
caustic remarks of some Iranian leaders and asserted that Syrian interests took primacy in 
Lebanon. Rafiqdoust for his part, while trying to allay concerns and request assistance from the
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Syrian leader, underscored that Iran had a privileged position in Lebanon and that its power and 
influence could not be ignored by the other parties.50
Meanwhile, Mehdi Karrubi also journeyed to Syria and Lebanon once again at the head of 
a delegation in a bid to defuse the crisis. Arriving in Damascus on June 1, he met with Syrian 
Vice-President Khaddam and then proceeded the next day to Beirut to make contact, in his words, 
with "revolutionary and concerned forces...to quell the fire of dissension and war, and rally all the 
forces against the real enemies...the Zionists and the USA."51 Realizing the delicacy of the 
situation and Syrian sensitivities, in an interview on June 4 in Beirut, Karrubi tried to portray Syrian- 
lranian relations in a positive light. He stated: "we agree with Syria that these clashes are the 
results of plots against the Lebanese and Palestinian people." Treading even more cautiously 
when asked if Iran desired the creation of an Islamic republic in Lebanon, he explained that the 
type of government in Lebanon was a domestic issue for the Lebanese people to decide. He 
added: "we respect the right of nations to decide their destiny, we will accept any system which has 
been approved by the majority of the Lebanese people."52
With the continuation of the siege, Iranian-Amal relations plunged to a new low when 
Karrubi's entourage was detained by Amal militiamen while touring southern Lebanon and forcibly 
taken back to Beirut. Angered by what was perceived as Amal's intransigence with Syrian 
acquiescence, Iranian Prime Minister Musavi castigated the Syrians for what he called their implicit 
"cooperation" with Tel Aviv and Washington. He postulated that "the disarming of Palestinians in 
Lebanon is serving Israeli interests and strengthens the hand of America the warmonger."53 
Ayatollah Montazeri also reacted sharply to the incident involving Karrubi, contending that "the 
fighting between the Palestinians and the Shi'ites will create deep wounds and hatred between 
Muslims. It is the aim of America and Israel to destroy Islam's unity. All those who encourage 
such a scheme are traitors to Islam."54
By early June, the situation seemed to be spiralling out of control on several fronts, with 
Syria losing its grip in Lebanon. In the northern port city of Tripoli, Tawheed fighters - angered by 
Damascus' policies - engaged the predominantly Alawite, pro-Syrian Arab Democratic Party militia 
in armed confrontations, while in Beirut the pro-Nasserite Murabitoun initiated hit-and-run attacks 
against Amal and the 6th Brigade, apparently with Libya's blessing. However, the worst was yet to 
come. Walid Jumblatt's Progressive Socialist Party, having been sympathetic with the plight of the 
Palestinians all along, became increasingly alarmed by Amal's actions. During the early stages of 
the Amal-Palestinian conflagration, the Druze had passively supported the Palestinians by 
providing those fleeing the carnage with protection and passing on Libyan arms and supplies to 
Palestinian fighters in the camps. However, the situation finally came to a head on June 11, when 
large-scale fighting broke out between PSP and Amal fighters in West Beirut.
162
The TWA 847 Hijacking and Syrian-lranian Intervention
As the factional fighting intensified in mid-June, Shi'ite radicals orchestrated an action to voice their 
grievances against Israeli policies in the south on the world stage and gain the upper hand in their 
struggle for the soul of Lebanon's Shi'ite community. In the midst of the internecine fighting, 
tensions rose to new heights and international attention suddenly became focused on Lebanon as a 
direct outcome of the hijacking of TWA flight 847 by Shi'ite militants on June 14, carrying 145 
passengers from Athens to Rome. The hijackers demanded the release of 753 Lebanese Shi'ites 
apprehended by the Israelis and transported back into Israel, as well as the seventeen Shi'ites 
imprisoned in Kuwait for involvement in bombing American and French installations in the emirate 
two years earlier. The aircraft initially shuttled back and forth between Beirut and Algiers. As 
negotiations between the hijackers and the authorities got underway, the hijackers gradually 
assented to releasing different groups of passengers, including women, children and non- 
Americans. Eventually only thirty-nine male Americans remained captive.
The hijacking was part of the broader growing power struggle between Hezbollah and Amal 
in Lebanon, orchestrated by Shi'ites associated with Hezbollah in order to secure the release of 
their co-religionists detained by Israel, to win the support of the Lebanese Shi'ites and to undermine 
Amal's position.55 Sensing that the hijacking might prove to be a potential embarrassment and 
undermine his position, Nabih Berri rapidly intervened and offered to mediate in the crisis. He 
persuaded the hijackers to take the remaining hostages off the plane in Beirut. Some of them were 
retained by the hijackers, while others were taken into custody by Amal militiamen. The crisis was 
finally resolved after seventeen days on 30 June, in large part due to Syrian and Iranian 
intervention, with the thirty-nine passengers being freed and Israel buckling under pressure to allow 
an "unrelated" release of 300 Shi'ite detainees. In the immediate aftermath, Bern’s stock rose 
considerably in the eyes of both the West and Lebanese Shi'ites since he was able to portray 
himself as politically astute and reasonable, with the hostages being freed unharmed and some of 
the Shi'ite prisoners being released by the Israelis. Berri had snatched victory out of the jaws of 
defeat, ostensibly, by cutting a deal with both Hezbollah and the United States.56 It should be 
underscored that both Syria and Iran had played a crucial role in ending the affair through intensive 
deliberations and behind-the-scenes bargaining.
A solution to terminate the crisis was reached immediately following the visit to Damascus 
by Iranian Majles Speaker Rafsanjani, who arrived from Libya. He came at the head of a high- 
ranking delegation which included Foreign Minister Velayati and Revolutionary Guards Minister 
Rafiqdoust. During their meetings with Hafez Assad, the Syrian leader urged them to intercede 
and persuade Hezbollah to free the hostages.57 The Syrians were eager to resolve the crisis as 
soon as possible and also avert a potential showdown with the United States. The hijacking and 
the ensuing crisis had come at an inopportune time, adding a further complication to what was 
already an extremely complex situation for the Syrians in Lebanon. The composition of the Iranian
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delegation and the fact that its previous stop had been Tripoli suggested that its objectives were 
multifold. Tehran was keen to secure additional Soviet-made missiles from its Arab allies to be 
utilized against Iraq and also to force Amal to lift the siege on the Palestinian camps, which it 
perceived as detrimental to Muslim unity and its revolutionary aspirations in Lebanon.58 During the 
visit, Rafsanjani publicly denounced Amal as not being a genuine representative of Lebanon's 
Shi'ites since it was facilitating "imperialist-Zionist" goals to annihilate the Palestinians.59
Following the deliberations between Syrian and Iranian officials, a group of prominent 
Shi'ite and Sunni clerics, including Sheikh Shamseddin, Sheikh Fadlallah, Sheikh Shaban of 
Tawheed (IUM) and the Bekaa Council of Ulema arrived in Damascus to meet with Rafsanjani. 
The purpose of their talks was to discuss conditions in Lebanon and find a solution to the TWA  
affair.60 During the consultations with Syrian and Lebanese Muslim leaders, Rafsanjani expressed 
his willingness to intercede. According to some sources, Syria and Iran concluded an arrangement 
whereby Tehran assented to helping Damascus secure the freedom of the hostages in exchange 
for the latteris assistance in procuring desperately-needed Soviet weaponry for the war effort 
against Iraq.61
Syrian and Iranian Moves in Lebanon During the Summer of 1985
At the outset of the TWA affair, the Syrians also accelerated their efforts to resolve the Amal- 
Palestinian conflict in order to prevent their position in Lebanon from eroding. Although the 
Syrians had a major stake in the political future of Lebanon, they were loath to intervene militarily 
in Beirut for fear of being pulled into the fray and sustaining heavy casualties. Syria did not want to 
be seen as an ally of any group, taking sides against another. The protracted siege had not only 
embarrassed Syria and called into question its position as champion of the Palestinians, but had 
also jeopardized its relations with Iran, Libya and even to some extent, the Soviet Union.62
The five-week "War of the Camps" finally came to an end when the Syrians brokered a 
ceasefire agreement, concluded in Damascus on June 18. The accord, put together by Vice- 
President Abd al-Halim Khaddam and signed by Amal and the PNSF, stipulated that the 
Palestinians were entitled to keep their light weapons, and that security in the refugee camps would 
be entrusted to Lebanese gendarmes. The agreement won the approval of the other Palestinian 
factions and also the Druze PSP.63 In reality, it represented a setback for Amal and the Syrians, 
since the Palestinian guerillas were entitled to retain their light arms and, to Amal's dismay, the 
PNSF was given an official political role in Lebanese affairs.64 Amal had had to give up its 
declared objective of putting the camps under the control of the predominantly Shi'ite 6th 
Brigade.65 Despite gaining some ground in the fighting, Amal had suffered extremely high 
casualties and could not have sustained its campaign without incurring the wrath of the Murabitoun, 
Hezbollah, the Druze PSP and the various Palestinian factions.66 At the same time, the ceasefire 
could not have come sooner for the Palestinians, since they had almost run out of ammunition and
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were suffering enormously. Over 600 refugees were killed and 2,500 wounded during the 
blockade.67 Within days the siege was lifted.
Although Assad succeeded in easing tensions and restoring some semblance of peace in 
Beirut, he failed despite persistent efforts throughout the summer of 1985 to get Lebanon's leading 
political leaders to accept a reconciliation plan entailing reform of the country's archaic political 
system. By the early autumn, Assad focused his energies on forging a consensus among the three 
main militia leaders, Berri, Jumblatt and Hobeika. He had decided to bypass the traditional 
political leaders, who were proving to be obstinate and uncooperative, and to seek a solution by 
getting the three most powerful militias in the country, Amal, PSP and the Lebanese Forces, to 
reach an agreement. In September he arranged reconciliation talks between them in Damascus.68
Throughout this period, both Syria and Iran jockeyed to strengthen their hand and 
consolidate their position in Lebanon. Iran, for its part, continued to cultivate relations with 
fundamentalist Lebanese and radical Palestinian groups in order to preserve its revolutionary 
credentials, expand its base of support in Lebanon, and inspire its followers to wage war on "the 
Zionists and agents of Western imperialism." In August, concurrent with the Arab summit in 
Casablanca, a PNSF delegation led by Abu Musa and Ahmed Jibril visited Tehran and met with 
Prime Minister Musavi and Foreign Minister Velayati. At a press conference prior to their departure 
from Tehran following an eight-day visit, Abu Musa described the Casablanca summit as a failure 
and declared that Iran was the first non-Arab country to recognize the PNSF as the representative 
of the Palestinians.69 In fact, the Palestinian mission in Tehran, previously run by PLO personnel, 
was handed over to Abu Musa, giving the PNSF its only major representation outside Syria.70
Immediately following the PNSF delegation's visit, Hussein Musawi and Sheikh Subhi al- 
Tufayli of Hezbollah arrived in Tehran, where they held talks with Revolutionary Guards Minister 
Rafiqdoust and Foreign Minister Velayati about the situation in Lebanon and the fate of seven 
Americans and four Frenchmen held hostage by Hezbollah. Damascus was pressing Tehran at the 
time to use its clout to secure their release.71 The two sides also explored ways to cement their 
relations. Musawi and al-Tufayli were subsequently granted an audience with Ayatollah Montazeri, 
who was a strong advocate for the establishment of an Islamic republic in Lebanon.72
The Taming of Tripoli and Iran's intercession
While Syria and its Lebanese allies achieved substantial progress in stabilizing the situation in 
Beirut and southern Lebanon, the longstanding deadlock in the northern port city of Tripoli 
persisted. In view of the tensions between Tawheed and the pro-Syrian Arab Democratic Party, 
the former's close links with the PLO and its efforts to prevent Syrian control and hegemony over 
the city and its environs, Damascus tried to assert itself by demanding that Tawheed acquiesce to 
the deployment of Syrian troops in Tripoli and disarm its fighters, in effect, relinquishing control of 
the city to the Syrian army. Sheikh Shaban agreed to permit Syrian forces to position themselves
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in certain sections of Tripoli in order to play an auxiliary role to Lebanese army units and 
gendarmes in maintaining security in the city. However, he steadfastly rejected demands that his 
militiamen surrender their weapons and relinquish control of the city - a privilege Tawheed had 
enjoyed for two years.73
Once again, events in another area of Lebanon put Syria and Iran at loggerheads, this time 
in the north. Just as Iran was nurturing the growth of Hezbollah in the south at Amal's expense and 
had supported the Palestinians in Beirut, now, in Tripoli, the two allies found themselves on 
opposite sides of the fence. This was already the third major area of contention in Lebanon 
between the two in 1985. Besides the ongoing rivalry between Tawheed and the ADP, the situation 
was exacerbated by unconfirmed reports that the PLO was channelling funds and resources back 
into the Tripoli area, and its fighters had begun to trickle back in under the protection of Tawheed. 
Fighting erupted once more between Tawheed and ADP militiamen on September 15. The Syrians 
subsequently dispatched a military delegation to arrange a ceasefire and impose their conditions, 
but to no avail.74 The intensity of the fighting was such during the first ten days that 250,000 of the 
city's 700,000 inhabitants fled their homes, 150-200 people were killed and 600 wounded.75 Iran 
dispatched Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Sheikholislam to Damascus to confer with Syrian 
officials, convey Iranian concerns over the confrontation in Tripoli and try to find a peaceful 
solution to the crisis.76 With Shaban refusing to yield to a Syrian diktat, Damascus abandoned its 
efforts to persuade him to agree to its terms on September 27 and opted to break the impasse 
through the use of force. Assad was determined to demonstrate his unbending resolve to impose 
control and hegemony over Lebanon.
The Syrians assembled a coalition of militias from the Syrian Social Nationalist Party 
(SSNP), the Lebanese Communist Party and the Lebanese Ba'th Party in Syrian-held areas on the 
outskirts of Tripoli to attack the city and dislodge the Tawheed fighters. Although pro-Syrian in 
their orientation, these parties also had a score to settle with Shaban, since they had been driven 
out of Tripoli in 1983 when the Sunni fundamentalists succeeded in seizing control of the city.77 
Determined to roll back Tawheed and re-establish a presence in Tripoli, the pro-Syrian forces 
launched a coordinated assault on Tawheed positions and advanced under the cover of a Syrian 
artillery and rocket barrage. They attacked on three fronts, while the ADP militia engaged 
Tawheed forces inside the city.78
Concomitantly, Sheikholislam continued his deliberations with members of the Syrian 
leadership, including Assad, Khaddam and al-Shara.79 Tehran was anxious to stop the 
bloodshed, particularly in view of Syria's heavy and indiscriminate bombardment of the city. As a 
direct result of these talks, the Syrians reluctantly accepted a proposal by Sheikholislam to send a 
delegation composed of Iranian diplomats from the Damascus and Beirut embassies to Tripoli to 
initiate discussions with Shaban and bring him back to Damascus for direct negotiations with the 
Syrian leadership.80 Although the Iranian team made it to Tripoli, intensification of the fighting on
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September 28 prevented them from bringing Shaban out. Subsequently, efforts were made to 
impose a temporary ceasefire to enable Shaban to journey to Syria.81 Eventually, on October 1, 
Iran's President Khamene'i called Hafez Assad and discussed the crisis with him at length. As a 
direct consequence, an Iranian team was sent once again to Tripoli, returning successfully this time 
with Shaban and one of his associates. Negotiations between Shaban and the Syrians took place 
in the presence of Iranian officials and members of the Hezbollah leadership. Finally, on October 
3, Assad himself presided over the signing of an accord to end the hostilities. The agreement 
signified a Syrian victory, leaving no doubt that Syria would be the dominant actor in Tripoli from 
now on. While Shaban's movement had avoided total defeat and annihilation, and Tripoli was 
spared a fate similar to that of Hama, Tawheed was militarily defanged. Under the terms which 
Shaban accepted, all medium and heavy weapons were to be turned over to the Syrian forces, and 
small arms had to be stored in specified depots subject to Syrian inspection. All the secular parties 
that had been banished from the city were permitted to re-establish a presence. Syrian troops, 
supplemented by Lebanese army and gendarme units, were stationed in Tripoli to maintain law and 
order, while the responsibility for overall security of the city was given to the commander of Syrian 
forces in northern Lebanon.82
Three days later, on October 6, four battalions of Syrian soldiers, including tanks, entered 
Tripoli and dispersed throughout the city. Both Tawheed fighters and their opponents from the 
secular-leftist coalition handed over their weapons to the new masters as stipulated in the truce 
agreement.83 The "taming of Tripoli" had been a bloody affair. By the time the ceasefire was 
imposed after three weeks of fighting, 500 people had lost their lives, more than 1,000 had been 
wounded and extensive collateral damage had occurred.84 While Syrian troops had not been 
directly involved in the fighting, the showdown demonstrated the extent to which Assad was willing 
to go to impose a Pax Syriana in Lebanon. Moreover, at a time when he was going through 
painstaking efforts to persuade the leaders of the Phalange, Druze PSP and Amal to agree on 
political reforms and a new order in Lebanon, Assad had deemed it necessary to pound the defiant. 
Sunni enclave mercilessly and to set an example for potentially recalcitrant parties.85
Syrian-lranian Rivalry and the Tripartite Agreement
Syria's confrontation with Tawheed caused a great deal of umbrage in Tehran. In view of 
Damascus' policies to prop up Amal at the expense of Hezbollah and crush the Palestinian 
resistance movement in Lebanon, Iran's clerics perceived Syrian moves in Lebanon as detrimental 
to their grand strategy to unite Lebanon's Shi'ites and Sunnis along with the Palestinians under the 
banner of revolutionary Islam and liberate Palestine. During the crisis, editorials in Iran's state- 
controlled media lambasted Syrian conduct, accusing Damascus of waging a "war against Islam."86
In light of the Syrian regime's sensitivity to being portrayed as anti-Musiim or anti-Sunni, 
the vitriolic rhetoric emanating from Tehran caused disenchantment in official circles in Damascus.
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Syrian-lranian relations were put on a shakier footing by Iran's criticism of the ongoing tripartite 
talks between Berri, Jumblatt and Hobeika in Damascus. The participation of Hobeika, who had 
been responsible for the Sabra and Shatila massacres in 1982, was particularly distasteful to the 
Iranians. They were also infuriated that the Palestinians, Sunni fundamentalists and Hezbollah 
were excluded from the process. The Iranian press characterized Syria's approach to reaching a 
settlement in Lebanon as "smacking of compromise, hypocrisy and peaceful co-existence with 
Zionists."87 On October 21, the chairman of the Iranian Majles' foreign affairs committee decried 
the presence of the Phalangists at the Damascus peace talks, asserting that the oppressed masses 
of Lebanon would settle for nothing less than Muslim majority rule.88
In order to iron out differences with Syria over the fate of Lebanon and promote Muslim 
unity in the country, during the latter half of October, a prominent member of Iran's Council of 
Guardians, Ayatollah Jannati, travelled to Syria and Lebanon. While in Damascus, he conferred 
with Hafez Assad, and then toured southern Lebanon to meet with Muslim clerics. Jannati visited 
Sheikh Mohammed Salim Jalaleddin, the Sunni Mufti of Sidon, and a number of other Sunni and 
Shi'ite clergymen and political activists. During these discussions, he underscored the necessity 
and importance of solidarity among Muslims and preventing rifts among their ranks 89
While Iran devoted its energies in the closing months of 1985 to preserving its foothold in 
Lebanon and actively promoting Muslim unity with a view to creating eventually an Islamic state in 
its own image (as some of its clerical leaders envisioned), Syria continued its efforts to negotiate 
an agreement among the top three militia leaders in the country and prevent them from falling out 
with one another.90 Between September and December, Syrian Vice-President Khaddam tried to 
coax them into adopting and implementing a reconciliation plan. The proposed Syrian reform 
package called for restructuring of the executive branch, with the Maronite Christians retaining the 
presidency, but transferring executive powers to the prime minister, a Sunni Muslim, as in the 
past.91 As far as the legislative branch was concerned, a Shi'ite would continue to serve as 
speaker of parliament, while the number of members in the legislature would be raised from 99 to 
142, equally divided among the Christians and Muslims 92 It also proposed the total abolition of the 
sectarian structure of the government at the end of a three-year transition period. With regard to 
security arrangements, the plan contained eight points for the imposition of a comprehensive 
ceasefire throughout Lebanon - maintained by the Syrian army and the Lebanese police. 
Furthermore, it called for the reorganization of the Lebanese army, repatriation of refugees and
go
disbandment of the militias.
Although the Damascus peace plan was ready for signature by October, mistrust and 
rivalry held up the conclusion of the agreement. The signing ceremony was repeatedly postponed 
and, as a result, the elements of speed and secrecy were lost.94 As details of the plan became 
public, those of Lebanon's traditional politicians (particularly Amin Gemayel and Camille Chamoun) 
who had been left out of the negotiations vehemently objected to the plan.95 Samir Geagea,
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Hobeika's predecessor-cum-rival in the Lebanese Forces, also voiced criticism of the Syrian- 
sponsored initiative. In late October, armed clashes occurred between Hobeika's supporters and 
those of Geagea.96
However, the series of setbacks did not deter the Syrians, who tirelessly endeavored to 
persuade the three militia leaders to endorse the peace plan. Finally, on December 28, following 
certain revisions regarding the period of transition and the number of deputies in the parliament, 
Berri, Jumblatt and Hobeika put their signature to the document, known as the Tripartite 
Agreement, intended officially to end the decade-long Lebanese civil war.97 It would prove to be 
an extremely short-lived victory for Assad. While the US-lsraeli-Maronite compact had been 
soundly defeated by 1985, the victors, the members of the Syrian-lranian-Muslim coalition, were 
now falling out over the political future of Lebanon and proving incapable of successfully bringing 
the civil war to an end.
THE KHARG RAIDS, SAUDI POLICY, AND THEIR REGIONAL IMPLICATIONS 
In mid-1985, Iraq received the latest version of the French Mirage F-1 warplane (EQ5 version), 
capable of launching Exocet missiles, and also acquired advanced French and Soviet-made laser- 
guided bombs, enabling its air force to hit targets with pinpoint accuracy. In view of its enhanced 
capabilities, Baghdad resolved to sever Iran's economic lifeline by intensifying its aerial campaign 
against the main oil export facilities on Kharg Island. It is important to note that the Kharg 
installations constituted the world's largest oil terminal, accounting for 90% of Iran's oil exports. 
Consequently, on August 15, the Iraqi air force escalated its operations by launching daring raids 
against the oil facilities at Kharg and continued this effort throughout the remainder of the year.98
Although the damage was quickly repaired each time, the initial raids clearly caught the 
Iranians, who were surprised by the tenacity of the Iraqi attacks, off guard. During late August and 
early September, export operations at Kharg were reduced from their normal 1.5 million b/d level, 
but rapid repairs were carried out and operational capacity was restored to its previous level. 
Tehran responded by intensifying its naval interdiction effort, searching ships bound for the Gulf 
Arab ports. Despite Iranian threats to resume attacks on ships heading to the GCC states, Iraq 
remained undeterred, continuing its aerial offensive against Kharg. By mid-September, the Iraqi 
air force had launched nine major attacks against Kharg, causing temporary disruption or reduction 
of Iran's oil exports. On September 19, Baghdad succeeded in carrying out a highly effective raid 
that destroyed one of the jetties and severely damaged the island's pumping station. As a result, 
Kharg's export capacity was cut from 1.5 million b/d to approximately 0.75 to 1 million b/d.99 
Determined to cripple revolutionary Iran's capacity to prosecute the war and bring it to its knees, 
the Iraqis carried out their eleventh raid in the six-week bombing campaign against Kharg on 
September 24. On this occasion, the terminal's operational capacity was gravely affected when 
several direct hits were scored. As a result, loading operations could not be continued and, for the
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first time since the outbreak of the Gulf War, the flow of oil from Kharg stopped.100
The efficacy of the early raids had profound implications for the clerical regime, which 
heavily relied on oil revenues to finance the war effort. During 1985, the Iranian government 
devoted a third of its annual budget to military expenditures. At this juncture, oil revenues made 
up 80% of the budget.101 Iran's only other oil export facility, on Lavan Island in the southern 
Persian Gulf near the Straits of Hormuz, exported only 200,000 b/d. The crisis confronting Tehran 
was such that Iranian President Khamene'i threatened that Iran would "close the Straits of Hormuz 
to all oil exporting countries in the region" if Iran was not able to continue its oil export 
operations.102 However, by now such statements were interpreted as empty threats since Iran did 
not have the required capability to maintain a blow-for-blow doctrine, nor the intention to sever its 
own economic lifeline. Iraq, with the blessing of Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf sheikhdoms, 
continued its aerial attacks unabated.
The Saudis, for their part, tried to take advantage of the confluence of a number of events 
to pressure Iran into accepting a peaceful settlement. Several factors, among them growing anti­
war sentiment inside Iran itself, the Saudi-lranian rapprochement, the Kingdom's enhanced 
capability to defend itself, its ability to export oil through the Red Sea, Iraq's improved capability to 
hit Kharg and the nascent initiative of the reconciliation committee headed by Saudi Arabia to bring 
Syria into the Arab fold (thereby isolating Iran diplomatically in the region), led the Saudis to 
conclude that the opportune moment had arrived to try to force the clerical regime to the 
negotiating table. The overall rationale was to thaw Saudi-lranian relations to a certain degree in 
order to acquire some leverage, and in parallel to put Iran under pressure simultaneously on the 
political, military and economic fronts, thereby forcing it eventually to sue for peace.
Ironically, after the havoc wreaked by the attacks in late September, the Iranians 
reorganized and bolstered their anti-aircraft defense network on the island and its environs, making 
it much harder for the Iraqis to repeat their earlier successes. Consequently, subsequent Iraqi raids 
during the last three months of 1985 had little impact on export operations, and as Iraqi losses 
started to mount with an increasing number of Mirage F-1's being shot down.104 Due to 
improvisation and the resourcefulness of their engineers, the Iranians were not only able rapidly to 
restore export operations, but moreover, boosted export production to almost 2 million b/d by late 
October to compensate for their earlier shortfall.105 In fact, on average, between 1984 and 1985 
Iranian oil production rose from 1.36 to 1.8 million b/d, and annual revenues from $10.9 billion to 
$12.95 billion.106
While the Iraqi air campaign was gaining momentum in the early autumn, Riyadh 
commenced its initiative to bring Syria back into the moderate Arab camp and exert indirect 
diplomatic pressure on Iran. In mid-September, the committee set up during the Casablanca 
summit to mend the rift in Syrian-Jordanian and Syrian-lraqi relations and led by Saudi Crown 
Prince Abdullah visited the three capitals, where it met with Hafez Assad, King Hussein and
170
Saddam Hussein.107 Subsequent to the tour of the three capitals, on September 14, it was 
announced that the mediation effort had already borne fruit and an agreement had been reached 
for Syrian Prime Minister Abd al-Raouf al-Kasm and his Jordanian counterpart, Zayd al-Rifai, to 
meet in Jeddah the following week in the presence of the Saudi heir apparent. Crown Prince 
Abdullah also emphasized that he would use his good offices to bring Syria and Iraq together at the 
negotiating table to achieve Arab unity and solidarity.108 On September 16-17, the Syrian and 
Jordanian prime ministers arrived in Jeddah and held two closed working sessions with the 
reconciliation committee chaired by Crown Prince Abdullah.109 At the end of their negotiations, a 
statement was issued by the Saudi Crown Prince, declaring that "the two sides agreed on a number 
of steps to create a propitious atmosphere" in order to cultivate closer relations and cooperate in 
forging an "Arab consensus" on important issues. The two parties had also agreed to continue their 
dialogue under Saudi auspices in October.110
Concurrent to the Syrian-Jordanian talks in Jeddah, Assad had dispatched Vice-President 
Khaddam to Tehran to confer with Iranian officials about developments in Lebanon and the Gulf 
and reassure them that Syria was not about to soften its position with regard to the Arab-lsraeli 
conflict. Upon arrival, Khaddam was received by President Khamene'i and handed the Iranian 
leader a message from Hafez Assad. Later, in a statement underscoring the importance of Syria's 
political stance and its invaluable support for the Islamic Republic, Khamene'i declared:
"The credibility and political prestige of Syria are backed by that country's clear-cut 
stand vis-a-vis the Zionist regime. Today, the whole world considers Syria the only 
country in the forefront of the Steadfastness Front, countering Israel...We attach 
great value to our friendship with Syria.''111 
Khaddam also met with Majles Speaker Rafsanjani, Prime Minister Musavi and Foreign Minister 
Velayati before leaving Tehran.112 The main topics of discussion were the Syrian-Jordanian 
dialogue, the evolving situation in Lebanon, most notably the siege of Tripoli, and Iranian oil 
deliveries to Syria, which had been discontinued since September. Besides voicing concern about 
Syria's intentions in accepting the Saudi mediation effort and its suppression of emergent Islamist 
movements in Lebanon, the Iranian leadership was wary of Syria's inability to make timely 
payments for oil deliveries and accumulation of a sizeable debt, which stood at approximately $1- 
1.3 billion by September 1985. While no solution was reached concerning future oil shipments, 
Khaddam reassured Iranian officials that Syria would not modify its position vis-a-vis Israel and in 
fact underscored that Syria had asked Jordan to reconsider its stance by abandoning the PLO- 
Jordanian initiative, making this a pre-condition for further negotiations between Damascus and 
Amman.113 While seeing Khaddam off at Tehran’s Mehrabad Airport, Velayati explained to the 
press: "Our Syrian brothers have given a negative reply to an important part of the requests of the 
delegation. They have accepted a meeting between the Prime Ministers of Jordan and Syria, 
provided that Jordan give up its compromising positions."114
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Overall, Assad calculated that being receptive to the reconciliation committee's overtures 
and entreaties would be prudent in order to stave off complete isolation by repairing ties with some 
of the moderate Arab states and extract concessions - financial and material benefits - from them. 
At the same time, by engaging them in a dialogue he would stand a better chance of modifying 
their positions on important issues, particularly Jordan's with regard to peace talks with Israel. 
Syria's desire to diversify its relations and mend fences with the moderate Arab bloc was also 
influenced and reinforced by a number of emerging trends and new realities on the ground. These 
were related to the evolution of its ties with Iran and the Soviet Union and the shifting Arab balance 
of power. They included: (a) the conflicting visions of Syria and Iran over the political future of 
Lebanon and the role of Islamist parties; (b) Iran's inability to prosecute the war successfully in 
1985; (c) its failure and unwillingness to satisfy Syria's oil requirements; (d) the gradual cooling of 
Syria's relations with its Superpower patron following Mikhail Gorbachev's ascension to power in 
March 1985; (e) the prominence of the Egyptian-Jordanian-lraqi-Saudi axis in regional politics; and 
(0 concern about the potential success of the PLO-Jordanian initiative in reaching an 
understanding with Israel that would completely sideline Syria in the Arab-lsrael arena.
In parallel with Iraqi moves to curb Iranian oil exports and Saudi attempts to wean Syria 
away from its Iranian ally, in late September, Riyadh's oil minister, Sheikh Zaki Yamani, threatened 
to unsheathe the oil weapon and bring oil prices crashing down if other OPEC members did not 
desist from violating their allotted quotas and selling at below-market prices. He posited that the 
Kingdom, in an unprecedented move, intended to sell its oil outside the OPEC pricing structure. 
Yamani also threatened to flood the market with Saudi oil, thereby depressing prices to around 
$15-18 per barrel in the early part of 1986, if other OPEC members failed to maintain discipline in 
the coming months.115 By flooding the market with their oil, the Saudis could punish those 
countries that had violated previous OPEC agreements, instill discipline and prevent their own oil 
revenues from shrinking. This would also cripple the Iranian war effort and push Tehran's 
revolutionaries to the negotiating table by reducing Iran's income to finance military expenditures - 
all at a single stroke. Against the backdrop of the ongoing Iraqi aerial campaign against Kharg and 
their own effort to pull Syria away from Iran, the Saudis decided to adopt a gradualist approach by 
giving matters more time.
The Saudi bid to reconcile differences between Damascus and Amman seemed to pay off 
in late October when the Syrian and Jordanian prime ministers met again in Riyadh, this time in the 
presence of Crown Prince Abdullah. On this occasion substantial progress was achieved, as the 
two sides agreed to adhere to the Arab peace plan adopted during the 1982 Fez summit, rejecting
"partial and unilateral settlements with Israel" and supporting a UN-sponsored international peace
116conference to resolve the Arab-lsraeli problem. Since sufficient common ground had been 
created during the two meetings in September and October, both prime ministers concurred on the 
need to hold additional meetings in Damascus and Amman to explore avenues of cooperation.
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There were hints that Hafez Assad and King Hussein could possibly meet in the coming weeks, 
while Syria, under considerable pressure from Saudi Arabia, also agreed to attend the next Arab 
summit scheduled to take place in the Kingdom in early 1986.117 Much to Tehran's consternation, 
it was also announced that, as a first step to heal the Syrian-lraqi rift, security officials from the two 
countries would meet on their common border to discuss matters of mutual concern.118 The news 
of high-level contacts between the Ba'thi rivals against the backdrop of deteriorating Syrian-lranian 
relations, caused by the discontinuation of Iranian oil exports to its Arab ally and unease among the 
revolutionary clerics over Assad's handling of the Tripoli crisis earlier in the month, raised 
questions in Iranian political circles about whether Syria might abandon its alliance with Iran.119 In 
order to allay Iranian fears, Hafez Assad sent a message to Iranian Prime Minister Musavi 
reassuring him of continued Syrian support in the war against Iraq, while the Syrian ambassador to 
Iran, Ibrahim Yunis, delivered a letter from Faruq al-Shara to Ali Akbar Velayati, reiterating that 
prospects for reconciliation between Damascus and Baghdad were non-existent because of the 
"fascist" nature of the Iraqi regime and the "criminal war" it was waging against the Islamic 
Republic. The Syrians had informed the reconciliation committee that there was no basis for
i2nfurther negotiations to thaw Syrian-lraqi relations.
In reaction to al-Shara's letter, Velayati attempted to dismiss reports of strains in the 
Syrian-lranian alliance and a shift in Syria's position in the Gulf War. He expressed his 
appreciation of Syria's stance and played down the significance of the ongoing dialogue with 
Jordan, elucidating:
"Our close relations with the regional progressive countries stem from their 
revolutionary, anti-imperialist, anti-Zionist and anti-reactionary stands. W e are 
convinced that the ties and the solidarity between our three countries - Syria, Iran, 
and Libya - are a strategic bond. Our enemies cannot touch it by such methods.
Our confidence in our Syrian brothers is too deep to be affected by such 
propaganda."121
Indeed, several days later, while visiting Kuwait, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz admitted that, 
despite talks between the Iraqi and Syrian representatives sponsored by the Arab reconciliation 
committee, tangible results had yet be achieved in bringing the two sides closer together.122 At the 
same time, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikholislam travelled to Damascus to confer with 
Syrian Vice-President Khaddam.
In early November, while Iraq announced its 33rd raid against Kharg Island since August 
15, the leaders of the six GCC countries gathered for a summit meeting in the Omani capital, 
Muscat, to discuss ways to bring the Gulf War to an end and review their relations with Iran.123 
After four days of deliberations, they issued a joint communique expressing deep concern about 
the recent escalation of hostilities that threatened to destabilize the Gulf region.124 interestingly 
enough, they announced their intention to launch an initiative to expand their dialogue with Tehran
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with a view to persuading the Iranian leadership to abandon its stated objective of toppling the Iraqi 
Bathi regime and terminate the conflict.125 This represented a discreet change in tactics by the 
GCC countries led by Saudi Arabia, to prod Iran into accepting a ceasefire. It could be best 
described as a subtle carrot and stick policy, bringing pressure to bear on Iran on various fronts 
and, concomitantly, conveying a clear message to Tehran that the GCC was amenable to forging 
closer cooperative links and mediating in the conflict.126 The Saudi-crafted strategy was clear, to 
tighten the noose around Iran's neck by decoupling Syria and Iran, increasing Iran's economic woes 
and encouraging Iraq to inflict losses on Iran, thereby leaving Tehran with no other alternative but 
to accept GCC mediation to end the war.
The Saudis were pleased that the Syrian-Jordanian dialogue, initially started under their 
auspices, had gained enough momentum for the two countries to continue the reconciliation 
process on their own.127 Much to Riyadh's satisfaction, Jordanian Prime Minister al-Rifai arrived in 
Damascus on November 12 at the head of a high-level political and economic delegation to further 
the reconciliation process. Al-Rifai first met with his Syrian counterpart.128 During two days of 
talks, al-Rifai, who was accompanied by Foreign Minister Tahir al-Masri and ministers holding the 
portfolios for industry, trade and finance, also held discussions with various Syrian officials to 
establish economic cooperation between the two sides.129 Al-Rifai later met with Assad and 
submitted an invitation from King Hussein to the Syrian leader to visit the Hashemite kingdom. 
The two sides agreed to harmonize their positions on the Arab-lsraeli peace process and forge 
economic links.
Due to the fact that the tripartite meeting of the foreign ministers of Syria, Iran and Libya 
was scheduled to take place again in December 1985 (to coordinate their regional policies), and 
Iran was beginning preparations for a major offensive against Iraq some time during the winter of 
1985-86, Tehran dispatched Foreign Minister Velayati on a tour of several Arab capitals to 
reinvigorate support for Iran's position in the Gulf War. Velayati left for Damascus on November 
16 and conferred the following day with Assad, Khaddam and al-Shara on "the situation in the 
region and issues of mutual interest" and the agenda of the upcoming tripartite meeting, before 
departing for Libya and Algeria.130
Syria and Iran were both wary that their strategic alliance was beginning to unravel. 
Tehran continued to deny Syria oil shipments to signal its disapproval of Damascus' policies in 
Lebanon and express annoyance with its Arab ally's repeated failure to service its oil debt. 
Furthermore, there were mounting Iranian concerns about the Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement 
and its broader implications. Although some analysts at the time argued that Iran had discontinued 
the shipments due to the efficacy of Iraqi raids, the available evidence indicates that this was not 
the case. Iran, as mentioned previously, was able to restore its production capacity and even 
increase it to compensate for the sporadic shortfalls during the autumn of 1985. In reality, Tehran 
was refusing to be forthcoming as a means of gaining greater leverage over Damascus and
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modifying its Arab ally's behavior in the region, particularly in the Arab-lsraeli arena vis-d-vis the 
Palestinians and Lebanese Islamist movements.
To shore up relations with its Iranian ally, Syrian Prime Minister al-Kasm travelled to 
Tehran on December 1, accompanied by a high-level political and economic delegation, and met 
immediately upon arrival with his Iranian counterpart, Mir Hossein Musavi.131 The first session was 
also attended by the ministers for foreign affairs, commerce, industry and economic affairs of the 
two countries. A second meeting was held the same day between the two prime ministers, along 
with the Syrian foreign minister and minister of state for foreign affairs, the Iranian foreign minister 
and deputy prime minister, to review political cooperation between the two sides on the regional 
level.132 At the conclusion of the three-day visit, a joint communique was issued, announcing that 
a protocol on commercial and economic relations and a letter of understanding on political 
cooperation had been signed. As in previous Syrian-lranian communiques, Iraq was criticized for 
commencing a "cruel war" against revolutionary Iran. Baghdad was also castigated for its attempts 
to escalate and expand the war by bombarding cities, attacking oil tankers in the Gulf and using of 
chemical weapons. Both called for an end to the foreign military presence in the Gulf, while Iran 
once again reiterated that it had no designs on Iraqi territory. With regard to Lebanon, they 
demanded the "immediate, unconditional and complete withdrawal" of Israeli forces from the 
country. Syria was also praised for its" sincere efforts to ensure the unity of Lebanon."133
The communiqu6 and the recent moves of the two allies demonstrated that they were both 
trying to coming to terms and accept the primacy of their partner's interest in its own backyard. 
Syria was loath to criticize Iran for continuing the Gulf War and attacking shipping bound for Arab 
ports, while Iran on some level was slowly trying to come to terms with Syria's predominance in 
Lebanon. Iran was determined to continue its support for Hezbollah and other Lebanese Islamist 
movements and aimed to protect the Palestinians from Syria’s proxies, particularly Amal. 
However, in instances where Damascus was adamant and even willing to commit its own forces to 
protect interests of paramount importance, Tehran was beginning to realize that it would have to 
defer to Damascus and accept the primacy of Syrian interests. On the other hand, the two parties 
were apparently unable to reach agreement on two critical issues: the resumption of Iranian oil 
shipments to Syria and the Damascus-Amman dialogue. Iranian officials were adamant that Syria 
would have to make payments as a precondition for the resumption of oil deliveries. Syria in the 
meantime could begin paying off its debt by exporting both industrial and agricultural products to 
Iran. In addition, the mere fact that no mention was made of the Syrian-Jordanian dialogue 
demonstrated that Tehran was highly critical and suspicious of Syrian motives.134
In order to cultivate closer ties with the GCC states, which seemed inclined to improve 
relations following the Muscat summit, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati was dispatched to Riyadh 
on December 7. For the first time since the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy six years earlier, a 
minister of the revolutionary regime was received by King Fahd. Velayati remained in the
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Kingdom for three days and held several rounds of talks with Saudi officials. However, the gulf 
between the two sides was too great for the deliberations to yield any substantive results. The 
Saudis had hoped to persuade Iran to accept a GCC mediation effort to end the war.135 Even 
before leaving for Saudi Arabia, Velayati asserted that the Islamic Republic would reject the GCC 
initiative unless Saddam Hussein was "officially recognized and condemned as the aggressor."136 
The disparity in their respective positions was no doubt a major disappointment to both sides, 
particularly the Saudis, who had tried since May 1985 to thaw relations with Iran and persuade it to 
accept a ceasefire. Subsequent to three days of negotiations, Velayati tried to put on a brave face, 
describing the outcome of his visit as "satisfactory."137 In sharp contrast, his Saudi counterpart, 
Saud al-Faisal, praised Iraq's willingness to accept a peaceful resolution to the conflict and posited: 
"we sensed no development in the Iranian stance that would allow positive action towards ending
138this devastating war."
The day after Velayati ended his visit to Saudi Arabia, on December 10, Syrian Prime 
Minister al-Kasm arrived in Amman, accompanied by Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara and Interior 
Minister Mohammed Ghabbash. The Syrian delegation held discussions with Jordanian Prime 
Minister al-Rifai on expanding their cooperative links and was later received by King Hussein.139 
By the end of the second day, both sides concurred on adopting a common approach to the Arab- 
Israeli peace process, and King Hussein accepted an invitation from President Assad to visit 
Damascus before the end of the month, for the first time since January 1979. In the eyes of some 
observers, the reconciliation talks and al-Kasm's announcement that the Jordanian monarch would 
visit Syria seemed to presage a new alignment in the Middle East.140 At the conclusion of the 
negotiations, a joint communique was released highlighting the need for a comprehensive peace 
settlement by holding an international peace conference, with both Amman and Damascus 
reaffirming "their rejection of partial and separate solutions as well as direct negotiations with 
Israel."141 By now it was beyond doubt that astute diplomacy on the part of the Saudis had borne 
substantial fruit within a period of three months. They had also facilitated the rapprochement by 
providing material incentives to the Syrians. With Iran refusing to provide Syria with much-needed 
oil, Jordan had since October been serving as the transit point for Saudi and Kuwaiti oil shipments 
to Syria to make up for the shortfall.142
Subsequent to the announcement in Amman of the forthcoming meeting between the 
Syrian and Jordanian leaders, the Arab reconciliation committee declared its intention to accelerate 
its efforts to reconcile existing differences between Syria and Iraq by visiting Damascus and 
Baghdad in the immediate future.143 However, the news of the ongoing rapprochement between 
Damascus and Amman, and the reconciliation committee's plan to intercede in the dispute 
between the two rival wings of the Ba'th Party in Syria and Iraq, were of little consolation to the 
Iraqi regime in the closing weeks of 1985 as it braced itself for a major Iranian push into Iraq. 
Frustration also mounted as its aerial campaign to stifle Iranian preparations and impede Tehran's
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oil export operations proved to be ineffectual.
With Iran carrying out extensive preparations for a major operation on the southern front 
and massing half a million troops east of the Iraqi port of Basra, on December 16, Saddam Hussein 
made an unscheduled trip to the Soviet Union, his main supplier of military hardware. The Iraqi 
leader's visit to Moscow was his first since 1978. Saddam Hussein intended to win assurances 
from Mikhail Gorbachev that the gradual thaw in Soviet-lranian relations since 1984 would in no 
way be to the detriment of Soviet-lraqi relations and press him to use his clout to prise Syria and 
Iran apart and persuade Iran to terminate the hostilities.144
In parallel with preparations in Damascus to welcome the Jordanian monarch, on 
December 21, the foreign ministers of Syria, Iran and Libya gathered in Tripoli for their scheduled 
consultations. At the end of the two days of talks, a tripartite communique was issued, with the 
Syrians and Libyans reaffirming their support for Iran in the Gulf War. Iran reaffirmed that it had 
no intention of annexing Iraqi territory and aimed to have achieve good-neighborly relations and 
Islamic solidarity with the Iraqi people and other Arab states. The communique also highlighted the 
need for Arab-lranian cooperation to confront Israel effectively.145 Afterwards, commenting on the 
third round of the tripartite foreign ministers' meeting, Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shara asserted 
that "these three countries are in one trench and the results of this session indicate the depth of 
our mutual solidarity...It is imperative that we remain firm in our stance and continue our solidarity 
against our common enemies in order to wrest our rights from them."146 Despite the facade of 
harmony and solidarity, Syria and Iran were unable to resolve any of their outstanding differences 
on issues such as Iranian oil deliveries, the Syrian-Jordanian reconciliation process and Hobeika's 
involvement in the Lebanese peace negotiations.
THE ASSAD-HUSSEIN SUMMIT AND THE SYRIAN-JORDANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT
In the weeks preceding the Assad-Hussein summit, substantive steps were taken to thaw relations 
between Syria and Jordan. King Hussein, in an extraordinary move, publicly expressed regret for 
having provided the Syrian Muslim Brethren with sanctuary in the past and allowing them to use 
Jordan as a base for their activities against the Assad regime.147 The Jordanian monarch vowed 
that this would not happen again.148 Furthermore, the Jordanian media ceased to criticize Syrian 
policy in Lebanon, and the government in fact lauded Damascus' constructive role in the war-torn 
country.149 Amman removed restrictions on Jordanians travelling to Syria, and telecommunication 
links between the two countries improved. In addition, Jordanian power stations began to supply 
areas of southern Syria, including four cities, with electricity.150
Both leaders had strong incentives to mend fences. The collapse of the PLO-Jordanian 
peace initiative under the weight of mutual distrust and divergent goals, Jordan's disillusionment 
with US policy in the region, and its vulnerability to any hostile moves on the part of Israel, all 
provided King Hussein with a strong incentive to secure his northern flank and try to negotiate with
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Israel from a position of strength. Syria, for its part, aimed to break out of its relative isolation in 
the Arab world, bolster its political and military position vis-d-vis Israel, mitigate the challenge 
posed by the Iraqi-Jordanian-Egyptian axis, diversify its relations in view of the cooling in Soviet- 
Syrian relations, prod Iran into being more flexible on oil deliveries and cooperative in Lebanon 
and continue being rewarded with financial aid and oil shipments from Saudi Arabia for its liaison 
with Jordan.
Eventually, on December 30, King Hussein arrived in Damascus for a two-day visit to 
confer with Hafez Assad. The two leaders discussed normalization of bilateral relations, 
developments in the region and the need for Arab unity. Both sides agreed to exchange 
ambassadors, since their relations had been downgraded below the ambassadorial level in 1980 
when they almost went to war.151 Despite the warming of relations, the Assad-Hussein meeting did 
not produce any radical shift in Syria's political alignment nor defection from the radical camp. 
More significantly, the two-day visit did not lead to a joint communique being issued prior to King 
Hussein's departure. There was a complete news blackout in Syria's state-controlled media about 
the Jordanian monarch's visit and its aftermath. While Jordanian officials subsequently stated that 
the absence of a joint communique did not indicate failure, they must undoubtedly have been 
disheartened by Assad's refusal during the talks to commence a dialogue with Baghdad.152 In fact, 
an official Syrian statement issued after the Assad-Hussein summit reaffirmed Damascus' 
steadfast support for Iran in its struggle until the removal of the Iraqi "aggressor."153
Overall, Assad's decision to mend fences with King Hussein was a tactical move in order to 
alleviate partially his security concerns in the Levant, and to increase his room for maneuver 
between the powerful pro-Iraqi bloc rapidly emerging in the region and his Iranian allies. The 
Syrian leader had no intention of severing his links with revolutionary Iran and throwing his weight 
behind his b£te noire - Saddam Hussein. Although disagreements over oil and Lebanon had 
strained Syrian-lranian relations during 1985, two major events in the opening months of 1986 
necessitated the preservation of the relationship with Iran, from Assad's perspective. These were 
the collapse of the Damascus Agreement and Iran's seizure of the strategically-located Faw 
Peninsula.
IRAN'S SEIZURE OF THE FAW PENINSULA AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 
On February 9,1986, Iran launched its first major offensive against Iraq since the disastrous defeat 
in Operation Badr the previous year. The bitter lessons derived from the military setbacks and 
resultant losses of 1984-85 had led the clerical regime critically to reassess its conduct of the war 
and reappraise the relationship between the political leadership of the country and the military 
establishment. Consequently, during 1985-86, the revolutionary regime delegated greater authority 
to military commanders in planning and conducting offensive operations against the Iraqis.154 The 
prime objective of the operation, codenamed "Wal-Fajr 8" (Dawn 8), was to seize the strategically-
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situated Faw Peninsula, Iraq's primary outlet to the Persian Gulf, by crossing the Shatt al-Arab, 
overwhelming the Iraqi defenders and deploying sufficient forces to prevent the Iraqis from 
regaining it. From the Iranian standpoint, success in this endeavor offered three important 
advantages: it would deny Iraq access to the Gulf, enable Iran to threaten the city of Basra from 
the south, and position Iran to cut off Iraq's lines of communication with Kuwait.155
On the night of February 10-11, under the cover of darkness and thundershowers, Iranian 
troops crossed the Shatt al-Arab and quickly established bridgeheads at six points. They then 
ferried additional men, supplies and vehicles across the river. Over the next few days the Iranians 
routed the Iraqi forces on the Faw Peninsula and fortified their position by constructing ten supply 
bridges across the Shatt al-Arab and sending over 25,000 men and equipment. By February 16, 
they occupied 300 square miles of Iraqi territory. In addition, they reached the outskirts of Umm 
Qasr and captured Iraq's main air control and warning center covering the Persian Gulf area.156
The Iraqi High Command was slow to react to the Iranian advances in the Faw Peninsula. 
As a result, Iran was able to achieve strategic surprise and deploy adequate numbers of men and 
materiel to consolidate most of its initial gains and repulse Iraqi attacks. Once the Iraqi 
counteroffensive got underway, it was impeded by lack of air cover due to poor weather conditions. 
The battle for Faw raged on for almost a month, until mid-March. By then the frontlines had 
stabilized, with both the Iranian offensive and Iraqi counterattacks gradually petering out. Iran was 
able to hold on to most of its gains and maintained an active force of 20-25 thousand men on the 
peninsula.157
In general, Wal-Fajr 8 was the best planned and executed operation by the Iranian military 
since the expulsion of the Iraqi army from Iranian territory in the spring of 1982. The offensive had 
required extensive preparations and a high degree of coordination among the various services, 
including the army, Revolutionary Guards and Baseej volunteers. Meticulous planning and proper 
preparations and execution had ensured success. As a result of the victory on Faw, the 
professional military won a greater voice in the future conduct of the war.158
The occupation of the Faw Peninsula sent tremors throughout the Gulf Arab states, 
particularly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, since they now had to consider a long-term Iranian military 
presence near their borders and the prospect of an Iraqi military defeat in the war. During the first 
week of fighting, on February 16, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud al-Faisal, and his Kuwaiti 
counterpart, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmad al-Sabah, flew to Damascus to discuss the Gulf conflict with 
Hafez Assad and Faruq al-Shara.159 The ostensible purpose of their visit was to persuade the 
Syrians to moderate Iran's behavior and also inveigle them to decrease their support for their 
Iranian ally if Tehran was not receptive to their entreaties. Prince Saud also delivered a message 
from King Fahd to Hafez Assad. In view of the proximity of the fighting and their vulnerability to 
Iranian attacks, the Kuwaitis were particularly alarmed by the events unfolding in Faw.160
Following on the heels of the two Arab foreign ministers' one-day visit, Iranian Deputy
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Foreign Minister Mohammad Besharati travelled to Damascus and Tripoli to brief the Syrian and 
Libyan leadership about the situation on the warfront and consult them on other regional issues.161 
In Damascus, Besharati conferred with Hafez Assad and also delivered a message from President 
Khamene'i. After their deliberations, Besharati told a press conference that Iran would continue the 
war until the Iraqi Ba'thi regime had been overthrown. While underscoring that Iran's decision to 
pursue vigorously its effort to topple and punish the aggressor was "final and irrevocable," he 
attempted to allay the fears of the Gulf states by positing that Tehran extended "a hand of 
friendship to all its Arab neighbors."162 Subsequent to his visit to Libya, as the fighting raged on in 
the Gulf, Besharati stopped over in Damascus once again on the return leg of his trip to discuss the 
latest developments with the Syrians. Following a meeting with Besharati on February 22, Hafez 
Assad made a public statement, broadcast in the Syrian news media, expressing his satisfaction 
with Tehran's assurances that it did not covet any Iraqi territory. Besharati also told journalists that 
"Iran was determined to regain its legitimate rights violated by the Iraqi regime, through 
punishment of the aggressor." He added that, once its goals were achieved, it was up to the Iraqi 
people "to take their destiny into their own hands" and decide on their future.163
Overall, it seems that Syria was somewhat ambivalent about the success of Wal Fajr-8. 
On one hand, the Iranian victory increased the chances and even held out the prospect of an Iraqi 
defeat in the 65-month-old war, to the delight of the Syrians. On the other hand, the seizure of 
Faw made Syrian statements that Damascus was able to moderate Iranian behavior seem dubious. 
The Syrians continued to defend Iran's military campaign, qualifying their support at the same time 
by declaring that, if the Iranians demonstrated any expansionist tendencies or coveted Arab land, 
they would sever their links with Iran. On the whole, Syria's ideological stance and justifications for 
its alliance with non-Arab Iran seemed increasingly untenable and left it exposed to charges of 
betraying Arab interests.164 Iran's breakthrough at Faw and subsequent intimidation of the lower 
Gulf states gave more ammunition to its opponents, who portrayed the Gulf W ar as an Arab- 
Persian conflict.165
Iran's military success greatly alarmed neighboring Arab states, prompting an emergency 
session of the Arab League foreign ministers to be convened on March 24 in Tunis. This decision 
to hold an extraordinary meeting reflected the level of unease in the Arab world over Iran's seizure 
of Faw and the possibility of a total Iraqi collapse. The success of Wal-Fajr-8 had sent Shockwaves 
throughout the Arab world and polarized it more than ever before. Both camps, particularly the pro- 
Iraqi bloc, now resolved to take drastic measures to bring pressure to bear upon Tehran and avert 
an Iraqi defeat in the war. During March 1986, Saudi Arabia, which had warned of a price war in 
the oil markets for some time, finally unsheathed the oil weapon by flooding the international 
market with Saudi crude. Overnight, oil prices plummeted from around $30 per barrel to just under 
$10. With a single stroke, Iran's oil revenues, vital to finance the war effort, had been cut by 
almost 70%. Besides economic considerations (namely, the desire to restore discipline in OPEC
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and recoup its lost influence in the cartel), there is little doubt that the Saudi move was also 
motivated by the desire to cripple Iran's war machine and force the clerical regime to the 
negotiating table to resolve the conflict peacefully. The concurrent oil price collapse and the 
opprobrium brought by the seizure of the Faw Peninsula in March 1986 reinforced Tehran's sense 
of embattlement and political isolation in the region, thereby increasing its dependence on the 
goodwill of its remaining Arab allies, particularly Syria.166
On March 20, Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shara visited Tehran, delivering a message from 
President Assad to his Iranian counterpart and conferring with Iranian officials about recent 
developments.167 In a drastic move, demonstrating the extent of Iraq's fury with Iran's success at 
Faw and al-Shara's trip to Iran, in the days preceding the Arab League meeting in Tunis, Iraqi 
Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz submitted a memorandum to Arab League Secretary-General Chedli 
Klibi severely reproaching Syria's stalwart support for Iran, calling it treasonous behavior. In the 
memorandum, Tareq Aziz stated that Syria was flagrantly violating the Arab League Charter and 
the Arab Defense Pact through its continued support for Iran. He characterized al-Shara's visit to 
Iran as a provocative act, contrary to "all Arab values and principles." He also depicted Damascus' 
conduct vis-d-vis the Palestinians and its policies in Lebanon as gross violations of the Arab 
League Charter.168
During the stormy session in Tunis, despite the vehement objections of the Syrian and 
Libyan delegations, the Arab League issued a strongly-worded communique, severely condemning 
Iran's occupation of Iraqi territory and expressing solidarity with Baghdad in its rightful and 
legitimate defense of Iraq's "national sovereignty, security and territorial integrity."169 By this 
juncture, the repeated statements by Iranian officials vowing to prosecute the war until the ouster of 
the Iraqi Ba'thi regime, their numerous threats to punish Iraq's Arab backers and the occupation of 
the Faw Peninsula made Syria's justifications for its pro-Iranian stance look highly implausible, if 
not completely absurd, from the perspective of many Arab League members.170
Riding high on the tide of the victory at Faw, Iran seemed unshaken by the Arab League 
condemnation and was more determined than ever to prosecute the war until the overthrow of the 
Iraq Ba'th. A negotiated settlement seemed to be the last thing on the mind of Iranian officials. 
The mindset prevailing among the Iranian leadership at the time was reflected in statements made 
by Foreign Minister Velayati on Friday, March 31, in an interview with the Persian-language daily, 
Ettela'at, in which he underscored that mediation efforts to end the war were futile. He urged the 
Gulf states to distance themselves from Saddam Hussein in view of the recent setbacks suffered 
by the Iraqi army on the battlefront. He brushed off Saudi efforts aimed at healing the Syrian-lraqi 
rift and concomitantly decoupling Syria and Iran. Velayati emphasized that Tehran and Damascus 
had a common stand on the issue of the Gulf War and the fate of the Baghdad regime, adding: "we 
are confident about the firmness of the political position of our friendly and brotherly country."
While the mood in Tehran was buoyant following Wal Fajr-8, this was tempered by concern
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that Iran was becoming increasingly ostracized by the Arab world. Sharp differences were also 
arising with Syria as a direct result of policies the clerical regime was pursuing in the Gulf and 
Lebanon. Moreover, the oil price collapse in early 1986, coupled with Iran's growing isolation and 
war-weariness at home, gradually brought about a realization that the war effort could not be 
sustained indefinitely.171 If Iran was to achieve its ultimate objective of toppling Saddam Hussein, 
this would have to be achieved within a limited timeframe. Consequently, in the months that 
followed, Iranian leaders began to talk about a "final offensive" to deliver the coup de grace 
against Baghdad. After the success in Wal Fajr-8, Iranian military planners went to work, carefully 
drawing up a strategic plan for their next major operation.
THE COLLAPSE OF THE TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT AND SYRIA'S WORSENING  
PREDICAMENT
Against the backdrop of the tumultous events of 1982-85, the Syrians had invested great effort in 
hammering out the Tripartite Agreement signed by Hobeika, Bern and Jumblatt. However, from 
the very outset, the accord lacked legitimacy, particularly in many corners of the Maronite camp.172
It was Samir Geagea, though, who resolved to torpedo the agreement, having received the 
support of the influential Maronite monastic orders led by Abbot Bulos Naaman, along with 
prominent political figures such as Amin Gemayel and Camille Chamoun.173
On January 8, elements within the Lebanese Forces loyal to Samir Geagea engaged pro- 
Hobeika forces in combat, culminating in intense intra-Maronite fighting. After seven days of fierce 
clashes, Geagea's men finally stormed Hobeika's headquarters. During the assault, some 200-300 
pro-Hobeika militiamen were slaughtered. However, Hobeika and some of his key aides were 
spared and allowed to leave the country, due to intense Syrian pressure. His departure on January 
15 signified the collapse of the Tripartite Agreement.174 The ouster of Hobeika represented a 
double coup: one by Geagea against Hobeika's faction within the Lebanese Forces, and the other 
by Amin Gemayel against Assad to demonstrate his contempt for the Syrian-sponsored 
agreement.175 There is no doubt that Geagea's action came as a profound shock to Hobeika and 
Assad, who had been completely unaware of the conspiracy brewing against them.176 The failure 
of the December 28 accord was a major disappointment for Damascus, since there could be no 
durable solution in Lebanon without Maronite participation. Three days after the rout of Hobeika's 
forces, on January 18, the National Unity Front, comprising pro-Syrian Lebanese political parties, 
declared a boycott of Amin Gemayel, with Nabih Bern and Walid Jumblatt subsequently 
demanding his removal from office.177
Besides eroding Syria's position in Lebanon, the collapse of the Tripartite Agreement was a 
major blow to Syrian prestige on the regional and international level, which must have pleased its 
opponents. Although it cannot be determined whether the anti-Hobeika camp received any direct 
foreign support, the outcome of events was viewed in a positive light by Tel Aviv and Washington,
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since they had scores to settle with Damascus. The collapse of what seemed to be an emergent 
Pax Syriana in Lebanon meant that Damascus needed to cultivate as many allies as possible in 
Lebanon in its efforts to forge a new consensus and stabilize the situation. Indeed, if the Tripartite 
Agreement had succeeded, Syria couid have afforded to assume a more confrontational stance 
vis-a-vis groups such as Hezbollah. However, the failure of the accord called for accommodation, 
in order to avoid alienating the rapidly growing pro-Iranian militia and unnecessarily straining 
relations with Tehran. Both on the domestic level in Lebanon and regionally, Assad needed to 
carry out a very careful balancing act, trying to advance Syrian interests, but not venturing so far 
as to antagonize the revolutionary clerics in Tehran and the radical elements in Lebanon. This 
need was reinforced by the outbreak of fighting between various factions throughout the country 
during the winter. While Syria and Iran attempted on a number of occasions to restore order by 
forging a consensus among Amal, Hezbollah, the PSP, the Murabitoun and the Palestinians, 
conditions had become so fluid and strife-ridden that they could no longer contain the political
_ 178crisis.
The Lebanese crisis was further exacerbated as PLO fighters continued to infiltrate 
Lebanon, leading to a new round of Amal-Palestinian clashes. This in turn contributed to an 
escalating spiral of tensions as Syria backed Amal, and Iran and Hezbollah threw their weight 
behind the Palestinians. In spite of significant differences with his Iranian allies, Assad was loath to 
jeopardize his strategic partnership with Iran. He was also reluctant to commit troops to crush his 
Lebanese opponents. Therefore he had to tread cautiously, while attempting to assert Syrian 
control in Lebanon.
As the year progressed, there were increasing signs of tension between the two camps. 
Besides the fighting between Amal and joint Hezbollah-Communist forces in Beirut in early 
February, clashes occurred the following month between Syrian forces and Hezbollah in the Bekaa 
Valley. Despite the growing friction between the Syrian army and Hezbollah, which maintained its 
regional headquarters in Ba'albek, Assad was reluctant to move against them for fear of 
jeopardizing his alliance with Iran, and Hezbollah destabilizing the situation in Lebanon.179 During 
the same month, when the leaders of the various Muslim militias, including Amal, the Murabitoun 
and PSP, reached an agreement under Syrian auspices to form a 1,500-man joint strike force in 
West Beirut to impose order, Hezbollah declined to join the arrangement.180
The Syrians already felt embattled on several fronts. A series of events in late 1985 and 
early 1986 put Syria and Israel on a seemingly irreversible collision course. In response to the 
downing of two Syrian MiG-23 aircraft over Syrian airspace by Israeli warplanes on November 19, 
1985, Damascus once again moved SAM missile batteries across the border into the Bekaa Valley. 
This precipitated another missile crisis similar to the one in 1981, which was eventually resolved 
through American mediation. However, another crisis flared up after the Israeli air force brought 
down a Libyan executive jet, on February 4,1986, bound for Damascus with a high-ranking Syrian
183
delegation, including the Assistant Secretary-General of the Syrian Ba’th Party, Abdullah al-Ahmar. 
Damascus was outraged when a resolution introduced in the UN Security Council condemning the 
Israeli action was vetoed by Washington. During March and April, a number of bombings occurred 
in Syria, killing at least 140 civilians and wounding many others. These events were blamed by the 
authorities on either Iraqi or Israeli agents. The violent incidents, along with the discovery of a 
bomb intended to blow up an El Al airliner at London's Heathrow airport - allegedly planted by 
Syrian air force intelligence - exacerbated the situation and exposed Syria to international 
opprobrium. Although the perpetrator, Nizar Hindawi, a Jordanian national, later surrendered 
himself and confessed to being a Syrian operative, there is reason to believe that he may have 
been a double agent, and that the plot had been a set-up to incriminate the Syrian government. In 
fact, Western intelligence officials subsequently commented on the amateurism of the plot and 
surmised that Israel might have orchestrated the operation in order to have a convenient casus 
belli during the spring of 1986 if it opted to precipitate a military confrontation with Syria.181
As Tel Aviv and Damascus edged closer to war by conducting large-scale maneuvers on 
the Golan front, Washington and Moscow were unnerved by the prospect of another Arab-lsraeli 
conflagration and took measures to contain the situation by urging both sides to exercise restraint. 
In May, Mikhail Gorbachev and Ronald Reagan took decisive steps to avert a military confrontation 
and at the same time reaffirmed their commitment to safeguarding the security of their regional 
partners. The Superpowers thereby succeeded in moving their respective allies away from the 
brink of war.182
In the aftermath of the Hindawi affair, the prospects of international condemnation and 
isolation, along with potentially damaging economic sanctions, being imposed by the West on Syria 
were quite unsettling to the Syrian leadership, at a time when the threat of a major military 
confrontation with Israel was also looming on the horizon. As Damascus' sense of embattlement 
and insecurity became more pronounced on the regional and international level during the spring of 
1986, it threatened Tehran with withdrawing its support in the Gulf W ar unless its Iranian ally was 
more forthcoming in using its influence in Lebanon to free the nine French and five American 
hostages.183 Reportedly, visiting Iranian emissaries were bluntly told in Damascus that, if Tehran 
failed to secure their release, not only would Syria re-assess its policy towards Iraq, but also use 
brute force to suppress Iran's Shi'ite fundamentalist allies in Lebanon.184 At this point, obstinacy on 
the part of Iran and Hezbollah was something Syria could ill afford if it aimed successfully to derail 
British-led efforts to punish it for its involvement in the Hindawi affair, and to strengthen its hand in 
inter-Arab politics.
In Lebanon, tensions rose to new heights and the situation came to a head on May 1, when 
Syrian army units in Ba'albek reportedly tried to secure the release of foreign hostages held in the 
Sheikh Abdullah barracks. The incident occurred as the G-7 summit got underway in Tokyo to 
discuss, among other things, Syria's role in sponsoring international terrorism.185 During a one-
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hour gun battle, three Hezbollah militiamen were wounded, while one Syrian soldier was killed and 
three others injured.186 In the immediate aftermath of the incident, Hezbollah kidnapped two Syrian 
officers. The Syrians responded promptly by detaining a number of Hezbollah members, 
demanding the immediate release of the officers. The militiamen subsequently complied that 
same evening, with the Syrians releasing the Hezbollah fighters the following morning. The 
Syrians cordoned off Ba'albek by establishing roadblocks in and around the town, and prohibited 
anyone from entering or leaving it as part of their security measures. More fighting took place the 
following day, resulting in 10 men on both sides being wounded.187
Concurrent to the outbreak of fighting in Ba'albek on May 1, Iranian Foreign Minister 
Velayati arrived in Damascus to confer with Assad and other Syrian officials on developments in 
the region. Eleven days later, his Syrian counterpart, Faruq al-Shara, flew to the Iranian capital, 
demanding the immediate release of the Western hostages from Iranian officials and threatening 
the withdrawal of support in the Gulf conflict. According to the Kuwaiti daily, Al-Qabas, on May 16, 
the Iranians apparently refused to use their influence with Hezbollah to gain the freedom of the 
hostages without any concessions from the West. The fact that the release could ease tensions 
between Syria and the West in the aftermath of the Hindawi affair and help avert the adoption of 
measures by the EC and US against Damascus was not enough to sway the Iranians.188
As tensions with Israel continued to escalate, Damascus initiated efforts on every front to 
prevent sliding into greater isolation and inviting the Israelis to carry out a first strike. While Assad 
tried to continue mending fences with Jordan's King Hussein in May 1986, Syria bolstered its 
defenses and put them on heightened alert to deter an Israeli attack.189 An all-out effort was 
undertaken to secure the release of the hostages in order to relieve pressure from Washington and 
Paris. In tandem with al-Shara's moves in Tehran, Assad called Ali Khamene'i, requesting him to 
intercede in the Lebanese hostage affair. On May 28, Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas 
confirmed that the Syrian military had been negotiating with the captors to secure the release of 
the French hostages.190
THE RENEWAL OF THE WAR OF THE CAMPS AND SYRIAN-IRANIAN MEDIATION EFFORTS
The situation in Lebanon became more convoluted in May and June 1986 as PLO fighters 
gradually trickled back into Lebanon and made their way back to the refugee camps, thus 
precipitating another Amal siege of the Palestinian refugee camps and putting Syrian-lranian 
relations to the test. In late May, heavy fighting erupted in southern Beirut between Amal 
militiamen and Palestinian fighters, costing the lives of more than 80 people during the first two 
weeks. Tehran dispatched Deputy Foreign Minister Besharati to the Levant to stop the bloodshed 
and hammer out an agreement. Talks between the two sides held at the Iranian and Algerian 
embassies in Beirut initially proved fruitless.191 Besides meeting Amal and PNSF leaders, 
Besharati also held talks with Lebanese Prime Minister Karami. Prior to his arrival in Beirut,
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Besharati had conferred with Assad about the Amal-Palestinian conflict in Damascus.192 The 
Iranian envoy eventually succeeded in negotiating a temporary ceasefire in order to supervise a 
two-hour mercy mission by six Iranian doctors to take eight ambulances into the besieged Bourj al- 
Barajneh camp and evacuate wounded Palestinians. Meanwhile, Nabih Bern travelled to 
Damascus, where he urged the Syrian leadership to send troops into Beirut to restore peace and 
order.193 As Syrian and Iranian negotiating teams headed by Vice-President Khaddam and Deputy 
Minister Besharati continued their deliberations to find a solution, Karami and other Lebanese 
Muslim leaders subsequently arrived in Damascus, pleading for Syrian military intervention to end 
the W ar of the Camps.194 Finally, in mid-June, Amal and the PNSF announced a truce. The two 
agreed to form a 1,500-man special force under Syrian auspices to maintain the ceasefire.195 
Although the siege was not lifted, the three weeks of hostilities ended, having taken the lives of 140 
people and leaving 800 injured.196
As the fighting died down in Beirut (if only temporarily), in early July, elements of the 
special force to monitor the ceasefire took up positions in the capital. This included the 
deployment of some 200-300 Syrian Special Forces commandos in West Beirut, thereby marking 
the return of a Syrian military presence in the city after four years. A security committee composed 
of representatives from both West and East Beirut also met to coordinate efforts to restore peace 
and order and re-open crossings along the Green Line. Many Christian leaders, with the exception 
of Amin Gemayel, welcomed Syria's moves.197 By the latter part of the month, senior Syrian 
military intelligence officers had entered into negotiations with Hezbollah leaders to extend the 
security plan to the fundamentalist movement's strongholds in the suburbs of southern Beirut, 
where the French and American hostages were believed to be held.198 Despite initial opposition by 
the pro-Iranian movement, after almost four weeks of sensitive negotiations, it bowed to pressure 
from the Syrians and its Iranian benefactors, consenting to the deployment of Syrian and Lebanese 
security forces in southern Beirut, on an understanding reached between Damascus and Tehran 
that the Shi'ite fundamentalists would retain their positions and continue to operate freely.199 
Consequently, on August 4, a contingent of 750 Lebanese soldiers and gendarmes, along with 200 
Syrian troops, entered the Shi'ite suburbs of south Beirut; they were to be responsible for curbing 
violence and preventing more Palestinian guerrillas from entering the refugee camps.200
As a result of Iranian entreaties, Hezbollah grudgingly accepted the implementation of the 
Syrian-sponsored security plan in Beirut. Tehran clearly did not want to antagonize its main Arab 
ally in its own backyard, even if it meant curbing Hezbollah's freedom of action to a limited extent. 
In general, the situation in Lebanon stabilized to a substantial degree for a few months, until 
fighting between Amal and the Palestinians flared up once more in the closing weeks of the year.
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THE SYRIAN-JORDANIAN RAPPROCHEMENT AND IRAN'S RESPONSE
By mid-1986, conflicts of interest between Syria and Iran over the political future of Lebanon, the 
Amal-Hezbollah rivalry and the fate of the Western hostages, along with Syria's failure to service 
its oil debt, had strained relations between the two allies. In Tehran, two opposing camps within the 
ruling elite had crystallized over how to handle the relationship with Damascus. Foreign Minister 
Velayati, at the head of the "pro-Syrian lobby," was a strong advocate of continuing the seven- 
year-old alliance, in view of Syria's critical role in supporting the Iranian war effort in the early 
stages of the Iraqi invasion and occupation between 1980 and 1982, permitting Iran to establish an 
important presence in Lebanon and incessant lobbying on behalf of Iran in the Arab League 
throughout the years. On the other hand, other prominent political figures within the Iranian 
leadership, led by Chairman of the Majles' Foreign Affairs Committee Ahmad Azizi, opposed 
perpetuating an alliance which yielded few - if any - tangible benefits to Iran's revolutionary cause 
at this stage. They argued that, on the whole, preserving links with Damascus was to their 
detriment, since Syria was over $1-2 billion in arrears on payments for Iranian oil shipments since 
1982, the Syrian army had consistently impeded the activities of the Islamic Revolutionary Guards' 
contingent in Lebanon and Damascus' current contribution to the Iranian war effort by selling 
Soviet-made light weapons to Iran was negligible at best.201 Overall, the dominant elements within 
the Iranian regime were concerned about Syria's threats to discontinue its diplomatic and military 
support for its non-Arab ally in the Gulf conflict, its insistence on securing the freedom of Western 
hostages in Lebanon without Iran deriving any tangible benefits, its efforts in Lebanon to 
circumscribe the activities of Hezbollah and the Palestinian resistance and its inability to service its 
outstanding debt to Iran. Iranian concerns were heightened in May when Assad accelerated his 
policy of thawing relations with Jordan.
From the Syrian standpoint, the precarious situation in Lebanon, the specter of a military 
confrontation with Israel in the aftermath of the Hindawi affair and its troubled partnership with Iran, 
all combined, put Syria in an extremely vulnerable position. Assad felt exposed on several fronts 
and needed to adopt a proactive policy to mitigate Syria's precarious security situation, and 
concomitantly strengthen his bargaining position vis-d-vis Tehran, in order to obtain its compliance 
on resuming oil shipments and restoring order in Lebanon. Syria decided to continue on the path 
towards normalizing relations with Jordan for a number of reasons: to secure its southern flank, to 
have an Arab ally also bordering Israel in case of a military showdown with Tel Aviv and to extract 
concessions from Iran - and perhaps Saudi Arabia - by feigning a rapprochement with Iraq and, if 
the opportunity presented itself, exploiting renewed links with Baghdad without giving up too much 
in return.
Assad journeyed to Amman on May 5 for a two-day visit, his first since 1977.202 While 
nothing concrete seemed to have come out of the talks, the fact that both sides expressed 
optimism about their future bilateral relations, and Hosni Mubarak's unscheduled visit to Aqaba five
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days later for consultations with the Jordanian monarch, raised hopes.203 Speculation increased 
when Assad declared on May 9, while addressing a group of Syrian lawyers, that the time had 
come to end the Gulf war.204 In the days that followed, Syrian Vice-President Khaddam revealed 
that the summit meeting between Assad and King Hussein had enabled them to remove obstacles 
on the path towards normalization of relations and rebuild trust and confidence. He asserted that 
both Damascus and Amman had concurred on the need to harmonize their positions vis-d-vis 
Israel, and to refrain from entering into bilateral negotiations with Tel Aviv to secure separate 
peace agreements. Khaddam asserted that Syria would pursue the path of reconciliation with 
Jordan in order to further its regional interests205
Prior to Assad's visit to Jordan, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati and Revolutionary Guards 
Commander Rafiqdoust visited Tripoli and Damascus to confer with their Arab allies.206 There 
were no indications that anything substantial came out of the Syrian-lranian talks. In spite of 
clashes between Hezbollah and Syrian forces in the Bekaa, Syrian pressure on Iran to obtain the 
release of Western hostages (in order to deflect some criticism from the West) and Tehran's 
adamant refusal to resume oil shipments to Syria, Iran's state-controlled media dismissed reports 
about a possible Syrian-Jordanian reconciliation.207 By mid-May, the Syrians felt embattled on a 
number of fronts. Britain's decision to expel three Syrian diplomats produced a similar riposte on 
the part of Syria, while US President Reagan's statements threatening punishment if Syria pursued 
policies similar to those of Libya unnerved Assad.208 The sense of siege in Damascus was 
compounded by conflicting signals emanating from Israel. Some Israeli officials tried to play down 
reports about an imminent military confrontation with Syria, but on May 13 Prime Minister Peres 
bluntly declared that Israel could not reach any understanding with Syria as long as Assad 
remained in power.209 These events coincided with Faruq al-Shara's visit to Tehran, where he met 
with President Khamene'i, Prime Minister Musavi and Foreign Minister Velayati to review the 
situation in the region, particularly the prospects of Israeli military action against Syria and Iranian 
cooperation in persuading Hezbollah to release Western hostages.210
At this critical stage, Damascus had good reason to suspect that the Israelis and 
Americans had strong motives to opt for a military confrontation. Since 1982, the Syrian armed 
forces had grown by more than 60%, equipped with the latest Soviet-made hardware in order to 
achieve "strategic parity" with Israel in both quantitative and qualitative terms. The Syrians 
believed that, from Peres’ perspective, a military victory would enable him to cut the Syrian military 
down to size. Secondly, he could then call for general elections and win decisively at the polls 
before having to hand over power to his Likud coalition partners in October 1986. Thirdly, there 
was also little doubt that the Reagan administration would look favorably on an ignominious defeat 
for Syria, after being humbled by Damascus and its allies in Lebanon during 1983-84. Fourthly, 
vanquishing Assad would in effect derail the nascent Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement, that 
threatened to build a unified position against Tel Aviv, and isolate Jordan. It would leave King
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Hussein with little choice but to enter into direct negotiations with Israel to secure his western 
frontier. While treading carefully and considering his options, Assad decided to bolster his 
defenses by deploying troops along the Golan Heights in a bid to deter an Israeli first strike.211
Although Syria had not received any Iranian oil deliveries for many months, on May 15, the 
previous Syrian-lranian oil agreement officially expired, and no steps were taken to negotiate a
91?new deal. Iran's non-compliance on securing the release of Western hostages and withholding 
of oil shipments frustrated the Syrian leadership during this crucial period. Sensing an opportunity 
to accelerate the reconciliation process with Syria and exploit the Syrian-lranian rift in order to lay 
the foundations for a Syrian-lraqi rapprochement, King Hussein intensified his efforts in late May 
and early June to achieve a major breakthrough.213
In economic terms, by the spring of 1986, Syria was also in dire straits. Unable to pay off 
the $1-2 billion it owed to Iran, Damascus continued to seek Saudi and Kuwaiti assistance to make 
up for the shortfall in its domestic oil requirements and had also begun since March to purchase
48,000 barrels of crude oil every fifteen days on the Mediterranean market.214 Plagued by 
shortages of various goods, the country's foreign exchange reserves had by the end of May been 
reduced to a meagre $100 million, equivalent to two weeks worth of imports. Its total foreign debt 
stood at approximately $18 billion, with the lion's share of $15 billion being owed to Moscow for the 
procurement of Soviet arms. The only significant foreign financial aid Syria was receiving was an 
annual sum of $500-700 million from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, under the terms of the 1978 
Baghdad summit resolution of the Arab League.215
The pro-Iraqi camp had high hopes at this point that it could decouple Syria and Iran, 
thereby terminating their alliance and paving the way for an Arab summit in the summer.216 King 
Hussein sought to bring Syria and Iraq together as a means not only of restoring unity in Arab 
ranks and bolstering Jordanian security, but also of isolating Khomeini's Iran and forcing it to seek 
a negotiated settlement to the six-year-old Gulf conflict. Consequently, on May 24, accompanied 
by Prime Minister Zayd al-Rifai and Foreign Minister Taher al-Masri, the Jordanian monarch made 
an unscheduled seven-hour visit to Damascus and held two rounds of talks with Assad.217 The 
main items on the agenda were bilateral links and the prospects of thawing Syrian-lraqi relations.218 
Less than 24 hours after returning to Amman, on May 26, King Hussein travelled to Baghdad to 
confer with Saddam Hussein on the outcome of his deliberations with the Syrian leader.219 The 
outcome of the negotiations in both Arab capitals proved encouraging for the Jordanians to such an 
extent that, on May 27, the King dispatched Prime Minister al-Rifai to Athens on a four-hour visit to 
meet with Assad, who had arrived in the Greek capital the previous day on a three-day state 
visit.220 Al-Rifai reportedly delivered a message from King Hussein to the Syrian leader and 
briefed him on the progress of the reconciliation effort subsequent to the bilateral meetings in 
Damascus.221
In the aftermath of al-Rifai's consultations with Assad, expectations for a breakthrough ran
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high. On May 27, Al-Siyasah reported that Amman had indeed secured the agreement of both 
sides for a summit meeting between the Syrian and Iraqi presidents. However, Iraqi Foreign 
Minister Tareq Aziz subsequently revealed that a preliminary meeting at the foreign ministerial 
level would be held, cautioning that it was premature to reach any definitive conclusions about the 
prospects and outcome of a summit meeting.222 In the meantime, Baghdad continued to broadcast 
anti-Syrian propaganda, advocating the overthrow of Assad and describing him as "the intimate 
ally of the enemies of Arabism and the Arab nation."223 By the end of the month there were clear 
indications that the purpose of the meeting between Faruq al-Shara and Tariq Aziz would be to set 
the stage for an Assad-Saddam summit.224 King Hussein, confident that the fruits of his labor 
would become apparent in the coming weeks, departed on a tour of several Western capitals 
(Paris, London and Washington) to discuss the deadlocked Middle East peace process and the 
emergent Syrian-lraqi rapprochement.225
In early June, Arab League Secretary-General Chedli Klibi announced that, if the Jordanian 
initiative succeeded in healing the rift between Damascus and Baghdad, an Arab summit would be 
convened in Casablanca in July.226 Concomitantly, there were reports that an Iraqi delegation had 
arrived in Syria to discuss the reopening of the trans-Syrian (IPC) oil pipeline, shut down since April 
1982 when the Syrian-lranian alliance was formalized.227 In the days that followed, both Iraqi 
Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz and King Hussein officially announced that the first meeting of the 
foreign ministers of Iraq and Syria for ten years would be held on June 13 on their common border 
to pave the way for a summit meeting between Saddam Hussein and Hafez Assad, aimed at 
eventually ending the Gulf war and resuscitating the Arab-lsraeli peace process.228 The Jordanian 
monarch was quite confident by this stage that his mediation efforts were going to pay off, ending 
the state of paralysis and disunity in Arab politics. In reference to Iran's seizure of the Faw 
Peninsula earlier in the year and Syria's stance in this regard, he confidently asserted that: "Syria's 
leadership and people believe, as we do, that Arab land is sacred and must be safeguarded...that 
is part of the Arab interest and the Arab identity."229
Iran's Riposte and the Failure of Jordanian Diplomacy
In spite of Syria's assurances that it was not about to abandon its alliance with revolutionary Iran, 
the political leadership in Tehran was ill at ease, since it was acutely aware of Syrian 
disenchantment with its refusal to resume oil shipments and lack of cooperation on a number of 
key issues in Lebanon, including the Amal-Hezbollah rivalry, the W ar of the Camps and the 
Western hostages. The clerical regime faced a major dilemma at this stage: while determined to 
prosecute the "imposed war" against Ba'thi Iraq until final victory and expand its foothold in 
Lebanon, it could not afford to alienate its key Arab ally, which played a critical role in maintaining 
the "pincer” against Iraq and allowing Iran access to the Lebanese theater. Not only were the 
Iranians concerned by Assad's state visit to Jordan in early May, but they became increasingly
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alarmed as they witnessed Jordan's intense shuttle diplomacy as the month progressed, with 
growing signs of a potential Syrian-lraqi reconciliation in the making. Initially, Tehran chose to 
demonstrate its deep displeasure with the Syrian-Jordanian rapprochement by inviting the leader of 
Syria's outlawed Muslim Brotherhood.230 However, the need to retain its most valuable Arab 
partner, in part to prevent the formation of a united, anti-Iranian coalition (vital both in practical and 
ideological terms), became more imperative in the latter part of May, when Iraq launched its first 
major attack, on May 17, across the border since the outbreak of the Gulf W ar in 1980 and 
captured the strategically-located town of Mehran.231 Baghdad's success and subsequent reports 
that substantial numbers of Egyptian and Jordanian troops were fighting alongside the Iraqis in the 
frontlines accentuated Iran's sense of regional isolation.232
Despite their differences, it is doubtful that Syria ever intended to make a clean break with 
its Iranian ally. The situation in the Levant necessitated mending fences with Jordan, but a re­
alignment with Iraq would do very little to mitigate Syria's security concerns and further its regional 
interests. Following the discontinuation of Iranian oil shipments, Iraqi oil deliveries and greater 
financial support from the Gulf Arabs would help alleviate the economic situation in Syria, but 
would not enhance Syria's ability to stabilize the situation in Lebanon and facilitate its quest to be 
the leader of the Arab world. From Assad's perspective, a reconciliation with Saddam Hussein - 
whom he deeply distrusted - would have a marginal impact on Syria's ability to bolster its position 
in the Middle East peace process and regain the Golan Heights. Overall, in strategic terms, the 
Syrian leadership calculated that a breach with Iran in favor of Iraq would have minimal effect on 
furthering its long-term interests. A limited rapprochement with Iraq to gain material benefits from 
Baghdad and its allies would remedy Syria's economic woes and, in parallel, cajole Iran to modify 
its position and be more cooperative with Damascus.
Even as plans were underway for the al-Shara-Aziz meeting on June 13 at the Tanaf 
security post on the Iraqi-Syrian border, Assad, in sharp contrast to King Hussein's assertions that 
the Iranian conquest of the Faw Peninsula had prompted Syria to reassess its position in the Gulf 
war, declared in early June that:
"We are against the occupation of any Arab land. In the Gulf War, we are against 
the occupation of Iraqi territory. Iran will withdraw its troops from Iraqi territory once 
it has attained its objectives - the overthrow of the regime in Baghdad. I am 
certain that Iran has no designs on any Arab territory. If the case is the contrary, 
we will reconsider our position. Syria discusses with Iran all dangers and 
difficulties that are facing the Arab conscience. This lies in the interest of the 
Arabs, Syria and Iran."234 
In order to pre-empt a possible Syrian-lraqi reconciliation, an Iranian delegation headed by Deputy 
Foreign Minister Besharati arrived in Damascus a week before the scheduled meeting between the 
two Ba'thi rivals. Besharati, who had been sent to patch up any differences with Syria and mediate
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in the Amal-Palestinian conflict in Lebanon, held talks with the Syrian and Lebanese Shi'ite 
leadership. Following these deliberations, Assad stated that Syria had always been interested in 
the formation of "a united entity with Iraq against the Zionist entity, but the policy of the Baghdad 
regime, including the imposition of war on Iran, disrupted this plan."235 The ties between Syria and 
Iran were described as "firm and strategic," with Khaddam expressing gratitude for Iran providing 
its good offices in Lebanon and elucidating that "Syria views the Islamic revolution of Iran as a gain 
not only for the Iranian nation, but for Arab nations and the Islamic liberation movement."236 
Besharati, having also delivered a message from Ali Khamene'i to Hafez Assad, dismissed reports 
about strains in the alliance and the discontinuation of oil deliveries to Syria. He underscored that 
Iran would continue to supply Syria with oil and give it more time to pay off its $1.5 billion debt to 
Iran.237 Indeed, Besharati's week-long visit to Syria and Lebanon coincided with the arrival of an 
Iranian oil tanker carrying at least half a million barrels of oil, believed to have been the first Iranian 
oil delivery since at least the end of 1985.238
In the days leading up to the meeting between Tareq Aziz and Faruq al-Shara, Baghdad 
did not desist from denouncing Damascus. For example, in a statement broadcast on Iraqi radio 
and published in the Egyptian daily, Al-Akhbar, on June 11, Iraqi Information Minister Latif Nassif 
Jasim rebuked Syria and Libya for what he described as their "betrayal of the Arab nation and their 
support for Iran against Iraq." Eventually, only hours before the two foreign ministers were due to 
meet, Jordanian sources in Amman announced that the talks had been "postponed to allow for 
further consultations."239 There were conflicting accounts about what had actually transpired. 
Some Arab sources claimed that negotiations between the two had occurred, but the results had 
been so disastrous that the two parties and their Jordanian mediators agreed to deny their 
existence.240 Irrespective of the veracity of these reports, the Syrian-lraqi dialogue foundered 
because of Syria's refusal to abandon its strategic partnership with Iran. Damascus had insisted 
the talks should either be limited to economic cooperation or focus on a full-fledged political union 
between the two countries. In contrast, Baghdad had demanded that the issue of the Persian Gulf 
War and Syria's relations with Iran be included in the agenda and addressed accordingly.241
Although there were some reports in the Western and Arab press that Syria had backed 
down due to Iranian pressure and threats to foment unrest in Lebanon, this seems highly 
unlikely.242 In the final analysis, it is improbable that Syria seriously considered severing its links 
with Iran. Instead, it saw a limited opening towards Iraq as a means of coaxing Iran towards 
cooperation on a number of vital issues and, in parallel, encouraging the Gulf Arabs to be more 
forthcoming with financial contributions. Overall, Assad was determined to preserve his 
partnership with Iran and concurrently exploit opportunities to obtain concessions from both 
sides.243 Several days after the scheduled meeting failed to take place, the official Jordanian news 
agency, Petra, reported that the talks between the Syrian and Iraqi foreign ministers had been 
postponed indefinitely.244
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While the resumption of oil deliveries undoubtedly provided a major incentive for 
Damascus to cancel the June 13 meeting, the Syrians indicated that renewed Iranian oil shipments 
were not enough in themselves to prevent a gradual rapprochement with Iraq. If anything, Assad 
was now in a better position to exploit the regional situation by demanding greater concessions 
from Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states in return for improved relations with Iraq.245 Assad's 
risky gambit had paid off. Not only had he succeeded in bolstering his regional influence and 
prestige by prevailing upon the Iranians to resume the flow of desperately needed oil, and placing 
himself in a stronger position to demand more advantageous terms from the pro-Iraq camp, but 
with Iranian cooperation he was also able to secure the freedom of two French hostages in Beirut 
on June 20, thereby ingratiating himself with Paris and driving a wedge among the Western allies 
against the backdrop of the Hindawi affair.246
Damascus was able to maintain its leverage with Jordan and the Gulf states by still 
officially keeping the door open to any third-party mediation. Despite the setback in thawing 
Syrian-lraqi relations, Jordan continued its rapprochement with Syria, with King Hussein 
commencing a new round of quiet diplomacy to bridge the gap between the Syrian and Iraqi 
positions.247 In the immediate aftermath of the cancellation of the Syrian-lraqi meeting, the Iraqi 
government intensified its attacks on the Assad regime. Tareq Aziz bitterly accused the Syrians of 
opportunism by trying to reap benefits from both Iran and the pro-Iraqi bloc.248 He also depicted 
the Syrian-lranian strategy towards the Gulf Arabs as deceptive, with Tehran threatening the Arab 
littoral states and Syria blackmailing them by creating an illusion of being the guarantor of their 
security and shielding them from "Iranian expansionism." He condemned Syria and Libya as the 
source of all problems in the Arab world.249 The Iraqi Ba'th Party daily, Al-Thawrah, also 
advocated isolating Syria as the only viable solution.250
IRAN'S ASSERTIVE ROLE ON THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
As the summer of 1986 progressed, Iran was not only able to revitalize its links with Syria, but also 
succeeded in scoring some major gains on the political and military fronts. It is interesting to note 
that its relations with France and the Soviet Union - Iraq's two primary arms suppliers - warmed up. 
While the gradual thaw in relations with Moscow (in part due to Mikhail Gorbachev's ascent to 
power, and political expediency on Iran's part to prevent sliding into isolation) led to the expansion 
of economic cooperation between the two countries, the changes with France were more complex. 
The spree of abductions in Lebanon, and the bombing campaign in France orchestrated by Iran's 
proxies and agents during 1985-86, forced the Mitterand government to modify its stance in the 
Gulf War, by agreeing to repay the $1 billion Eurodif loan to Iran (from the Shah's era) in several 
tranches, expel the Iranian Mojahedin from France and extend a $1 billion line of credit to Tehran 
to purchase non-sophisticated French armaments.251 Iran's ability to coerce France to submit to its 
demands, coupled with Syrian pressure, led to the release of a number of French hostages during
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the course of 1986.
The cancellation of the Syrian-lraqi reconciliation talks and French capitulations were 
followed by a small, but nonetheless significant military victory on July 2, when Iran launched a 
counteroffensive, culminating in the recapture of Mehran after a week of heavy fighting.252 As a 
result, Iraq's seizure of Mehran had proved to be short-lived, and earlier claims by Baghdad that 
the war had entered a new phase with Iraq assuming offensive operations as part of its "active 
defense" strategy to force Iran to the negotiating table did not seem credible. Furthermore, within 
72 hours after the Iraqi defeat in Mehran, a thirty-five-man Syrian delegation led by Economics 
Minister Mohammed al-lmadi arrived in the Iranian capital for a week-long visit to renegotiate a 
series of economic and commercial agreements that had been concluded in 1982253 Among the 
items on the agenda was a comprehensive review of the previous bilateral oil agreement. Al-lmadi 
met with Iranian Prime Minister Musavi, and both concurred on the need for greater cooperation in 
order to confront their main enemies - Israel, Iraq and the United States. During their deliberations, 
Musavi emphasized that "cooperation between Syria and Iran is imperative and more urgent than 
ever to counter the conspiracies of the two countries' common enemies."254
After lengthy negotiations lasting more than four days, it was announced on July 9 that, 
under the terms of a new arrangement approved by both parties, Iran would sell 2.5 million tons of 
oil to Syria over a six-month period between on 1 October 1986 and the end of March 1987.255 
The agreement, signed by Ghazi al-Durubi and his Iranian counterpart, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, 
was another indication that the alliance was being reinvigorated and restored to its former status. 
The day after the conclusion of the accords, al-lmadi met with Iranian President Khamene'i, 
expressing satisfaction at the outcome of the bilateral negotiations and reaffirming Syria's 
unswerving support for Iran's cause.256
In mid-July, both Tehran and Damascus were heartened by reports and Baghdad's own 
admission that purges had occurred in the Iraqi Ba'th Party and the armed forces, following a coup 
attempt. They both claimed that economic malaise and military setbacks had produced a severe 
political crisis in Iraq, whereby Saddam Hussein was more vulnerable than ever.257 Indeed, Iraq 
was feeling the pinch economically. The Iraqis were fighting for survival and needed to take 
decisive measures in order to avert disaster and force Iran to accept a negotiated settlement.258 
However, Iran's revolutionary leadership was in no mood to compromise. While the economic 
conditions in Iran were noticeably deteriorating, following the victories at Faw and Mehran, and with 
meticulous preparations for the "final offensive” already underway, Tehran calculated that a 
decisive engagement in the coming months producing a major military victory would ultimately 
lead to the overthrow of Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba'th. Damascus' decision not to abandon 
its alliance with Iran and the thaw in relations with Iraq's two primary backers - the Soviet Union 
and France - boosted Tehran's confidence and strengthened its conviction that victory could be at 
hand. During July, Khomeini's special representative on the Supreme Defense Council and Majles
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Speaker Rafsanjani reiterated Iran's conditions for ending the Persian Gulf War: "punishment of 
the aggressor or the downfall of Saddam Hussein," and $200-300 billion in war reparations.259 He 
also warned Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and other regional states against continuing to finance the Iraqi 
war effort. Rafsanjani went even further by characterizing them as "reactionary" in view of their 
support for "Iraq's acts of wickedness," and stated that they would be held responsible and "pay for 
such aggressions."260 The threats and vitriolic rhetoric emanating from Tehran were partly the 
result of reports in the Arab press that the Gulf Arabs had recently pledged Iraq $4 billion for 
military expenditures.261
In parallel with the moves by the GCC states to shore up Iraq financially and economically, 
Jordan's King Hussein once again attempted to resuscitate the Syrian-lraqi reconciliation process 
by flying to Damascus on July 26 to try to persuade Hafez Assad to resume a dialogue with Iraq. 
The talks between the two leaders lasted some 13 hours over a two-day period, with Assad 
refusing to yield, convinced that the rift with Ba'thi Iraq was irreparable. Consequently, the 
Jordanian monarch left Syria empty-handed on July 27.262 A few days later, in an unprecedented 
move, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein called on Iran's leaders in an open letter to desist from 
further hostilities and end the six-year-old war.263 Not surprisingly his offer was rebuffed by the 
clerical regime. Unable to turn the tide in the ground war, financially strapped, and politically on 
the defensive on several fronts, Baghdad escalated the air war by intensifying the bombing 
campaign against Iran's oil facilities.264
On August 12, Iraq conducted its first air attack against Iran's new oil loading terminal on 
Sirri Island (600 kilometers east of Kharg Island). The efficacy of the raid was such that operations 
on Sirri had to be discontinued and moved to Larak Island, 200 kilometers further east near the 
Straits of Hormuz. Sirri Island was beyond the normal range of Iraqi aircraft. The very fact that the 
Iraqi air force had managed to conduct the attack meant that its aircraft had either refuelled in the 
air or landed in one of the lower Gulf states during the course of their mission. Iran claimed that, 
based on radio communication and radar signals it had picked up, the warplanes had flown via one 
of the GCC states.265 Majles Speaker Rafsanjani claimed that Iran had transcribed the Iraqi pilots' 
conversations and recorded the radar readings, proving that they had refuelled in one of the 
neighboring Arab countries.266
The air campaign in the weeks that followed cut Iran's oil exports by at least one-third from 
about 1.6 to 1.8 million b/d to somewhere between 0.8 and 1.2 million b/d.267 In the aftermath of 
the Saudi-instigated price crash earlier in the year, the escalation of the Iraqi air campaign against 
the oil installations eroded Iran's already precarious economic situation even further, prompting 
Tehran to lash out against the Gulf states, threatening retaliation if they continued to provide aid to 
Baghdad. Such was the intensity of Iran's war of words against the GCC states, that at the behest 
of the Saudis, Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shara arrived in Tehran on August 19 to mediate and 
defuse tensions between Iran and its southern neighbors. Al-Shara, who was carrying a message
195
from Assad to his Iranian counterpart, met with President Khamene'i, Prime Minister Musavi and 
Deputy Foreign Minister Besharati during his one-day visit.268 Al-Shara's departure coincided with 
heightened Iraqi aerial activity, prompting Khamene'i on August 22 directly to accuse the Gulf 
states of assisting Iraq's air campaign to disrupt Iran's oil exports and threaten to respond in kind if 
they did not desist from such actions.269 At the same time, he underscored: "We don't want to 
expand the war. If we had wanted to, it would have expanded already to the GCC countries."270 
He also posited that Iran desired good relations with its southern neighbors "in spite of all we know 
about the help they give Iraq."271 In the days that followed, Tehran once again pointed the finger 
directly at Saudi Arabia and Kuwait for supporting Iraq.272 Alarmed by the Iranian accusations, 
Syrian officials continued their role as intermediaries at Riyadh's request to ensure that Iran did not 
widen the scope of hostilities. Subsequently, Vice-President Khaddam and Foreign Minister al- 
Shara were dispatched by Assad on August 22 and 23 respectively to seek clarification and 
prevent the expansion of the conflict.273 In their meetings with Khamene'i and Musavi, they were 
assured that Iran did not have any intention of escalating the war to engulf the lower littoral 
states.274
On the eve of a Non-Aligned Movement summit in Zimbabwe, Iranian Foreign Minister 
Velayati and al-Shara flew to Damascus on August 24 to participate in the previously scheduled 
fifth tripartite meeting of the foreign ministers of Syria, Iran and Libya to review regional 
developments and coordinate their positions prior to attending the summit in Harare.275 The talks 
primarily centered around the Gulf War, the Arab-lsraeli conflict, the Libyan-American 
confrontation and the agenda of the NAM summit, with the Syrians and Iranians denouncing 
Washington's attempts to intimidate and cow Tripoli into submission.276
Despite the relative improvement in Syrian-lranian relations during the summer of 1986, as 
the year progressed, there were renewed tensions as disagreements emerged on a wide-range of 
issues. Their conflicting agendas in Lebanon with regard to the Amal-Hezbollah rivalry, the 
resumption of the "War of the Camps" and the continued captivity of the Western hostages all 
plunged Syrian-lranian relations to new lows. As a result, the period between the autumn of 1986 
and the summer of 1987 was one of the most troubled phases in the Syrian-lranian alliance, with 
the two sides holding frequent consultations to articulate their concerns and interests, iron out their 
differences through mutual accommodation and compromise in order to prevent an irreparable rift 
and restore their relations to a normal footing.
IRAN'S DIPLOMACY AND THE IMPACT OF THE IRAN-CONTRA REVELATIONS
By the latter part of 1986 the Iranian leadership had evidently become aware that the war could not 
be prolonged indefinitely. W ar weariness at home and low oil prices on the international markets 
meant that the conflict could only be sustained for a limited period of time. With the price of a 
barrel of oil hovering around $11-12, and export capacity fluctuating due to Iraqi raids on oil
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refineries and loading terminals, Iran was only generating some $6-8 billion in revenues during 
1986.277 Iran continued to mobilize its forces for a "final offensive", massing some 600,000 troops 
on the southern front by the end of the summer.278 In early October, during the annual session of 
the UN General Assembly in New York, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati stated that the Gulf 
conflict was approaching an end with the defeat of the "Iraqi aggressors." Having in mind a 
statement made earlier that week by Hafez Assad to the effect that, while Syria sided with Iran in 
the conflict, it would not condone the seizure of Arab territory, Velayati explained that Iran might 
have to overrun a substantial area of Iraq in order to achieve its ultimate objectives. However, he 
elucidated: "we are not going to occupy the lands of Iraq forever."279 Drawing an analogy with the 
Allied effort to defeat Nazi Germany, he asserted that Iran would not stop the struggle until the Iraqi 
Ba'th had been swept away280
While Iran's revolutionary leadership was becoming more confident that it could deal a 
devastating blow against Ba'thi Iraq in its next major offensive, it was also acutely aware that the 
conflict with Baghdad could not be pursued indefinitely. The window of opportunity to determine 
the outcome of the war on the battlefield would only remain open for a very limited period of time 
due to domestic political and economic considerations, as well as Iran's growing isolation in the 
Arab world. Tehran firmly believed that the Iraqi aerial attacks in the southern Persian Gulf were 
being aided and abetted by Riyadh and the sheikhdoms just as the Saudi-engineered oil price 
collapse in early 1986 had been partially motivated by their desire to deny Iran the financial 
resources to prosecute the war successfully. Consequently, the Islamic Republic assumed an 
increasingly confrontational stance both at the August OPEC meeting and during the annual Hajj 
that same month, in which 150,000 Iranian pilgrims participated. Demonstrations and rallies held 
by the Iranian pilgrims in Mecca and Medina led to clashes with Saudi security forces and over 100 
arrests.281 Throughout the autumn of 1986, Baghdad stepped up its aerial campaign against Iran's 
oil industry. Such was the intensity of the Iraqi raids that, by October, petrol rationing had to be 
reintroduced in Iran for the first time since the September 1980 Iraqi invasion.282
At this critical juncture, it was imperative for Iran to preserve its alliance with Syria to 
prevent Iraq from reaping any political, economic or strategic gains from a fissure in Syrian-lranian 
relations. For the clerical regime, attaining victory over Iraq took precedence over all else. As a 
result, even in Lebanon, in the remaining months of 1986, while Iran did try to reconcile differences 
between the various Islamic and revolutionary groupings, it ultimately deferred to the Syrians 
whenever a conflict of interest arose. Ensuring Syrian loyalty was of paramount importance and, 
whenever there was an instance where their bilateral ties appeared to be in danger, Tehran would 
take appropriate action to prevent any rifts from occurring.
On October 8, a week after Hafez Assad's statements regarding the occupation of Arab 
territory by Iran and his call for "total and immediate unity" between Syria and Iraq as a means to 
end the war, the Minister of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, Mohsen Rafiqdoust, was
197
dispatched to Damascus to seek clarification about Syria's position and to coordinate policy. The 
official purpose of the visit was described by the Syrians as "an exchange of important 
information.”283 it was reported that the fate of the American and French hostages in Lebanon was 
also on the agenda during Rafiqdoust's deliberations with Syrian officials.284 During his week-long 
stay in Damascus, he met with Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shara and Head of the Syrian National 
Security Organization Ahmed Diyab, and was received by President Assad on October 12.285 
Rafiqdoust subsequently stated that he had discussed the most recent developments in the Gulf 
theater with the Syrian President and, in a highly illuminating remark, underscored that the special 
relationship between Iran and Syria "has been effective in dispelling the misconception perpetuated 
by imperialism which attempts to depict the war as an Arab-Persian conflict and not a war against 
oppression. Such misconceptions seek to denigrate our just defense."286 The Syrian leader also 
declared in an interview that he had received assurances from his Iranian allies making "it clear 
that they have no ambitions on Iraqi territory, will not seek to annex any Iraqi land or try to impose 
hegemony...we are not worried about this."287
During the latter half of November, once the Reagan administration and the Shamir 
government had admitted their role in the sale of arms to Iran, Baghdad and its allies intensified 
their attacks against Iran.288 In another blow against the pro-Iranian bloc, following the conclusion 
of a three-day meeting of the PLO Executive Committee in early December to discuss regional 
issues, and renewed fighting in the refugee camps in Lebanon, PLO Chairman Arafat delivered a 
statement which formally condemned Iran's dealings with the United States and Israel and Syria's 
policies in Lebanon against the Palestinians and advocated Arab solidarity with Iraq 289 Indeed, the 
political firestorm created by the Iran-Contra scandal - on the regional and international level - and 
in tandem the beginning of a new round of clashes between Palestinian fighters and the Amal 
militia in Lebanon prompted Tehran to resume its mediation efforts in the Lebanese quagmire once 
again in a bid to stop the cycle of violence. Iran was now walking a tightrope, trying to discard its 
tarnished image by hammering out a deal between the Palestinians and their pro-Syrian opponents 
in order to demonstrate its ability to play a constructive role in the Arab world and, concomitantly, 
further its revolutionary interests in the Levant without overstepping the bounds in the eyes of the 
Syrians. This was imperative at a time when it was trying to recoup its position because of the 
Iran-Contra controversy and also completing final preparations to launch its greatest offensive 
against Arab Iraq in five years.290
SYRIAN MOVES TO PREVENT THE RESURGENCE OF PALESTINIAN POWER AND IRANIAN 
MEDIATION EFFORTS
While Syria's troop deployment in West Beirut during the summer of 1986 stabilized the security 
situation in the Lebanese capital to some degree, the political impasse remained unresolved and 
inter-factional fighting continued intermittently. Despite Hezbollah's initial objection to the Syrian
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military presence and refusal to participate in the joint security plan, Iran went along with Syrian 
actions as long as they did not impede Hezbollah's general activities.291 The Iranians also tried to 
persuade their protege not to thwart Syrian moves in the Lebanese capital, where the streets were 
cleared of gunmen and militia offices were closed down.292
Syria and Amal continued to be troubled, though, by the steady influx of Palestinian 
guerrillas into the country and Hezbollah's ability gradually to win over the hearts and minds of the 
Shi'ite poor in West Beirut and the outlying southern and eastern areas of the city.293 By the latter 
part of 1986, between 6 and 9 thousand Palestinian guerrillas had returned to Lebanon by various 
means.294 From Amal's perspective, the challenge was two-fold: the large Palestinian camps in 
Beirut had an increasing number of Palestinian fighters and, at same the time, the camps 
themselves separated Amal strongholds in West Beirut from the Shi'ite ghettos to the east and 
south, where Hezbollah was attracting a large following at the expense of the secular, pro-Syrian 
movement.
Intent on stemming the flow of fighters and weapons to the Palestinian strongholds and 
turning the tide in its favor, the Amal militia attacked the Palestinian refugee camps in Beirut and 
the south on November 21. The fighting that ensued lasted for almost three months and marked 
some of the worst violence since the 1982 Israeli invasion.296 In Beirut, Bern's men and the pre­
dominantly Shi'ite 6th Brigade of the Lebanese army attacked Bourj al-Barajneh, with the fighting 
quickly spreading to Sabra and Shatila. In the south, the Rashidiyyah camp near Tyre and the Ain 
El Helweh and Mieh Mieh camps on the outkirts of Sidon were also besieged.297 The Palestinians 
put up surprisingly stiff resistance and pushed the attackers back in some instances. In southern 
Lebanon, Palestinian fighters captured the strategically located town of Maghdousheh on a hilltop 
overlooking Sidon (including Ain El Helweh, Mieh Mieh and the coastal highway to Beirut) from 
Amal.298
Unable to overrun the camps, Amal and its allies resorted to shelling them, thereby 
inflicting many civilian casualties and causing outrage in much of the Arab-lslamic world. Amai's 
policies were condemned not only by the mainstream Arab states, but also by Syria's closest allies, 
Iran and Libya.299 The failure to deliver a knock-out blow to the Palestinians and to regain 
Maghdousheh prompted Amal and its Syrian patrons to try to find a face-saving way out of the 
conundrum. As consultations got underway in Damascus between Syrian, Amal and PNSF 
officials, members of an Iranian delegation that had been touring Syria and Lebanon since mid- 
November travelled to Tyre and Sidon to try to broker a ceasefire agreement.300 Concomitantly, 
Nabih Bern’ met with Iranian ambassador Mohammad Hassan Akhtari in Damascus. Libya's 
Colonel Qadhafi also dispatched his right-hand man, Major Jallud, to try to mediate, although Amal 
vehemently objected to any Libyan role, arguing that only Syria and Iran could sponsor a 
settlement.301 As tensions escalated, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati and Revolutionary Guards 
Minister Rafiqdoust also arrived in Damascus on November 28 to confer with Assad and other
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Syrian officials.302
By the end of November, some 500 people, many of them refugees, had been killed in the 
Amal-Palestianian clashes, with the combatants failing to accept a nine-point ceasefire proposal 
jointly drafted by Iranian, Syrian and Libyan officials.303 Following the intensive efforts of Iranian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikholislam, on December 5, Amal and the PNSF agreed to a ceasefire 
in order to pave the way for a comprehensive agreement.304 As a result, the scale of the fighting 
decreased considerably. However, PLO loyalists rejected the Iranian-sponsored plan and 
continued to engage in sporadic clashes with Amal militiamen.305 In the meantime, to Damascus' 
consternation, PLO Chairman Arafat from his headquarters in Baghdad called for an emergency 
meeting of Arab League foreign ministers in early December to obtain a pan-Arab commitment for 
protection of the camps, with the Jordanians and Iraqis immediately signalling their readiness to 
participate.306 Despite a brief pause, renewed hostilities broke out after a few days, again 
prompting Iranian negotiators to redouble their efforts to find a durable solution.307 As the fighting 
raged on, two committees headed by a number of prominent Lebanese clergymen (Sheikh Maher 
Hammoud, a Sunni cleric from Sidon, Sheikh Said Shaban of Tawheed and Sheikh Hussein 
Fadlallah) were formed under Iranian supervision to facilitate negotiating and implementing an 
agreement.308
Although the death total had risen to 700 by mid-December, the intensity of the fighting 
eased somewhat as Iranian intermediaries made headway in bringing the positions of the rival 
parties closer together.309 Syria and the PLO agreed in principle to underwrite an Iranian plan 
stipulating an immediate ceasefire, the lifting of Amal's siege of all refugee camps and a phased 
withdrawal of all Palestinian guerrillas from Maghdousheh, to be replaced gradually by Hezbollah 
and leftist militiamen.310 As implementation of the terms got underway, with the arrival of Hezbollah 
gunmen and the evacuation of PNSF fighters from Maghdousheh, Amal insisted that it ought to 
regain control of the town, leading to the outbreak of violence both in Beirut and the south, with
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PLO loyalists rapidly moving into Maghdousheh to pre-empt an Amal takeover. Despite this 
setback, the Iranians remained undeterred and continued their attempts to bring about a 
disengagement of the combatants and relieve the camp populations. By this stage, it had become 
evident that Iran's stock had risen considerably in Lebanon, as it was the only outside party that 
had channels of communication open to all the warring factions. It had not succeeded in ending 
the Amal-Palestinian conflagration, but it had greater room to maneuver and negotiate with the 
different parties than did Syria and Libya.
The protracted fighting had damaged Syria's image and driven it to desperate measures, 
pleading for Iranian and Libyan mediation. It had become quite evident by the end of 1986 that 
Syria could not impose its will in Lebanon, and it had to compromise and enlist the support of Iran 
and its Lebanese allies to restore some semblance of order and stability in the country.312 Assad 
and Bern had clearly miscalculated and overplayed their hand in this case. Although they had
200
been opposed to the main thrust of Iranian and Hezbollah policies in Lebanon since 1985, they 
clearly preferred to enlist the tatter's support and use their good offices to resolve the situation, 
rather than having the Arab League or pro-Iraqi states meddle and intervene in what was 
considered from the Syrian perspective an "internal affair."313
The "War of the Camps" during the winter of 1986-87 had the overall impact of 
accentuating the rise of pro-Iranian sympathies among Lebanese Shiites and Palestinians, with 
Tehran's power and influence momentarily eclipsing that of Damascus.314 Amal's failure swiftly to 
accomplish its objectives, Syria's inability effectively to manage the crisis - to its great detriment - 
and consistent Iranian pressure prompted Nabih Berri to order a ceasefire as a goodwill gesture 
just before New Year's Eve 1987 "because of the sisterly stand of Syria and the wish of the Iranian 
President." Iranian emissaries also announced that Amal had agreed to lift the siege of 
Rashidiyyah for humanitarian reasons 315 However, a series of events in the early weeks of 1987 
exacerbated the situation in Lebanon, putting Iran and its Lebanese protege once again on a 
collision course with Syria and its surrogates.
IRAN'S PREPARATIONS FOR KARBALA 5, THE BATTLE FOR BASRA AND ITS REGIONAL 
CONSEQUENCES
From Tehran's perspective, in ideological terms, the need to play an activist role in Lebanon to 
stop the Amal-Palestinian clashes and restore some semblance of Muslim unity by protecting the 
rights of Palestinian refugees and re-establishing Shi'ite-Sunni harmony also had a direct bearing 
on its continuous efforts to dispel anti-Iranian rhetoric depicting the Gulf War as an Arab-Persian 
conflict. By proving its capability as a major power broker in Arab politics, it could dispel pro-Iraqi 
racist propaganda and partially restore its tarnished image in the immediate aftermath of the Iran- 
Contra revelations. In parallel with its activities in Lebanon during the winter of 1986-87, Iran 
finalized careful preparations that had been underway for almost two years to launch its greatest 
offensive since Operation Fatah al-Mobin in March 1982, in a bid to capture the port of Basra, 
Iraq's second largest city.316
Damascus was clearly concerned about the possible ramifications of Iran's impending 
assault on a major Arab city and its impact on Syria's reputation and stature in the Arab world. The 
humbling of Saddam Hussien and the Iraqi Ba'th Party would undoubtedly have pleased the 
Syrians, but the mere fact that a non-Arab country closely aligned with them would potentially fulfill 
this role produced a great deal of ambivalence among Syrian leaders, who were keen to uphold
317their pan-Arab credentials. Another point of contention was the upcoming OIC summit 
scheduled to take place in Kuwait during the latter part of January 1987. While Iran had indicated 
its steadfast refusal to attend a gathering hosted by one of Iraq's main financial benefactors, Syria 
had adopted a divergent position by signalling its readiness to attend the summit meeting. Despite 
their differences, as a means of trying to ensure Syrian loyalty, the Iranian parliament on
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December 11 approved a bill to provide one million tons of oil to Syria free of charge during the 
last quarter of the Persian year ending on March 20.318
Iran's "Final Offensive" and its Outcome
Throughout December 1986 and early January 1987, Iran finalized preparations for its greatest 
offensive in five years, Karbala 5, intended to draw the Iraqis into a decisive engagement and lead 
to the seizure of Basra. The Iranians opted to conduct the attack in winter during inclement 
weather in order to minimize the impact of Iraq's air superiority and curtail its advantage in armor, 
due to wet and marshy terrain which made movement extremely difficult. There were also political 
considerations. With the OIC summit scheduled to take place in Kuwait in late January, Tehran 
calculated that, through intimidation and the conduct of a large-scale offensive close to the host 
country, the Kuwaitis could be forced to abort the meeting. As the Kuwaitis were the most vocal of 
the GCC states in supporting Iraq and played a vital role in the transshipment of war materiel to 
Iraq, Iran considered them to be de facto co-belligerents. Tehran's decision to boycott the summit 
was reinforced by the participation of Egyptian President Mubarak - the latter being an occurrence 
unprecedented since Cairo concluded the Camp David Accords in 1979.
In the days preceding the commencement of Karbala 5, Deputy Foreign Minister Besharati 
was dispatched to Damascus to confer with Assad and other Syrian officials on regional 
developments and the Kuwait summit.319 There is little doubt that the Syrian leaders must have 
been briefed about the imminent Iranian offensive, since they were concerned about the regional 
repercussions of the fall of a major Arab city to a non-Arab adversary and its impact on Syria's 
pan-Arab credentials.
Eventually, on January 9, 1987, the "Battle for Basra" began in earnest as Iran launched a 
full-scale offensive to break the five Iraqi defensive arcs east of the city. It committed a total of
200,000 troops to the operation. Facing them were four Iraqi divisions and five Republican Guard 
brigades.320 A four-pronged offensive was launched, with the Iranians starting some 30-40 miles 
away from their main objective. What followed in the next six to seven weeks marked some of the 
most brutal and bloody fighting in the history of the First Persian Gulf War. By February 22, when 
the Iranians earned out their last major frontal attack, they had managed to occupy 100 square 
kilometers, overrunning four of Iraq's defensive arcs and advancing to within six miles of Basra 
itself. However, these limited gains had been achieved at a frightful cost. It is conservatively 
estimated that at least 40,000 Iranians were killed or wounded, while Iraqi losses stood at around 
10-15,000.321 By this stage, the Iranian drive had been blunted. The Iranians were bled dry, 
having lost some of their finest infantry units and most seasoned veterans in the attack.322 
Consequently, Tehran issued a communique on February 26, announcing the end of Operation 
Karbala 5.323 The seven-week battle represented a significant strategic victory for Iraq. Iran had 
not only failed to take Basra, but also suffered critical losses, including many of its best troops.
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While the clerical regime tried to put on a brave face, claiming that Karbala 5 had been a 
success and more offensives would follow until final victory, in actuality, it had finally come to the 
painful realization that it was unable to defeat the Iraqis in a major engagement and humble its 
Bathi opponent. The "Battle for Basra" marked a major turning point, and the beginning of the end 
of the war.324 Subsequently, Iran launched no more large-scale offensives against Iraq, limiting its 
actions only to small operations with modest objectives. As a result, Iran began to lose the 
initiative in the conflict, and Iraq was afforded greater room for maneuver, gradually regrouping 
and turning the tide of the ground war the following year.
Besides the setback on the military front, much to Tehran's chagrin, the Islamic summit 
conference went ahead as scheduled in Kuwait City. Despite certain misgivings and initial 
hesitation, Hafez Assad decided to attend the OIC meeeting to prevent the risk of greater isolation 
in the Arab-lslamic world. His move vexed his Iranian allies, who criticized Syria's participation in 
the state-controlled media.325 At the same time, the Syrian leader reaffirmed his stand supporting 
Iran in the Gulf conflict. Prior to his departure for Kuwait, he gave an interview to the Kuwaiti daily, 
Al-Qabas, where he explained that Iran had no designs on Iraqi territory and sharply criticized 
Baghdad for sowing the seeds of regional discord by sabotaging the Syrian-lraqi unity talks at the 
beginning of the eighties and then proceeding to invade Iran. He blasted his Bathi rival by 
asserting: "Saddam Hussein wants us to alienate a nation of 45 million that rediscovered itself in 
Islam and wanted to confront Israel under its banner. That was a golden opportunity. The Iran of 
Khomeini is anti-Israel. Iran was the only country to send forces when Israel invaded Lebanon in 
1982."326
At this stage, Assad was treading a fine line. On one hand, he was determined to adhere 
to his previous policies in Lebanon and the Persian Gulf, but he deemed it necessary to make 
certain conciliatory gestures towards the Gulf states and in effect towards the moderate, pro-Iraqi 
camp to avoid becoming a complete outcast in Arab politics. With Yasser Arafat, King Hussein, 
Hosni Mubarak and King Hassan attending the conference, prudence dictated his participation to 
forestall the crystallization of a formidable Arab-lslamic bloc opposed to Syria and its regional 
policies. Concomitantly, by trying to take the middle ground to a certain degree, he calculated that 
Iran might demonstrate greater flexibility in its policies in the Levant and the Gulf in order to 
appease its most valuable Arab ally.327
At the outset of the Kuwait conference, Syria expressed some reservations about a draft 
resolution, supported by the majority of the member states, highlighting Iraq's willingness to accept 
a negotiated settlement and calling for the withdrawal of the combatants to their internationally- 
recognized borders. However, Assad eventually relented and approved the final resolution, which 
also called for an immediate ceasefire.326 During, the summit, Assad held talks with Mubarak. This 
was the first time he had met with an Egyptian head of state since the Camp David Accords. While 
the Syrians subsequently characterized the meeting between the two leaders as being devoid of
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"political significance," it must have come as a severe psychological blow to the Iranian clerics, 
preoccupied with the greatest battle they had ever waged inside Iraq and helplessly witnessing the 
political consultations in Kuwait City unfold in their absence.329
Overall, the Kuwait summit marked the beginning of Egypt's formal re-entry into the Arab- 
lslamic fold and concomitantly exposed the shortcomings of Syria's foreign policy, leaving the self- 
declared standard-bearer of Arab nationalism open to charges of betrayal. As a firm supporter of 
Iraq in the Gulf War, a backer of the PLO and a proponent of the Jordanian-Palestinian 
rapprochement, Mubarak was well on the road to restoring Egypt's pan-Arab credentials. 
Conversely, Assad was paying dearly for continuing his alliance with non-Arab Iran and throwing 
his weight behind Amal in the struggle against the Palestinians in Lebanon. The Syrian leader was 
the only one to condemn Egypt's peace treaty with Israel in his speech at the Kuwait summit. With 
large-scale fighting in the Basra theater and no end in sight to the 76-month-old war, the Gulf 
Arabs were more than ever convinced that drastic steps needed to be taken to reverse the current 
situation. Mubarak's presence reinforced their conviction that an Egyptian role was necessary to 
restore unity among Arab ranks, maintain security in the region and tip the balance of power in 
their favor.330
The sense of vulnerability among the GCC states was compounded by Iranian retaliatory 
raids against oil tankers in the Gulf during this period, particularly those owned or chartered by 
Kuwait. Between December and March, 15 of the 20 Arab tankers destroyed or sunk were Kuwaiti. 
These events facilitated Egypt's reintegration into the Arab fold and prompted Kuwaiti requests for 
Moscow and Washington to reflag its tankers in subsequent months.331 These developments put 
Iran's remaining Arab allies in an extremely awkward situation. Both Damascus and Tripoli tried to 
varying degrees to distance themselves from Tehran. Some Syrian officials stated on the record 
that they had discontinued arms shipments and facilitation of weapons procurement for Iran.332 
Besides the Iran-lraq conflagration, a series of events in early 1987 relating to Lebanon, Iranian oil 
deliveries to Syria and Damascus' renewed dialogue with Iraq put the Syrian-lranian alliance to the 
test. The first crisis was precipitated by a severe clash of interests in Lebanon.
THE END OF THE "WAR OF THE CAMPS", SYRIA’S RE-ENTRY INTO BEIRUT AND ITS 
IMPACT ON THE SYRIA-1 RAN ALLIANCE
During the early weeks of 1987, the "War of the Camps" continued in Beirut and southern Lebanon. 
As in the past, Amal resumed bombardment of the Palestinian refugee camps, destroying much of 
Shatila and Bourj al-Barajneh by the end of January. The situation in the camps had become so 
critical that, according to some reports, in Bouq al-Barajneh some refugees had turned to 
cannibalism.333 The dire conditions led the PLO guerillas in Maghdousheh finally to pull out, as a 
concession to Amal, and turn the village over to pro-Iranian Hezbollah and Sunni militiamen, in 
order to ensure that at the very least, Amal would not use the strategic heights to shell the Ein el-
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Helweh camp near Sidon.334
Throughout this period, Iranian mediators pursued efforts to negotiate a ceasefire and 
convince Amal to lift the siege. Despite a pledge by Nabih Bern to allow humanitarian supplies to 
reach the camps after the Palestinian evacuation of Maghdousheh, the stalemate continued. The 
situation was aggravated even further on February 13, when a convoy of UNRWA trucks (carrying 
16 tons of food for the inhabitants of Bouij al-Barajneh) and Iranian ambulances came under 
gunfire from Amal fighters as they tried to enter the camp in the presence of Iranian diplomats and 
Amal officials. This led to a violent exchange that resulted in the death of a Lebanese employee of 
the Iranian embassy and the injury of two others.335 In order to defuse a potentially explosive 
situation, Amal relented and permitted the delivery of food and medical supplies during the next 
two days under the supervision of Iranian and Syrian officials.336 Concurrently, in the south, Berri 
acceded to requests to lift the siege of Rashidiyyah for 48 hours to allow the delivery of food and 
medical supplies for the first time in 17 weeks. This brief respite enabled some 10,000 Palestinian 
refugees to stream out of the camp.337
In general, though, Amal had overplayed its hand. Its heavy-handed tactics against the 
Palestinians and efforts to wrest control of West Beirut away from the other militias were greatly 
resented, particularly by Jumblatt's Druze PSP.338 The growing rivalry finally prompted Jumblatt 
and other left-wing groups to take decisive action. On February 15, the combined militias of the 
PSP, LCP, SSNP and Murabitoun attacked positions held by Amal and the 6th Brigade, leading to 
five days of heavy fighting. Amal and its allies suffered major losses and were pushed out of most 
areas they had controlled in West Beirut. Syria frantically tried to salvage Amal's position by 
attempting on February 18 to broker a ceasefire agreement, which was ultimately ignored.339
As the violence continued, Sunni leaders such as Prime Minister Rashid Karami and Selim 
al-Hoss and the Shi'ite speaker of parliament, Hussein al-Husseini, appealed for Syrian 
intervention to restore peace. In the meantime, Berri and Jumblatt travelled to Damascus and, 
after painstaking negotiations, acquiesced to handing over security matters in West Beirut to 
Syrian forces.340 In addition, Berri announced at a press conference in Damascus that he would lift 
the siege of the Palestinian camps due to the positive attitude of the anti-Arafat PNSF towards 
Iranian and Syrian peace initiatives.341 Eventually, on February 22, the Syrian 85th Brigade, 
reinforced by armor and other units, entered West Beirut to impose order.342 The move brought a 
welcome sigh of relief from the population. The Syrians deployed some 7,000 troops, supported by 
2,500 Lebanese soldiers transferred from the Bekaa and northern Lebanon.343
It is noteworthy that the motives behind Syria's decision to re-enter Beirut with a sizeable 
force after a five-year absence were multifold. First and foremost, Assad could ill afford to stand 
idle and watch his main Lebanese proxy be routed. In effect, the Syrian intervention saved Amal 
from certain defeat.344 Furthermore, the Syrian leader knew that, if the moderate, secular Amal 
movement became a spent force, this would undoubtedly facilitate the resurgence of PLO power in
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Lebanon and also enable Hezbollah to fill the void left in the Shi'ite community and radicalize it. 
This in turn would also allow Iran to play an even greater role in Lebanon by expanding its power 
and influence.345 He had by this point come to the realization that employing traditional divide-and- 
rule tactics to achieve minimum control without cost to Syria had proven to be ineffectual. 
Attempting to exert indirect control through its proxies and the token force of 200 elite Syrian 
troops deployed in Beirut the previous July was no longer enough. Decisive steps had to be taken 
in order to prevent the situation from spiralling out of control and to restore some semblance of law 
and order.
Brigadier Ghazi Kan'an was charged with the task of implementing the nine-point Syrian 
plan, accepted by the Muslim Lebanese leaders, to enforce the ceasefire and disarm the militias.346 
Upon entry into the Lebanese capital, the Syrians took firm measures within a matter of days, 
controlling the streets, closing down 75 militia offices and disarming gunmen.347 Those who defied 
them were either arrested or shot on the spot. Amal's foes in particular were treated harshly. On 
February 24, the Syrians escorted about 1,500 Druze PSP and Communist fighters out of the 
city.348 However, on the same day, a grave incident occurred that could have plunged Syrian- 
Iranian relations into a major crisis and indeed put the alliance to one of its greatest tests in the 
Levant.
The Massacre of Hezbollah Members and Its Impact on Syrian-lranian Relations 
By early 1987, Syria was greatly perturbed by the growing power of Hezbollah and its increasingly 
bold conduct - at times seemingly without the knowledge or support of its Iranian patrons. In 
addition, the deepening factionalism within Iranian political circles (as clearly illustrated by the Iran- 
Contra affair and its subsequent exposure) indicated that Tehran was not pursuing a uniform, 
consistent policy in Lebanon, further complicating Syrian attempts to coordinate policy on Lebanon 
with its Iranian partner and come to grips with the difficult situation in the war-torn country.
Even prior to the Syrian decision to re-enter West Beirut, Damascus was alarmed by a 
series of incidents that jeopardized its position on the regional and international level. From 
Damascus' standpoint, Hezbollah's intransigence and independence manifested itself in several 
instances. Violent clashes between Amal and Hezbollah supporters in the Lebanese capital in 
September 1986, and a number of subsequent confrontations pitting Syrian forces against 
Hezbollah in the Bekaa and Beirut between October 1986 and February 1987, aroused serious 
concern.349
Concurrent to these events, as Syria was trying to reassert its control in Lebanon and 
rectify its image after the damage caused by the Hindawi affair, the kidnapping of three Americans 
in Beirut between September 9 and October 21 (after a fifteen-month pause) enraged the Syrians. 
Although it is evident that Hezbollah was responsible for these abductions, the degree of Iranian 
complicity is unclear, although they may have been undertaken with the support of some of the
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radical elements within the regime.350 However, the situation reached a critical point in early 1987 
when Hezbollah kidnapped eight more Westerners (four Americans, two Germans, one Frenchman 
and the special envoy of the Archbishop of Canterbury, Terry Waite). Syria was incensed by 
Hezbollah's reckless actions, and grew more determined to take drastic measures, even if it meant 
direct military intervention to restore order and curb the power and influence of Hezbollah. The 
final straw was the disappearance of Anglican Church envoy Terry Waite, on January 20, when he 
set out to negotiate with Hezbollah members (using the cover name "Islamic Jihad") to secure the 
release of two American hostages. The incident prompted Syrian, Iranian and Druze emissaries to 
shuttle back and forth between Damascus and Beirut, in a flurry of behind-the-scenes activity to 
determine the fate and whereabouts of the Briton.351
The combination of all these factors hardened Syrian resolve to check the ascendancy and 
activities of Hezbollah, or at the very least, certain aspects that proved to be to the detriment of 
Syrian interests in Lebanon and ran contrary to Damascus' efforts to cast off the stigma of the 
Hindawi affair and improve relations with the West. Another important indicator of Assad's 
determination to assert his authority and curb the power of religious extremists was the fact that he 
reassigned three officers from the Syrian Special Forces, Colonels Hisham al-Mouallaq, Ali Deeb 
and Abdul-Hamid Sultan (who had played a pivotal role in the crushing of the Hama insurrection in 
March 1982) and their units to the Lebanese capital. The presence of the three men, noted for 
their brutal efficiency and loyalty to the Syrian Ba'th, was a clear sign of Damascus' commitment 
and determination - both in political and military terms - to achieve control. Stem warnings were 
also issued to the Shi'ite community through local clerics that, if any of the Western hostages were 
killed by their captors, "the severest possible punishment" would be meted out.352
Consequently, within 48 hours of the Syrian entry into West Beirut, an incident occurred 
that initially threatened to pit the Syrians in an open confrontation with Hezbollah and plunge 
Syrian-lranian relations into a major crisis. On February 24, when Syrian troops entered the Basta 
district of West Beirut, a Hezbollah stronghold, they reacted in a heavy-handed manner when they 
encountered resistance during their deployment. After a gunman opened fire and wounded a 
soldier in the leg, Syrian troops stormed a three-story building that housed the local Hezbollah 
headquarters, known as the Fathallah barracks.353 Initial reports indicated that in the ensuing 
melee, some 20 Hezbollah militiamen were killed, but as the dust settled, a different picture of the 
incident emerged.354
It was subsequently revealed that the Hezbollah personnel had given themselves up and 
peacefully handed over the Fathallah barracks to the Syrians. However, a group of them were 
rounded up, with their hands tied, lined up against a wall and shot. In all, 23 Hezbollah militamen 
and five women were slain. Afterwards, those who still remained alive were knifed to death. This 
was confirmed by witnesses in the area and medical staff who examined the bodies later at a 
Beirut hospital.355 While the Syrians justified their action as legitimate self-defense in order to
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restore law and order, Hezbollah refuted these claims, describing it as "an act of liquidation."356 
The movement issued a communique accusing Damascus of "deliberately massacring" its 
members, with some militants vowing revenge.357 The next day, as a sign of solidarity and outrage 
among the Shi'ite community, the funeral procession in the southern suburbs of Beirut for the dead 
drew more than 10,000 mourners as some chanted "Death to Syria."358 Hezbollah fighters were 
also placed on high alert in case the Syrians tried to enter the southern neighborhoods and clamp 
down on them.359 Prominent Shi'ite clerics spoke in unison against the Syrian action, with Sheikh 
Fadlallah condemning what he called the "massacre" perpetrated by the Syrians, and Sheikh Subhi
360al-Tufayli accusing Damascus of conspiring with Israel and demanding an apology.
The Syrian army for its part expressed no regret about the incident, and signalled its 
determination to stay its course. In fact, following the killings, at midnight on February 24, Ghazi 
Kan'an issued a statement to the effect that every gunman was "an enemy of the city," and his 
forces would "not discriminate" between members of any organization carrying weapons.361 The 
next day, Damascus announced that those who resisted the efforts of its forces to halt the violence 
and chaos would pay dearly, urging Lebanese to turn their guns away from each other since the 
violence was only "serving the interests of Israel." Through their robust presence in West Beirut, 
the Syrians put an end to the looting and disorder. As a way of showing who the masters were in 
West Beirut, Syrian soldiers proceeded to take down portraits of Ayatollah Khomeini that had been 
placed in the streets and replace them with those of Hafez Assad.362
Iran's Reaction to the Basta Incident
The overall reaction of Tehran to the Basta affair was cautious and restrained. There is no doubt 
that the Syrian decision to enter West Beirut, and the killing of Hezbollah personnel two days later, 
caught the Iranian government off guard. As recently as February 20, Deputy Foreign Minister 
Sheikholislam had returned to Tehran after a three-month mission in Lebanon to facilitate efforts to 
end the siege of the camps.363 The day after Syrian forces entered West Beirut, Foreign Minister 
Velayati and Revolutionary Guards Minister Rafiqdoust hastily departed for Damascus to seek 
clarification about Syrian motives and subsequently received assurances that Hezbollah would not 
be suppressed.364 Their one-day visit, which included a meeting with Assad, was cloaked in 
secrecy, and they departed without any formal statements. During their deliberations, its seems 
Assad made it perfectly clear to his Iranian allies that they would have to defer to him in 
determining the course of events in Lebanon and understand that, in the Levant, Syrian interests 
were paramount.365 Upon arrival in Tehran, Velayati publicly cautioned the Syrians to be careful 
about their moves in Lebanon and, on a defiant note declared: "no other country in the world has 
as much influence in Lebanon as Iran."366 In reality, the Iranian leadership was acutely aware that, 
if Assad deemed it necessary, there was very little the Islamic Republic could do to prevent him 
from crushing its Lebanese followers. In any case, with Operation Karbala 5 still in full swing, Iran's
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revolutionaries knew now more than ever before that their main priority lay in the successful 
prosecution of the Gulf war. Lebanon was a sideshow and did not constitute their primary interest, 
especially at this critical stage.
Subsequent to the Basta affair, the official Iranian reaction was to express disapproval of 
the Syrian action, but refrain from holding the Syrian regime responsible for the incident.367 This 
was reflected repeatedly in the statements of government officials and in the state-controlled news 
media. Prime Minister Musavi went so far as to denounce the killings as an act that only benefitted 
the "cause of imperialism."368 Rafsanjani also advised both the Syrians and Hezbollah to avoid 
confrontation, since that would serve Israel's interests. He described the Basta massacre as 
"bitter," and emphasized that the "friendship" between Damascus and Hezbollah "should be 
preserved."369 The day after the clash, the Persian-language daily Kayhan claimed that the 
incident had been an unfortunate mistake caused by ill-disciplined Syrian soldiers. It added that 
Syria knew perfectly well that Hezbollah was a force to be reckoned with, and Iran would not accept 
its being weakened or sidelined.370 A few days later, another major daily, Ettela'at, exonerated the 
Syrian regime by explaining: "without doubt, this action was not consistent with the political and 
military command instructions of Damascus, and it smacks of a plot hatched by an errant group in 
the military..."371 Overall, Tehran refrained from pinning the blame on the Assad regime and 
conveniently attributed the killings to renegades within the Syrian army. It demanded that those 
responsible be identified and brought swiftly to justice to prevent a similar recurrence in the 
future.372
Some of the more hardline figures in Iran's political-religious hierarchy such as Ayatollah 
Montazeri and Interior Minister Mohtashami were more outspoken in their condemnation of the 
Basta killings, but again, fell short of holding Damascus responsible. Montazeri appealed for 
reconciliation and unity among all Lebanese, Palestinians, Syrians, Sunnis and Shi'ites.373 In 
general, most of the Iranian leadership viewed the Syrian military presence in West Beirut with 
great skepticism, with some fearing that the imposition of a Pax Syriana at the expense of Iranian 
influence had the implicit backing of Washington and Tel Aviv. Consequently, in the days that 
followed, Tehran took steps to ensure that there would be no further moves against Hezbollah and 
convince Syria that any hostile action targeting its Lebanese acolytes would be interpreted as an 
attack on Iran.
In parallel, after some initial outbursts lashing out at Syria, the Hezbollah leadership 
adopted stem measures (perhaps in consultation with the Iranian government) to ease tensions 
and contain the situation. It issued a fatwa (religious edict) ordering its followers to avoid 
confrontations with the Syrians.374 Furthermore, in the days that followed, many of its members 
withdrew from West Beirut to the southern suburbs, while those who remained or entered the city 
maintained a low profile. Concurrent to these steps, Fadlallah went out of his way to dismiss 
reports about an imminent showdown with the Syrian forces.375
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While exercising restraint to prevent further friction with its Arab ally, Iran tried to bolster its 
negotiating position vis-a-vis Syria and in tandem boost Hezbollah's morale and confidence in its 
Iranian patron by highlighting the strong bond between Tehran and its Lebanese protege. To 
emphasize that the two were inseparable and any move against Hezbollah would be interpreted as 
a direct assault on Iranian interests, the clerical regime dispatched a new ambassador, Ahmad 
Dastmalchian, to Lebanon in early March. Moreover, he was accompanied by a high-ranking 
delegation composed of two ayatollahs and two hojjatolislams representing Ayatollah Khomeini and 
his successor-designate.376 The Iranian delegation received a rapturous welcome as thousands of 
Hezbollah supporters and Shi'ites from southern Beirut came out to greet them. One of their first 
moves was to visit the cemetery where the Basta victims were buried and pay tribute to them. 
Dastmalchian called the killings a "hideous and inexcusable crime."377 Later, they visited the Basta 
district and met with the families of the fallen. One of the Iranian delegates, Ayatollah Jannati, 
tried to convey the message that Iran and Hezbollah were inextricably linked, by stressing that the 
Islamic Republic valued all its combatants equally, be it "on the battlefields of the Iraqi-imposed 
war, or in the war front against the Zionists."378 At the same time, while showering praise on 
Hezbollah for its valiant efforts against Israel, France and the United States, the Iranians tried to 
discourage their Lebanese followers from taking any retaliatory actions against Syria by urging 
patience and prudence. Jannati articulated this by declaring: "Revenge belongs to Allah. Your 
patience in this phase will merit Allah's best reward...victory is the ally of patience.''379
Concurrent with the Iranian initiative in Lebanon, the leadership in Tehran decided to send 
an envoy to Damascus to ascertain Syrian intentions in both the Levant and the Gulf and try to 
reach some sort of modus vivendi on both fronts with its Arab ally. In view of the Syrian 
deployment in West Beirut and the Basta incident, Tehran was concerned that Assad was now 
striking an independent path in Lebanon and also seemed to be reconsidering his position on the 
Iran-lraq conflict. Only two days after the Syrian-Hezbollah clash, he delivered a speech warning 
his Iranian allies that, if Basra was overrun, the Arab world would unite against them.380
Thus, in conjuction with Dastmalchian's arrival in Lebanon, on March 6, Interior Minister 
Mohtashami was sent to Syria on an unscheduled three-day visit.381 Mohtashami met with his 
Syrian counterpart, Mohammed Ghabbash, the following day to discuss their "bilateral relations 
and matters of mutual concern" and reaffirmed Iranian support for Syria's goals and aspirations.382 
On March 8, Mohtashami was finally granted an audience with Assad, delivering a message from 
AN Khamene'i and holding three hours of talks on developments in Lebanon.383 According to 
reports, the Syrian leader assured him that he had no intention of disarming Hezbollah and was 
aware of its crucial role in thwarting Western and Israeli designs in the past. In addition, he 
underscored that the killing of the Hezbollah members had not been a pre-meditated act. Assad 
apparently said that Hezbollah would be permitted to operate against the Israelis in the south, and 
Syrian troops would not move into Beirut's southern suburbs.384 On the other hand, he told
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Mohtashami that no activity running contrary to Syrian interests would be tolerated, and he 
expected both Tehran and Hezbollah to cooperate in this respect.385 In effect, if Iranian-Hezbollah 
interests diverged from those of Syria, the latter would take precedence in Damascus' Lebanese 
backyard. Hafez Assad made sure he drove home his point when, on the same day that 
Mohtashami returned to Tehran, in an address at Damascus University commemorating the 24th 
anniversary of the 1963 Ba'thi Revolution, he reiterated the primacy of Syrian interests in Lebanon, 
elucidating: "A solution will not come from overseas, or from anywhere outside the borders of 
Lebanon and Syria...those who are against imperialism and Zionism must go along with Syria, 
appreciate Syria's direction in Lebanon and respect and support that direction."386 He also 
expressed his desire for the Lebanese themselves to put aside their differences and reach national 
accord to restore peace in their country. Assad signalled his readiness "to extend all possible help" 
towards this end.387
In an interview upon his return to Iran, Mohtashami expressed satisfaction with the 
outcome of his talks since he had been able to ascertain Syria's position and reach an 
understanding on strengthening bilateral relations and Hezbollah's future role.388 Mohtashami 
stressed that forging closer links with Syria was "a must."389 On the whole, initial Iranian fears that 
Syria intended to break with its non-Arab ally had proved to be unfounded. From the Iranian 
perspective, maintaining Hezbollah as an armed resistance movement, directing its attention to the 
struggle against the Israeli occupation in the south and the continuation of the alliance against Iraq 
by far outweighed entertaining notions of establishing an Islamic republic in Lebanon and 
jeopardizing the strategic partnership with Syria.390 It therefore came as no surprise that, on March 
13, during the Friday sermon at Tehran University, Speaker of Parliament Rafsanjani declared that 
Damascus had no intention of standing in Hezbollah's way. He depicted Syria as the "strongest 
bastion of resistance against Israel," that had succeeded in the vital task of establishing relative 
peace in Lebanon through its military presence.391 The Syrian-lranian alliance had survived the 
crisis caused by the Basta affair. Assad had succeeded in dictating the rules of the game in 
Lebanon and the parameters of Iranian-Hezbollah activities.392 The partnership had survived an 
important test. However, it was to face further challenges in the months that followed.
OTHER AREAS OF CONTENTION, AND THE IMPACT OF THIRD PARTY EFFORTS TO MEND 
THE SYRIAN-IRAQI RIFT
Syria and Iran had managed to reach a modus vivendi on Lebanon - at least for the time being. 
Although Assad had persuaded his Iranian ally that Syrian interests took precedence in his 
bailiwick, by no means did this mean that he could dispense with its support or indeed Hezbollah's 
in Lebanon's fractious political landscape. As a major movement that was rallying a growing 
number of supporters among the Shi'ite community, Hezbollah was a force that Syria aimed to 
coopt and accommodate as far as possible. This was imperative in view of the fact that Damascus
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faced opposition to its policies in the Christian and Palestinian camps. Furthermore, Syria's 
dilemma was exacerbated since its own ally, Amal, was experiencing an internal crisis and 
beginning to disintegrate. Several of its key members who had become disenchanted with Bern's 
policies were either dismissed or had defected. Amal had been badly mauled in the latest round of 
fighting in Beirut, while in the south, many of its fighters were joining Hezbollah. Corruption within 
the ranks of Amal and its brutal tactics alienated many young Shi'ites, who turned to its pro-Iranian
393rival for inspiration.
in addition to the precarious situation in Lebanon, there were other formidable challenges 
facing Damascus that necessitated diversifying its relations and showing flexibility in its dealings 
with the moderate Arab camp. The acute economic crisis which had plagued Syria since 1985 was 
continuing to take a severe toll on the country, forcing Assad again to rethink strategy and become 
more amenable to Arab and Soviet entreaties to mend fences with Iraq and the PLO. (See next 
section on the impact of Gorbachev's new thinking on Syrian foreign policy in the Middle East.) A 
steadily declining GDP, shrinking foreign currency reserves and the inability to finance its current 
accounts deficit meant that, from late 1986 onwards, Syria was forced to reduce defense 
expenditures, disband military units and mothball heavy equipment.394 Assad's cherished goal of 
achieving "strategic parity” with Israel was looking ever more elusive. It also continued to have 
problems making timely payments for Iranian oil shipments. In fact, due to financial constraints, 
Syria took one million tons of free Iranian oil and only purchased at most one-fifth of the amount 
that it was entitled to buy at a 25% discount under the previous arrangement. By March 1987, a 
month before the expiry of the agreement, it had accumulated a total debt of approximately $1.7- 
2.3 billion.395 Kuwait, in the meantime, had stepped in and made up for the shortfall. Other reports 
at the time indicated that Syria was also receiving Libyan oil and purchasing additional supplies on 
the Black Sea spot market.396
During the early months of 1987, Syria tried to accommodate the moderate, pro-Iraqi bloc 
as a means of alleviating some of the economic hardship it was facing and lessening its political 
isolation in the Arab-lslamic world: hence, Assad's decision to attend the OIC summit in Kuwait and 
condemn Iranian moves to occupy Basra. King Hussein of Jordan attempted to exploit this new 
window of opportunity to bring Syria back into the Arab mainstream and heal the Syrian-lraqi rift. 
The Jordanian monarch had already met with Hafez Assad during the Kuwait meeting on January 
28.397 One week after the end of the OIC conference, King Hussein travelled to Damascus and 
held talks with Assad over a two-day period on regional issues and bilateral ties.398 This initiative 
coincided with renewed Soviet efforts to bridge the gap between Syria and Iraq. Moscow 
welcomed the Syrian-Jordanian reconciliation process and its support for an international peace 
conference on the Middle East as a means to restore order in the Arab world, diminish prospects 
for the implementation of any American proposal resembling the Reagan Plan and enhance Soviet 
influence and standing in the region.399 In addition, the Soviets were strong advocates of a Syrian-
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PLO rapprochement, in order to create a unified Arab position in the Middle East peace process.400
In parallel with Soviet efforts to resuscitate the Arab-lsraeli negotiations, Moscow also aimed to 
end the Gulf War, since it considered the conflict detrimental to bolstering prospects for a 
resolution to the Arab-lsraeli problem. Furthermore, it viewed the Iran-lraq hostilities as providing 
the US with a pretext to increase its presence and influence in the Gulf region.401 Overall, there 
was a significant convergence of interests between Jordanian and Soviet moves during this period 
to bring about a Syrian-lraqi reconciliation in order to restore unity in Arab ranks, isolate Iran and 
force the clerical regime to sue for peace. Interestingly, in mid-February, as the fighting raged on 
the outskirits of Basra, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz was dispatched by Saddam Hussein to 
Moscow and Amman to hold talks with Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Andrei Gromyko and King 
Hussein on the war and bilateral affairs.402 This was followed by a one-day visit to Baghdad by 
King Hussein on March 8 for consultations with the Iraqi leader.403
Assad, for his part, had no intention of abandoning his strategic partnership with Iran, since 
he was still receiving shipments of Iranian oil and needed Tehran's good offices to control 
Hezbollah and steer events in Lebanon. In addition, his nemesis, Saddam Hussein, continued to 
be tied down in a desperate struggle for survival against the Iranians. However, he calculated that 
he needed to take certain tactical measures to mitigate his regional isolation and security dilemma 
and in tandem extract financial and material benefits from both sides in order to contain the 
economic crisis at home. Such an opportunity arose in April 1987 due to the confluence of several 
events. With the previous oil agreement scheduled to expire in April, Iran delivered its last major 
load of crude oil (some 260,000 tons) to Syria in early March and stated that renewal of the 
agreement would be contingent on Syria's ability to settle its outstanding debt.404 Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia intensified their efforts to persuade Syria to abandon Iran through proposals for the 
resumption of Iraqi oil shipments as part of a Syrian-lraqi reconciliation, and for Saudi oil and 
financial support to compensate it for the termination of Iranian oil deliveries and repayment of its 
foreign debts. Consequently, on April 3, King Hussein arrived in Damascus on an unscheduled 
visit and held a seven-hour meeting with Hafez Assad on regional developments, including inter- 
Arab politics and the Arab-lsraeli conflict.405 At the same time, the Syrian leader was scheduled to 
travel on a state visit to Moscow in late April - his first since June 1985 - to meet Mikhail 
Gorbachev and boost bilateral cooperation. With Syrian-lranian relations now on seemingly shaky 
ground, and Syria facing a myriad of political and economic problems at home and abroad, 
Moscow, Amman and Riyadh believed that they could induce Damascus to finally abandon its 
alliance with Iran in favor of Iraq, thereby restoring Arab unity and dealing a major blow to Iran - 
both in symbolic and practical terms - leaving revolutionary Iran isolated in the region and 
ideologically bankrupt, without any supporters in the Arab East.
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Gorbachev's New Thinking, Syrian-Soviet Relations and Their Impact on the Syrian-lranian 
Alliance
The Syrians had been quite concerned about the new directions in Soviet foreign policy since 
Mikhail Gorbachev took power in March 1985. Like his predecessor, Chernenko, not only did he 
seem less sympathetic to Syrian concerns, but he also adopted a new orientation in the Kremlin's 
Middle East policy to make new inroads in the region and lessen Moscow's dependency on 
traditional allies such as Syria. Furthermore, from Damascus' perspective, an extremely 
worrisome aspect of Gorbachev's new approach lay in his overtures towards Israel.406
Predictably, the first meeting between Gorbachev and Assad, during the latteris visit to 
Moscow in June 1985, did not go well. On almost every issue, the two men did not see eye to eye. 
The Soviet premier expressed reservations about supporting the Syrian doctrine of "strategic 
parity" with Israel, emphasizing the need for diplomatic solutions. Furthermore, he disapproved of 
Assad's hostile stance towards Yasser Arafat and Saddam Hussein, underscoring the need for Arab 
unity and a coordinated approach on the Gulf War and the Arab-lsraeli problem. Although Hafez 
Assad received a rude awakening and came away empty-handed from these talks, he maintained 
his previous course. Morevoer, this did not lead to a rupture in Soviet-Syrian relations.407
By the spring of 1987, in view of the plethora of domestic and external problems he was 
facing, Assad knew that he would have to demonstrate flexibility and comply with some Soviet 
demands when he embarked on his second state visit to the Soviet Union to meet with Gorbachev. 
From Assad's standpoint, his negotiations in Moscow (April 23-25) went quite well - in fact better 
than could have been expected when one considers the dire straits Syria was in at this juncture.408 
He was able to secure desperately needed assistance in return for a few concessions. A number of 
economic and industrial agreements were concluded, entailing Soviet assistance in the 
development of Syria's oil and phosphate industries and construction of a hydro-electric dam on 
the Euphrates River. Gorbachev agreed to reschedule Syria's $15 billion debt and to deliver 
weaponry that had been promised, including MiG-29's.409 Assad acceded to Gorbachev's request 
that he hold a secret meeting with Saddam Hussein in Jordan to iron out their differences, upon his 
return to the Middle East, and publicly reaffirmed his support for an international conference, with 
Soviet participation, to resolve the Arab-lsraeli dispute in a comprehensive manner.410
At the same time, it should be pointed out that, in spite of his political and economic woes, 
Assad took an unusually hard line on certain issues.411 The Syrian leader brushed off Soviet 
criticism of his quest to attain "strategic parity" with Israel and Gorbachev's insistence on pursuing 
only a diplomatic option. Assad, who was a firm believer in negotiating from a position of strength, 
pointed out that the increasing levels of US aid to Israel enabled Tel Aviv to be more intransigent 
and less amenable to compromise in peace talks, particularly when the Soviet Union was showing 
reluctance to aid its Arab allies.412
Overall, the cooling of Soviet-Syrian relations produced a gradual reformulation of Syrian
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foreign policy, including its means and objectives. The diminished likelihood of matching Israel in 
terms of conventional weapons meant that Syria would have to rely less on its Superpower patron 
for assistance and instead enlist the support of regional states such as Iran and local actors such 
as radical Lebanese and Palestinian groups to attain its objectives. Herein lay another important 
reason to avoid alienating the emergent Hezbollah movement in Lebanon. As long as the radical 
Shi'ites did not prove to be an obstacle to Syrian policy, the Western hostage issue and the 
guerrilla warfare in the south, targeting the Israelis and SLA, could further Syrian objectives. This, 
in turn, necessitated maintaining cordial relations with Iran to keep Hezbollah in line and also 
explore further avenues of cooperation with Iran in the Gulf region.
The Syrian-lraqi Dialogue and Iran's Riposte
Immediately following his departure from Moscow on April 25, Assad travelled the next day to 
Jordan to hold secret talks with Saddam Hussein.413 In view of the acute economic crisis at home 
and the volatile situation in the region, coupled with intense lobbying and pressure from Moscow, 
Amman and Riyadh, the Syrian leader decided that he had nothing to lose by meeting with his Iraqi 
Bathi rival.414 Quite to the contrary, the occasion provided Syria with a convenient opportunity 
possibly to extract concessions from the pro-Iraqi camp and in tandem gain greater leverage over 
Iran through some delicate diplomatic maneuvering and posturing.
The Syrian and Iraqi presidents conducted their negotiations over a two-day period (April 
26-27) in the town of Jafra (situated near an air base) in the northeastern corner of the Jordanian 
panhandle close to the junction with the Syrian-lraqi border.415 The opening round was also 
attended by King Hussein and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah.416 The deliberations on the second 
day only involved the two Ba'thi leaders and their personal aides, and lasted five hours. One of the 
major sticking points was Saddam Hussein's insistence that a genuine reconciliation between the 
two would require at minimum Syrian neutrality in the Gulf War.417 Although no major 
breakthrough occurred, the two sides agreed to take gradual steps to scale down hostilities and 
explore possible avenues of cooperation in a number of areas as a means of building confidence 
and thawing relations. It was decided that they would both curtail the activities of exiled opposition 
groups based in their countries and the propaganda wars directed against one another.418 They 
also agreed to desist from further activities to destabilize each other and free political prisoners 
loyal to the other side. In addition, both parties agreed to convene a meeting of their oil ministers 
to discuss the possibility of reopening the IPC oil pipeline closed in 1982 and form joint committees 
to discuss various issues, including utilization of the Euphrates' waters and harmonization of their 
positions vis-a-vis Turkey in this regard.419
In general, the Syrian-lraqi summit (the first of its kind between the two leaders since the 
collapse of the 1979 unity talks) represented a considerable achievement for King Hussein and 
underlined the efficacy of Saudi and Soviet lobbying.420 The outcome of the bilateral talks at the
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time seemed to have laid the foundations of a genuine rapprochement and heralded a new phase 
in Damascus-Baghdad ties. Confident that they had finally succeeded in weaning Syria away from 
Iran, the Saudis leaked details about the outcome of the meeting to the Arab press that were 
subsequently picked up and publicized in the Western news media.421 Besides Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia serving as intermediaries, it was evident that the Soviets had played an instrumental role in 
persuading Assad to meet with his rival.
In actuality, Assad's gambit paid off. The meeting and the subsequent revelations about it 
created expectations for a Syrian-lraqi rapprochement, with the moderate Arab camp providing 
inducements to Damascus to facilitate the process, and a flurry of activity on Iran's part to ensure it 
would not be abandoned by its most important Arab ally. For the next few months, the Syrians 
proved to be quite adept at exploiting the new conditions that had emerged as a result of the Jafra 
summit.422
While Iran must have been aware that Syria was under immense pressure from the Soviet 
Union and key Arab states to terminate their alliance and to realign itself with the moderate, pro- 
Iraqi bioc, it was still surprised by the Syrian-lraqi talks. Indeed, only days before Assad departed 
for Moscow, Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikholisiam had been in Damascus to confer with Faruq al- 
Shara on regional developments and the Gulf War, with al-Shara reaffirming Syrian support for 
Iran.423 During Assad's visit to Moscow, Syrian Oil Minister Ghazi al-Durubi arrived in Tehran to 
negotiate a new oil agreement with Iran. Due to Syria's economic plight and political 
considerations, Iran seems to have backpeddled on its previous position and agreed to supply oil, 
despite Damascus' outstanding debt. As it turned out, a new 12-month agreement was concluded 
between al-Durubi and his Iranian counterpart, Gholamreza Aghazadeh, on April 25, whereby Iran 
would continue to deliver one million tons of crude free of charge and sell some 1.5-2.5 million tons 
at a 25% discount.424
Within a week after details of the Jafra summit were leaked to the press, Faruq al-Shara 
was dispatched to Tehran to brief the Iranian leadership on the outcome of the Syrian-lraqi talks 
and reassure them that Damascus was not contemplating a major policy shift on the Iran-lraq 
issue. Al-Shara arrived on May 12 for a one-day visit. He first met with President Khamene'i, 
delivering a message from Assad.425 He asserted that "despite all efforts undertaken in 
Baghdad...Syria will stand by the Islamic revolution of Iran...” Khamene'i, for his part, emphasized 
the need for continued expansion of bilateral relations.426 Al-Shara then proceeded to meetings 
with Prime Minister Musavi and Speaker of Parliament Rafsanjani before departing for Syria later 
that day. One of the topics of discussion during his deliberations with Rafsanjani was the Syrian- 
Soviet summit. Rafsanjani expressed frustration with Moscow's Middle East policy, stressing that 
the most important impediment to improved Soviet-lranian relations was the Kremlin's continued 
support for Iraq 427 At Tehran's Mehrabad airport where he was seen off by Foreign Minister^ 
Velayati, when asked by a reporter about the Syrian-lraqi negotiations, al-Shara gave an elusive
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response, stating: "If you mean how Iran-Syria relations are, I should say that these relations are 
firm and steadfast. In relation with international issues, our stand is quite obvious."428
By now, Tehran and Damascus both realized that on the local, regional, and international 
level, developments were not moving in their favor. For Syria, mounting domestic problems, the 
fluid situation in Lebanon and the gradual cooling of relations with the Soviet Union meant that it 
would have to engage in a careful balancing act on the regional stage to safeguard its interests. 
There was no question about severing links with Iran. However, Syria's growing marginalization in 
inter-Arab politics, and the gradual return of Egypt to the Arab fold, necessitated greater flexibility 
in its regional diplomacy.
As far as Iran's clerical regime was concerned, the preservation of the alliance with Syria 
became imperative in the months that followed. Tehran found itself increasingly isolated in the 
Arab-lslamic world as the year progressed.429 However, the revelations about the Iran-Contra 
affair, the failure of Karbala 5 and the reflagging operations by the two Superpowers contributed to 
the radicalization of Iranian politics and enabled extremists to gain the upper hand. Coupled with 
the hardening of American and Western European attitudes towards Iran in the first half of 1987, 
the more pragmatic elements within the Iranian leadership had to retreat from their previous 
policies and assume a hardline posture in order to safeguard their own position and prove their 
revolutionary credentials.430 Iran’s growing isolation was also underscored by incidents that led to 
the marked deterioration of relations with two key Western European countries, Britain and 
France.431
These developments led to a downward spiral in Iran's fortunes. In fact, Tehran gradually 
resorted to acts of recklessness and desperation in the Gulf region and beyond over the next year, 
eliciting decisive responses from regional and extra-regional actors, especially the two 
Superpowers, that paradoxically guaranteed the survival of Saddam Hussein. By mid-1987, Iran 
had begun to embark on a self-destructive path that would condemn it to regional and international 
isolation and provide the United States with a convenient pretext to become in effect a de facto co­
belligerent in the Gulf conflict on the side of Iraq. Tehran's ill-conceived strategies, misjudged 
conduct and maladroit diplomacy sealed its fate. They ensured that it would fail to attain its 
objectives in war and also become the target of Arab and Western opprobrium.
In sharp contrast to its Syrian partner, where prudence, careful calculation and realistic 
objectives were a hallmark of Damascus' foreign policy, revolutionary Iran once again tried to 
thrive on an evolving crisis to gain short-term benefits without regard to long-term interests and 
formulation of attainable goals. As in the past, style and form were deemed more important than 
substance and solid accomplishments. Beginning in the spring of 1987, within a matter of a few 
months, Iran had alienated key Western and Arab states as a result of its brinkmanship and 
reckless conduct. Whether intentional or not, Tehran committed a crucial mistake by trying to take 
on the US (and the Soviet Union initially) in its backyard - albeit indirectly - by planting mines in the
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shipping lanes of the Guif during the summer. Its determination to take action and challenge the 
foreign navies in the Persian Gulf was reinforced by the stalemate in the ground war.432
SUPERPOWER DIPLOMACY AND IRANIAN-SYRIAN REACTIONS TO THE FOREIGN NAVAL 
PRESENCE IN THE GULF
Throughout the spring of 1987, both the US and Soviet Union engaged in a flurry of diplomatic 
activity in the Gulf to pave the way for implementation of the reflagging agreements. As part of 
this initiative, it was announced that Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovsky would tour 
the region to hold talks in Iraq, Kuwait, Oman and the United Arab Emirates.433 Petrovsky's visit to 
the region in late April, where he also met with Saddam Hussein and Tareq Aziz in Baghdad, 
coincided with the Gorbachev-Assad summit.434 The fact that the two Ba'thi rivals met with Soviet 
officials just prior to the clandestine meeting in Jafra was not a mere coincidence. Gorbachev was 
determined to use all possible means to bring about a Syrian-lraqi rapprochement in order to 
restore unity in Arab ranks and force Iran to accept a negotiated settlement.435
Syria avoided criticism of Soviet moves in the Gulf, but joined in the chorus of Iranian 
condemnation of US policy. Both the Syrian and Iranian state-controlled media denounced the 
visit of US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy to the Gulf region just a week after 
Petrovsky's trip. In a scathing editorial published in the Syrian daily Al-Thawrah on May 8, entitled 
"A Tour of Deception and Dupery," Murphy's tour of Iraq and the six GCC states was described as 
a ploy on the part of Washington to exploit the tense situation that had arisen as a result of Iraq's 
aggressive policies to increase US military forces in the Gulf and act provocatively against the 
littoral states.436 Furthermore, an editorial in the Iranian daily Jomhuri Eslami on May 11 called 
Murphy's mission a sign of "desperate" US actions in the aftermath of the Iran-Contra revelations. 
Another article in the same newspaper the following day scoffed at Murphy's assertions that a 
Kuwaiti ship flying the American flag would not be considered Kuwaiti. It underscored: "No matter 
what flag it shows, a Kuwaiti ship will be considered a Kuwaiti ship and cannot serve the Baghdad 
regime and the war criminals ruling over Iraq. It cannot be allowed to be actively involved in 
strengthening the enemy's military might."437
Despite the polemical nature of Syrian and Iranian statements concerning the purpose of 
Murphy's tour, they were not far from the truth. The US Assistant Secretary of State visited 
Baghdad on May 10-11, where he first met with Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz to discuss US-lraqi 
relations, the regional situation and the Gulf War. The next day, he held talks with Saddam 
Hussein and submitted a written note from Ronald Reagan to the Iraqi leader. His visit came at a 
critical time, in view of the US decision to reflag the Kuwaiti tankers and the fact that he was the 
most senior US official to visit Iraq since the Iran-Contra scandal. In order to restore Iraqi 
confidence in the US and prove the administration's commitment to end the war on terms favorable 
to Iraq, he informed the Iraqi leadership that the US would soon introduce a resolution in the UN
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Security Council favoring Iraq. The resolution would spell out terms disadvantageous to Iran, 
urging the two parties in the Gulf conflict to cease hostilities and withdraw to their internationally- 
recognized borders - meaning Iran would have to give up all the territorial gains it had made in Iraq 
since 1982. To give the resolution teeth, any party that refused to abide by it would be subject to 
an international weapons embargo. Naturally, Baghdad was expected to accept the resolution, 
while Iran would reject it. Overall, the reflagging effort and the UN resolution were part of an 
overall package of American plans and assistance to prove that Iran-Contra had been an 
aberration in US policy and that Washington was now going to use all possible tools at its disposal 
to cow Iran.438 At a press conference before departing from Baghdad, Murphy posited that 
"understanding had prevailed in his talks without exception."439 The growing momentum of US 
activity in the Gulf to prop up Iraq and rally the Gulf Arabs was such that even the inadvertent Iraqi 
attack on the USS Stark - just six days after Murphy's meeting with Saddam Hussein - had minimal 
impact, if any, on Washington's relations with Baghdad.
As the Reagan administration increasingly assumed a war footing against Tehran, Moscow 
took substantive steps to defuse tensions with its southern neighbor and curry favor to the extent 
possible. Two factors facilitated this endeavor. Firstly, both Soviet and Iranian policymakers 
wanted to prevent an American military buildup in the Gulf, fearing that it might be a prelude to a 
permanent deployment in the area. Secondly, Gorbachev was concerned that the Reagan 
administration's new initiative in the Gulf was aimed at patching up US-Arab relations in the 
aftermath of the Iran-Contra scandal and in tandem impeding Soviet efforts to cultivate ties with 
the Gulf states. Numerous statements made by US officials at the time clearly indicated that the 
purpose of a high-profile presence of US forces in the Persian Gulf was to thwart Iranian and 
Soviet power and influence. Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy candidly pointed out that 
the purpose of the US presence was to prevent the encroachment of Iran and the Soviet Union in a 
region vital to the West, while Ronald Reagan pledged publicly on May 30 that "the use of the vital 
sea lanes of the Persian Gulf will not be dictated by the Iranians. These lanes will not be allowed 
to come under the control of the Soviet Union.''440
The Soviet-lranian rapprochement gained further momentum with the passage of UN 
Security Council Resolution 598 on July 20, 1987. Although the unanimously approved resolution 
called for an immediate ceasefire and the release of POWs, several important articles that had 
been inserted reflected the success of Soviet diplomacy in avoiding the passage of a resolution 
with a distinctly anti-Iranian slant, as the US-Arab bloc had desired. Resolution 598 requested the 
Secretary-General to mediate between the two belligerents and called upon other countries to 
avoid actions that could exacerbate the situation. (According to the exact wording in the text, to 
"refrain from any act which may lead to further escalation and widening of the conflict.") As a 
result, Moscow subsequently accused Washington of aggravating conditions in the Gulf by sending 
in a large armada. Moreover, to show Iran their willingness to assume a more even-handed
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position in the war, the Soviets managed in the Security Council debate to push through another 
article calling for the creation of an impartial body under the auspices of the UN Secretary-General 
to determine responsibility for the outbreak of the conflict.441
Since the resolution partially accommodated some Iranian demands, Tehran's response 
was not an outright rejection, but it made its acceptance contingent upon certain changes, most 
important of all, that the formal ceasefire and identification of the aggressor occur concurrently. In 
contrast to the Iraqi position that the resolution must be accepted as an "integral and indivisible 
whole," Iran's reservations concerned the sequence of its implementation.442 The US-Arab bloc 
interpreted the Iranian riposte as stonewalling and urged the Security Council to impose a 
worldwide arms embargo on Iran. Iraq and other states, including the US, introduced a draft 
resolution to this effect, but the Soviets stifled their efforts by arguing the Secretary-General should 
be given time to resolve the outstanding issues with Iran.443 While there is no doubt that the 
Kremlin was trying to take full advantage of emerging US-lranian tensions in the Gulf to thaw 
relations with the clerical regime, it was attempting to adopt a more balanced position on the Gulf 
W ar in view of the fact that, unlike Washington, it had channels of communication open to both 
belligerents. Just as Syria maintained links with Iran and pro-Iraqi Arab states to enhance its 
regional power and status, and also to obtain benefits from the two sides, similarly, the Soviet 
Union found it advantageous to engage both camps diplomatically in order to bolster its influence 
and status in the Middle East.
Subsequent to the subtle shift in Soviet policy in the summer of 1987 with regard to the 
Iran-lraq conflagration, Moscow's stance remained quite consistent for the next year until the war 
ended in August 1988. It attempted to improve relations with Iran in a bid to persuade its 
leadership to accept a negotiated settlement and deny Washington further grounds to boost its 
military presence and political influence in the Persian Gulf. However, Soviet efforts came to 
naught. Tehran's insistence on fighting until victory, or a negotiated settlement on its terms, 
diminished the prospects for a Soviet-lranian rapprochement as Gorbachev continued the flow of 
arms to Saddam Hussein to forestall an Iraqi collapse. Ultimately, the US effort to punish Iran, by. 
drafting a resolution unacceptable to it, weakened the position of pragmatist elements in Tehran 
(who desired a negotiated settlement that would identify the aggressor in the conflict) and 
strengthened the hand of the radicals, who were bent on pursuing the military option. Ironically, 
Washington's determination to give Iran no quarter and close off all possible avenues towards a 
political settlement bolstered the position of hardliners in Tehran and prolonged the conflict.444 The 
continuation of the hostilities for another year gave the US the opportunity to make itself 
indispensable to the security of the Gulf Arabs and expand its foothold in the region, just as 
Moscow had feared.
In the final analysis, revolutionary Iran's futile efforts to vanquish Iraq impeded the 
normalization of relations with the Kremlin and in tandem enabled the US to intervene effectively in
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the Gulf arena to deny it any hope of victory. Tehran subsequently furnished the Reagan 
administration with a convenient pretext to seek direct military confrontation by laying mines in the 
Gulf, naively thinking that the US would not respond to its actions decisively. The Iranians not only 
committed grave miscalculations in their strategy to prosecute the war, but also made a number of 
other serious mistakes that brought greater opprobrium, severely straining their relations with the 
Arab world. By July 1987, Iran's long slide towards isolation and eventual defeat was becoming 
distinctly recognizable - epitomized by the Bridgetown and Mecca incidents.
ARAB DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS TO DECOUPLE SYRIA AND IRAN
In parallel with Iran's increasing isolation and its determination to meet the emergent challenge in 
the Persian Gulf, throughout the remainder of the spring and summer of 1987, moderate Arab 
states and the West tried to engage Syria diplomatically to convince it to distance itself from its 
Iranian ally. On May 12, the same day that al-Shara visited Tehran to brief the Iranian leadership 
about the Syrian-lraqi summit and reaffirm Syria's commitment to their longstanding alliance, King 
Hussein began a new diplomatic initiative to reinvigorate the Syrian-lraqi reconciliation process and 
restore Arab unity, in a bid to bolster prospects for an international peace conference. He first 
travelled to Egypt for consultations with Hosni Mubarak; the next day he proceeded to Baghdad 
and later to Damascus to meet with the leaders of both states in order to mend the rift between the 
two Ba'thi rivals.445
In spite of the assurances they had received from al-Shara, the Iranians remained 
somewhat suspicious of Syrian motives; they were apprehensive due to their own growing isolation 
and persistent efforts by Arab and Western governments to wean Damascus away from them. A 
subsequent meeting between al-Shara and his Iraqi counterpart Tareq Aziz fuelled their concerns 
about the imminent demise of their partnership with Syria.446 In the backdrop of the Superpower 
intervention in the Gulf and the marked deterioration of its relations with Britain, France and much 
of the Arab world, the Islamic Republic embarked on an intensive campaign to salvage its 
remaining links with key Arab and Western states between May and July.447 Tehran adopted a 
three-track approach to stave off isolation and mend fences with other states. It dispatched envoys 
to Syria, the Gulf and Western Europe to contain the damage that had already been done and 
head off any further moves aimed at isolating it. In late May, Iranian ambassador to Syria 
Mohammad Hassan Akhtari met with Faruq al-Shara, handing him a message from Ali Khamene'i 
for Hafez Assad, reiterating Iranian support for Syria's struggle in the Levant.448 This was followed 
up less than a week later by the visit of an Iranian delegation headed by Deputy Foreign Minister 
Sheikholislam, which met with President Assad and Prime Minister al-Kasm. Both sides concurred 
that the US deployment in the Gulf constituted a threat to regional stability, and Sheikholislam 
condemned the assassination of Lebanon's pro-Syrian Prime Minister, Rashid Karami, which had 
occurred just prior to his arrival on June 1.449 Later at a press conference, Sheikholislam
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expressed regret that certain Gulf states were pursuing policies indicating that their own security 
and the advancement of US and Iraqi interests in the region were inextricably linked. He 
emphasized that "there will be security in the Persian Gulf for all littoral states, or for none."450 
Sheikholislam's deliberations in Damascus coincided with the visit of another Iranian delegation to 
West Germany and Italy, led by Deputy Foreign Minister for International and Economic Affairs 
Mohammad Javad Larijani, and that of a third team touring the Gulf sheikhdoms to reassure them 
of Iranian intentions as the escalating spiral of tensions continued in the area.451
Throughout the summer of 1987, there were frequent contacts between high-level Syrian 
and Iranian officials that produced a number of agreements and the expansion of bilateral 
relations. Iran was undoubtedly concerned about the ongoing Syrian-lraqi dialogue, that led to 
meetings between Khaddam and Tareq Aziz in May, and al-Shara and his Iraqi counterpart in 
June.452 Reports in the Arab press at the time hinted that these talks were preparing the way for 
another summit meeting between Assad and Saddam Hussein.453 A high-level Iranian delegation 
headed by Mohsen Rafiqdoust visited Damascus during the latter part of June. The ostensible 
purpose of Rafiqdoust's trip was to seek clarification about the recent Syrian-lraqi talks and 
strengthen bilateral ties with Damascus. At a press conference in Damascus following his initial 
consultations, he claimed that reports of a Syrian-lraqi reconciliation were "baseless speculation 
and lies."454 He emphasized that the strategic alliance between Tehran and Damascus remained 
intact, and Syria was not about to abandon it for one with "a weak and dying regime."455 The 
negotiations also involved their respective ministers for finance and economics and led to the • 
conclusion of a bilateral agreement to further develop cooperation in commercial, industrial, 
banking and technological affairs.456
The diplomatic tug-of-war to win over Syria continued unabated as King Hussein 
commenced a new round of shuttle diplomacy to facilitate a Syrian-lraqi rapprochement. Following 
on the heels of Rafiqdoust's departure, the Jordanian monarch arrived on June 24 (for the seventh 
time since 1985) in Damascus, where he was greeted at the airport by Assad.457 His visit also 
coincided with a mission undertaken by Kuwait's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Saud 
Mohammed al-Usaymi, to Syria and Jordan to seek support for Kuwait's position in the Gulf War. 
Al-Usaymi held consultations with both Assad and King Hussein. The Jordanian monarch 
subsequently affirmed that Jordan and Kuwait would coordinate their policies to restore unity in 
Arab ranks.458 Alarmed by King Hussein's renewed attempts to bridge the gap between Damascus 
and Baghdad and in conjunction, Kuwait's initiative to win Syrian support for its stance in the Gulf 
conflict, Tehran announced that it was preparing to send Prime Minister Musavi at the head of a 
40-member delegation to Damascus to expand and consolidate bilateral relations.459 King Hussein 
followed up his deliberations with Assad by flying to Baghdad on June 30 for talks with Saddam 
Hussein, which the Jordanian media characterized as part of "persistent efforts to achieve Arab 
solidarity" and in preparation for a Syrian-lraqi summit meeting.460
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Throughout this period, rumors of an imminent meeting between Assad and Saddam 
Hussein persisted. Reports to this effect appeared on numerous occasions in the Arab and 
Western press.461 The postponement of Musavi's visit to Syria only fuelled such speculation.462 To 
dissipate Iranian concerns and dispel rumors about a Syrian-lraqi reconciliation, Faruq al-Shara 
arrived in Tehran unexpectedly on July 12 to brief the Iranian leadership on Syrian moves and 
coordinate their policies. Meeting first with his Iranian counterpart, he pledged Syria's continued 
support for Iran in prosecuting the Gulf War.463 At the same time, hoping to enlist Iranian support, 
al-Shara expressed disappointment with the turn of events in Lebanon (including the kidnapping of 
American journalist Charles Glass by Hezbollah) and emphasized that the need to secure the 
release of Western hostages was of paramount importance to Syria.464 Furthermore, during his 
two-and-a-half hour meeting with Velayati, al-Shara condemned the American and foreign naval 
presence in the Persian Gulf, underlining that "this would only electrify the atmosphere and spread 
the war."465 The next day, he held consultations with President Khamene'i for over two hours, 
clarifying Syria's stance on various regional issues. Besides downplaying the prospects of 
reconciliation with Iraq as a direct result of Jordanian mediation, al-Shara also allayed Iranian fears 
about the Kuwaiti initiative, cautioning: "It will be better for Kuwait to remain neutral in the war, 
otherwise it might be crushed by the tension created by itself."466 Subsequent to their 
deliberations, Khamene'i confidently declared: "Fortunately, our Syrian brothers have always 
proved that they are strongly committed to the expansion and deepening of relations with the 
Islamic Republic of Iran. This is something resented by colonialism and world imperialism."467
Besides al-Shara's visit, once US reflagging operations commenced in earnest on July 22, 
the Syrian media stepped up their criticism of American policy in the Gulf, stating that it reflected 
Washington's "dreams of domination." The move was explained as part of long-held aspirations 
"to dominate the entire Gulf region" that were reinforced by the loss of their main pillar in the area, 
the Shah of Iran. Damascus claimed that Washington was using freedom of navigation as an 
excuse to justify its intervention on behalf of Iraq.468
In concurrence with Syria's renewed pledge to back Iran, Syrian-lraqi tensions rose 
considerably when a Syrian MiG-21 fighter aircraft was shot down over Iraqi airspace by Iraqi air- 
defense units on July 28.469 In spite of Syrian denials, Baghdad claimed that the warplane had 
been on a "combat mission."470 The MiG pilot was captured alive, but according to Al-Qadisiyah, 
Saddam Hussein had instructed that he should not be referred to as a prisoner, perhaps to salvage 
prospects for a reconciliation with Damascus. Nonetheless, the incident caused mutual 
recriminations.471
As Iran's foes in the West and Arab world multiplied, Tehran's revolutionary clerics 
aggravated conditions by trying to raise the stakes during the Hajj season. Enraged by Kuwaiti and 
Saudi moves to bring foreign powers into the fray and facilitate their activities in the Persian Gulf, 
Iran on July 31 committed a colossal blunder in the holy city of Mecca that affirmed its pariah
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status in the eyes of many in the Middle East and beyond, and proved to be a godsend to the pro- 
Iraqi camp. Concomitantly, Syria played its most crucial role ever - probably since the early 
months of the Gulf W ar - in standing up for its Iranian ally in various regional fora and preventing 
its total isolation.
THE MECCA INCIDENT AND THE EFFICACY OF SYRIAN DIPLOMACY
As previously mentioned, the Iran-Contra revelations not only prompted the Reagan administration 
to adopt a more hardline policy towards Iran to restore its credibility in the eyes of Iraq and the Gulf 
states, but also enabled the radical elements in the Iranian regime to regain the initiative, with the 
pragmatists forced to follow their lead in order to ensure their own political survival. The 
radicalization of Iranian politics from late 1987 onward ushered in a new phase in Iranian foreign 
policy. Political radicalization on the domestic level, combined with immense frustration due to the 
inability to score a decisive victory in the land war and outrage at the conduct of Iraq's Gulf Arab 
supporters by inviting the US and Soviet navies into what Iran considered mare nostrum, led to the 
adoption of aggressive and militant policies by Tehran to confront an ever more formidable 
coalition of Western and Arab forces arrayed against it. The growing sense of embattlement, 
desperation and paranoia led Iran to take a desperate gamble at the height of the Hajj season in 
the holy city of Mecca.
With some 150,000 Iranian pilgrims performing the Hajj at that time, Iran now tried to 
intimidate the Saudis and drive a wedge between them and the US. Given the Saudi royals' 
sensitivities about their relations with the West and their potential vulnerability as "Guardian of the 
Holy Places," Tehran hoped that, by organizing massive pro-Iranian demonstrations in Mecca, it 
could conduct a political tour de force to unnerve Riyadh and force it to cease cooperation with the 
US and pro-Iraqi camp. On July 31, as on several other occasions in previous years, a large 
demonstration was organized by Iranian cadres involving sizeable numbers of pilgrims who 
chanted anti-American and pro-Iranian slogans. However, this time they began to advance on the 
Grand Mosque, where they were barred from entering the complex by Saudi National Guardsmen 
and police. Clashes erupted as the Iranians attempted to break through the line of Saudi security 
personnel, with some of them using knives and other instruments, including perhaps some 
handguns. After initial attempts to disperse the mob with tear gas and other non-lethal means, at 
least some of the Saudi forces used firearms against the Iranians. In the ensuing melee, over 400 
people were killed and some 650 others injured. Among the dead were 275 Iranians and 85 Saudi 
security personnel. Both sides subsequently made some false claims. Tehran stated that Riyadh 
had provoked the incident, while the Saudis flatly denied that their forces had fired any shots.472
Revolutionary Iran's gambit failed miserably. Rather than forcing the Saudis to perform a 
volte face, it backfired by plunging relations between the two countries to unprecedented lows. 
More worrisome for the clerical regime, both in practical and ideological terms, was the fact that
the events in Mecca produced a new Arab-lranian schism and created a widespread impression in 
the Arab world that Iran's brand of Islamic fundamentalism was heretical and knew no bounds.473
With tensions in the Gulf already at an all time high, the Mecca incident sent Shockwaves 
throughout the region, threatening to destabilize the situation even further. It led to intense 
diplomatic activity on both sides to buttress their respective positions, and to keep the other side on 
the defensive. Iran continued to accuse Saudi Arabia of instigating the violent clashes and tried to 
rally the few Arab allies in had - particularly Syria - behind it. The pro-Saudi bloc redoubled its 
efforts to isolate Iran and persuade Syria to change its allegiance. Damascus, for its part, finding 
itself in an awkward and sensitive position, still tried to mediate between the two sides to defuse 
tensions and mend the damage done to Arab-lranian relations. For the next three months, until an 
Arab League summit meeting was finally convened in Amman during early November, there was a 
great deal of shuttle diplomacy and political maneuvering undertaken by both camps to advance 
their own agenda.
Less than 24 hours after the Mecca incident, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Sheikholislam left for Damascus, where he met with Hafez Assad immediately upon arrival to 
discuss the crisis and submitted a message from Ali Khamene'i.474 Sheikholislam remained in the 
Syrian capital for several days to confer with other high-ranking officials, including Vice-President 
Khaddam and Foreign Minister al-Shara, and to devise a strategy to deal effectively with this 
severe crisis in Arab-lranian relations.475 As a result of their deliberations, the Syrians and Iranians 
seemed to have agreed to adopt separate, but complementary, strategies to deal with the fallout. 
Tehran was reassured of Damascus' unswerving support and initiated efforts to win the support of 
neighboring Arab and Muslim states, while the Syrians chose to mediate between the two sides and 
discourage Arab countries from shunning Iran. On August 2, the day after the Assad- 
Sheikholislam meeting, the Syrian leader called King Fahd, expressing deep regret about the 
situation and, according to Saudi sources describing the conduct of the Iranian pilgrims as 
"unacceptable from any quarter."476 In concurrence with his attempt to mollify the Saudis, he 
submitted a message to his Iranian counterpart, Ali Khamene'i, asking Tehran to tone down its anti- 
Saudi rhetoric and ease tensions with Riyadh.477 It is noteworthy that Syrian officials refrained from 
making any public statements about the Mecca incident, and the state-controlled media avoided 
criticism of Iran in the whole affair.478
The Syrians were aware of their delicate position as the only party that had channels of 
communication open with both Tehran and Riyadh. Moreover, the two antagonists now demanded 
Damascus' support against the other. However, as it enjoyed important political links, and was the 
recipient of economic and financial benefits from both countries, it was loath to alienate either one 
completely. While deciding to maintain its alliance with Iran, Syria tried to assuage the concerns of 
the Gulf states about further Iranian subversion and adventurism. Syria could not afford to jump 
ship and bandwagon with the mainstream Arab states such as Egypt and Iraq - its two main rivals
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in the Arab world - who were trying to take full advantage of the Mecca incident for their own 
purposes. Iraq tried to portray it as a proof of Iranian hypocrisy and expansionism in the Arab 
world. Saddam Hussein stated it demonstrated that: "even when the Iranian rulers say they have a 
religion, it is not the Islamic religion."479 The Egyptians also tried to get full mileage by 
condemning Iran's actions as "an ugly crime against Islam." Hosni Mubarak appealed for an 
emergency OIC summit meeting to discuss the issue.460 Consequently, the Syrians were quite 
conscious that, if they sided entirely with Riyadh, Iraq's position in the Gulf W ar and the 
reintegration of Egypt into the Arab world would be boosted. The most logical option was to try and 
defuse the crisis by diplomacy, thereby impeding Iraqi and Egyptian moves to exploit the crisis, 
without abandoning the alliance with Iran.
As part of the joint Syrian-lranian diplomatic offensive, and in order to allay the fears of 
Arab states and prevent the crystallization of a solid Arab bloc against it, Tehran endeavored to 
bolster relations with Arab states which were not blatantly pro-Iraqi, or somewhat sympathetic 
towards Iran. On August 5, Sheikholislam arrived in Abu Dhabi, where he met with UAE President 
Sheikh Zayid bin Sultan Al-Nuhayan to discuss the crisis in Saudi-lranian relations and delivered a 
message from Ali Khamene'i. In parallel, another Iranian envoy, Ali Shams-Ardakani, went on a 
similar mission to Muscat, where he was received by Sultan Qaboos.481
On August 5, Faruq al-Shara visited Tehran to reaffirm Syrian support for its ally and 
coordinate policy. During his one-day visit, he held talks with his Iranian counterpart and the prime 
minister and delivered a note from Hafez Assad to Ali Khamene'i. Although al-Shara denied press 
reports that his presence in the Iranian capital was part of a Syrian initiative to mediate between 
Riyadh and Tehran, he was careful not to criticize Saudi Arabia.482 Instead, he expressed regret 
about the tragic events in Mecca and accused Washington of having been involved in the affair, in 
order to exacerbate the Gulf Arab-lranian rift and legitimize its high-profile naval presence in the 
area.403 Besides underscoring Syrian solidarity with Iran, he stated: "I am confident that the Islamic 
Republic of Iran is capable of preventing the aggressors from achieving their aims and, just as US 
plans have been faced with defeat in the past, they will face defeat in the future too...US and Arab 
reaction wish to spread the war and turn it into an Arab-Persian war, but the Islamic Republic of 
Iran has managed to defeat that conspiracy."484 In the aftermath of al-Shara's visit, close 
communication was maintained between the two sides as the pro-Saudi camp accelerated efforts 
to mobilize support to punish Iran's intransigence by isolating it.485 To show support for Iran and 
exert indirect pressure on the Gulf Arabs to prevent them from throwing their weight behind the US, 
the Syrian media intensified their propaganda campaign against the US naval presence in the Gulf 
region. Washington's moves were depicted as an effort to acquire direct control of the "Arab oil 
lake," by using the need to protect tankers and ensure freedom of navigation as a pretext. It 
accused the Reagan administration of "reckless, aggressive behavior" to impose its hegemony.486
As expected, the Arab diplomatic offensive to isolate Iran got underway rapidly in the days
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following the tragic events in Mecca, with Tunisia leading the call for an emergency meeting of the 
Arab League Council. Initially, Kuwait was designated to host the meeting on August 15, but the 
need for additional preparatory consultations and scheduling problems led to the postponement of 
the gathering until the 23rd, with the venue being shifted away from the Gulf to Tunisia. The delay 
was engineered by UAE President Sheikh Zayid in a last-ditch effort to buy time and, along with the 
Syrians and Algerians, to mediate between Saudi Arabia and Iran. He also agreed with Jordan to 
follow up on its previous initiative to bridge the gap between Damascus and Baghdad.487 The UAE 
President arrived in Damascus on August 16 and prolonged his stay in the Syrian capital to 
negotiate with Hafez Assad, thus heightening expectations for a possible solution.468 In parallel 
with his deliberations in Damascus, Sheikh Zayid had dispatched an envoy to Baghdad to confer 
with Saddam Hussein. However, hopes of a breakthrough were dashed, as no substantive 
progress was achieved and Iraq rejected the UAE mediation attempt.489 Consequently, the stage 
was set for a major confrontation in the three-day Arab League meeting that commenced on 
August 23, with Saudi Arabia and Kuwait spearheading a drive to ostracize Iran, and Syria at the 
forefront of efforts to thwart them.
Syria's Role in the Arab League Foreign Ministers' Meeting and Its Implications for Inter- 
Arab Politics
The convening of the Arab League foreign ministers' meeting in Tunis represented a major 
milestone in Arab-lranian relations during the 1980's, and its outcome had the most profound 
impact on the evolution of inter-Arab politics since the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab fold in 
1979. The deliberations in Tunis clearly demonstrated Syria’s ability to be a spoiler by preventing 
the emergence of a pan-Arab consensus on a decisive riposte to the Mecca affair - something that 
Damascus was unwilling to countenance. With Egypt's continued absence from the Arab League, 
and Iraq still locked in a desperate struggle for survival against Iran, Syria was by default the key 
player in Arab affairs and held enormous sway. Its ability during the proceedings, despite 
overwhelming support from the majority of members, to prevent the passage of a harsh anti- 
Iranian resolution underscored the urgent need for a major policy shift by the League with regard to 
Egypt, in order to tip the scale and dilute Syrian power and influence in Arab and regional politics. 
In many respects, the Tunis conference and Iran's continued refusal to accept UN Security Council 
Resolution 598 unconditionally paved the way for the Amman summit three months later, where 
the stage was set for Egypt's formal re-entry into the Arab fold, and Iran was unanimously 
condemned.
Against the backdrop of the seven-year-old Gulf War and the potential threat that the 
hostilities could engulf other neighboring states, the events in Mecca provided tremendous impetus 
to general Arab disillusionment with Iran and underscored the need to signal intense displeasure 
with its conduct. On the eve of the Tunis meeting, the Syrians were well aware that they now
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would have to be at the vanguard of efforts to prevent the crystallization of a pan-Arab consensus 
against Iran. Already there were suggestions that Saudi Arabia would propose the revival of the 
1950 Arab Defense Pact, stipulating that aggression against any Arab League member would be 
construed as a threat against all its members - thereby enabling the Gulf states and others to back 
Iraq overtly.490 In addition, with the recent passage of Resolution 598 by the UN Security Council, 
it was apparent that the anti-Iranian camp would try to build on the momentum it had generated, by 
threatening punitive measures against Tehran unless it complied with the UN resolution.491 Prior to 
the opening session, the Syrians, led by Faruq al-Shara, convened a meeting in Tunis with the 
participation of the Libyan, Algerian and South Yemeni representatives to harmonize their 
positions.492
Upon his arrival in Tunis on August 22, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, who was to 
chair the emergency session, stated that he would press for severance of relations with Iran, in 
view of its "anti-Arab actions."493 It was quite apparent that Saudi Arabia would assume a 
maximalist position in order to rally the other members, put any potential dissenters on the 
defensive and come away from the meeting with tangible gains. In a ferocious attack against Iran, 
in his opening speech, Saud al-Faisal denounced Iran's "terrorist and destructive actions against 
the Arab and Islamic worlds, particularly its neighbors in the Gulf."494 He went on to advocate a 
unified Arab position since Iran was bent on continuing the war at any cost, even by destabilizing 
the region. He also blamed Iran for laying mines in the Gulf, intervening unnecessarily in Lebanon 
and maintaining ties with Israel while "hiding behind the slogans of Islam."495 His words were 
echoed by Arab League Secretary-General Chedli Klibi, who condemned Iran for attempting to 
expand the war and destabilize its Arab neighbors, urging it instead to reconsider its policies and 
accept UN Security Council Resolution 598.490
The opening speeches set the tone for subsequent statements by the other participants, as 
the overwhelming majority, including Libya, Algeria and South Yemen, expressed solidarity with 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait and signalled their displeasure with Iranian conduct in Mecca.497 Only 
Syria remained unwavering in its support of Iran and criticized the efforts of the pro-Iraqi camp to 
depict the Gulf conflict as an Arab-lranian war.498 Al-Shara fought off intense pressure from the 
Saudis and their allies to abandon the alliance, arguing it was vital not to isolate Iran, but to 
maintain open channels of communication with Tehran in order to modify its behavior.499 In fact, 
the Syrian foreign minister was outspoken in his criticism of Iraq for starting the hostilities and 
condemnation of the foreign naval presence in the Gulf.500 His words elicited a harsh response 
from his Iraqi counterpart, Tareq Aziz, who caustically retorted that the Syrian voice being heard in 
the session was "a Persian voice rather than an Arab one."501
While most of the delegates voiced their outrage against Iranian behavior, not all favored 
taking an overtly anti-Iranian position. A draft resolution calling for the severance of diplomatic ties 
with Iran was backed by some 15 out of the 21 delegations present.502 Libya, Algeria, Oman and
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the UAE supported Syrian arguments that completely ostracizing Iran would only exacerbate the
c m
situation, and prove to be counterproductive in the long run. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Iraq and 
Tunisia led the effort to push through the draft resolution, but al-Shara would have none of it. The 
Syrians mustered the necessary support and thwarted this initiative. The delegates worked late 
into the night on the second day, modifying and watering down the text, until the Syrians grudgingly 
gave their consent.504 The final resolution was unanimously passed on the last day of the 
emergency meeting, August 25, with some minor reservations.
#■
Overall, it represented the strongest position the Arab League had ever taken on the Gulf 
War, reflecting its concern about the continuation of the conflict, possible expansion of the fighting 
and Iranian efforts to destabilize other neighboring Arab states. Although the final draft did not 
exclude a possible rupture in Arab-lranian relations, it gave Iran until September 20 to reconsider 
its position and accept UN Security Council Resolution 598. Thereafter, the Arab League Council 
would reconvene to formulate an appropriate response. The resolution reaffirmed Arab solidarity 
"with Iraq in its legitimate defense of its sovereignty and territorial integrity," and condemned 
Iranian "acts of sabotage and anarchy" in Mecca. It also appealed to the UN Security Council to 
adopt urgent measures to ensure Iranian compliance with Resolution 598.505
Despite the harsh wording of this essentially anti-Iranian resolution, in reality the Syrians 
had succeeded in their endeavor to defang it. The issue of a rupture in Arab-lranian relations had 
been shelved momentarily, and another proposal calling on the UN Security Council to impose an 
international arms embargo on Iran was also dropped from the final text.506 Consequently the 
resolution lacked punch, with Jordanian Foreign Minister al-Masri forthrightly describing it as 
"incomplete." The Saudis tried to put on a brave face by declaring the meeting to be a success 
and describing the final resolution as "balanced."507 The Iranian media welcomed the outcome of 
the Arab League deliberations, praising the "realism and independence" of the pro-Iranian bloc led 
by Syria for thwarting this US-backed "conspiracy" against Iran.508 At a press conference on 
August 26, Prime Minister Musavi underscored the close nature of relations between Syria and 
Iran, mentioning that Syria had prevented the misrepresentation of the Gulf conflict as one 
between Arabs and non-Arabs.509
The failure of the mainstream Arab states to achieve their aims in Tunis prompted them to 
mobilize themselves effectively, in order to prevent being outmaneuvered by the Syrians once 
again, and intensify their efforts to decouple Syria and Iran and punish Iranian intransigence. 
Although Damascus had pulled off a diplomatic coup that it savored and was greatly appreciated in 
Tehran, it would prove to be a short-term gain only. Furthermore, in the remaining months of 
1987, a combination of the continuing of the Gulf War, clashes between US and Iranian forces, and 
periodic Iranian attacks against Kuwait provided major impetus to the hardening of the Arab 
position against Iran and the re-entry of Egypt into the Arab fold, in effect eclipsing Syrian power 
and influence in the Arab world.
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Arab Strategy Against the Syrian-lranian Alliance in the Aftermath of Tunis 
In the weeks prior to the September 20 deadline set by the Arab League, the mainstream Arab 
bloc, led by Saudi Arabia and Jordan, adopted a two-track approach to bring about the demise of 
the Tehran-Damascus axis by trying to pull Syria into their camp and concomitantly depict the Gulf 
War as a continuation of the historical struggle between Arabs and Persians. Amman and Riyadh 
hoped that Assad would eventually yield and drop his backing for Tehran, as more and more Arab 
states distanced themselves from Iran and the Arab propaganda war against the Iranians reached 
unprecedented levels.
Even prior to the commencement of the Tunis conference, King Hussein dispatched Prime 
Minister al-Rifai to Damascus on August 22, to press the Syrian leader to reconsider his position in 
light of recent events.510 In addition, a week after the conclusion of the deliberations in Tunis, the 
Jordanian monarch made an unscheduled visit to Damascus (his second in four months) in an 
effort to persuade Assad to settle differences with Saddam Hussein.511 As in the past, the Syrians 
would not be swayed, but concurred on the need to prevent the Gulf W ar from spreading to the 
southern littoral states.512 King Hussein's two-day visit was immediately followed by the arrival of 
Syrian Prime Minister al-Kasm in Amman to discuss cementing bilateral relations.513 In general, 
Damascus continued to pursue a two-pronged approach with regard to the Gulf conflict. On the 
one hand it stood by Iran and in fact intensified its anti-Iraqi rhetoric, at a time when many Arab 
states, particularly Saudi Arabia, escalated their propaganda war against Iran to new heights (see 
below). On the other hand, Syria continued to mend fences with Jordan and offered its good offices 
to mediate between Iran and the Gulf Arabs, in order to ease tensions and prevent expansion of 
the hostilities. Despite a great deal of speculation and reports to the contrary in the Arab and 
Western media at the time, Damascus was still intent on preserving its links with Tehran while, to 
the extent possible, avoiding total isolation in the Arab world.514
Besides the Jordanian initiative to wean Syria away from its non-Arab partner, the 
moderate Arab camp unleashed enormous invective against Iran and its remaining Arab allies, 
prompting some members of the former Steadfastness Front to draw closer to the Arab 
mainstream.515 After the consultations in Tunis, Saudi Interior Minister Prince Nayef defended his 
government's decision to publicize the Mecca incident widely, calling it a "pre-mediated" Iranian 
plot and signalling Saudi readiness to participate in an Islamic summit solely devoted to the Iranian 
threat.516 The harsh statements emanating from Riyadh in subsequent weeks were notable for 
their viciousness and racism. In order to maintain the momentum of their anti-Iranian diplomacy in 
the region and drive a wedge between Iran and as many Arab states as possible, the Saudi news 
media continued their unrelenting campaign against Tehran. Iran was rebuked for its occupation of 
the three disputed islands in the Gulf, also claimed by the UAE, and its illegitimate control of 
"Arabestan" - the southwestern part of Iran. Riyadh urged that neither of these areas belonging to 
the Arab homeland should be conceded to the "Persian race." It also drew parallels between
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Iranian policies towards the GCC states and Sassanid Persian attempts to control the Arabian 
Peninsula during the pre-lslamic era.517 By now, the similarities between Iraqi and Saudi 
propaganda were unmistakable. In essence, the Gulf W ar was depicted as an ethnic conflict 
pitting all Arabs against the Persians, and not just a struggle between two regional states.518
Syrian Moves to Defuse Arab-lranian Tensions in the Gulf
In late August, after a brief hiatus, Iraq resumed its aerial attacks against Iranian oil facilities and 
shipping in the Gulf region. Besides hitting more than 20 targets in the first half of September, the 
Iraqi air force also intensified its bombardment of Iranian urban and economic centers, carrying out 
almost fifty raids between August 16 and September 15.519 Iran retaliated by attacking Gulf Arab 
shipping. In an unprecedented move, it fired a number of Chinese-made Silkworm missiles at 
Kuwait from the occupied Faw Peninsula in early September.520 Consequently, an emergency 
session of GCC foreign ministers was convened on September 12 in Jeddah to discuss this new 
dimension to the Iranian threat. The escalation of hostilities in the Gulf and the heightening of 
Arab-lranian tensions coincided with a mission undertaken by UN Secretary-General Perez de 
Cuellar to Tehran and Baghdad, to try to find some common ground between the two sides and 
persuade Iran to accept a ceasefire. Not surprisingly, Perez De Cuellar returned empty-handed to 
New York on September 16, informing the Security Council that Iran's acceptance of Resolution 
598 was contingent upon the identification of the aggressor by an impartial international 
commission.521 Due to the confluence of events, the Syrians moved to fill the void by holding 
consultations with the Gulf Arabs and Iranians with a view to mediating effectively and easing 
tensions. Damascus realized that it could not act as an intermediary between Iran and Iraq, but it 
could try to defuse tensions between Iran and the GCC, in an effort to enhance its own credibility 
as a mediator and also prevent Iran from sliding into greater isolation.
In the week prior to the second Arab foreign ministers' meeting in Tunis to consider the 
future of Arab-lranian relations, Assad dispatched Vice-President Khaddam to Jeddah to hold talks. 
with GCC foreign ministers, and Faruq al-Shara to Tehran to confer with Iranian leaders. Khaddam 
arrived in Jeddah on September 13, the day after the emergency session of the GCC was 
convened. The GCC foreign ministers issued a communique demanding Tehran's full acceptance 
of Resolution 598 and exchanged views with Khaddam on the situation.522 Three days later, al- 
Shara visited the Iranian capital, where he submitted a message from Assad to Khamene'i and also 
met with his Iranian counterpart. The primary purpose of their talks was to discuss ways to contain 
the situation and mend Gulf Arab-lranian ties.523 Al-Shara's visit was immediately followed by the 
arrival of Syrian Minister of Economy and Finance al-lmadi in Tehran to explore the expansion of 
bilateral economic and commercial links between the two allies 524 It is noteworthy that, in the run­
up to the visits by the two Syrian envoys, Iran renewed its previous commitment to continue 
deliveries of one million tons of crude oil to Syria per annum, free of charge.525 As the date for the
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Tunis meeting approached, it was apparent that Syria would not depart from its previous positions, 
and thereby would continue to maintain its strategic partnership with Iran and oppose a rupture in 
Arab-lranian relations.526 Moreover, in an interview on the eve of the Arab League meeting in 
Tunis, Hafez Assad cautioned that "it would not be possible to reach any results through the use of 
power or pressures” on Iran. Instead, he stated: "it is possible to reach results with Iran through 
friendly dialogue."527 With regard to emerging Arab attitudes towards Iran, he reiterated his 
opposition to banishing Iran, positing: "after Mecca, some Arabs wanted to change relations with 
Iran...It is against the interests of the Arabs to break relations with Iran."528 The Syrian leader 
reaffirmed that he had no intention of withholding support for Iran and credited Syrian diplomacy 
for playing "a major role in preventing the expansion of the war."529
THE REVERSAL OF IRAN'S FORTUNES ON THE REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL STAGE 
(SEPTEMBER - NOVEMBER 1987)
The Arab League Meeting in Tunis and its Consequences
When the Arab League Council reconvened for an extraordinary session on September 20 in 
Tunisia, two crucial factors favored the pro-Iranian camp. Already, the UN Security Council had 
opted for a diplomatic solution once more, by giving Perez de Cuellar more time to bridge the gap 
between the two sides, before considering the imposition of sanctions on Iran. Secondly, it was 
obvious that a consensus could not be reached on the issue of an Arab diplomatic boycott of Iran, 
since the Syrian-led camp in the Arab League (composed of Libya, Algeria, South Yemen, Oman 
and the UAE) was vehemently opposed to such a move and instead advocated further dialogue 
with Tehran.
Upon arrival in Tunis, the chairman of the meeting, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal, 
stated that the main goal would be to reach agreement on holding an Arab summit to decide the 
future of Arab-lranian relations 530 The pro-Iraq camp had realized from the very outset that it 
would not be feasible to forge a consensus at this stage on a common Arab stand towards Tehran, 
with at least seven Arab states, led by Syria and Algeria, advocating further negotiations with 
Iran.531 Furthermore, the members decided to postpone any crucial decision in order not be seen 
as being out of step with the UN Security Council, thereby giving Iran more time to reconsider its 
position.532 In addition, a drastic move such as the severance of ties with Iran had to be decided at 
the highest level, by the heads of state. Overall, the second meeting in Tunis was viewed as a 
stepping stone for gradually achieving a consensus and setting the stage for collective action, if 
and when it was eventually deemed necessary.
Once again, in his opening speech to the delegates, the Saudi foreign minister lambasted 
Iran for its "excessive intransigence and persistent rejection" of peace efforts, calling for collective 
Arab action to thwart Iran's "terrible scheme."533 By the end of the meeting, the members could 
only agree to hold an Arab summit in seven weeks' time, on November 8, in Amman, Jordan.
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Although the resolution passed at the conclusion of the emergency session indicated that the 
purpose of the summit would be "to examine the developments in the Iran-lraq war from all 
angles," as the conflict was "now at the core of the Arab nation's concerns in view of the great 
dangers which its continuation and likely expansion constitute for the Arab nation," no agreement 
was reached on whether the Gulf W ar should be the only item on the agenda.534
During the proceedings, Faruq al-Shara voiced strong reservations about a gathering of 
Arab leaders to discuss only a single item, namely, the Gulf War, while ignoring the centrality of 
the Arab-lsraeli conflict and other important issues, including the Palestinian question and the 
Lebanese crisis.535 The day after the Tunis meeting, upon his return to Syria, al-Shara immediately 
declared that the Amman conference should be dedicated to discussing major challenges facing 
the Arab nation, "starting with basic and essential issues such as the Arab-lsraeli conflict;” 
otherwise Syria would not participate in the summit 536 The Syrians were adamant that the summit 
agenda should reflect the primary importance of the Arab-lsraeli struggle rather than the hostilities 
in the Gulf region. Several other Arab states, including Libya and South Yemen, concurred with 
the Syrian position, thereby raising the prospect of a summit boycott by a number of Arab 
governments.537 In general, Damascus' objective in expressing major reservations about giving 
the Iran-lraq war priority over the Arab-lsraeli issue was three-fold: to prevent its own concerns 
regarding unresolved issues with Israel from being ignored; to avoid, as Iran's primary Arab 
supporter, becoming the target of criticism for its stance in the Gulf W ar at the meeting; and to 
prop up the position of its Iranian ally by downplaying the issue of the Gulf conflict.
In an effort to dissuade Assad from boycotting the Amman summit, and fearing that 
several other Arab leaders might follow suit, King Hussein and Prime Minister al-Rifai arrived on 
September 24 in Latakia, where the Syrian leader was staying. In spite of their efforts to persuade 
him to attend a conference dealing solely with the Gulf War, Assad would not be swayed.538 Assad 
demanded a formal broadening of the summit agenda. The Syrian position was reaffirmed two 
days later during the visit of Vice-President Khaddam to Libya, where both sides emphasized that 
they would not attend the conference unless "all issues of interest to the Arab nation" were 
discussed.539 In tandem with the pronouncements of Syrian officials, the Syrian news media also 
toed the official line, describing the Gulf conflict as a "secondary issue.” For example, an article 
that appeared in the daily, Tishrin, on October 4 criticized the Iraqi attempt to divert Arab attention 
from the Palestinian front in order to focus on "marginal, fabricated issues" since it only served 
Saddam Hussein's "personal purposes," and the "enemies of the nation."540
As conference host, to ensure maximum attendance and success, King Hussein prudently 
decided to remove the bone of contention - the summit agenda - by declaring that there would be 
no specific agenda and all issues, including the overarching Arab-lsraeli problem, could be 
discussed.541 Consequently, during a working visit to Damascus by Prime Minister al-Rifai on 
October 12 to promote bilateral cooperation, Assad informed the Jordanian envoy that he would
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accept the invitation to attend the Amman conference.542 Although Jordan had made a concession 
to ensure the participation of Syria and a number of other states, one cannot argue with certainty 
that Syria would not have altered its position at the last minute, had it not been for Amman's 
gesture. In view of the escalating tensions in the Gulf, putting Iran on a collision course with the 
Kuwaitis and Saudis (also providers of financial and material assistance to Assad), and Syria's own 
economic woes, Assad might have eventually decided to attend as the date for the Amman summit 
approached. Just as at the OIC summit in Kuwait earlier that year, the Syrian leader might have 
reversed his previous position. In the final analysis, Damascus could hardly afford completely to 
alienate its few remaining Arab aid donors and become sidelined in Arab politics. Even if Amman 
had not given in to Syrian demands, Assad might have eventually concluded it would be more 
advantageous to defend his own precarious position and that of his Iranian ally within Arab political 
fora, rather than avoiding them.
Through a combination of shrewd diplomacy and maintaining open channels of 
communication with both parties, Syria had managed to preserve its room for maneuver and won 
vital breathing space for Iran in the three-month period between the events in Mecca and the 
Amman summit. However, in the weeks that followed, Iranian actions and the efficacy of US-lraqi 
responses nullified some of the Syrian gains. The exposure of Iran's mining operations in the 
Persian Gulf, its willingness to be drawn into a de facto war with the United States and its 
continued attacks on Kuwaiti oil installations and tankers strengthened anti-Iranian sentiment in the 
region and beyond, increasing the resolve of the pro-Iraq camp to punish Iranian excesses and 
bring Egypt back into the Arab fold in order to help neutralize the Iranian threat and tip the Arab 
balance of power against Tehran's Arab allies. In effect, Iran's clumsy moves to challenge the US 
and its Arab allies in the Gulf greatly weakened its hand and, in the process, worked to the 
detriment of Syrian interests.
The Iran Ajr Incident, the Beginning of US-lranian Clashes, and Arab Reaction 
The Iranian government was pleased with the outcome of events in Tunis. Having won a brief 
respite on the regional level due to Syrian diplomacy, it now focused its efforts on appealing its 
case and winning international support at the annual session of the UN General Assembly in New 
York, where President Khamene'i was scheduled to address the UN body on September 22. 
However, on the night of September 21, less than 24 before Khamene'i's speech, US naval forces 
in the Gulf attacked and captured an Iranian naval vessel, the Iran Ajr, while it was laying mines 
some 50 miles northeast of Bahrain, killing six crewmen and apprehending the remaining 25 in the 
process. News of the Iran Ajr incident overshadowed Khamenei's address the following day, 
putting him in an extremely awkward position. He was left to fend off questions from reporters and 
deny the truth of reports, claming instead that the vessel had been an unarmed supply ship.
There is little doubt that the assault on the Iran Ajr - the first direct military clash between
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US and Iranian forces since the 1979 Revolution - had been deliberately timed by the US to 
discredit Khamene'i and derail the Iranian initiative at the UN.543 Iran had now been caught red- 
handed laying mines in international waters, thereby justifying Washington's position that it had to 
maintain a high-level military presence in the region to protect the sea lanes and Gulf Arab 
shipping. Any remaining support for Iran on the international level quickly evaporated.544
Iran's image was further tarnished, especially in the Arab-lslamic world, the day after the 
Iran Ajr affair, when the PLO Central Committee publicly claimed that it was now in possession of 
documents proving secret israeli-lranian negotiations on Jewish Iranian emigration to "occupied 
Palestine."545 In spite of the multiple blows dealt to it during September 21-22, Iran remained 
defiant and vowed revenge against the US. Syria also continued to stand by its ally, supporting 
Iranian claims that the Iran Ajr had been a supply vessel and condemning what it termed as "US 
piracy" and Washington's application of the "law of the jungle" in the Gulf.546
Amid the intensification of hostilities in Gulf waters, as Iraq continued the Tanker War, Iran 
remained undaunted and pursued its "blow for blow" doctrine irrespective of the prominent foreign 
naval presence. Consequently, a second US-lranian clash occurred on October 8, pitting three US 
helicopters against a number of Iranian speedboats, resulting in the sinking of one craft and the 
death of eight crewmen.547 In response, Tehran vowed revenge and fired a number of Silkworm 
missiles at Kuwaiti targets. On October 16, one missile struck the US-flagged Kuwaiti tanker, Sea 
Isle City, blinding its American captain and injuring eighteen other crewmen. Washington 
subsequently declared that it would retaliate for the attack on the US-flagged ship.546
In parallel with these developments in the Gulf theater, Iran decided to dispatch a high- 
level delegation headed by Prime Minister Musavi and Revolutionary Guards Minister Rafiqdoust 
to Damascus to confer with the Syrians on regional issues and seek assistance. A few days before 
their scheduled visit, Deputy Prime Minister for Political Affairs Ali Reza Moayyeri arrived in the 
Syrian capital to bring the Syrians up to speed and highlight Iranian concerns.549 Moayyeri met 
with Prime Minister al-Kasm and Foreign Minister al-Shara to discuss the Gulf W ar and the fate of 
Western hostages in Lebanon.550 On October 18, Musavi and Rafiqdoust, accompanied by Deputy 
Foreign Ministers Besharati and Lavasani, arrived in Damascus and went immediately into
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conference with al-Kasm, and with al-Shara later that day. The following day, Musavi was received 
by Hafez Assad, while al-Shara held talks with Besharati and Lavasani.551 The consultations 
stretched over a three-day period, as the two allies deliberated over a number of important issues. 
The main item on the agenda was the Arab League summit in Amman, only three weeks away, as 
the Iranians were worried that the pro-Iraqi bloc, now enjoying the full support of Riyadh, would be 
able to muster enough support against Iran and finally succeed in outmaneuvering the Syrians. 
Tehran was fearful that the growing momentum of pro-Iraqi diplomatic efforts would precipitate a 
total Arab breach with Iran.552
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During the talks in Damascus, the Iranians reportedly sought more Scud missiles from the 
Syrians to replenish their own dwindling inventory.553 The Syrians, for their part, emphasized that 
Iran should adopt a less confrontational stance against the US and coordinate future moves 
concerning the Western hostages with them.554 With regard to Syria's $3 billion debt, Musavi 
reportedly agreed to defer the issue for another 18 months due to Damascus' severe economic
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At this critical juncture, not only were the Syrians trying to serve as intermediaries between 
their Iranian ally on one side and the Arab and Western blocs on the other, but they were also 
attempting to iron out existing differences between Iran and the Soviet Union. It was rumored that 
Musavi held secret negotiations with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Yuli Vorontsov in 
Damascus.556 Indeed, Musavi's three-day stay (October 18-20) in Damascus conveniently 
overlapped with the presence of Vorontsov between October 17 and 19. Vorontsov had already 
met with al-Shara on his first day, and held consultations with Assad the next day on the Middle 
East peace process and the situation in the Gulf, including the implementation of UN Resolution 
S98.557 Given the circumstances at this crucial stage, it would have been surprising if Vorontsov 
and Musavi had not met under such convenient conditions. It is believed that Vorontsov insisted ' 
Iran should avoid further provocations against US forces in the Gulf if it desired continued Soviet 
support in the UN Security Council and other areas.558
Concurrent to the Syrian-lranian negotiations in Damascus, on October 19, the US 
retaliated for the attack on the Sea Isle City by sending warships to destroy the Iranian Rostam and 
Reshadat oil platforms, located 120 miles east of Bahrain. After the vessels fired more than a 
thousand rounds at the targets, US Navy SEAL teams moved in and blew up what remained of the 
two structures.559 The move drew a rapid response from Tehran, where an emergency session of 
the Supreme Defense Council chaired by Khamene'i was convened. The Iranian government 
subsequently pledged swift retribution through "an appropriate and decisive" riposte.560 It 
characterized the attack as "blatant aggression," accusing the US of waging a "full-fledged war with 
the Islamic Republic."561 In Damascus, Musavi vowed that Iran would not remain silent, 
underscoring that the American presence in the Middle East was a foreign one and, "with the 
assistance of the people of Syria and Lebanon," revolutionary Iran would destroy its foothold in the 
region.562 The Syrian media also tried to drum up support for Iran and justify Damascus' policies 
by arguing that the US attack exposed "its participation in the Iraqi regime's unjust war," and drew 
analogies between US policy in the Gulf and its earlier involvement in Lebanon. It went on to 
castigate Iraq for allegedly forging a covert relationship with the US subsequent to the breakdown 
of the 1979 Syrian-lraqi unity talks.563 At a press conference prior to his return to Tehran on 
October 20, Musavi stated that, during his talks with Assad and al-Kasm, the Syrian leadership had 
reaffirmed its commitment to stand by Iran, and that the hostilities in the Gulf would be halted once 
punishment had been meted out to Saddam Hussein.564 He also mentioned that Washington had
236
passed a message through Syria, urging Iranian restraint in order to break the cycle of US-lranian 
clashes in the Gulf, and considered the matter closed. Musavi posited: "we will not let any blow go 
unanswered...we will retaliate for this attack."565 Iran once again struck back on October 22, this 
time by firing a Silkworm missile at Kuwait's Sea Island oil terminal, its main loading facility for .. 
supertankers. The terminal was handling one third of Kuwaiti oil exports at the time, and was put 
out of commission for a month.566 After three tragic encounters with US forces, Iran was now 
careful to avoid attacks on American assets, for fear of further US retaliatory strikes. Instead, it 
concentrated on testing the parameters and degree of Washington's commitment by targeting its 
Gulf Arab allies in the weeks that followed.567
With a flurry of diplomatic activity in the latter part of October as the date for the Arab 
summit drew nearer, it was quite evident that the Saudi-led initiative to finally create a consensus 
in Arab ranks for the passage of an anti-Iranian resolution in Amman and for the readmission of 
Egypt into the Arab League would encounter Syrian opposition. However, it was unclear what 
Assad could do to stem the tide of anti-lranianism sweeping much of the Arab world, and the 
growing calls for Egypt's rehabilitation. The gradual marginalization of the Syrian position, the 
cooling of Syrian-Soviet relations, the active US military intervention in the Persian Gulf and Iran's 
failure to adopt realistic goals in its struggle against Baghdad (and now Washington) all combined 
to put Syria in a highly disadvantageous position in defending its own interests and shielding its 
main regional ally from further blows.
Many observers questioned whether Assad would buckle under pressure from the majority 
of the members, especially if, in view of the abysmal state of the Syrian economy, his two main aid 
donors - Saudi Arabia and Kuwait - threatened to terminate assistance. Such speculation was 
fuelled by the fact that Syria's faltering economy finally prompted Assad to carry out a major 
shake-up of his government at the end of October. On October 28, the ministers for industry and 
supplies were sacked amid charges of mismanagement and corruption.568 A similar fate had 
already befallen the ministers for agriculture and construction in previous weeks.569 Two days 
later, on October 30, Assad instigated the resignation of Prime Minister al-Kasm (after he had 
served in his post for seven years) and replaced him with Mahmud al-Zubi, who had previously .  _ 
been president of the Syrian parliament 570 In all, nineteen members of Syria's 35-member cabinet 
lost their positions. However, the portfolios for defense and foreign affairs were retained by Tlas 
and al-Shara respectively.571
Already six days before the summit, Kuwait's foreign minister indicated that his 
government was prepared to discontinue its $50 million annual aid package to Syria if certain 
demands were not met. There were indications that Riyadh was also reconsidering its position on 
some $500 million in annual grants to the Syrians, unless they modified their position on the Gulf 
War.572 With emotions running high over controversial and potentially explosive issues that had to 
be addressed in Amman such as ostracizing Iran and re-embracing Egypt, King Fahd decided to •
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stay out of the fray and send Crown Prince Abdullah (who enjoyed good relations with both Syria 
and Iraq) in his stead.573 The battle lines had already been drawn in the days preceding the 
Amman meeting. While Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Jordan were now at the forefront of efforts to 
banish Iran and formally reintegrate Egypt into the Arab community, Syria was spearheading the 
move to block a complete Arab break with Iran and prevent Egypt's readmission into the Arab 
League. Although in a minority, Damascus was not without support, since Algeria, Libya, Oman 
and the UAE favored keeping diplomatic channels with Tehran open.574 Despite doubts about their 
ability to orchestrate an effective boycott of Iran, it was clear that the pro-Iraq camp was 
determined to formalize its rapidly expanding ties with Egypt in some manner.575 With the 
expansion of the conflict, the Gulf Arabs wanted openly to seek Egyptian assistance to neutralize 
the threat posed by Iranian revanchism.
Syrian Participation in the Amman Summit and its Consequences
From the very outset, Hafez Assad knew that he faced a tall order in Amman. Apart from being in 
a minority on the various issues that were to be discussed, he realized that he could only score 
limited gains through shrewd diplomacy, which would entail some degree of obduracy, compromise 
and deception. Assad was well aware that he could not prevail on all fronts, but he was determined 
to attain as much as he could in five areas that were of key interest to Syria. Essentially, these 
were to ensure: a) that the Arab world did not close the door to further diplomacy in the Gulf, 
thereby giving Syria greater opportunity to mediate between the Arab sheikhdoms and Iran and to 
use its influence in a constructive manner; b) that Syrian interests were not ignored with regard to 
the Arab-lsraeli conflict; c) that Egypt remained excluded from the Arab League; d) that Gulf Arab 
financial aid to Syria would be maintained; and e) that any move by the pro-Iraqi bloc to condemn 
or excommunicate Syria would be thwarted.576
It was clear the Syrians would have to take the lead and fight an uphill battle on several 
fronts. Libya's Colonel Qadhafi, who saw eye-to-eye with Assad on the continued exclusion of 
Egypt and further Arab-lranian dialogue, had announced on November 2 that he would not attend 
the conference, calling it a US-inspired event directed against Iran.577 Besides attempting to 
elevate the Gulf conflict to the level of an Arab-Persian war in order to drive a wedge between Iran 
and the Arab world, it was evident that the pro-Iraqi camp would try to censure Damascus for its 
support of Tehran and push it into a comer by demanding the suspension of aid to Syria. Already, 
many in the Arab world were calling Assad a traitor and a pseudo-Arab.578 However, the Syrian 
leader was determined to confound his opponents and derail any initiative to excommunicate him 
or his political allies.
As the extraordinary summit got underway on the evening of November 8, King Hussein 
warned in his opening address that the Gulf W ar was "no longer confined to Iraq alone, but was 
now engulfing brotherly Kuwait and Saudi Arabia," and "threatening the security of the whole region
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and world peace."579 He argued that disunity and weakness in the Arab world were exacerbating 
conditions in the Gulf and Arab-lsraeli arenas.580 Drawing parallels between Iranian and Israeli 
behavior, he accused Tehran and Tel Aviv of coveting Arab territory and using religion for political 
ends.581 To frustrate their ambitions and bolster Arab power, he called for the formal readmission 
of Egypt into the Arab League, since its prolonged absence had contributed to "weakening the 
underpinnings of the Arab order."582
During the proceedings the following morning, both Syria and Iraq took a hard line. In his 
address, Saddam Hussein depicted the "Iranian menace" as the greatest challenge that the Arab 
nation had faced since the creation of the Arab League, demanding specific censure of Iran and, in 
a thinly-veiled attack on Syria, suspension of Arab aid to its Arab supporters.583 The Iraqi leader 
stated that Egypt should be allowed to rejoin the Arab fold due to the "changing and dynamic 
political situation" in the region.584 For his part, Assad delivered a two-hour-long speech during the 
morning session, defiantly opposing Cairo's re-entry into the Arab League in uncompromising 
terms and advocating further dialogue with Tehran.585 He raised questions about Egypt’s ability to 
uphold the Arab League Charter and the 1950 Joint Defense Pact as a result of restrictions 
imposed by the Camp David Accords.586 Furthermore, the Syrian President rejected Egypt's return 
on the basis that it would imply the League's tacit acceptance of the peace treaty with Israel.587 In 
view of the huge gap between their positions, the Iraqi leader at one point became livid and 
threatened to walk out over indications that the participants might stop short of condemning his 
Iranian foe - "the vile foreign aggressor” - as he called it.588 King Hussein subsequently interceded 
and directed his efforts at reconciling differences between the two Ba'thi rivals over the next two 
days.
That afternoon, the Jordanian monarch convinced Assad and Saddam Hussein to attend a 
four-hour mini-summit in his hotel suite in the presence of five other Arab leaders, Saudi Crown 
Prince Abdullah, Algeria's President Benjedid, the Emir of Kuwait and the presidents of the UAE 
and North Yemen.589 While the meeting seems to have gone relatively smoothly, with both Ba'this 
articulating their positions and showing varying degrees of flexibility, Assad underscored that he 
would veto Egypt's readmission.590 The Jordanians tried to capitalize on the meeting by raising 
premature expectations of a breakthrough. Summit spokesman Akram Barakat characterized the 
encounter as "a promising start to a new era of brotherly relations between Syria and Iraq.''591
Later that evening, both Assad and Saddam Hussein attended a dinner banquet hosted by 
King Hussein. Although denied by the Syrians, reports indicated that the two leaders held a 
bilateral meeting later that evening. The morning of the next day, November 10, Faruq al-Shara 
and Tareq Aziz met for several hours in the presence of Arab League Secretary-General Klibi. 
This was followed up by another round of negotiations between Assad and Saddam Hussein under 
the auspices of the Jordanian king later that evening.592 Once again, the Jordanians widely 
publicized these negotiations and portrayed them in a very positive light. However, the Iraqis were
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more circumspect in their statements, while the Syrians maintained total silence.593
By now, a picture was gradually emerging of the extent of Syria's willingness to give 
ground on the issue of the Gulf conflict and Egypt's status. Despite its posturing and tough stand, it 
became evident that Assad was going to make some concessions - a tactical retreat on both fronts 
- in order to achieve some important gains in the overall equation and prevent alienating the other 
Arab states completely. Reluctant to swim against the powerful tide of pro-Iraqi sentiment in 
Amman, Assad indicated that he would go along with a statement condemning Iran's continuation 
of the war and attacks on the Gulf Arab states. However, he was unwilling to approve the formal 
readmission of Cairo into the Arab fold. As a result of the Syrian-lraqi talks, Iraqi Deputy Prime 
Minister Ramadan expressed optimism about prospects of Syrian backing for a final resolution 
supporting Iraq's position in the seven-year war. Ramadan described the shift in the Syrian 
position as "positive."594 In addition, he stated that the talks between the Syrian and Iraqi leaders 
had been generally constructive. Short of a fissure in Arab-lranian relations, Ramadan 
emphasized that the "minimum" Baghdad was willing to accept was unanimous endorsement of 
Iraq's stand in the conflict and unqualified support for UN Resolution 598 in the final summit 
resolution. He noted that the extent of any future Syrian-lraqi reconciliation would depend on the 
degree of Damascus' cooperation in this regard. Moreover, Ramadan astutely observed that such 
a breakthrough would severely undermine Tehran's ideological stand and its "internal propaganda 
campaign," since the clerical regime had justified its war effort in part by the support it received 
from some key Arab states and its ideological appeal elsewhere in the region.595
On the same day, a special panel of Arab foreign ministers entrusted with drafting the final 
summit resolution began its deliberations 596 Here, the Syrian strategy was two-fold: ruling out any 
compromise on the issue of Egyptian membership in the Arab League, and at the same time 
showing some flexibility on Gulf affairs. The official spokesman of the Syrian delegation, Gibran 
Kourieh, issued a statement reiterating Syria's opposition to Egypt's readmission and threatening to 
block any initiatives undertaken by the Arab League in other areas.597 In other words, the price for 
Syrian acquiescence to the passage of an anti-Iranian resolution would be the continued 
suspension of Egyptian membership. Concerning the latter, Syria was not without support. To 
differing degrees, Libya, South Yemen, Algeria and even Tunisia questioned the hasty 
reinstatement of Egypt at this stage.598 Even on the Gulf War, the Syrian and Iraqi delegations 
debated at length well into the late hours to formulate a compromise resolution.599 Although the 
Syrians were fighting on several fronts, and in spite of Saudi and Kuwaiti statements that as of 
March 1988 they would no longer be technically obliged to continue with the ten-year subventions 
agreed at the 1978 Baghdad summit, the Syrians were still determined to extract as many 
concessions as possible, even on the issue of the Gulf conflagration. In attempts to score some 
gains on behalf of their Iranian partner and cushion the blow against Tehran, Faruq al-Shara 
demanded the inclusion of a statement condemning the US naval presence in the Gulf and, more
significantly, opposed an Arab endorsement of Resolution 598 in its existing form.600
In essence, the modifications that he sought concerning the chronological sequence of the 
UN resolution - namely, the appointment of an impartial international commission to determine the 
aggressor prior to (rather than after) the establishment of a formal ceasefire - mirrored Iran's 
position. More significantly, the Syrians tried to downplay the importance of the UN resolution by 
proposing that a delegation of Arab heads of state, perhaps led by Assad himself, travel to Tehran 
to persuade the Iranian leadership to sue for peace. However, the Iraqis turned down this 
proposal, insisting that Resolution 598 should be fully implemented without any modifications.601
Once the deliberations had ended, paving the way for the passage of the final resolution on 
November 11, it was readily apparent that the results were mixed. The Syrians had averted a 
rupture in Arab-lranian relations in exchange for a strongly-worded resolution condemning Iran's 
conduct in the Gulf theater. Meanwhile, the Syrians had had to back down on their demands for 
the condemnation of the US naval presence in the area and the alteration of Resolution 598.602 On 
the subject of Egypt's rehabilitation, again there was a certain amount of give and take, with both 
sides making concessions. The pro-Syrian camp prevailed in the debate about Egypt's status by 
thwarting its return to the Arab League. On the other hand, a major concession was granted 
through the adoption of a specific clause in the final resolution recognizing that the decision to 
resume bilateral diplomatic relations with Cairo fell within the provenance of each individual 
member of the Arab League. In fact, only Libya lobbied vigorously against this clause, with Syria 
and its other supporters expressing no reservations.603
In conclusion, the final statement and resolutions approved by the participants on the last 
day of the summit, November 11, condemned Iran's occupation of Iraqi territory, its continued 
aggression against Iraq and its refusal to accept a ceasefire.604 The Arab League reaffirmed its 
support for Kuwait and Saudi Arabia in the wake of hostile Iranian moves against them.605 
Specifically, Iran's "repeated attacks" against Kuwait and the "acts of sabotage and rioting" 
perpetrated by Iranians in Mecca were denounced.606 The members expressed solidarity with Iraq 
and urged Iran and the UN Security Council to fully implement Resolution 598 "in accordance with 
the sequence of its clauses."607 Moreover, they indicated their readiness to uphold their obligations 
towards Iraq as stipulated in the Arab League Charter and the 1950 Joint Defense Pact. They also 
affirmed their willingness to fulfill similar obligations towards the GCC states in the event of further 
Iranian attacks against them.608
At a press conference immediately following the end of the proceedings, King Hussein 
proudly declared that it had been the "summit of harmony and accord."609 With Syria - the "beating 
heart of Arabism” and Iran's most important Arab ally - having grudgingly given its consent to the 
final communique and relevant resolutions, the Jordanian host could now claim some credit for 
breaking the political impasse that had paralyzed the Arab League. With Assad now "falling into 
line", an illusion of Arab solidarity against Iran had been created, albeit temporarily. More
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importantly, though, the path was now clear for the de facto reintegration of Egypt into the Arab. 
fold after a nine-year absence. By feigning solidarity with the mainstream Arab states, Syria had 
on this occasion escaped accusations of impeding joint Arab action to restore some semblance of 
unity in Arab ranks.610
Undoubtedly, Jordanian prestige was enhanced by the relative success of the conference. 
On the other hand, even before leaving Amman, the Syrian delegation took steps to dispel the 
mirage of Syrian solidarity with the pro-Iraq camp. Assad's spokesman, Gibran Kourieh, 
steadfastly denied Jordanian claims that King Hussein had reconciled the Syrian and Iraqi 
presidents.611 Indeed, at the conclusion of the summit in the Royal Cultural Center, when asked to 
shake hands in front of reporters, Assad and Saddam Hussein pointedly declined to do so.612 One 
Syrian official also explained that the outcome of the Amman summit would not have a decisive 
impact on the Damascus-Tehran axis 613
Some press reports at the time claimed that Assad had received pledges of assistance 
amounting to some $2 billion in financial aid and oil from the GCC states in exchange for his 
political support. However, the existing evidence shows that these claims were baseless, mere 
speculation.614 Iraqi Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz later posited that some of the Gulf states 
promised to provide support to Damascus on condition that it pursued a constructive policy in the 
Gulf.615 Syrian conduct in Amman reflected a shrewd calculation of profit and loss in order to carry 
out an effective damage limitation exercise and yield few substantial concessions. As in many 
past instances, Assad had shown himself to be a master of maneuver, escaping Arab opprobrium 
without terminating his alliance with Iran. Damascus remained well positioned to coax the Gulf 
states to provide desperately needed aid without the loss of Iranian oil shipments 616
Predictably, Iran denounced the outcome of the Amman summit, calling it "a shameful, 
humiliating defeat for the Arab masses."617 With regard to the condemnation of Iranian conduct in 
the Gulf region, Tehran reiterated that "despite all the enemies' plots and propaganda," it was 
"determined to continue its defensive war until the aggressor Baghdad regime" had been punished 
and "Iran's rightful demands were met."618 As far as Egypt's informal re-entry into the Arab fold 
was concerned, the Arab League’s decision was depicted as an "implicit acceptance of the Camp 
David Accords - an act of treason."619 The restoration of ties with Cairo was described as the 
legitimization of the "Zionist entity" and abandonment of the Palestinian cause.620 Overall, the 
outcome of the summit must have come as an immense disappointment to Iran's Islamist regime. 
Although Tehran was very much appreciative of Syrian efforts in successfully blocking a rupture in 
Arab-lranian relations, nonetheless, Iran turned out to be the biggest loser in Amman, thus 
highlighting the general failure of Iran's Arab policy since the 1979 Revolution.
The Amman summit was a major watershed and marked an important turning point in 
Syrian-lranian fortunes in the 1980s. While the conference could be considered a tactical victory 
of sorts for the two states, particularly Syria, it demonstrated that Iran's mismanagement of the
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general conduct of the war had rallied the majority of the Arab world against it and galvanized 
support for Saddam Hussein. In the broader picture, the clerical regime's ideological zeal 
combined with its inability to assess realistically the evolving political and strategic conditions in the 
Gulf and beyond had led to its gradual isolation in the Middle East, had diminished Syrian-lranian 
power and prestige in the region, had marginalized Syria's position in inter-Arab politics and had 
increased Tehran's dependence on Syrian goodwill and cooperation. In the Gulf conflict itself, 
Iran's failure to harmonize its war aims and capabilities, and to integrate military and manpower 
requirements with available domestic resources resulted, in the squandering of valuable assets, 
and horrendous losses. Despite growing Arab and international support for Iraq since 1984, Iran's 
futile attempts to bring Iraq to its knees and to intimidate its Gulf Arab allies internationalized the 
conflict, thereby alienating most of the Arab-lslamic world. It provided a pretext for the Reagan 
administration to deploy military forces in the Persian Gulf, and to intervene as a de facto co­
belligerent siding with Baghdad.
In many respects, the Amman summit sounded the death knell of revolutionary Iran's 
hopes and aspirations to export its Islamist ideology to other areas of the Middle East, just as the 
failure of Operation Karbala 5 earlier in the year finally drove home the fact to some elements 
within the Iranian leadership that Iraq could not be defeated on the battlefield. From the standpoint 
of many Arab governments, the direct challenge posed by a neighboring Islamic country to the 
status quo in the Arab East, both in terms of security and ideology (particularly a political ideology 
that had an organic familiarity, legitimacy and appeal to some of the Arab masses) impelled the 
anti-Iranian camp to elevate Iran to enemy number one, thereby replacing Israel as a more serious 
and present danger. The Amman resolution portrayed Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait as 
"confrontation states," much to the disappointment of Syria and Lebanon.621 With the Arab 
commitment to the Arab-lsraeli struggle waning, in an unprecedented move, the Arab League had 
relegated the Palestinian struggle to a secondary position.622
In general, the Amman summit represented a double blow for Iran in symbolic and 
ideological terms. On one level, the strongly-worded resolution (approved by the overwhelming 
majority of the Arab League), harshly rebuking Iranian policies for the first time, conveyed the 
impression that the Iraqi-lranian conflict had now been elevated to the level of a war pitting Arabs 
against Iranians.623 Secondly, the sharp denunciation of "the bloody and criminal acts perpetrated 
by the Iranians" in Mecca (according to the text of the resolution) directly challenged the religious 
and ideological legitimacy of Khomeini's theocratic state. By putting the events in Mecca into an 
Islamic context, describing them in the resolution as "erroneous practices which are contrary to the 
teachings of the true Islamic faith," a severe blow had been dealt to Iran's Islamic credentials. The 
message was clear: supporters of Arab nationalism and Islam throughout the Arab-lslamic world 
were obliged to confront the Iranian threat.624
Although Syria had headed off an Arab-lranian break by the Arab League, in effect
243
securing a tactical and symbolic victory for itself and its non-Arab partner, in reality, by the end of 
1987, this was a moot point. Arab-lranian relations had reached a nadir, with key states such as 
Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and several others no longer having 
diplomatic relations with Iran. A de facto Arab-lranian rift had occurred, leaving the clerical regime 
politically isolated and ideologically discredited.
Syria's predicament was in many respects comparable with Iran's, although not as grave. 
Assad had succeeded in orchestrating a careful balancing act in Amman by swimming with the tide 
of Arab unity to condemn Iranian policies and keep open diplomatic channels with the pro-Iraqi 
camp, and in parallel to extract some noteworthy concessions and preserve the alliance with Iran. 
Damascus achieved tactical victories by prevailing on others to defer the question of Egypt's 
membership in the Arab League and to refrain from severing links with Iran. To a limited extent, 
Syria had proven its ability once more to be a spoiler and to score certain gains. In reality, though, 
they were only of short-term benefit, amounting to very little in substance.
With regard to Egypt's readmission into the Arab League, here again, it had been a hollow 
victory. In view of the clear consensus among the majority that Cairo needed to be reintegrated on 
some level (implicitly to diminish Syria's political clout, and explicitly to neutralize the military 
threat posed by Iran in the Gulf region), Assad could not go so far as to argue that other Arab 
governments did not have the sovereign right to re-establish bilateral relations with Egypt.625 
Already, on the last day of the Arab summit, Iraq and five GCC states officially declared their 
intention to restore diplomatic ties with Cairo after the end of the conference 626 Within a matter of 
days after the resumption of full Iraqi-Egyptian ties, the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Morocco, 
North Yemen, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Mauritania and Qatar (in that order) all followed Baghdad's 
lead and rushed to restore normal relations with Mubarak's Egypt.627 In rapid succession over a 
two-week period, all these states re-established links with Cairo, much to the chagrin of Syria and 
its allies. In fact, by December 1987, only six states, Syria, Libya, Algeria, Lebanon, South Yemen 
and Tunisia had not followed suit with the majority of Arab League members.628
The beginning of Egypt's informal re-entry into the Arab fold was an indisputable sign that 
Syria's political fortunes had taken a turn for the worse, and that it was being sidelined in Arab 
affairs. The decision to officially draw Egypt into the Saudi-lraqi-Jordanian orbit at a time when 
Syria was bogged down in Lebanon, and Iran was proving unable to affect the outcome of the war 
and becoming increasingly entangled with the US, meant that the pendulum had finally swung 
against the Syrian-lranian axis. Events in the closing months of 1987 clearly demonstrated that the 
Damascus-Tehran nexus was gradually becoming overshadowed by a much more formidable 
alliance that had the full support of Washington.
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Syria's Response to the Evolving Regional Situation in the Aftermath of the Arab League 
Summit
Subsequent to the conclusion of the Amman conference, Damascus took decisive steps to shore 
up its regional position. In order to prevent the continued decline of its political influence, it 
adopted a two-pronged approach, by initiating a diplomatic campaign to reassure Iran of its 
continued commitment to the alliance, while offering its good offices to the GCC to defuse Arab- 
lranian tensions in the Gulf. Syria's overall objectives in the immediate post-summit period were 
three-fold: to support Iran to the extent possible in the war against Iraq, to prove itself 
indispensable to the GCC states by serving as an effective mediator between them and Iran and to 
dissipate Arab-lranian tensions in the Gulf in order to render Egyptian proposals for military and 
political support of the Arab sheikhdoms superfluous, thereby impeding Cairo's attempts to 
reintegrate itself into the Arab fold.
Immediately after the summit meeting, Syrian Foreign Minister al-Shara dampened 
expectations about a possible Syrian-lranian fissure by stating that Damascus did not support the 
Arab League's condemnation of Iran. He castigated Secretary-General Klibi's omission of certain 
Syrian reservations regarding Iran while reading the final statement. He also cautioned that the 
significance of the talks between Assad and Saddam Hussein should not be exaggerated.629 
Concomitantly, the Syrian media denounced attempts by some of the other Arab states to "distort" 
Syria's stance towards Iran and emphasized the continued importance of Syrian-lranian 
cooperation.630 An editorial in Tishrin on November 14 criticized the Arab League's attempt to 
isolate Iran by misrepresenting the Gulf W ar as an Arab-Persian conflict. It went on to conclude: 
"in the final analysis, Iran is the natural ally of the Arabs in their battle against Israel and the United 
States."631 Moreover, on the same day, al-Shara declared that "Syria remains firmly on the side of 
the Iranians and will never depart from its solidarity with the Islamic Republic."632 Two days later, 
on November 16, Faruq al-Shara sent a message to Ali Akbar Velayati stressing the continued 
need for Syrian-lranian solidarity and indicating his intention to visit Tehran soon in order to brief 
his Iranian counterpart on what had transpired in Amman.633
In tandem with sending promising signals to Iran, Syria undertook measures to diminish the 
GCC's perceived need for Egyptian military assistance. Such action on the part of Damascus 
assumed greater urgency in the light of Iran’s reaction to the Arab summit. (See next section.) 
Already in the days following the Amman meeting, Egyptian military officials were dispatched to 
several Gulf states, most notably Kuwait, to examine ways to improve security. Among the issues 
discussed were bolstering air defense capabilities against possible Iranian aerial attacks and 
beefing up internal security to counter subversive activities by local pro-Iranian groups.634 
Consequently, on November 21, as a two-day meeting of GCC heads of state got underway in Abu 
Dhabi to discuss joint security and defense measures, Assad sent messages to GCC leaders 
assuring them that, in the event of Iranian aggression, Syrian troops would be sent to protect
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them.635
The Syrian President also tried to increase his room for diplomatic maneuvering between 
the antagonists by sending a trade delegation to Iraq on November 21 to explore opportunities for 
renewed commerce between the two sides, to concur with the renewal of telephone links between 
them and a continued understanding to refrain from propaganda campaigns against one another. 
However, the talks seem to have come to naught, since Syria was still unwilling to meet even Iraq's 
minimum demand to move towards neutrality in the Gulf War. Impatient with the lack of progress 
in the Syrian-lraqi dialogue, King Hussein shuttled between Damascus and Baghdad from 
November 25 to 30 in an effort to persuade the Bathi rivals, as a first step in the normalization 
process, to re-establish diplomatic relations. Again, he failed to break the deadlock.636 During 
King Hussein's deliberations in the two capitals, on November 29, Iran's ambassador to Damascus, 
Mohammad Hassan Akhtari, met with Syrian Information Minister Salman, who reassured him that 
Syria's stance toward Iran and the Gulf W ar remained "unchanged."637
Iran's Response to the Amman Summit, and Subsequent Diplomatic Moves in the Gulf 
Conflict
From the perspective of Iran's revolutionaries, the outcome of the Amman summit was a major 
disappointment, representing a symbolic and psychological blow to their crusade to transcend 
ethnic-sectarian cleavages by uniting Persians and Arabs under the banner of revolutionary 
Islam.638 In view of the American resolve to use force in the Persian Gulf, and continued Iraqi 
aerial attacks, Iran tried to muster the necessary strength to initiate new ground offensives, in order 
to keep Baghdad under pressure and demonstrate to the pro-Iraqi camp that the Islamic Republic 
remained undeterred, despite the political setback experienced in Amman. Already, Iran had 
begun another military mobilization, claiming success in building up some 200 battalions of 
volunteers (Baseej), composed of 200,000 to 500,000 men. In reality though, the clerical regime 
was facing severe difficulties in this endeavor, with only 60,000 to 100,000 men reporting for 
duty. Two days after the conclusion of the Amman summit, on November 13, Iran's Supreme 
Defense Council announced a new mobilization campaign, fuelling some speculation that Tehran 
was planning a major winter offensive.640 However, the magnitude of the brewing crisis within Iran 
was underlined by the fact that, on this occasion, Ayatollah Khomeini himself had to issue a 
religious decree calling on all able-bodied men to enlist and all other citizens to donate money to 
pay for the cost of one soldier each at the front.641
Meanwhile in the Gulf, the Tanker War continued unabated, with both sides escalating their 
attacks. As tensions rose once more, Crown Prince Abdullah of Saudi Arabia followed up on King 
Hussein's earlier initiative to mediate between Syria and Iraq by departing for Baghdad on 
December 19 to hold talks with Saddam Hussein. The next day, he left for Damascus, where he 
was received by Hafez Assad.642 Although little headway seems to have been made in healing the
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Syrian-lraqi rift, as a direct outcome of the Saudi-Syrian dialogue, Damascus subsequently stepped 
up its mediation efforts between Iran and the GCC states. Faruq al-Shara embarked on a new 
round of shuttle diplomacy between Tehran and Riyadh during the period December 22-29, with his 
efforts bearing some substantive results.643
Due to strong Syrian pressure, Iran halted its attacks on Gulf Arab shipping, which had 
peaked just before Christmas.644 In between two visits to the Iranian capital, the Syrian foreign 
minister spent several days in Riyadh, where GCC heads of state had gathered for the GCC 
summit meeting.645 Again, al-Shara seems to have prevailed upon them to adopt a more 
moderate position vis-S-vis Tehran. Indeed, the final communiqu6 issued at the end of the GCC 
conference on December 29 was noteworthy for its conciliatory tone, contrasting sharply with that 
of the Arab League summit in Amman. While the participants expressed regret for the 
"destructive" war between Iran and Iraq, and Iran's "procrastination" in accepting UN Resolution 
598, they omitted any reference to the Mecca incident and refrained from directly condemning 
Iranian conduct in the Gulf War.646 Afterwards, in a surprising move, Saudi Foreign Minister Saud 
al-Faisal asserted that the GCC's "dialogue with Iran has never ceased, it is continuing, and will 
continue."647
Overall, the efficacy of Syria's diplomacy, and the support that it received from states such 
as Oman and the UAE which favored maintaining links with Iran, prompted both sides to take a 
step back and decrease hostilities in the Gulf, if only temporarily.648
THE GULF WAR AND SYRIAN MEDIATION EFFORTS (JANUARY - MARCH 1988)
In the early weeks of 1988, the Syrians followed up on their earlier success in easing Arab-lranian 
tensions in the Persian Gulf by intensifying their mediation efforts. With the lull in the Tanker W ar 
and the conciliatory position adopted by the GCC towards Iran at the Riyadh summit, Damascus 
was determined to press on to defuse the potentially explosive situation, gain precious political 
capital by laying the groundwork for a GCC-lran dialogue and convince Tehran to desist from 
provocative acts in the Gulf. Moreover, the tour of the Gulf sheikhdoms by newly-appointed US 
Defense Secretary Frank Cariucci in early January, and a ground-breaking visit to the region by 
Hosni Mubarak scheduled for mid-January to consolidate the budding friendship between Egypt 
and the GCC, lent greater urgency to the Syrian initiative. Damascus was particularly concerned 
that Cairo would exacerbate the situation, by playing up the Iranian threat in order to strengthen its 
emerging military ties with the Gulf states and, in doing so, diminish the efficacy of Syrian 
diplomacy to bridge the gap between the two sides.
Throughout the winter of 1987-88, as Iran tried to mobilize enough men and materiel for 
another possible offensive in the Basra area, the Syrians, in consultation with the Gulf Arabs, 
anxiously tried to head off such a move, fearing that an operation similar to Karbala 5 would 
accelerate Egyptian moves to cement defense links with the GCC, galvanize support for Iraq and
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in the process push Syria to the sidelines of Arab and regional politics.649 Subsequent to al-Shara's 
successful shuttle diplomacy between Tehran and Riyadh in late December, Assad tried to build on 
the earlier gains by dispatching Vice-President Khaddam along with al-Shara to the Gulf states to 
offer Syria's good offices once again. The involvement of Khaddam underscored the seriousness 
of the Syrian effort to bring about an accommodation between Iran and the GCC. The Gulf states 
were also willing to give Syrian mediation a chance in view of the fact that UN efforts had proven 
to be ineffective.650
As Khaddam and al-Shara prepared to set off for the Gulf region, Carlucci toured the GCC 
states, meeting with political leaders in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and Oman. At the same 
time, Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati declared that, in response to the promising signals from the 
GCC and Syrian entreaties, Tehran was prepared to commence a dialogue with Gulf states.651 
Once Khaddam and al-Shara began their consultations in the GCC states in subsequent days, it 
became evident that the purpose of their mission was multifold. Not only were they attempting to 
build diplomatic bridges across the Gulf to improve GCC-lranian ties and contain the hostilities, but 
they also aimed to put forth a series of proposals in order to achieve a comprehensive peace in the 
region.652 Damascus hoped to persuade Tehran to refrain from conducting any major offensives 
against Iraq, and to convince Baghdad through Gulf Arab intermediaries to continue its moratorium 
on attacks targeting Iranian shipping in Gulf waters. By preserving a degree of calm in the area, 
the Syrians intended to prod the GCC to adopt a neutral position in the war and pay Iran 
reparations demanded from Iraq, in exchange for an Iranian commitment to cease hostilities, and 
withdraw from occupied Iraqi territory.653 The Syrians were genuinely worried that a full-scale 
offensive by Iran would provide Washington and Cairo with the perfect pretext to intervene 
effectively on the side of the pro-Iraqi camp, torpedo Syrian attempts to reach a diplomatic solution 
and facilitate the passage of a UN Security Council resolution imposing an international arms 
embargo on Iran.654
As Carlucci continued his talks with Gulf Arab officials, the Syrian delegation headed by 
Khaddam also began its tour of the GCC states, offering to arrange and even host a meeting 
between Iranian and GCC representatives.655 During the deliberations with Gulf Arab leaders, 
Khaddam and al-Shara proposed that the GCC should encourage Baghdad to continue its 
ceasefire in the Gulf. In exchange, Syria would do its utmost to discourage any possible Iranian 
land offensive. Under such circumstances, the GCC and Iran could commence a dialogue under 
Syrian auspices to improve relations and explore possibilities to end the war.656
Unfortunately for the Syrians, their strategy suffered from three major weaknesses. Firstly, 
the GCC countries were divided on this issue. While Oman, Qatar and the UAE seemed amenable 
to Syrian mediation, and were eager to thaw relations with Iran, the other three members, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, were reluctant to support the Syrian plan wholeheartedly.657 Secondly, 
Iraq was deeply suspicious of Damascus' motives, interpreting this initiative as part of an effort to
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break the unity achieved in Arab ranks in Amman. Baghdad believed that Syria was trying to 
decouple the GCC and Iraq by facilitating a GCC-lranian rapprochement, and in parallel to assist 
Iran by isolating Iraq. Thirdly, Iran did not see eye-to-eye with its Arab ally in terms of Syria's 
overall agenda. On the one hand, the clerical regime was appreciative of Syrian moves to curb 
attacks on Iranian shipping and ease Arab-lranian tensions. It interpreted the Syrian effort as a 
means to gain some room for maneuver diplomatically, buy some time to weigh its options and 
reverse its slide into greater regional isolation. On the other hand, the hardliners within the Iranian 
government who enjoyed the stalwart support of Ayatollah Khomeini were intent on continuing the 
war with Iraq until the overthrow of the Iraqi Ba'th. The more pragmatic elements within the ruling 
elite hoped to cut Iran's losses by finding a face-saving way to extricate themselves from the 
conflict. In general, it is extremely difficult to assess what was happening within the black box of 
Iranian decision-making at the time. Although some members must have welcomed the proposals 
put forth by their Arab ally to end the war, it is evident that the hawks led by Ayatollah Khomeini 
himself were still in the dominant position, refusing to contemplate a negotiated settlement.
On January 10, the head of the UAE Foreign Ministry's GCC department, Saif Said, 
arrived in Tehran carrying a message for Ali Akbar Velayati. The UAE indicated that the purpose 
of Said's mission was to hold talks with Iranian officials aimed at "defusing tensions in the Gulf and 
ending the Iran-lraq War." Subsequent to these deliberations, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister 
Sheikholislam stated that the conflict would only be terminated when Saddam Hussein was toppled 
and called on the GCC to withdraw its support for Iraq.658 Not surprisingly, Baghdad now seized 
the opportunity to end the tacit truce between the two sides brokered by Syria since late December. 
With Hosni Mubarak's visit to the Gulf only a few days away, Iraq launched new aerial attacks 
against Iranian targets, bombing the Tabriz oil refinery and hitting four tankers near Kharg Island 
between January 10 and 12.659 In order to avoid contributing to the total collapse of the Syrian 
mediation effort and playing into Iraq's hands, Iran refrained from attacking Gulf Arab shipping and 
reiterated its willingness to pursue a political dialogue with the GCC.660 On January 12, Syrian 
Minister of Information Salman somewhat prematurely declared: "We have succeeded in achieving 
an agreement by Iran and the Arab Gulf states to achieve a direct dialogue."661
As Mubarak's visit to the region got underway, Iran denounced what it depicted as Egyptian 
meddling in the Persian Gulf and accused Cairo of stoking the fires in the region.662 The Egyptian 
leader toured the Gulf region in mid-January to cement ties by bolstering military and economic 
cooperation with the GCC. He intended to conclude a number of military cooperation agreements 
in exchange for greater financial aid from the Gulf sheikhdoms.663 To highlight Cairo's 
commitment to Gulf security, during his stay in Saudi Arabia, Hosni Mubarak declared that "Egypt 
is an Arab country and the security of this area is part of Egyptian security."664 Only a day later, in 
Kuwait, he also implicitly rejected the Syrian mediation effort during a press conference.665
Iran, for its part, was trying to perform a delicate balancing act. It wanted to avoid casting
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a pall over the Syrian initiative to defuse GCC-lranian tensions, and to thwart Egyptian attempts to 
make further inroads in the Gulf, but at the same time it felt compelled to respond to Iraqi attacks. 
Rafsanjani warned that Iran was poised to launch a new ground offensive and might be forced to 
abandon the restraint it had exercised to date out of respect for Syrian efforts. He urged the Gulf 
states to distance themselves from Saddam Hussein and "come to the side of justice before it is 
too late."666 Only days later, on January 15, Iran conducted a limited operation along the northern 
front in Iraqi Kurdistan, codenamed Bayt al-Moqaddas 2.667 In concurrence with the renewed 
fighting in the north, Tehran announced its intention to follow up the dialogue with the GCC and 
sent the Foreign Ministry's Director-General for Arab-African Affairs, Mohammad Hossein 
Lavasani, to Abu Dhabi to hold further talks with UAE officials.668 His deliberations with the UAE 
foreign minister resulted in an Iranian pledge to refrain from attacking vessels flying flags of GCC 
states.669
By the latter part of January, several issues were becoming increasingly clear. Syrian 
success in facilitating a constructive dialogue between the GCC and Iran had been limited at best. 
The GCC was still divided on the wisdom of pursuing such an approach. Indeed, Tehran's 
assurance that it would desist from hitting GCC ships was only a limited concession, since the 
majority of the vessels destined for the Gulf states were not flying the flags of these countries. 
Moreover, it was evident that Iran was facing severe difficulties in mobilizing the necessary 
numbers to sustain a land campaign and assault Basra once again 670 Speculation now emerged 
that a de-escalation in the land war was inevitable.671 Altogether, these were unmistakable signs 
that the Islamic Republic was running out of options and had painted itself into a comer, in spite of 
Syrian attempts to heal the rift between Iran and the Gulf Arabs and devise an acceptable formula 
to end the war. In order to maintain pressure on Baghdad and its allies, in mid-January, Iran 
decided to respond in kind to Iraqi attacks in the Gulf by once again targeting third-country ships 
bound for Gulf Arab ports 672 Overall, Iran's riposte was ineffectual since it perpetuated tensions in 
the Persian Gulf without yielding any substantive results in strategic terms. On land, it was now 
only capable of conducting offensives on a limited scale.
Iraq's Reaction to Syrian-lranian Moves in the Gulf
After a brief pause from late December until mid-January, Iraq subsequently adopted an 
aggressive, two-track strategy to deal decisive blows against Iran in the Gulf in order to force it to 
the negotiating table and discredit Syrian moves to bridge the gap between the GCC and Iran. 
Baghdad resumed the Tanker War and conducted deep penetration raids against Iranian targets 
throughout January and February, highlighted by attacks on Kharg on February 7 and the Rey oil 
refinery on the outskirts of Tehran on February 27 673 Besides trying to bring Iran to its knees, the 
aerial campaign was also intended to feed into the policy of impeding Damascus' effort to stabilize 
the situation in the Gulf and ease GCC-lran tensions. Baghdad hoped that an intensive assault on
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Iran's strategic assets would fuel the fires and prompt Iran to threaten the Gulf Arabs in an overt 
manner. Such a development would derail the Syrian initiative and demonstrate the limits of 
Assad's influence. Concurrently, Iraq finally broke its silence and renewed its propaganda 
campaign against Syria for the first time since the Amman summit. The state-controlled media 
denounced the Syrian attempt to revive a GCC-1 ran dialogue, since it violated the spirit of the 
Amman summit resolutions to create a united Arab front against Iran. Damascus was accused of 
"whitewashing Iran," and trying to isolate Iraq at the same time.674 The Iraqi Ba'th unleashed an 
unrelenting barrage of criticism against its Syrian rival. Iraqi Minister of Information Jasim claimed 
that none of the Arab states trusted the Syrians since they had been "Iran's constant allies."675 A 
few days later, on January 26, Foreign Minister Tareq Aziz dismissed Syria's intercession, 
reiterating that UN Security Council Resolution 598 was the only formula for ending the hostilities. 
In addition, he expressed pessimism about the prospects of a Syrian-lraqi rapprochement, because 
of Damascus' insistence to break with the pan-Arab consensus achieved in Amman.676 Saddam 
Hussein also publicly accused Syria of endangering Arab security by serving as Iran's strategic ally, 
urging it to remain neutral at the very least 677 The Iraqi leader blamed Syria for the return to the 
"pre-summit atmosphere" by reneging on the anti-Iranian consensus reached at the Amman 
conference.678 The anti-Syrian polemic emanating from Baghdad increased during late January 
and early February. In an article published in Al-Thawrah on January 31, Deputy Prime Minister 
Ramadan called Syrian policy in the Gulf "a dirty attempt to divide brothers," warning that Arab 
fragmentation would only encourage Khomeini to continue the war. Furthermore, he stated that 
Iran's strategy was to create a new Persian empire under the guise of exporting revolutionary 
Islam.679
Damascus' reaction to Baghdad's war of words was relatively restrained. It is noteworthy 
that the Syrians tried to exploit the recent unrest in the Occupied Territories to justify their stand in 
the Gulf War, and deflect criticism. With the Palestinian intifada bringing a renewed focus in the 
region and beyond on the Arab-lsraeli struggle, Syrian officials stressed that, from the very outset, 
they had believed Iraq's ill-conceived effort to wage war on Iran, and its attempts to depict the 
hostilities as an Arab-lranian war, to be harmful to the combatants, and to have diverted Arab 
attention away from the centrality of the Palestinian issue.680 They rejected Iraqi accusations that 
their mediation in the Gulf was to the detriment of pan-Arab interests, arguing that preventing an 
escalation of hostilities that could potentially drag the GCC states into the war, and establishing 
"channels for dialogue and understanding between the Gulf states and Iran," would be beneficial to 
the Arabs.681 Interestingly enough, Damascus countered that Iraq's condemnation of its initiative in 
the Gulf and intentional policy of intensifying its air campaign in the waterway could only be 
interpreted as an attempt to destabilize the region and divert Arab and international attention away 
from the uprising in the Occupied Territories.682
As Iraq continued to engage in hyperbole, criticizing the Syrian-lranian partnership, any
251
lingering impression of Arab unity that had persisted since Amman quickly dissipated. The marked 
deterioration in Syrian-lraqi relations and the deadlock in the Gulf led to a flurry of diplomatic 
activity, with the various parties exercising damage control and jockeying for support to further 
their interests. King Hussein tried to cool Syrian-lraqi tensions in late January by going to Baghdad 
and sending Prime Minister al-Rifai to Damascus. Following talks with Saddam Hussein, he then 
proceeded to Damascus to meet with Hafez Assad. Despite his efforts to contain the situation, 
neither Baghdad nor Damascus seemed willing to reconsider its policies.683 Concurrent with the 
Jordanian initiative, Faruq al-Shara arrived in Tehran on January 30 for consultations with Iranian 
officials.684 Al-Shara conveyed a message from Hafez Assad to Ali Khamene'i and also met with 
his Iranian counterpart. The deliberations dealt with ways to contain the volatile situation in the 
Persian Gulf and strengthen GCC-lranian ties.685
In the aftermath of al-Shara's visit, throughout much of February, Syria continued to 
encourage the GCC-lranian dialogue, while Iran refrained from attacks on vessels flying GCC 
flags. In fact, a period of relative calm prevailed in the Gulf between February 12 and March 6, as 
Iraq discontinued the Tanker War and Iran was not compelled to retaliate. This lull could be 
partially attributed to an incident on February 12, reminiscent of the USS Stark attack, when an 
Iraqi TU-16 bomber hunting for targets in the Gulf mistakenly fired missiles at an American 
destroyer, USS Chandler, barely missing the warship, and later mistakenly attacked a Danish 
tanker carrying Saudi crude, damaging it.686 One can only speculate that, as a consequence, 
Washington and Riyadh brought pressure to bear on Baghdad to suspend its raids, particularly in 
view of the absence of any Iranian offensive in the Basra region and the relative restraint shown by 
Tehran in the Gulf. (Indeed, the fighting was confined to the north in Kurdistan and was limited in 
scale.) More importantly in the broader picture, Iraq seems to have acquiesced in order to give 
diplomacy a chance, hoping that a new American initiative in the UN Security Council would finally 
prod Iran to the negotiating table. As president of the Security Council, and with its term due to 
end on February 29, the United States announced its intention that same month to push through a 
resolution on the Gulf W ar threatening the imposition of sanctions on Iran after a 30-day period, if 
the UN Secretary-General failed to persuade Tehran to accept a negotiated settlement.687
While opting to give diplomacy a chance, Iraq also took advantage of the lull in the Tanker 
W ar and the absence of a major Iranian land operation to finalize preparations for its own 
campaign to turn the tables on Iran and bring the conflict to a favorable conclusion (in the event 
US moves in the Security Council failed). Baghdad gradually felt confident that it could seize the 
initiative on the military front and turn the tide of the war. As the US relinquished the presidency of 
the UN Security Council on February 29, Iranian President Khamene'i reiterated that acceptance of 
Resolution 598 would be contingent on prior identification of Iraq as the aggressor by the UN body. 
That evening, Iraq fired eleven modified Scud-B missiles (named Al-Hussein) at Tehran. It was 
the most intensive missile attack ever against the Iranian capital.688 For the next 52 days, almost
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190 missiles were fired at Tehran and other major Iranian cities in a bid to force the clerical regime 
to the negotiating table. These were supplemented by hundreds of sorties carried out by the Iraqi 
air force, bombing civilian and economic targets in and around thirty-seven Iranian cities and 
towns.689
Iranian Foreign Minister Velayati appealed in vain to the UN Secretary-General to 
intervene to stop the Iraqi attacks.690 Tehran also failed to achieve a "balance of terror" with 
Baghdad during March and April. With only a limited number of Scud missiles in its inventory 
(supplied by Libya, Syria and North Korea), and less than 50 of its US-made warplanes remaining 
operational, it responded by firing just over 70 missiles at Baghdad and other Iraqi urban centers, 
while only a handful of aerial assaults were conducted by the Iranian air force.691 Throughout 
March and April, it is estimated that 2,000 Iranians were killed by the Iraqi bombardment, and 
8,000 were wounded. The attacks had a devastating psychological impact on the clerical regime 
and the people, as the leadership bickered and hundreds of thousands of civilians fled into the 
countryside and the east, amid rumors that Iraq would launch missiles armed with chemical 
weapons against the cities.692
As the war of the cities escalated in early March, both Iraq and Iran raised the stakes by 
adopting their previous strategies to exert pressure on each other. On March 8, Iraq ended its 
moratorium in the Tanker W ar and recommenced attacks on Gulf shipping.693 In Damascus, the 
Syrian government criticized Iraqi actions and the renewed escalation of hostilities in the Gulf. 
Information Minister Mohammed Salman reasserted that Syria had previously won assurances 
from Iran that it would not attack Gulf Arab ships, putting the blame for the unstable situation 
squarely on Iraq's shoulders. He also brushed off Iraqi criticism of Syrian diplomacy aimed at 
reducing tensions in the region. Concurrently, his Iraqi counterpart, Latif Nassif Jasim, once again 
dismissed the prospect of reconciliation with Syria, accusing it of "stabbing Iraq in the back with its 
deception and lying."694 As on many occasions in the past, with the sudden escalation of the 
hostilities in the Gulf area, and the intensification of the war of words between the Iraqi and Syrian 
Bath regimes, King Hussein tried to mediate between the two Arab rivals by visiting Baghdad and 
Damascus in subsequent days to hold talks with Saddam Hussein and Hafez Assad.695 However, 
his intercession did not produce any concrete results.
Iran, for its part, decided to retaliate against Iraqi attacks on its urban centers and shipping 
in the Persian Gulf by launching an offensive, codenamed Wal-Fajr 10, into Suleimaniyiah 
province (150 miles northeast of Baghdad) on March 13. The Iranian forces, with the help of Iraqi 
exiles and local Kurds, scored some significant gains by overruning several border towns - 
including Halabjah - and subsequently pushed towards the Darbandikhan Reservoir and Dam, one 
of the largest in the country, that provided hydroelectric power to much of northeast Iraq and 
Baghdad.696 In order to terrorize and punish the local Kurdish population for siding with Iran, on the 
night of March 16, Iraqi warplanes dropped bombs containing poison gas on the town of Halabjah,
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resulting in the deaths of 2-4,000 Kurdish civilians.697 The events in Halabjah reinforced Iranian 
claims that Iraq had been using chemical weapons extensively in the war since 1984. However, on 
this occasion non-combatants had intentionally been targeted for the first time. The incident 
provided undeniable proof of Iraqi chemical warfare. It received extensive media coverage 
throughout the world and focused international attention on the issue more than ever before.698 
Besides attempting to win sympathy for its position, Tehran tried to use the tragedy to stir up 
passions at home and drum up support for the war effort. However, with the Iraqi missile campaign 
still in full swing, the state-controlled media's focus on Halabjah may have actually backfired and 
unnerved the Iranian public, heightening concerns that Iraq might also fire missiles armed with 
chemical warheads at Iranian cities.699
In spite of the Halabjah massacre, heavy fighting raged on throughout late March and early 
April, with the Iraqis eventually recovering some lost ground and the Iranians once again failing to 
achieve a major breakthrough.700 The Iranian war machine was undeniably running out of steam 
and popular support for the war effort waning. It was now only a question of time before Iraq would 
try to take advantage of the propitious circumstances and take the offensive. Indeed, the period 
from April to July 1988 would be fateful, with Iran suddenly suffering major reverses and Syria, 
being a mere spectator, unable to affect the outcome of events in favor of its ally.
THE AMAL-HEZBOLLAH RIVALRY AS A FACTOR IN SYRIAN-IRANIAN RELATIONS  
From early 1987 onwards, following Iran's failure to seize Basra, Lebanon gained greater 
significance in ideological, symbolic and practical terms for Iran's revolutionary regime. As hopes 
for toppling the Iraqi Ba'th and exporting the revolution to their closest Arab neighbor began to 
recede in the aftermath of Operation Karbala 5, the determination of Iran's clerical leaders to 
maintain and expand their foothold in Lebanon grew stronger. The carnage and misery produced 
by the ongoing civil war and the Israeli occupation continued to make Lebanon fertile ground for 
Iran's ideologues to proselytize and win over more adherents for their religious and political cause 
among the Lebanese Shi'ites. Consequently, Tehran paid greater attention to the Lebanese arena 
during 1987-88, channeling more resources there and showing sensitivity to attempts by other 
actors to undermine its influence. Although the Iranians were more resolute in their determination 
to expand their constituency in Lebanon, this was not supposed to be at the expense of their 
strategic partnership with the Syrians.
For Syria, the imperative to restore order in Lebanon assumed greater importance by 
1988, due to the impending expiry of Amin Gemayel's term in office and the expected election of a 
new Lebanese president in September of that year. Damascus hoped to strengthen its grip in the 
fractious land in order to ensure a smooth transition process and the selection of a president to its 
own liking by the Lebanese parliament. As in the past, Syria continued to view Iranian policy in its 
backyard, especially the activities of Hezbollah, with ambivalence. On the one hand, the guerrilla
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war waged against the Israelis and the SLA in the south received Damascus' blessing, seen as a 
means to bleed the Israelis and enhance Syria's confrontationalist credentials.701 Moreover, 
support for the resistance in southern Lebanon became more important with the unexpected 
outbreak of the Palestinian intifada, which focused both Arab and international attention once again 
on the need to find a just and durable Arab-lsraeli peace. The uprising in the Occupied Territories 
and Syrian-backed Hezbollah operations in southern Lebanon to some extent facilitated Assad's 
bid to gamer Arab support and tip the balance of power against the Egyptian-Jordanian-lraqi axis. 
Syria could emphasize once more that it was the only true confrontation state, and providing it with
702support was a pan-Arab duty.
On the other hand, Hezbollah's stated long-term objective of establishing a religious order 
in Lebanon, and waging an incessant struggle against Israel and its backers, did not fit into Assad's 
plan to re-establish a secular, multisectarian order in the country. By the early months of 1988, as 
Iran continued to make inroads into the Shi'ite community at the expense of Amal and orchestrated 
a series of kidnappings (much to the embarrassment of Nabih Berri and Hafez Assad), both Amal 
and Syria became determined to take firm action to rein in Hezbollah. However, what could not be 
foreseen was that Iran and its Lebanese cohorts would respond in a forceful manner. While 
Tehran's ideologues believed that they could ill afford to give up their only bridgehead in the Arab- 
Islamic world, Hezbollah, with much justification, interpreted events as a fight for survival. As a 
result, the contradictions in Syria's Lebanon policy came to the fore by the spring of 1988 and 
sparked the worst confrontation ever between Amal and Hezbollah, putting the Syrian-lranian 
alliance to the ultimate test.
With Iranian guidance and support, Hezobllah was by now turning into a veritable fighting 
force, capable of combining guerrilla tactics with conventional warfare to strike effectively at the 
IDF and SLA in the self-declared security zone. Damascus endorsed Hezbollah's military strategy 
in the south as long as the pro-Iranian movement did not go too far, since it feared that a major 
escalation could unwittingly drag Syria into a serious confrontation and perhaps even full-scale war 
with Israel. Besides direct contacts and their channels through the Iranians to ensure that 
Hezbollah did not go beyond certain bounds, the Syrians also expected Amal to keep the Shi'ite 
fundamentalists in check.703 However, there was growing unease within the Amal leadership that 
Hezbollah was becoming too powerful and a major force to be reckoned with in Lebanon. Indeed, 
Amal was resentful of Hezbollah's ability to win over the hearts and minds of many Shi'ites through 
a combination of ideological indoctrination, financial inducements and social benefits.704 The 
ability of the pro-Iranians to expand their base in the Shi'ite community at the expense of Amal, 
and to outspend their secular rival, prompted Amal officials to accuse Hezbollah of being no more 
than Iranian "robots," lacking genuine grassroots support.705 Hezbollah inroads in Amal's traditional 
geographical base of southern Lebanon led to armed clashes between the two militias in 
September 1987, and vocal criticism of Ayatollah Khomeini and Tehran's policies in Lebanon by
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Nabih Berri.706
As Hezbollah grew more confident and assertive, it showed no hesitation to criticize certain 
aspects of Syrian policy. Its daily newspaper, Al-Sabi, and the weekly, Al-Ahd, occasionally took 
an anti-Syrian stance on, for example, the prospect of a thaw in US-Syrian relations when US 
Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy visited Damascus in October 1987.707 Another sign of 
mounting friction between Syria and the pro-Iranian movement was the temporary detention of 120
708Hezbollah members by Syrian forces in northern Lebanon during November 1987.
During the winter of 1987-88, the Reagan administration became increasingly concerned 
about instability in the Middle East. Besides the ongoing hostilities in the Persian Gulf region, the 
sudden eruption of the Palestinian uprising, the escalation of Hezbollah operations in southern 
Lebanon with the blessing of Syrian military intelligence and prospects of an added political crisis 
in Lebanon when Amin Gemayel's presidency ended later in the year convinced Washington that 
concrete steps were required to mend US-Syrian relations and reach some sort of modus 
vivendi.709 From the American perspective, Syria's cooperation was vital, since it was the only 
major ally of Iran and was the most influential player in Lebanon. Damascus' participation was 
essential to restore peace in the Levant and the Gulf and secure the release of US hostages. 
Consequently, Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy travelled to Syria once more in early 
February to meet with Hafez Assad and find some common ground on these issues. Although all 
the details about their deliberations were not divulged, it is clear that Assad asked Murphy to 
intercede in order to bridge the gap between Syrian and Maronite positions on political reform in 
Lebanon and Gemayel's succession.710
Subsequent to Murphy's visit, on February 17, Hezbollah abducted Lieutenant-Colonel 
William Higgins, an American who was serving as head of the UN Truce and Supervision 
Organization's observer group (affiliated with UNIFIL) near Tyre in southern Lebanon.711 Hezbollah 
demanded the release of Lebanese and Palestinian captives held by Israel in exchange for Higgins' 
freedom.712 The abduction of Higgins was undoubtedly a major source of embarrassment to Amal 
and the Syrians since he had been kidnapped in an area nominally under the control of Amal, and 
his captors also intended to signal their displeasure with a possible US-Syrian rapprochement.713 
With the collaboration of UNIFIL, Amal cordoned off the area around Tyre and mounted an 
extensive search. Dozens of Hezbollah activists were detained for questioning by Amal, but to no 
avail.714 Amal's clamp-down also sparked minor skirmishes with Hezbollah fighters in the Bekaa 
and the south.715
As far as any possible Iranian involvement is concerned, it was suspected that certain 
political figures were aware of, or indirectly involved in, Higgins' abduction. The Iranian media 
accused Higgins of being a CIA operative. Following the incident, Ayatollah Montazeri received 
Sheikhs Fadlallah and al-Tufayli in Qom to review the situation and later summoned Iran's 
ambassadors to Syria and Lebanon and other Hezbollah officials to discuss Syrian demands for
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Higgins' immediate release.716 The kidnapping served both Hezbollah and Iranian interests in so 
far as it dealt a blow to both Amal and UNIFIL and provided some leverage in affecting the 
outcome of the US-Syrian rapprochement. Both were keen to carry on the struggle in southern 
Lebanon and prevent being sacrificed as part of a deal between Damascus and Washington. 
Indeed, by mid-March, as Amal's frustration with its inability to locate Higgins grew, Nabih Bern 
condemned Iranian "interference" in Lebanese affairs, emphasizing his concern about the security 
situation in the south. In addition, he tried to play the secular, Arab nationalist card by underlining 
that, while Amal sought "privileged and strategic ties with Iran," relations with Syria took 
precedence since it was "an Arab country like Lebanon."717
As Amal-Hezbollah relations approached breaking point, Assad continued his dialogue with 
the US and resolved to take decisive action. Hezbollah's growing power and boldness and the need 
to restore Syrian credibility in the eyes of Washington prompted Damascus to mobilize Amal to 
crack down and curb Islamic extremism in Lebanon. Ironically, Iran's earlier mediation in the 
winter between the Palestinians and Amal and the consequent cessation of hostilities around the 
refugee camps in Beirut and the south had freed up large numbers of Amal militiamen to take part 
in the impending showdown with Iran's clients.718 Eventually, on April 4, Amal forces attacked 
Hezbollah strongholds in and around Nabatiyah and Jezzine, near the Israeli-held security zone.719 
Following three days of heavy fighting that left more than 50 people dead and 130 injured, 
Hezbollah's last bastion in the south, the village of Siddiqin, was captured by Amal forces.720 
Hezbollah clerics and activists in the area were rounded up and expelled, and detachments of 
Iranian Revolutionary Guards stationed in the villages of Sharqiyah and Jibshit were forced to 
leave the south.721 By April 9, Amal boasted that its rival was "finished militarily" in the south and 
subsequently released a statement denouncing Hezbollah for carrying out "evil deeds," including 
terrorism, kidnapping and hijacking. Hezbollah's Sheikh al-Tufayli countered these charges by 
accusing Amal of being "an ally of Israel" and helping America implement its designs in the
722region.
It is noteworthy that Assad and Bern miscalculated and underestimated both Hezbollah and 
Iranian resolve to perpetuate their presence in Lebanon. The scenario that they had envisaged 
would not materialize. By the spring of 1988, a number of factors had contributed to the 
complexity of the political equation involving Syria, Iran, Amal and Hezbollah. The gradual 
institutionalization of Hezbollah as a political actor in Lebanon meant that it was no longer simply 
an Iranian proxy and was beginning to assert its independence by formulating and pursuing its own 
agenda. Secondly, the growing cleavages among the Iranian leadership confused the situation 
even further. While the pragmatists within the Tehran regime desired stable, strategic ties with 
Damascus, and aimed to cooperate with Syria to ease tensions and gain the release of Western 
hostages as long as some Iranian influence was tolerated in Lebanon, the more radical elements 
distrusted Syria and Amal, suspecting that Iranian and Hezbollah interests in Lebanon would
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eventually be compromised as part of an overall agreement between Syria and the US on 
Lebanon's political future.723 Thirdly, Tehran's determination to reverse the situation in Lebanon 
was reinforced by major setbacks in the Gulf W ar in mid-April, as US and Iraqi forces dealt 
decisive blows on land and sea. Major gains by the anti-Iranian coalition in the Persian Gulf 
dimmed Iranian hopes for any success and an honorable peace, thereby strengthening Tehran's 
drive to maintain its precarious foothold in Lebanon.
THE BEGINNING OF THE END FOR IRAN: THE PRO-IRAQ CAMP SEIZES THE INITIATIVE
As the war of the cities raged on throughout March and early April, Iran began to suffer a series of 
devastating and consecutive blows dealt by the pro-Iraqi camp and the United States aimed at 
cowing it into submission. The period between April and June marked the turning of the tide in the 
Gulf conflict, as Iraq seized the initiative in the ground war by launching a series of offensives that 
dislodged Iranian forces from prized possessions, including the Faw Peninsula, the Shalamcheh 
region east of Basra and the oil-rich Majnoon islands. In parallel, the United States took steps to 
neutralize the threat posed by Iran's naval forces in the Persian Gulf. By the end of the spring of 
1988, the Islamic Republic found itself more vulnerable and isolated, both on the regional and 
international level, than ever before. Indeed, Iran's military reverses on land and sea, coupled with 
the tragic shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane by the US Navy in early July (also 
highlighting the lack of sympathy and support from the international community), left it with no 
recourse and finally led to Tehran's unconditional acceptance of UN Resolution 598 in mid-July, 
thus ending the longest and bloodiest war in modem Middle East history.
On April 18, Iraq commenced its first major offensive operation in seven years in the 
marshes south of Basra, aimed at recapturing the Faw Peninsula. Elements of the 7th Army Corps 
supported by Republican Guard units stormed the Iranian defensive lines. Enjoying the element of 
tactical surprise and outnumbering the defenders 6 to 1, the Iraqis overran the Peninsula within a 
35-hour period, inflicting heavy losses on the Iranians.724 Only four hours after the Iraqi offensive 
in Faw got underway, the US Navy attacked two offshore platforms used by IRGC naval units in 
the southern Gulf, in retaliation for the damage done to a US naval vessel four days earlier by a 
mine suspected to have been planted by Iran. The hostilities rapidly escalated, involving 
substantial forces from both sides. By the end of the day when the fighting finally receded, the US 
had inflicted enormous losses on the Iranians. In addition to destroying two platforms, its forces 
sank an Iranian navy frigate, a gunboat and a number of speedboats, and damaged a second 
frigate. On the American side, only a Marine helicopter was lost.725 The Iraqi victory in Faw, the 
first major triumph in the land war since 1981, and the impressive success scored by the US Navy 
in the Gulf marked a major milestone in the evolution of the Gulf War and huge setbacks for the 
Iranian war effort. Iraq had clearly demonstrated that it could take the intiative in the ground war 
once again, while the US had shown that it would not allow Iran to gain the upper hand in the Gulf
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theater, putting two of Iran's four major surface vessels out of action in the process.726
Although Washington and Baghdad never admitted any collusion in the operations against 
Iranian land and naval forces and denied any links between the two events, Iran was convinced 
that the two had coordinated their moves to maximize the prospects of success.727 It seems highly 
improbable that the timing of the first major Iraqi land offensive in over seven years and the largest 
US-lranian military clash since the 1979 Revolution, occuring only hours apart on the same day, 
could have been a mere coincidence. In view of the extent of US-lraqi cooperation throughout 
1987-88, the two sides must, at the very least, have informed one another of their impending 
actions.
Predictably, international reaction to the events of April 18 was for the most part favorable 
towards the United States. Syria was the only country in the Arab East to criticize US actions.728 
Just a few days after the victory at Faw, on April 21, Baghdad declared a unilateral moratorium in 
the war of the cities, while Washington announced that its forces in the Gulf would now come to the 
rescue of any ship being attacked by Iran, not just Kuwaiti tankers being escorted by the US Navy. 
With Iran still reeling from the double blows inflicted on land and sea, the US now expanded its 
protective umbrella in the Persian Gulf, while Iraq continued aerial raids against Iranian assets in 
the waterway.
In the light of the major military reverses it had suffered and its growing political isolation, 
Tehran dispatched Velayati to Damascus on April 23 to brief the Syrian leadership on 
developments in the Gulf and perhaps request further Syrian mediation to ease tensions between 
Iran and the Gulf states.729 Upon arrival, Velayati held talks with Faruq al-Shara and was received 
the next day by Hafez Assad.730 Besides conveying a message from Khamene'i to Assad, the 
primary focus of the two-hour meeting between Velayati and Assad was the situation in the Gulf, 
and regional and international mediation efforts.731
Even if Syrian intercession to contain the damage to Arab-lranian relations in the Gulf was 
being seriously considered, in all probability, by this stage it would have been ineffective. Baghdad 
continued its air campaign in the Gulf (with US and Saudi assistance) and finalized preparations for 
its second major offensive, scheduled for late May, and aimed at driving Iranian forces east of 
Basra back across the international border. Throughout this period, there was very little Syria 
could do to aid its Iranian ally as events in the Gulf continued to unfold rapidly. As Iran received a 
drubbing in the Gulf at the hands of the pro-Iraqi coalition, and Syria's patience with Hezbollah was 
stretched to the limit in mid-May (see next section), sensing that a propitious moment had arrived, 
Washington dispatched its UN ambassador, Vernon Walters, to Damascus and Baghdad to forge a 
consensus on important regional issues and explore avenues of cooperation in the Arab-lsraeli and 
Gulf arenas.732 In view of Iranian reverses in the Gulf and Syrian-lranian tensions in Lebanon at 
this critical juncture, one of Walters' goals may have been to exploit the opportunity to decouple 
Syria and Iran and pave the way for a Syrian-lraqi understanding of some form. In any event, no
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radical shift occurred in Damascus' partnership with Tehran.
In parallel, on May 25, Iraq launched a major offensive to dislodge the Iranians from 
positions east of Basra (near the border town of Shalamcheh). After ten hours of intense fighting, 
the Third Army Corps with the support of Republican Guard units had completely routed the Iranian 
forces and pushed them back across the border.733 In spite of these defeats, Ayatollah Khomeini 
remained defiant and maintained his unwavering conviction that a military solution would still have 
to be pursued against the Iraqi Bathi regime. In a message delivered on May 28 to the opening 
session of the third Majles (which had been elected the previous month), he urged the people to 
continue to support the war effort, reaffirming that "the destiny of the war is written at the fronts, not 
at the negotiating table."734
In mid-June, the Iraqi army retook key positions east of Suleimaniyiah in the north and, 
further south, overran the strategically-situated Iranian border town of Mehran on June 18. In 
parallel, the Iraqi air force intensified its bombing of targets throughout Iran: this peaked on June 
23, when ten oil installations were attacked in the southwest. These were the heaviest raids since 
the end of the war of the cities in April.735 Finally, on June 25, Iraq initiated a full-scale offensive in 
the Hawizeh marshes aimed at retaking the oil-rich Majnoon islands. Specially trained Republican 
Guard and amphibious units took part in this eight-hour operation. As in the previous offensives, 
the Iraqis enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority and were extremely well-equipped, 
outnumbering their foe 20:1 in terms of tanks and artillery. They enveloped the Iranian positions in 
the marshes and pushed into Iran itself after annihilating enemy units.736 Once again, the victory 
was total. The Iraqis had attained their objective at minimal cost, while thousands of Iranian 
soldiers were either killed or captured during the fighting. Iran conceded more ground in Iraqi 
Kurdistan in late June and lost some warplanes in a desperate bid to expel Iraqi forces from Iranian 
territory east of the Majnoon Islands.737
By now, the Iraqi steamroller seemed to be unstoppable. Indeed, many regional 
observers, including the Iraqis themselves, were surprised by the relative ease (when compared to 
earlier campaigns) in defeating the Iranians. The impressive string of Iraqi victories between April 
and June can be attributed to several important factors. Overall, proper and meticulous planning 
on the part of the Iraqis, low Iranian morale in the last phase of the war (once the initiative had 
been lost after Operation Karbala 5), numerical superiority of the Iraqi army in terms of men and 
materiel, the extensive utilization of chemical weapons and adequate intelligence on Iranian troop 
dispositions provided to Iraq by US satellite intelligence, all combined, had a decisive role in 
turning the tables on revolutionary Iran in such a dramatic manner. By the end of June, it was 
quite apparent that victory was beyond Iran's grasp, while Iraq had weathered the worst part of the 
conflict and was now indisputably on the ascendant.
Iran was now clearly on the defensive and could do very little to determine the course of 
events on the warfront. Momentous events in subsequent days strengthened the hand of those
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factions that advocated a negotiated settlement and persuaded the hardliners, including Ayatollah 
Khomeini, to sue for peace. Both Iran and Syria played a largely passive role in the Gulf theater 
between April and July 1988. On the other hand, during the same period, they demonstated their 
ability to serve as key actors in Lebanon and, in May, survived one of the most crucial tests the 
Syrian-lranian alliance had ever faced.
THE AMAL-HEZBOLLAH CONFRONTATION AND ITS IMPACT ON SYRIAN-IRANIAN 
RELATIONS
Subsequent to the rout of Hezbollah forces in southern Lebanon at the hands of Amal between 
April 4 and 7, Iran sent a high-level delegation headed by Ayatollah Jannati to mediate between the 
two Shi'ite organizations and resolve their outstanding differences. While Tehran sought to find 
some common ground between the two rivals, it was also keen to restore Hezbollah's military 
presence in the south. At a press conference at the Iranian embassy in Beirut on April 22, Jannati 
announced that his consultations with the various parties had led to a joint decision to form a five- 
member commission composed of Fadlallah, Shamseddin, two representatives from Amal and 
Hezbollah and himself to review the situation and seek a solution.738 As the deliberations 
proceeded, it became evident that Bern was adamant in his refusal to allow a Hezbollah presence 
in the south.739 Jannati was unable to bridge the gap in their positions on issues such as the UN 
presence in the south and confrontation with Israel and its proxies in the area. The lingering 
tensions and frustration over the impasse once again resulted in a flare-up, as Amal and Hezbollah 
forces clashed in the Bekaa Valley on April 26-27. To make matters worse, Bern acccused Iran's 
ambassador to Lebanon, Ahmad Dastmalchian, of provoking these incidents.740 Nonetheless, the 
commission continued its efforts throughout late April and early May. However, Hezbollah's sense 
of siege and perception that its enemies in Lebanon and beyond wanted to eradicate it were 
reinforced by a daring Israeli ground attack ordered by Defense Minister Yitzhak Rabin against a 
Hezbollah-held citadel in the village of Maydoun (well beyond the self-declared security zone in the 
southwestern part of the Bekaa) on May 2. During the two days of fighting, the Hezbollah 
stronghold was completely destroyed, and forty of its guerrillas were slain.741
In parallel to Iran's intercession, one that was not yielding favorable results, Hezbollah 
augmented its cooperation with local Iranian Revolutionary Guards in order to regroup, and to 
strike effectively at its Shi'ite rival.742 Undoubtedly, Amal and Israeli operations targeting 
Hezbollah bases within a short time frame contributed to the pro-Iranian militia's paranoia and 
underlined the belief that the movement could be on the verge of extinction. For mainstream 
elements within the Iranian regime, their displeasure with certain aspects of Syria's Lebanon policy 
compelled them (along with the more radical elements) to take decisive measures to prop up 
Hezbollah. At this juncture, Tehran was beginning to walk a fine line. Although it could not tolerate 
the elimination of Hezbollah, it was loath to jeopardize the partnership with Damascus.
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During the first week in May, the Iranian team led by Jannati spent six days in Beirut trying 
to hammer out some form of compromise agreement. Amal continued to turn down requests for a 
renewed Hezbollah presence in the south to conduct operations against the occupation.743 The 
political deadlock perpetuated the charged atmosphere and led to renewed clashes. On the 
morning of May 6, after an incident in which three Amal members were killed by Hezbollah in the 
southern suburbs, Berri immediately resolved to deal a decisive blow by unleashing an assault 
against Hezbollah positions in Dahiya - Beirut's predominantly Shi'ite southern suburbs and 
slums.744 Amal fighters (with Syrian logistical support) launched a ferocious attack, overrunning 
Hezbolllah positions in the southern suburbs and outlying areas during the initial 36 hours of 
fighting.745 The intensity of the Amal onslaught must have come as a surprise to Hezbollah and 
Iran. Both Amal and Syria seemed to have mistakenly concluded that the Hezbollah defeats in the 
south and Maydoun had weakened and demoralized the pro-Iranian movement, and that the 
opportune moment had also arrived to remove its presence from the Lebanese capital.746 
Moreover, they underestimated Iran's determination to hold on to its assets in Lebanon in the light 
of the diplomatic and military setbacks its was experiencing in the Gulf. Damascus calculated that 
Iran would resign itself to conceding certain priveleges it had enjoyed in the Levant in exchange for 
continued Syrian cooperation vis-S-vis a resurgent Iraq. In view of Tehran's weakness and growing 
isolation, the last thing Assad expected was stiff resistance to his objectives from Tehran and its
747proxies.
Besides failing to predict Iran's reaction, Syria and Amal failed to grasp the growing 
complexity and gravity of the situation, particularly from Hezbollah's vantage point. Hezbollah by 
mid-1988 was no longer simply an Iranian puppet, but a semi-autonomous organization that had its 
own agenda and aspired to becoming a predominant force in Lebanese politics. Aside from Iran's 
concerns in Lebanon, Hezbollah interpreted events in April and May as a systematic and concerted 
effort to deny it a following among the Lebanese Shi'ites.748 It is noteworthy that the southern 
suburbs of Beirut were now the only area of the country where Hezbollah could operate with 
relative freedom, since its activities in the Syrian-occupied Bekaa were closely monitored, and 
controlled intermittently. Consequently, resistance to the Amal incursion in southern Beirut was 
now considered imperative to avoid extirpation.749
As Amal wrested control of large areas of the suburbs from Hezbollah, on May 7, a large 
contingent of Hezbollah fighters backed by several hundred Iranian Revolutionary Guards from 
Ba'albek managed, undetected by the Syrians and Amal, to slip into the Lebanese capital to bolster 
Hezbollah's strength. The reinforced Hezbollah units immediately went on the offensive, launching 
a well-planned and highly-disciplined attack on Amal positions, rapidly forcing their foe to fall back 
and advancing in a methodical manner, capturing key areas of the southern suburbs.750 As the 
clashes continued, calls for peace by the joint commission were ignored. On the night of May 7, a 
brief ceasefire was imposed after a meeting between Iranian Ambassador Dastmalchian and
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representatives from Amal and Hezbollah.751 However, it broke down after 16 hours the next 
afternoon. Concurrently, Ghazi Kan'an arrived in Beirut to meet with Nabih Bern and later 
appealed to Sheikh Fadlallah to rein in Hezbollah. Kan'an proposed a ceasefire agreement, and 
the deployment of Syrian troops in the southern suburbs to separate the rival militias. Iranian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikholislam also arrived from Iran in an attempt to negotiate a truce. By 
now, fighting had spread to most areas of south Beirut, with Hezbollah making significant .^- 
inroads.752
For the next several days, the fighting raged on, punctuated by shortlived ceasefires t 
arranged by Iranian and Syrian mediators, almost on a daily basis. Kan'an and Bern pushed for 
the cessation of hostilities, followed by the withdrawal of all militiamen from the streets of the 
southern suburbs and deployment of Syrian troops.753 However Hezbollah was reluctant to accept 
Damascus' plan on two counts. Firstly, the presence of the Syrian army in the suburbs would 
provide Assad with a strategic advantage in Hezbollah's domain.754 Secondly, Hezbollah had 
succeeded during the course of six days of intensive combat in expelling Amal from almost 80% of 
south Beirut.755 Having gained the upper hand, Hezbollah calculated that it was more 
advantageous to continue its advances in order to obtain better terms from the Syrians and Amal, 
within the framework of quadripartite talks also involving Iran. Its primary goal was to arrive at a 
quid pro quo arrangement whereby it would offer concessions in the suburbs in exchange for a 
renewed Hezbollah presence in southern Lebanon.756 Iran for the most part was sympathetic with 
these aims. While it strove to prove itself a valuable intermediary between the two sides, it was 
also keen to contain the bloodshed and ensure that it would not cause irreparable damage to its 
bilateral ties with Syria.
By May 11, after heavy fighting that had cost more than 150 lives and 550 wounded,
Hezbollah was indisputably on the ascendant. It had overrun the Amal headquarters in Bourj al-
Barajneh (linking up with Arafat loyalists in the area), and consolidated its hold over the districts of
Hayy Madi, Haret Hraik, Bir al-Abed and Hayy Muawwad.757 Amal forces had been pushed into a
narrow area on the western edge of the suburbs, only in control of the Chiyah district and parts of
Ghubaryh.758 Frustrated by the inability to impose a truce, and alarmed by the prospect of a
complete Amal rout in the fighting, Kan'an that same day threatened that, unless calm was
restored, Syrian forces would have to intervene to restore order.759 Iran for its part became deeply
concerned about a possible Syrian military intervention on the side of Amal and its implications.
Consequently, Iranian President Khamene'i immediately called his Syrian counterpart to discuss
the intra-Shi'ite feuding, and how to halt the violence.760 Afterwards, on the same day, the
quadripartite committee met at the Iranian embassy in Beirut and reached a ceasefire
agreement.761 The parties agreed that the ceasefire would be followed by the evacuation of
wounded, exchange of prisoners and withdrawal of fighters from the streets. As part of the
agreement, a joint security force composed of Syrian soldiers, Iranian Revolutionary Guards and,,
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militiamen from Amal and Hezbollah began to patrol the southern suburbs in the early hours of 
May 12 to supervise and monitor the ceasefire. That evening the quadripartite committee 
reconvened at the Iranian embassy to follow up matters.762
The committee tried to conclude a durable arrangement whereby Amal and Hezbollah 
could finally reach some sort of modus vivendi. Assad was performing a delicate balancing act at 
this stage, since he was facing a predicament similar to that of his Iranian allies. Although he 
wanted to enhance his position in Lebanon, even if it meant curbing Hezbollah, the question of 
severing longstanding links with Iran did not enter his mind. In fact, both Syria and Iran were eager 
to resolve the crisis in an expeditious manner, in part for fear that the fallout might have a harmful 
impact on their bilateral relations. However, both sides had divergent views on re-establishing the 
status quo ante. For Hezbollah and Iran, it meant returning to the situation prior to the April 
clashes in southern Lebanon, when Hezbollah had a sizeable presence in the region. In sharp 
contrast, Amal and Syria interpreted it as restoration of the status quo in south Beirut only and 
steadfastly refused to accept a renewed Hezbollah presence in southern Lebanon.763
As the quadripartite negotiations became deadlocked, Syria's nightmare scenario began to 
unfold in subsequent days. Unable to convince Amal to meet their demands, Hezbollah and Iran 
seemed to have calculated that they could obtain favorable terms only by pressing the initiative 
and backing Amal into a comer. On May 13, less than 48 hours after the ceasefire, Hezbollah 
fighters resumed the offensive, pushing towards the outer perimeter of the suburbs and Beirut 
airport. They overran the Awzai district and seized control of the highway connecting the airport to 
the capital, as Amal militiamen fell back.764 They neared a Syrian military encampment and drew 
fire from Syrian troops stationed at a checkpoint guarding the highway. In the ensuing melee, at 
least five Hezbollah fighters and one Syrian soldier were killed, and others were wounded.765 
Brigadier Ali Hammoud warned that Syrian forces would "eradicate any militia presence" in areas 
already under their control, while Sheikh Fadlallah asserted that it was up to Hezbollah's 5,000 
fighters to preserve an "Islamic presence" in Lebanon.766 In order to defuse tensions, Iranian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikholislam met with Hammoud on the 13th. That evening, there was 
another reprise in the fighting, but the hostilities resumed by the 15th, with Hezbollah achieving
767further gains. In Damascus, the Syrian leadership considered its options as its primary 
Lebanese ally was on the verge of defeat.
As the situation seemed to be spiralling out of control, with Hezbollah advancing in the 
northern section of the southern suburbs and Amal facing certain defeat, Syria decided to prepare 
for a military intervention in south Beirut, regardless of the reaction this could elicit from the 
Iranians or the Maronites.768 By now, six ceasefires arranged by Iran and Syria had collapsed, 
leaving Hezbollah in control of most of the twenty square kilometers that constituted the southern 
suburbs. More than 1,100 people had been killed or wounded in eight of the bloodiest days in the 
Lebanese Civil War.769 Nevertheless, Berri continued to reject Hezbollah offers to relinquish
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control of certain areas to Amal in return for a foothold in southern Lebanon.770 His forces fell back 
south and west towards Syrian-controlled areas.771
On May 15, Ghazi Kan'an announced that Syria had no alternative but to enter the suburbs 
in order to spare its 600,000 inhabitants from death and destruction and impose law and order.772 
Already, a force of 5-7 thousand Syrian troops supported by armor under the command of General 
Bairakdar had descended on West Beirut from the Shouf Mountains on the 14th, and was poised to 
enter the sprawling slums and shanty town area of Dahiya.773 By now, Damascus' main concern 
was to salvage Amal's position, while Tehran was worried about the possibility of a full-scale 
confrontation between Hezbollah and the Syrian forces.774 Prior to Kan'an's announcement, as 
additional Syrian forces poured into West Beirut, Damascus dispatched a senior intelligence officer 
to Tehran for 24 hours to inform Iranian officials of the planned intervention and discuss the fate of 
the Western hostages held in Dahiya.775 In effect, Assad had already reached a decision to 
intervene without consulting Iran.776
Tehran reacted immediately by sending two more envoys, Deputy Foreign Minister 
Besharati and Revolutionary Guards Minister Rafiqdoust, to Syria and Lebanon on May 15 to 
dissuade Syria from entering Dahiya.777 The next day, while Sheikholislam met with Hafez Assad, 
Besharati held talks with Faruq al-Shara, and Rafiqdoust conferred with other Syrian officials.778 
The purpose of Rafiqdoust's mission was to formulate mutually agreeable security measures in 
order to introduce and maintain a ceasefire.779 Earlier, Besharati had visited Fadlallah in Beirut to 
discuss the Syrian intervention. In parallel, a Hezbollah delegation had met with Kan'an, who 
assured them that the Syrian move was not aimed at curbing Hezbollah, and that both Shi'ite 
militias would be treated on an equal footing.780 Although both Hezbollah and Iranian officials 
stated that in principle they had no objections to the Syrian entry, they were desperately trying to
781seek a formula that would prevent or, at the very least, delay such action. Iran was attempting 
to gain a valuable victory by ensuring Hezbollah's continued existence and its freedom to wage war 
on the Israeli and SLA forces in the south, without jeopardizing its alliance with Syria. Damascus 
on the other hand was looking for a way to save its most important Lebanese proxy in order to 
establish a Pax Syriana, and at the same time preserve links with its Persian partner.782
There was intense Syrian and Iranian diplomatic activity between May 14 and 17 to 
prevent the planned deployment from turning into a confrontation with Iran's clients.783 It should be 
underscored that neither side was interested in precipitating a direct confrontation for fear of its 
broader implications. Indeed, throughout the Amal-Hezbollah fighting, the two allies, especially 
Syria, stressed the continued importance they attached to their "strategic alliance."784
It was quite evident that, behind closed doors, the Iranian envoys were voicing their 
vehement opposition to Syria's planned intervention. Intense Iranian displeasure, and the prospect 
of a costly confrontation with Hezbollah that could bleed the Syrians and endanger the lives of the 
Western hostages, eventually convinced Assad to hold back and try to find a political solution.785
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Moreover, Hezbollah explicitly warned the Syrians that the Western hostages would be killed if 
their troops entered the southern suburbs.786 Following a telephone conversation between Assad 
and Khamene'i, and consultations between Besharati and al-Shara on May 16, Besharati rushed to 
Beirut and held talks that evening with Ghazi Kan'an at the Iranian embassy.787 Afterwards, they 
announced an agreement had been reached to reconvene the quadripartite committee, which met 
immediately in order to establish a ceasefire and hold further negotiations aimed at reaching a 
comprehensive arrangement to end the Amal-Hezbollah dispute.788 As a direct consequence of 
these developments, the seventh ceasefire went into effect that night.
The next day, fighting erupted once more, as Hezbollah pushed Amal back even further 
and the death toll mounted to more than 250.789 Despite this setback, Besharati stated that a 
Syrian deployment would only complicate matters. He asserted they were "in total agreement with 
the Syrian brothers...desiring the implementation of the ceasefire and withdrawal of militamen from 
the suburbs."790 The Syrians, however reluctantly, seemed to have acceded to Iranian demands to 
give diplomacy a chance, as Kan'an also voiced approval of political negotiations.791 He 
expressed hope that peace and security could be achieved "through political means."792 Implicitly 
acknowledging Damascus' dilemma, Kan'an elucidated that Syria "has decided to postpone its 
entry into the suburbs to allow its political efforts to run their course...we want to establish balanced 
relations with all parties."793
As the clashes continued, Berri travelled to Damascus, where he pleaded with Assad for 
Syrian intervention. The Syrian leader purportedly pledged that his forces would step in to rescue 
Amal and restore order.794 As Amal's position continued to deteriorate, the political wrangling 
between Iran and Syria intensified as Besharati maintained his firm opposition to Syrian plans to 
enter Dahiya. Furthermore, he insisted that, in the event troops had to be deployed, their presence 
would have to be restricted to neighborhoods controlled by Amal. Hezbollah also emphasized that 
it would not disarm as part of any ceasefire agreement.795 Both demands partially reflected 
concerns that Amal gunmen would return with the deployment of Syrian peacekeepers and exploit 
their presence to settle scores with their Shi'ite rivals.796 From the Syrian standpoint, the fact that 
Hezbollah now controlled almost 90% of the southern suburbs, and refused to disarm under any 
circumstances, rendered the Iranian demand for a limited deployment unacceptable.
As the negotiations continued at a feverish pace, Iranian officials also sought guarantees 
that Syria would safeguard Hezbollah's presence in Beirut, especially its social and religious 
institutions and medical facilities - the hallmarks of Tehran's influence among the Lebanese 
Shi'ites.797 In view of the favorable situation on the ground for Hezbollah, Iran and its client 
continued to put forth new proposals and additional demands to maximize their leverage and 
extract more concessions from Syria and Amal. Indeed, this continued to be a recurrent pattern in 
the quadripartite negotiations for the next ten days, until the crisis was finally resolved on May 26. 
After constant haggling, each time the parties seemed close to reaching a comprehensive
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agreement, the Iranians would insert new conditions, much to the dismay and exasperation of the 
Syrians.790
The renewed clashes on May 17 prompted Besharati and Kan'an to hold another meeting, 
with both parties concurring on the need to end the fighting through a political settlement.799 Iran 
also asked for guarantees that 300 Revolutionary Guards in the suburbs would be given safe 
passage once the hostilities had ended.800 After their deliberations, Besharati reiterated at a press 
conference that there was complete convergence in the positions of the two allies, and a Syrian 
deployment was unnecessary.801 At the same time, the Amal leadership grew increasingly 
disillusioned by the conduct of its patron, fearing that in the high-stakes game of regional power 
politics, Damascus could very well sacrifice Amal in order to preserve its relations with Iran. As 
Hezbollah continued to tighten the noose around Amal, Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Has 
hurried to Beirut on May 18 for consultations with Ghazi Kan'an to assess the possibility for armed 
intervention. Frustrated by what he saw as Hezbollah and Iranian intransigence, Tlas struck a 
defiant note by declaring that Syria would "not permit any gambling over Lebanon’s Arab future."802 
He also stressed that the decision to intervene made four days earlier was "still in effect."803 Tlas 
inspected Syrian units in Beirut and called on them to "remain fully prepared," since entry into 
Dahiya was only a question of time.804 Reportedly, the Syrian Defense Minister had initially been 
predisposed to send in Syrian forces to halt the hostilities, but Kan'an persuaded him that such a 
move would only lead to a bloodbath that would tie down their forces in a costly and protracted 
conflict in Lebanon, and possibly sound the death knell of the Syrian-lranian alliance.805
Although fringe elements within both the Syrian and Iranian regimes advocated advancing 
their respective agendas in Lebanon, even if ultimately at the expense of their nine-year-old 
alliance, the prevailing view among the ruling circles in Damascus and Tehran was that prudence 
dictated a compromise solution would have to be reached in order to preserve their strategic ties. 
In essence, the Amal-Hezbollah crisis of May 1988 demonstrated beyond doubt that the Syrian- 
lranian relationship had matured and evolved into a stable, durable, regional axis. It represented a 
major milestone, signifying the consolidation of the Tehran-Damascus nexus.
At this point, the stakes were quite high for Syria and Iran. Despite the critical nature of the 
situation in Lebanon, both players had to look at the broader picture and evaluate their longer-term 
interests, on both the regional and international level. Neither side had a strong desire, nor indeed 
any interest, in precipitating a direct Syrian-Hezbollah confrontation.806 For Assad, American and 
Maronite refusal to cooperate with him in a constructive manner to establish a new order in 
Lebanon, and the sudden collapse of the Amal position in Beirut (exposing the pro-Syrian 
movement's decrepitude and fragmented structure), meant that he was left with few allies and had 
lost the buffer through which he could operate in Lebanon.807 Consequently, his room for political 
maneuvering had become markedly restricted. The Syrian leader now needed Iranian cooperation 
more than ever to control events in his backyard. The Syrians knew that, if vital national security
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interests were at stake, Hezbollah could probably be crushed if they committed at least 15,000 elite 
troops to such an undertaking.808 However, on balance, Syrian interests militated against such a 
move.
In the overall picture, the suppression of the pro-Iranian fundamentalists would not 
necessarily strengthen Assad's hand in Lebanon at this stage, and would undoubtedly strain 
relations with Tehran. In addition, Damascus was well aware that a Syrian-Hezbollah confrontation 
in Beirut and elsewhere in Lebanon that would potentiality bog down its forces and bleed both sides 
would be looked upon favorably by Tel Aviv and Washington.809 In terms of regional power 
politics, the Syrians calculated that a rupture in their relations with Iran would leave them more 
vulnerable, at a time when Iraq was beginning to reassert itself for the first time in more than six 
years and would seize any chance to mete out retribution for its Ba'thi rival's stalwart support of its 
Iranian foe.810 Moreover, Assad realized that time was of the essence, and he had to act in an 
expeditious manner to end the intra-Shi'ite feuding before the opening of the Arab summit on June 
7 in Algiers. He hoped to defuse the crisis in order to stabilize the situation in Lebanon and restore 
relations with Iran to a firm footing. The Syrian leader knew that his partnership with revolutionary 
Iran was a key asset in dealing with other Arab states and trying to gain their political and financial 
support. Assad was therefore keen to play his "Iran card" in Algiers to obtain concessions and 
shore up his regional position 811
Tehran was also eager to preserve its strategic ties with Damascus. Although Lebanon 
had been a primary focus of Iranian efforts to export the Islamic revolution, the clerical regime was 
conscious that, to date, its inroads in Lebanon were only achieved because of the active 
cooperation or acquiescence of the Syrian government. Lebanon had gained greater importance in 
ideological terms, now that Tehran realized it could not succeed in toppling the Iraqi regime; 
however, on the regional level, the alliance with Syria still remained the most vital component in 
Iran's Arab policy. Overall, the Iranians believed that some sort of accommodation would have to 
be reached with Syria over south Beirut that would leave Hezbollah with either some of its newly- 
acquired gains or restore its rights in southern Lebanon. This was preferable to adopting an 
uncompromising stance that could lead to an all-out Syrian-Hezbollah confrontation, and possibly 
the total eradication of Hezbollah. Such a development would translate into considerable loss of 
Iran's political, military and financial investment in the Shi'ite community since 1982 and deal a 
devastating blow to Syrian-lranian relations.812 In sum, despite the importance Iran attached to its 
foothold in Lebanon to ensure the future of revolutionary Islam, its growing weakness and isolation 
on the regional and international level meant that perpetuating the friendship with Syria figured first 
and foremost in the minds of Iran's leaders.813 Both Syria and Iran were determined to maintain 
their strategic axis and present a common front, regardless of the obstacles they faced in resolving 
their differences. Hence, throughout the May crisis, as the two sides conducted long, arduous 
negotiations (marked by constant wrangling over details), they diligently pursued this painstaking
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process almost on a daily basis for three weeks against the backdrop of the clashes and carnage 
only a few miles away.
As the fighting entered its second week, with casualties continuing to mount, and Amal 
desperately trying to cling to its shrinking foothold in south Beirut, the quadripartite talks continued. 
Iran now began to soften its stance on the introduction of a Syrian force, but along with Hezbollah, 
argued that, if a political solution could be reached, the deployment would be unnecessary.814 Both 
Besharati and Kan'an continued to support the search for a negotiated settlement, while Berri 
insisted on immediate Syrian intervention to save the day for his battered militia.815 Besharati 
hinted that a Syrian entry would require "further discussion" and "preliminary steps" that would 
satisfy Iranian concerns.816 In other words, Syria would have to meet certain Iranian demands and 
give specific guarantees regarding Hezbollah's future before a compromise could be reached. In 
tandem, both Syria and Hezbollah made conciliatory statements and denied that the intra-Shi'ite 
feuding had caused a rift between them. In an interview with Le Monde, Kan'an praised 
Hezbollah's struggle against the Israeli occupation and emphasized that the fundamentalist 
movement was not an obstacle to Syrian efforts to find an equitable national solution in 
Lebanon.817 Sheikh Fadlallah asserted that Hezbollah fighters would not resist a Syrian entry into 
the suburbs if they received assurances that they would not be disarmed. He underscored that the 
movement must continue to exist as a viable political and military force in the future 818 Fadlallah 
also pointed out that the Syrian army and Hezbollah co-existed peacefully in the Bekaa Valley 819 
A statement released by Hezbollah reiterated that there was no dispute with the Syrians, and "the 
doors of the suburbs are not closed to them."820
Intensive negotiations continued between the two regional allies as Iranian President 
Khamene'i sent another message dealing with the crisis to his Syrian counterpart, conveyed by 
Besharati to Assad during a meeting on May 19.821 It was quite apparent that something was afoot 
as Kan'an returned to Damascus that evening and Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikholislam was 
dispatched once more to the Syrian capital the next day.822 Sheikholislam met with Assad upon 
arrival and passed on another message from Khamene'i, while Besharati returned to Beirut to hold 
further talks with Amal and Hezbollah representatives.823 Following deliberations in Damascus, 
both Kan'an and Sheikholislam proceeded to Beirut on May 21, where quadripartite negotiations 
also involving Besharati, Hammoud and the representatives from the two militias now entered a 
new stage. The parties managed to forge a consensus on key issues, and the ninth ceasefire went 
into effect.824 As the fighting died down, and Hezbollah temporarily eased some of the pressure on 
Amal, it became dear that Syria and Iran had reached a understanding on allowing Hezbollah to 
remain armed and continue to function as a political force in Lebanon, while the Western hostages 
would not be released without certain demands being met 825 However, as in the past, just as the 
two sides seemed close to reaching an understanding, paving the way for the deployment of Syrian 
troops, Iran once again raised the stakes by inserting a new condition. At a six-hour meeting of the
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quadripartite committee held on the night of May 21-22 in West Beirut, Iranian Deputy Foreign 
Minister Sheikholislam - along with Hezbollah officials - insisted on the creation of a joint Syrian- 
lranian security force for the southern suburbs, as opposed to only a Syrian peacekeeping 
contingent. Hammoud and Amal officials rejected the demand outright, arguing that it was "out of 
the question" and that the composition of the security force was non-negotiable.826
While Syria was keen to maintain its valuable links with Iran, and to preserve cooperative 
ties with Hezbollah in order to use it to control events in Lebanon, it was nonetheless determined 
that certain lines it had drawn would not be crossed and that, if certain interests were at stake, 
other parties would not dictate terms in its backyard. Despite its willingness to accommodate Iran 
and Hezbollah on key issues, it was unwavering in its predilection to be the ultimate arbiter in 
Lebanon. Damascus' stance was accurately articulated by Vice-President Khaddam, who stated: 
"We greatly value our alliance with Iran, but our regional allies must respect our 
position...our role [in Lebanon] is above all other considerations. In their 
operations, our allies should pay attention to our interests and to those of our 
[Lebanese] friends. The movements of some [Lebanese] have become a threat to 
the Syrian roie. We shall not allow the creation of complications in the Lebanese 
arena."827
The quadripartite negotiations continued two more days, but had already become deadlocked once 
again, as Syria refused to give ground on the composition of the peacekeeping force. Moreover, in 
spite of Syrian assurances that Hezbollah would be allowed to maintain a political presence in 
Beirut and its fighers would be permitted to keep their arms, no progress was achieved on the issue 
of allowing the pro-Iranian militia to resume its guerrilla operations in the occupied south. By May 
24, the ceasefire broke down as Hezbollah resumed its assault.828 In parallel with the political 
track, Iran calculated that further gains on the ground by its clients at the expense of Amal would 
force Syria to re-evaluate its position and grant Hezbollah's demands. As fierce fighting re­
erupted, Amal, which now controlled about 10% of Dahiya, lost more ground as it was pushed out 
of the Ghubaryh quarter and clung desperately to Chiyah, its only remaining foothold.829 Amal 
issued a statement accusing Iranian Revolutionary Guards and PLO fighters of directing and 
assisting Hezbollah operations and acknowledged its losses in Ghubaryh. The pro-Syrian militia 
was now in an extremely vulnerable and precarious position, controlling less than 10% of the 
southern suburbs. Hezbollah forces now occupied seven of the eight quarters in south Beirut.830
With Amal now on the verge of total defeat in Beirut, and Iran and Hezbollah hardening 
their position, Assad decided to act in a swift and decisive manner to prevent a debacle in Dahiya. 
The next day, May 25, as Nabih Berri and Salim al-Hoss hurried to Damascus once more to plead 
with Khaddam for military intervention to end the violence, Assad received a high-ranking 
Hezbollah delegation at his summer palace in the seaside resort of Latakia.831 It was an 
extraordinary step, since the Syrian leader had invited the four Hezbollah representatives to his
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residence for direct talks. The mere fact that no Iranian representatives were present was a 
testimony to the growing independence of the Shi'ite movement. After three hours of negotiations, 
a five-point agreement was reached, paving the way for the Syrian entry into the suburbs and at 
the same time leaving Hezbollah assets intact. It stipulated that the Syrian army would be 
stationed throughout the suburbs, Hezbollah and Amal gunmen would be withdrawn from the 
streets, both Shi'ite groups could maintain political and information offices in the suburbs, 
Hezbollah fighters and Iranian Revolutionary Guards would have to withdraw to the Hayy Madi 
barracks, the pro-Iranians could only deploy fighters along the Green Line with East Beirut and 
Syrian troops would be replaced by Lebanese gendarmes within several weeks.832 Although not 
specified, there was an implicit understanding that Hezbollah would be allowed to resume guerrilla
QOO
operations in the occupied south.
The deal was approved the next day by the quadripartite committee in Beirut.834 Syrian 
Information Minister Mohammed Salman officially announced news of the breakthrough. Iranian 
Deputy Foreign Minister Sheikholislam expressed satisfaction that joint efforts with Syria to end the 
fighting had finally borne fruit, while Sheikh Fadlallah pointed out that the agreement had been 
"crafted in a manner to save face for ail parties concerned."835 Upon his return from Damascus on 
May 26, a relieved Nabih Berri stated that the Syrians would commence their deployment the very 
next day, Friday, May 27.836 Indeed, Ghazi Kan'an also arrived in Beirut the same day in order to
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supervise the operation.
As news of the agreement spread, the fighting rapidly receded, and militiamen from both 
sides disappeared from the streets. The clashes in Dahiya had been some of the most vicious in 
Lebanon's thirteen-year-old civil war. During the three-week-long gunbattles, more than 300 
people died, over 1,000 were wounded, and some 400,000 civilians fled their homes in south 
Beirut.838
Around 11 a.m. on the morning of May 27, the first detachment of 800 Syrian soldiers 
backed by 100 Lebanese gendarmes entered the southern suburbs to enforce the ceasefire 
agreement, thus officially ending the 22-day Amal-Hezbollah confrontation. By now the militiamen 
had completely disappeared from the streets. As a consequence the deployment went quite 
smoothly, with local inhabitants warmly welcoming the peacekeeping forces.839 At a Friday sermon 
in Beirut, Fadlallah called on his followers to cooperate fully to ensure the successful 
implementation of the new security plan, while the Iranian embassy also issued a statement to the 
same effect.840 The second and last phase of the deployment was completed by the second day as 
3,500 Syrian troops fanned out and took up positions throughout Dahiya, without any major 
incident.841 By June 1, as a result of Iranian mediation, Hezbollah had turned over 200 Amal 
prisoners captured during the fighting to the Syrian peacekeepers, and Amal had freed 58 
Hezbollah captives. Bern also promised the release of all Lebanese and Palestinians in Amal 
custody.842
271
Assad had prevailed in demonstrating his indispensability and crucial role as the final 
arbiter and interlocutor in Lebanese affairs to all sides.043 With Syria asserting control over Dahiya 
by late May, it again tried to link its policy of limiting the power and influence of Hezbollah and 
securing the release of the foreign hostages to US diplomatic assistance to bridge the gap between 
Damascus and East Beirut's position on the presidential elections. As Syrian troops completed 
their deployment on May 29 and set up checkpoints around the pro-Iranian quarter of Bir El-Abed, 
the Syrian Information Minister indicated his government's disenchantment with Samir Geagea's 
Lebanese Forces and underscored that Syria would "not tolerate the presence of parties that 
collaborate with Israel."844 He warned extremist elements on both sides of the fence that any party 
that attempted to deepen divisions in Beirut would be "removed from the arena."845 Assad's ability 
to cut a deal with Iran and Hezbollah that opened the way for Syrian control of the southern 
suburbs, and simultaneously strengthened his hand in Beirut without endangering the lives of the 
Western hostages, did not go unnoticed in Washington. In fact, the Reagan administration reacted 
positively and, following the Superpower summit in Moscow, US Secretary of State Shultz arrived 
in Damascus and held talks with Assad on June 6. Although both the Syrians and Americans 
seemed to favor General Michel Aoun, Commander of the Lebanse Army, to succeed Amin 
Gemayel as president, both men were overshadowed by Geagea, who held enormous sway in the 
Maronite community.846
Overall, the Amal-Hezbollah confrontation and the ensuing crisis demonstrated the 
strenght and maturity of the Syrian-lranian relationship. In spite of three long weeks of tortuous 
and painstaking negotiations marked by incessant wrangling over guarantees and conditions, and 
the prospect of a forceful Syrian entry to crush Hezbollah, neither Syria nor Iran seriously 
considered ending their alliance. Both sides continued to value their partnership and, moreover, 
displayed confidence in their ability to consult and negotiate continuously in order to find some 
common ground to resolve the crisis. Assad refrained from confronting Hezbollah not only for fear 
of sinking deeper into the Lebanese quagmire and jeopardizing the lives of the hostages, but more 
importantly, out of deference to Iran, whose influence and backing were needed to control events 
in Lebanon and contain Iraq on the regional level.847 His conciliatory policy towards Hezbollah fed 
into his strategy to secure its support for his future designs in Lebanon and strengthen relations 
with Iran to thwart his regional rivals. Indeed, Assad's strategy paid off several months later, 
subsequent to the end of the Gulf War, as the struggle in Lebanon over Gemayel's succession 
intensified. The Syrians relied heavily on Iran and Hezbollah to crush Aoun's anti-Syrian rebellion 
in 1988-89, which received support from Iraq and Israel.
From Tehran's standpoint, despite its determination to boost its position in Lebanon, there 
was never any doubt that, if it had to chose between this endeavor and the axis with Syria, the 
former would be abandoned. Iran's support for Hezbollah during the crisis was a calculated move 
to enhance its position in the Levant and safeguard its proxy's future. The clerical regime did not
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seriously contemplate severing its links with Damascus. With Iraq on the ascendant in the Gulf, 
and the Algiers summit approaching, Iran acquiesced to the Syrian intervention and Hezbollah 
relinquishing control of Dahiya as part of an overall understanding that guaranteed its continued 
influence in Lebanon and left Hezbollah's assets untouched. Iran needed Syria and had no 
illusions about challenging its Arab ally in its own backyard.846
REGIONAL DIPLOMATIC MOVES AND THE END OF THE PERSIAN GULF WAR
Following the peaceful resolution of the Amal-Hezbollah confrontation in Lebanon, the Syrians 
prepared to participate in the Algiers summit to show their support and solidarity with the 
Palestinian intifada (the main item on the agenda). At the same time, amidst the myriad of reports 
and speculation in Western and Arab capitals and the news media during the May crisis that the 
Syrian-lranian alliance was at a breaking point, some members of the pro-Iraq camp, most notably 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, reckoned that the opportune moment had arrived to try once more to 
prise Syria and Iran apart. Indeed, during the heat of the May crisis, there had been reports that 
Hafez Assad and King Fahd had spoken over the telephone on several occasions.849 In view of 
Riyadh's decision to severe diplomatic links with Iran in late April, intensify its propaganda war 
against Tehran and facilitate Iraqi aerial attacks on Iranian assets in the Gulf, the contacts between 
the Syrian and Saudi leaders had aroused suspicions that something was afoot. Against the 
backdrop of what many had perceived as the most severe crisis in Syrian-lranian relations, Syria's 
political isolation in the Arab world, Iran's inability to meet the combined US-lraqi challenge in the 
Persian Gulf and Iraq's string of battlefield successes in the land war, many surmised that the 
Damascus-Tehran axis could collapse with an appropriate push. However, this was not to be the 
case.
As stated earlier, the ability of both Syria and Iran to manage the May crisis; by conducting 
protracted negotiations over a three-week period, and to reach a mutually acceptable arrangement 
to end the Amal-Hezbollah clashes signified that the alliance had matured and become more solid. 
Syria needed Iran to control events in Lebanon and, despite the sudden resurgence of Iraqi power 
in the Gulf, a rapprochement with Baghdad was not an idea that was being seriously entertained in 
Damascus. Furthermore, Syria and Iran had concluded another one-year oil agreement in late 
April, whereby Damascus would continue to receive one million tons of Iranian crude free of 
charge, which translated into 20,000 b/d.850 It is important to note that, by this stage, the 
importance of Iranian oil deliveries was beginning to recede on Damascus' agenda and no longer 
served as a bone of contention between the allies. With the Dayr al-Zawr oil fields gradually 
coming on stream, Syria was achieving self-sufficiency for its domestic oil requirements during 
1988 and was expected to have a comfortable surplus by 1989.651 Consequently, foreign oil 
supplies - whether from Iran or elsewhere - were no longer a major long-term consideration in 
Syrian foreign policy formulation. By now, the oil factor was not a prominent element in Assad's
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calculations to maintain cooperative links with Khomeini's Iran. The maintenance of the alliance 
was now based on common political and strategic objectives, not economic or financial 
considerations. In view of the relatively better economic outlook for Syria, the political importance 
of the Palestinian intifada in the Arab world and the diminution of the Iranian threat in the Gulf, the 
Syrian leader believed that he had greater room for maneuver at the upcoming Algiers summit and 
decided to attend personally in order to exploit the evolving regional situation.
In sharp contrast to the Amman summit, where the main topic on the agenda had been the 
Gulf War, seven months later, when the Algiers meeting was convened, the eruption of the 
Palestinian uprising and Iraq's ability to reverse the situation and score notable gains in the Gulf 
theater meant that the focus was shifting back to the Arab-lsraeli arena. The Palestinian-lsraeli 
conflict would constitute the most important item on the conference agenda. As a result, Assad 
was in a less precarious position and could put forth a more convincing case for greater Arab 
assistance, in view of his stalwart opposition to Israeli policies in the Levant. Although the summit 
did not, as had been the case in Amman, mark a major turning point in inter-Arab politics, with 
Egypt's de facto re-entry into the Arab fold, it was important in symbolic terms and was not devoid 
of controversy. Eighteen of the 21 members of the Arab League were represented at the four-day 
summit by their heads of state. Only the leaders of Somalia, Oman and Iraq failed to attend. 
Saddam Hussein sent Taha Yasin Ramadan in his stead, since he was still "needed in the 
confrontation theater."852
Due to the centrality of the Palestinian issue on this occasion, and Arafat's assertiveness, 
both Hafez Assad and King Hussein avoided open confrontation with the PLO chairman. While the 
first two closed sessions of the conference dealt with the Palestinian uprising, during the third 
session on June 9, developments in the Gulf region were also discussed. The Iraqi delegation tried 
to comer the Syrians, with Ramadan reiterating Iraq's dissatisifaction with Syria's stance and 
declaring that "Iranian aggression is parallel to the Zionist aggression, is similar to it, and is its 
partner."853 As in the past, the Iraqis tried to portray the war as a pan-Arab conflict against Iran and 
moved for the inclusion of passages strongly critical of Iran in the text of the final communique. 
Syria, along with Algeria and Libya, tried to thwart these efforts. During the session, Assad 
objected to any anti-Iranian amendments; a move which Ramadan later described as "impudent." 
However after a bilateral meeting between the Syrian leader and King Fahd, and further 
deliberations involving Assad and a number of other Gulf heads of state, Assad acceded to their 
requests to go along with the passage of a final communique that condemned Iranian conduct and 
condoned Iraq's recovery of territories occupied in the Gulf War.854 Moreover, there were 
indications that the GCC states provided financial inducements for Syria's acquiescence as a 
frontline state against Israel. Some reports stated that Damascus was promised an aid package 
totaling $250 million, while others claimed that each donor would decide how much to contribute on 
its own.855 In the end, despite certain objections to the wording of the final statement, the Syrians
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did not express any formal reservations nor oppose its passage.856 The communique criticized 
Iran's "intransigence" for continuing the hostilities, threatening the Gulf states, occupying Arab land 
and refusing to comply with UN Security Council Resolution 598. It went on to express "full 
solidarity” with Iraq for its adherence to pan-Arab responsibilities, including its defense of "pan-Arab 
security and Arab land." The participants also reaffirmed their support for Saudi and Kuwaiti 
actions to defend themselves in the face of Iranian subversion.857
In the aftermath of the Algier summit, Syrian state-controlled media welcomed renewed 
Arab attention to the Arab-lsraeli conflict and additional support for the frontline states. At the 
same time, it emphasized that Syria had disagreed with the anti-Iranian sections of the final 
statement.858 Despite the fact that Damascus went along with the Arab League's condemnation of 
Tehran, it did not deviate from its previous policy of maintaining and expanding cooperative links 
with its non-Arab ally. Both in Amman and Algiers, Syria did not try to swim against the strong anti- 
Iranian current, and paid lip-service to the pro-Iraqi bloc by endorsing its position. However, it 
refused to abandon its strategic relationship with Iran. In early July, the Emir of Kuwait dispatched 
his foreign minister, Sheikh Sabah al-Ahmed al-Jabir, to Baghdad and Damascus to hold talks with 
the leaders of both states in a bid to mend the Syrian-lraqi rift, but this initiative failed to bear fruit, 
as had been the case with previous mediation efforts.859
Two major developments in the first half of July finally persuaded the entire Iranian 
leadership, including Ayatollah Khomeini, to sue for peace. On July 3, the US Navy cruiser USS 
Vincennes, operating near the Straits of Hormuz, entered Iranian territorial waters and challenged 
two Iranian gunboats. The USS Vincennes fired on them, and in the ensuing engagement it shot 
down a commercial airliner, Iran Air 655 (flying in the vicinity on a regular, scheduled flight from 
Bandar Abbas to Dubai), mistaking it for an Iranian F-14 warplane. Two hundred and ninety 
passengers and crew died when the aircraft was struck by two missiles fired from the US vessel.860 
While Washington expressed regret about the tragic incident, it defended its policy in the Gulf. 
Ronald Reagan described the event as an "understandable accident" and argued that the USS 
Vincennes had acted in self-defense while under attack.861 Washington immediately engaged in an 
extensive disinformation campaign to conceal the truth about the incident.862
While Tehran angrily lashed out at Washington, wildly accusing it of "premeditated 
murder," the incident came as a profound shock to the clerical regime and the people, highlighting 
the formidable nature of the forces arrayed against them.863 Furthermore, the mild international 
reaction to the incident no doubt came as a bitter disappointment, exposing Iran's isolation and 
weakness.864 The reaction in the Arab world was for the most part neutral, or critical of Iran. Only 
Syria and Libya harshly condemned the US government. Damascus called it a "criminal act" and 
one of the "ugliest forms of terrorism." It expressed its condolences and solidarity with the Iranian 
government and families of the victims.865
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The destruction of Iran Air 655, coupled with Iraq's military victories on land and US-lraqi 
efforts to neutralize Iranian power in the Gulf, compounded the sense of helplessness already felt 
in Tehran, in tandem with the heightened tensions in the Gulf, Iraq kept up the pressure in the 
ground war. Less than three weeks after the victory in the Majnoon islands, on July 12, the Iraqi 
army launched another major offensive northeast of Basra, near the Amarah oilfields, to retake 
some of the last significant pockets of territory held by Iranian forces. The Iraqis quickly 
overpowered the Iranian defenders. In addition to recovering their territory, the Iraqis pushed into 
Iran and temporarily occupied some 1,500 square miles.866 The next day, Baghdad threatened to 
invade Iran once again if Iran did not give up its remaining footholds in Iraqi Kurdistan.
By now, Iran had lost virtually all the gains it had made in Iraq since 1984. With the loss of 
much of its heavy equipment in the recent fighting, Iranian morale was at an all time low. Tehran 
promptly announced on July 14 that it would oblige and pull back its forces behind the international 
frontier.867 Three days later, Ayatollah Khomeini convened an extraordinary meeting involving 40 
senior political and military officials to discuss the future of the war. After eight hours of 
deliberations, the majority persuaded him and the remaining hawks that victory could not be 
attained on the battlefield and Iran had no recourse but to end the eight-year-old conflict.868 The 
next day, on July 18, Ali Khamene'i sent a letter to UN Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar stating 
Iran's formal acceptance of Resolution 59S.869 Khomeini, who had been an uncompromising foe of 
Saddam Hussein and the Iraqi Ba'thi regime, indicated in an address to the nation on July 20 that 
the decision to end the war had been difficult - one "more deadly than drinking poison." He 
admitted that he had finally accepted the counsel of his military advisors 870
Syria was surprised when Iran accepted Resolution 598, since it had not been consulted or 
informed prior to Iran's announcement on July 18.871 Nonetheless, Damascus welcomed Tehran's 
decision to cease hostilities with Baghdad and condemned its Ba'thi rival once again for having 
started the war in the first place.872 Iraq was also caught off guard by Iran's sudden acceptance of 
a ceasefire, although only a day earlier, on the 20th anniversary of the Iraqi Ba'th's seizure of 
power, during a speech commemorating the occasion, Saddam Hussein had predicted "the 
enemy's total collapse this year." In his address he had also expressed gratitude for the pan-Arab 
support he had received at the Amman and Algiers summits and condemned Syria's "abominable 
crimes" in Lebanon and betrayal of "Arab solidarity."873 Sensing that Iranian weakness and 
vulnerability were at their height, Iraq decided to press the initiative by invading Iran to seize 
territory in order to bolster its negotiating position. It launched a series of offensives on the central 
and southern fronts between July 22 and 29, capturing huge swathes of territory, along with men 
and materiel. Iran fought back desperately and recouped some of its losses during the closing 
days of July and early August.874 Ironically, Iran now appealed to the Security Council for support, 
with Iraq showing contempt for the UN body by ignoring repeated calls to end the fighting and
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withdraw its forces.
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Throughout this period, Syria denounced Iraqi actions and argued that Baghdad's refusal to 
sue for peace vindicated its stance and proved that the Iraqi regime was determined to "wreak 
havoc" in the Gulf and divert Arab attention away from the Arab-lsraeli theater.876 Under intense 
international pressure, Saddam Hussein finally accepted a ceasefire on August 6. A UN observer 
force of 350 troops was hastily assembled and dispatched to the region. The UN Security Council 
met subsequently and decided that the ceasefire would officially come into effect on August 20, 
with Iran and Iraq agreeing to commence peace negotiations under UN auspices in Geneva on 
August 25.877
In the immediate aftermath of the Gulf War, as Iran and Iraq prepared to begin peace 
talks, there was heightened diplomatic activity in the region on both sides. A week after Iraq 
agreed to cease hostilities, Velayati left for Damascus and Tripoli to inform their leaders about 
recent developments and hold consultations with them. He first travelled to Syria to brief Assad 
and al-Shara on the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 598 and discuss future 
bilateral cooperation in the emerging regional environment. Reportedly, Assad congratulated 
Velayati on the decision to end the war, describing it as an opportunity to stabilize the situation and 
improve their relations.878 In mid-August, King Hussein, accompanied by a high-level military 
delegation, visited Baghdad to congratulate Saddam Hussein on his triumph against Iran. The 
Jordanian monarch was presented with huge quantities of US and British-built tanks and armored 
vehicles captured from the Iranians, as a token of appreciation for his consistent support of Iraq 
during the war. He called Iraq's victory a "brilliant chapter in modern Arab history."879
In parallel with the diplomatic moves on both sides, there was an intensification of 
propaganda wars in some quarters, most notably with Baghdad stepping up its attacks on Syria. In 
an interview with Egypt's Al-Akhbar on August 11, Iraqi Deputy Premier Ramadan praised Egyptian 
support for Iraq during the war and asserted that Egyptian-lraqi relations served as a model for 
fraternal ties among Arab states. He contrasted Cairo's backing with Damascus' stance. He 
accused Syria of betraying the aims and aspirations of the Arab nation by assisting Iran, destroying 
Lebanon and massacring Palestinians. Ramadan advocated Arab steadfastness against what he 
called Syria's treachery. Even before peace talks between Iran and Iraq had got underway, 
Baghdad already signalled its determination to punish Syria for its policies during the Gulf War. 
For example, an editorial in the Iraqi Ba'th's daily Al-Thawrah on August 14 warned that the Syrian 
regime would soon face the most difficult stage in its history, now that Iraq had emerged victorious 
from its "holy defensive war." It emphasized that Assad would pay dearly for his treasonous 
collaboration with the enemies of the Arabs - the Khomeinists and Zionists.
Damascus was equally harsh in its ripostes. It continued to underscore the harm that 
Baghdad had done to the Arab cause by initiating the Gulf conflict and trying to expand the 
hostilities to create an Arab-Persian conflict, thereby deflecting attention away from the Palestinian 
issue. With the cessation of hostilities, Syria now urged other Arab states to follow its example by
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deepening Arab-lranian cooperation to restore unity and confront the "common enemy." The 
Syrian media predicted that Saddam Hussein would have difficulty keeping his grip on power under 
peaceful conditions, and would continue to manufacture crises to oppress the Iraqi people and 
block a satisfactory resolution of outstanding problems with Iran in order to highlight the fabricated 
Arab-lranian cleavage. They intimated that Saddam Hussein's fallacy would ultimately confirm 
what Syria had maintained all along since 1979, that "the Islamic Republic of Iran is a supporter of 
the Arab cause and not an enemy of the Arabs."880
Another sign of the continuation of the Syrian-lraqi rift was the visit of a high-level Iraqi 
opposition delegation to Damascus in late August, composed of senior representatives from the 
Iraqi Communist Party, the Socialist Party of Kurdistan, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan and the 
Kurdistan Democratic Party. This was at a time when the Iraqi army had begun a systematic 
campaign to crush resistance in the Kurdish north, now that the guns had fallen silent along the 
Iranian front.881 It was clear that, despite the end of the Iran-lraq hostilities and the beginning of 
peace negotiations, the gulf between Baghdad and Damascus remained as wide as ever. All 
indications were that the rivalry between the two Bathi regimes would continue unabated. 
Concomitantly, Iran's military weakness and diplomatic isolation, combined with the consolidation 
of the powerful Egyptian-Jordanian-lraqi axis (backed by Washington and Riyadh) and the cooling 
of Syrian-Soviet relations, raised questions in the minds of many about the future viability of the 
Syrian-lranian alliance. Many observers concluded that, as Tehran turned inward to put its own 
house in order, Assad would have to reorder his strategic priorites and reformulate his foreign 
policy because of the changing calculus of power on both the regional and international stage.
CONCLUSION
By the end of the third phase in the evolution of the Syrian-lranian axis, during the summer of 
1988, the partnership between the two sides had been consolidated. It had been able to survive 
intra-alliance tensions and serious disputes on numerous occasions between 1985 and 1988. The 
inherent desire of both regimes to perpetuate their special relationship manifested itself in their 
common ability to consult one another continuously, particularly at times when their interests 
diverged, and reach mutually agreeable arrangements. Their ability to withstand serious setbacks, 
jointly find solutions and compromise on important issues in the Levant and the Persian Gulf during 
an extremely turbulent period in Lebanese and Gulf politics, spanning more than three years, 
proved that the Tehran-Damascus axis had matured and become institutionalized. This was 
demonstrated in their successful handling of the February 1987 and May 1988 crises in Lebanon, 
Syria's steadfast support for Iran in the aftermath of the Mecca incident and the Amman and 
Algiers summits.
Despite going through the motions and feigning solidarity with the mainstream Arab states 
in the two Arab League conferences, Assad continued to support his Iranian ally at a time when it
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was losing the initiative in the Gulf and becoming increasingly isolated in the Middle East and the 
rest of the world. Furthermore, as the importance of Iranian oil shipments decreased, with Syria 
having boosted its own oil production to achieve self-sufficiency for its internal needs by 1988, only 
political and strategic considerations were now paramount in maintaining close links with Iran. 
Damascus calculated that keeping Tehran on its side, rather than going against it, would give it a 
better chance of controlling the volatile situation in Lebanon as events unfolded after the Israeli 
retreat in 1985, with Maronite opposition to Syrian policy and Hezbollah's gradual rise to 
prominence. Furthermore, Iran's war effort kept Iraq in check and neutralized Baghdad's potential 
to create problems for Syria in Lebanon or elsewhere. The Gulf W ar also gave a whole new 
dimension to Syrian foreign policy. It enabled Syria to mediate between Iran and the GCC states 
to contain the hostilities, thereby bolstering its power and influence and ability to acquire financial 
and material benefits from both sides in return. Finally, as Gorbachev signalled his disapproval of 
Assad's quest to achieve "strategic parity" with Israel, reduced arms supplies to Syria and began to 
diversify his relations in the Middle East by repairing relations with Israel and some of Syria's Arab 
rivals, the Syrian leader realized that he could no longer count on support from his Superpower 
patron and had to rely more on his own resources and capabilities, and that of his allies in the 
region, namely Iran and the Lebanese Shi'ites.
From revolutionary Iran's vantage point, perpetuation of the alliance with Syria was critical 
in several respects. In ideological terms, an alliance with one of the key players in the Arab world, 
which was at the same time the only true confrontation state against Israel and the cradle of 
modem Arab nationalism, enabled it to dimiss pro-Iraqi propaganda depicting Iran as an enemy of 
the Arab nation and portraying the Gulf W ar as an Arab-Persian conflict. In practical terms, Iran's 
continued ability to prevent Iraqi oil exports from the Gulf and intedict shipping bound for its foe, 
combined with Syria's refusal to reopen the IPC pipelines to the Mediterranean, served as a 
"Syrian-lranian pincer" to maintain an partial economic stranglehold on Iraq. This neatly fed into 
Iran's strategy to drain and paralyze Iraq economically and gradually bring it to its knees through a 
war of attrition. Syria also served as an important gateway for Iran into Lebanon. It had been a 
facilitator of Iran's activities among the Shi'ite community that was of both political and ideological 
value to the clerical regime. Due to Syrian cooperation and acquiescence, Iran had been able to 
gain a large following among the Shi'ites and mobilize them to resist the Israelis and their 
Lebanese allies. Despite intermittent squabbling with Damascus over the future of Lebanon from 
1985 onwards, Tehran was well aware that Assad was the final arbiter in Lebanon, and it would not 
serve Iran's long-term political interests to challenge him in his own backyard. In the final analysis, 
Syrian interests took precedence in Lebanon, just as Iran's did in the Gulf and, even if Iran was not 
able to replicate its theocratic model in Lebanon, a modest foothold there (right at the doorstep of 
the "Zionist entity") was better than none. Between 1985 and 1988, the two allies were able 
successfully to delineate the parameters of their cooperation, identify their vital interests and forge
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understandings on how to perpetuate their partnership for many years to come.
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CONCLUSION: A DECADE ON, THE ALLIANCE ENDURES
During the two-year period (August 1988 - August 1990) between the cessation of the Gulf hostilities 
and the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, many observers predicted the imminent demise of the Syrian- 
Iranian alliance. However, the partnership endured and still stands today at the start of the twenty- 
first century. Why did the strategic relationship between Damascus and Tehran continue, despite 
their inability to bring Saddam Hussein to his knees and to stabilize the situation in Lebanon by 
1988? There was ample reason for the Syrian and Iranian regimes to perpetuate their special 
relationship during the interwar years between the two Gulf conflicts and in the post-Cold War era.
First and foremost, incessant speculation that the days of the Syrian-lranian nexus were 
numbered proved to be unfounded: many analysts failed to recognize that the continuous 
consultations between the two allies and their ability to compromise on key issues, build mutual trust 
and maintain cooperative links during the troubled years of 1985-88 had led to the consolidation of 
the alliance. Over time, their common ability accurately to assess the evolving regional situation, to 
recognize the limits of their power and to set feasible goals lent stability to the alliance. Both 
Damascus and Tehran also understood that their activities in the other’s sphere of influence had to 
be within certain limits and subject to the other’s approval, particularly if vital interests were at stake.1 
Secondly, the regional environment in the immediate aftermath of the First Gulf War necessitated 
preserving their ties in order to enhance their regional position and to mitigate their security 
concerns. Indeed, two of the most salient factors that ensured the longevity of the Syrian-lranian 
alliance during 1988-90 were the resurgence of Iraqi power and influence throughout the Middle East 
and the institutionalization of the pro-Iraqi Arab alliance, which had gradually emerged during the 
1980's through the formal creation of the Arab Cooperation Council (ACC) in February 1989.
As early as 1985, one Middle East scholar had predicted, "Even if the Iran-lraq war were to 
end, so long as the present leadership remains in power in Iraq, Syria and Iran will in all likelihood 
cooperate to keep its influence in check."2 Indeed, not only did the Iraqi Ba'thi regime survive the 
eight-year war, but its massive military expansion program through foreign assistance had moreover 
enabled it to repulse Iranian offensives for six consecutive years and to regain the upper hand in the 
closing months of the conflict, thereby bolstering its power and prestige in the Arab world. By 1988, 
Iraq's well-equipped and battle-hardened army constituted one of the five largest military 
establishments in the entire world. In addition to its military might, Iran's weakness and Syria's 
isolation also magnified Iraq's power in political terms and made it the prime contender for leadership 
of the Arab world. The regional situation instilled renewed confidence in Saddam Hussein, who felt 
flush with a sense of victory over Khomeini's Iran and now had a free hand to pursue an activist 
foreign policy and strike at his foes, most notably Assad's Syria.3
During the twenty-four months prior to the Kuwait crisis, Iraq demonstrated its clear intent to 
play a pivotal role in the Arab world by providing military aid to Mauritania in its conflict with Senegal, 
encouraging the unification between the two Yemens, backing the Sudanese Islamist regime's 
struggle against rebels in the south and becoming more outspoken and confrontational with regard to
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issues relating to the Arab-lsraeli conflict.4 However, from the standpoint of Syria and Iran, two 
developments in the winter of 1988-89 reinforced their determination to continue their liaison in order 
to respond to Iraq's growing assertiveness. In Lebanon, following the expiry of Amin Gemayel's term 
as president, the ensuing deadlock over his succession sparked a major political crisis, prompting 
Armed Forces Commander General Michel Aoun to step into the political vacuum and challenge 
Syrian hegemony in Lebanon. The confrontation between Syria and Christian Lebanese forces loyal 
to Aoun presented Baghdad with an irresistible opportunity to punish Damascus, in its very own 
backyard, for pursuing pro-Iranian policies during the Gulf conflict. As early as the autumn of 1988, 
Iraq began arms deliveries to anti-Syrian forces in Lebanon.5 By 1989, as the conflict between 
Assad and Aoun escalated, Baghdad used every available opportunity to thwart Damascus' efforts to 
oust Aoun and regain control of the situation. Substantial quantities of weapons were sent to Aoun 
loyalists via Egypt and Jordan and, on the diplomatic front, the Iraqis tried to rally Arab support 
against the Syrian military presence in Lebanon and to seek condemnation of Assad's actions.6
Unable to challenge Iraqi power effectively in the Persian Gulf any longer, Iran had turned 
inward after the ceasefire to focus on domestic reconstruction and revive its energies. Nonetheless, 
it closely coordinated its policies in Lebanon with Syria to restore unity among the ranks of Shi'ite 
movements such as Hezbollah and Amal and mobilize them as part of a broad-based, pro-Syrian 
coalition that eventually prevailed over Aoun's supporters in the latter part of 1989. Besides Iraq's 
meddling in Lebanon, from the Iranian and Syrian perspective, another worrisome development only 
six months after the termination of hostilities in the Gulf was the formation of an Arab alliance, the 
ACC, composed of Egypt, Jordan, Iraq and North Yemen. In essence, the ACC formalized the main 
Arab axis that had gradually emerged during the 1980's aimed at containing Syrian-lranian power in 
the region. The ACC was undoubtedly the dominant Arab political configuration by this stage. Not 
only did this new alliance further marginalize Syria and Iran, but it also caused deep consternation 
among some of Iraq's traditional Arab backers, such as Saudi Arabia, which rushed to conclude a 
non-aggression pact with Saddam Hussein in March 1989.7 Syria was now the only key Arab state 
to be left out of the three existing alignments in the Arab world - the ACC, GCC and AMU.8 
Damascus' status as an outcast in Arab politics, coupled with the gradual cooling of Syrian-Soviet 
relations, reinforced the logic of alliance with Iran, which provided valuable assistance to its Syrian 
partner to impede Iraqi interference in Lebanon. Moreover, Syrian-lranian cooperation against Aoun 
bore fruit that same year.9
Although Iran was displeased by Syria's participation in the Saudi-sponsored Taif Accords in 
October 1989, which restricted Iranian access to Lebanon, and by the Syrian-Egyptian 
rapprochement during the winter of 1989-90, no major shifts occurred in their bilateral relationship.10 
Saddam Hussein's growing boldness and hubris had begun to cause varying degrees of concern 
among some of his Arab supporters, consequently increasing, with the passage of time, Syria's room 
for political maneuvering.11 As Damascus mended fences with Riyadh and Cairo in the year prior to 
the Kuwait crisis, the clerical regime in Iran could not emulate its Arab ally since it did not have 
diplomatic relations with Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The stark reality was that Tehran could not find a
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viable alternative to its alliance with Damascus even if wanted to, since most Arab governments had 
severed links with the Islamic Republic during the 1980's.12
The onset of the Kuwait crisis changed the entire political equation in the Middle East 
overnight and presented Syria and Iran with opportunities to capitalize on the new situation and 
recoup their position. For Assad, his Bathi rival's invasion and occupation of another Arab country 
vindicated his previous policy of aiding Iran during the eight-year war.13 With the marked 
improvement in Syrian capability to control the situation in Lebanon, he subsequently opted to join 
the international coalition against Iraq, judging that it would be more advantageous in order to 
neutralize Saddam Hussein and concomitantly extract concessions from the Gulf Arabs and the 
United States. Iran, now under the Khamene'i-Rafsanjani leadership, was still weak militarily and 
decided to stay clear of the fray. However, its decision to remain neutral did not mean that it 
intended to be an idle bystander. Far from it, Tehran believed that, by mediating between the two 
sides, it could gain leverage over them and exploit subsequent events. In fact, its ability in the initial 
phase of the crisis to thaw relations with Baghdad, by breaking the two-year deadlock in the peace 
negotiations and obtaining significant concessions from its foe, alarmed the anti-Iraq camp, 
prompting Assad to undertake his first state visit to Iran since the 1979 Revolution in September 
1990 to seek clarification and gain assurances that Iran would not side with Iraq in the event of war. 
Again, some analysts predicted the demise of the Syrian-lranian alliance. Although they adopted 
divergent positions in this regard, the Kuwait crisis did not sound the death knell of the partnership. 
In fact, the two allies took a further step in institutionalizing their bilateral relationship in November 
1990 through the creation of the Syrian-lranian Higher Cooperation Committee, chaired by their vice- 
presidents and foreign ministers. The primary purpose of this body was to meet at regular intervals 
to hold consultations and strengthen their cooperative links.14
Throughout the crisis, Iran abided by the UN-imposed embargo on Iraq and maintained its 
neutrality. The fateful events of 1990-91 divided the Arab world. Iraq's annexation of Kuwait, and the 
subsequent war that pitted Arabs directly against one another, dealt a significant blow to Arab 
nationalism and to lingering notions of pan-Arab solidarity.15 Such developments, coupled with the 
GCC's preference for a Western rather than an Arab military presence in the postwar Gulf security 
arrangement, made Assad's policy of perpetuating his alliance with non-Arab Iran seem acceptable 
in Arab political circles in view of the new regional environment of the 1990's, in stark contrast to the 
previous decade when backing a non-Arab actor against an Arab one was considered heresy in 
mainstream Arab politics.
Although the Syrian-lranian alliance experienced a brief hiccup in the immediate aftermath 
of the Second Gulf War when Iran was deeply alarmed by the prospect of a permanent Egyptian and 
Syrian troop deployment in the Persian Gulf, tensions rapidly receded once it became apparent that 
the GCC states preferred a continued US military presence in the area instead. In general, the 
conflict and its outcome represented a mixed blessing for the Syrian-lranian axis. Both Damascus 
and Tehran took advantage of Iraq's aggression to mend fences with key Arab and Western 
governments and to break out of their regional and international isolation. They also derived
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considerable satisfaction from the fact that Saddam Hussein's military machine was cut down to size 
and that his regime became politically isolated during the remainder of the 1990's. The war 
reinforced the Syrian and Iranian arguments that Bathi Iraq had been a revisionist power ail along, 
and had been the aggressor in both Gulf conflicts. In spite of Iraq's removal from the immediate 
picture and the Bush administration's promise to craft an Arab-lsraeli peace, the high-profile 
presence of US forces in the Gulf region and the subsequent failure of the incoming Clinton 
administration to break the impasse in the Syrian-lsraeli track of the peace process dashed 
expectations in Damascus and Tehran that they could truly benefit from the emerging "New World 
Order." Assad himself later lamented that the "main winners have been the Arabs' enemies," 
cautioning that the new environment was detrimental to Arab and Syrian interests.16
The passing of the bipolar international system meant that Washington now enjoyed a 
virtually unassailable position in the Middle East - both in the Persian Gulf and in the Arab-lsraeli 
theater. In the Gulf, it was free to establish a "Pax Americana" by isolating Iraq and Iran, maintaining 
high force levels in the area and transferring billions of dollars worth of military equipment to the 
GCC states. In the Levant, Washington failed to end the Arab-lsraeli conflict through resolution of 
the outstanding issues, including the return of the Golan Heights to Syria. In spite of the conclusion 
of the 1994 Jordanian-lsraeli peace treaty, substantive progress on the Syrian and even the 
Palestinian tracks of the peace process remained elusive. During its first term in office, the Clinton 
administration went to considerable lengths to try to prise Syria and Iran apart by implementing its 
"Dual Containment" policy in the Gulf, and also by dispatching Secretary of State Warren 
Christopher to Damascus more than 20 times between 1993 and 1997 in an attempt to persuade 
Assad to distance himself from Iran and to conclude a peace accord with Israel.
Overall, Washington's pro-Israeli slant in the Arab-lsraeli negotiations, its support for the 
emergence of a Turkish-lsraeli alliance after 1996 to isolate Iran and cow Syria into submission and 
its willingness to exploit Iran-Gulf Arab differences in order to justify its military presence and 
massive arms sales to its regional allies reinvigorated and gave more impetus to Syrian-lranian 
cooperation in the post-Cold War era. Throughout the 1990's, Bathi Syria and Islamist Iran 
continued to collaborate and assist one another through various means in political and military 
affairs. On several occasions, Syria mediated between Iran and the Gulf states over differences that 
arose, most notably, in the dispute with the UAE over Abu Musa and the Tunb islands after 1992, 
and in the row with Bahrain in 1995.17 As in the past, Damascus' strategy was to try to defuse Arab- 
Iranian tensions in the Gulf, and to prevent the US from exploiting volatile conditions to advance its 
own agenda. From Tehran's standpoint, Syrian intercession and political mediation was greatly 
preferable to further Western intervention.18
In a similar vein, both Iran and Hezbollah coordinated their moves with Syria in the early 
1990's to restore stability and order in Lebanon, resolve the Western hostage issue and also ensure 
that Israel paid a price for its continued occupation of the self-declared security zone. Hezbollah 
succeeded in transforming itself into a viable political party in its own right by modifying its political 
platform and conforming to the realities on the ground. By toning down its Islamist rhetoric and
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recognizing the sectarian diversity of the country, it demonstrated its ability to operate within 
Lebanon's secular framework after 1992.19 In parallel, with Syrian and Iranian backing, Hezbollah's 
increasingly effective guerrilla campaign against the IDF and SLA throughout the 1990's finally 
prompted Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak to announce that Israeli forces would be pulled out of 
southern Lebanon by July 2000. However, what was supposed to be an orderly, phased withdrawal 
over a two-month period turned into a rout in mid-May, as the SLA collapsed and the IDF hastily 
withdrew within a matter of days by May 24, 2000. Lebanese resistance with Syrian-lranian 
collaboration spanning many years had finally borne fruit. It was the first time that Israel had given 
up territory and withdrawn to its international frontiers without any prior political agreement.
Since Iran and Syria did not have reliable suppliers for modem weaponry during the 1980's, 
with the United States cutting off the flow of arms to Iran after the 1979 Revolution and Gorbachev 
scaling back significantly on military assistance to Assad after ascending to power, the two allies tried 
to diversify their sources for military hardware and develop indigenous arms industries. Unable to 
procure high-tech weaponry from the US or Western Europe, during the 1990's the two relied 
primarily on the Russian Federation, Ukraine, China and North Korea for arms. Aside from 
purchasing modem weaponry, Syria and Iran enlisted the support of these states to build arms 
factories in order to gain the necessary expertise to upgrade their weapons and develop new ones. 
In view of the major impact that surface-to-surface missiles had in the two Gulf conflicts, Iran and 
Syria focused particularly on acquiring the necessary technology and know-how to develop their own 
ballistic missile capability. Besides buying missiles from Russia, China and North Korea, they sought 
their assistance to design new missiles. It is believed that as early as September 1991, during a visit 
to Tehran by Syrian Chief of Staff Hikmat Shihabi, a secret agreement was concluded for joint 
production of surface-to-surface missiles.20 Reportedly, the two allies collaborated in developing a 
cruise missile, while Iran and North Korea participated in establishing production facilities for the 
manufacture of a missile similar to the Soviet-model Scud in Aleppo and Hama21 The primary 
motive for such programs seems to have been to develop their own deterrent capability, in light of 
Iraq's willingness to use non-conventional weapons in the past two wars and Israel's overwhelming 
military superiority. Joint and independent development of ballistic missiles and possibly other non- 
conventional weapons were intended to diversify their capabilities and correct what Tehran and 
Damascus perceived as the major military imbalance in the region favoring their adversaries.
On the regional and international level, both Tehran and Damascus considered the 
continuation of their partnership as a useful means to maximize their autonomy, keep their local 
adversaries in check, dilute foreign - particularly American - power and influence in the Middle East 
and also assert themselves within their respective spheres of influence. While Syria enjoyed greater 
room for maneuver in the regional and Arab state system when compared to Iran, it also recognized 
the limits of the revived "Arab Triangle" - its alignment with Egypt and Saudi Arabia - in the post-Cold 
War era. Both of these Arab countries remained close political allies of the United States and were 
heavily dependent on it for their military and security requirements. Due to their reliance on 
American goodwill, Damascus was well aware that it could not effectively utilize its channels with
329
Cairo and Riyadh to persuade Washington to modify its policies in the Arab-lsraeli peace process in 
order to take more account of Syrian interests and concerns.22 Hence, the alliance with Iran - a 
country that had the capability to neutralize Iraqi power and wield considerable influence in the Gulf 
and Lebanon - remained one of Syria's primary trump cards in the diplomatic tug-of-war to attain its 
objectives.
In terms of alliance theory and lessons one can draw from the Syrian-lranian case, one has 
to be extremely careful about making empirical generalizations and trying to apply the specific 
findings to other cases. Although alliances do display some common characteristics, each alliance 
in international politics is unique in its own right. Nevertheless, case studies and close surveys of 
alliances throughout various periods in international history enable us to understand alliances better 
and lead to the enrichment of the growing body of knowledge on alliance theory. With regard to the 
Syrian-lranian alliance, the evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that a compact alignment 
between two middle powers that is buttressed by geography, common political and security concerns 
and complementary interests and which is also defensive in nature and capable of setting limited, 
attainable objectives can play a major role in shaping events in a specific region for long periods and 
spoiling the designs of the Great Powers. Furthermore, in a turbulent region where threats may 
emerge and recede rapidly, it is vital for the alliance partners to possess the ability to engage in 
continuous consultations in order to ensure that they harmonize their policies and cooperate to meet 
the existing challenges, and modify them once their common objectives have been attained. In the 
case of the Damascus-Tehran nexus, dangers posed by Iraqi, Israeli and US policies in the Middle 
East between 1979 and 1989 resulted in the need to overcome some ideological incompatibilities 
and conflicting visions to consolidate the alliance and thwart their enemies.
In conclusion, it is worth mentioning once more that the Syrian-lranian alliance was shaped 
to varying degrees by the experiences and geography of the two states. However, the role and 
impact of ideology and the worldviews of their political elites should not be underestimated. Their 
leaders share certain perceptions and their secular and fundamentalist ideologies overlap in certain 
respects. While Iran has tried to use its brand of revolutionary Islam to transcend nationalism, create 
Muslim unity in the region by overcoming Arab-lranian political cleavages and demonstrate its 
solidarity through active participation in the Arab-lsraeli struggle, Syria has striven to overcome the 
political fragmentation of the Arab world by acting as a vehicle for Arab unity, since it considers itself 
as the birthplace and heartland of Arabism. Hafez Assad, Ruhollah Khomeini and their successors 
have viewed the region as a strategic whole and regarded their alliance as a vital tool to further Arab- 
Islamic interests and increase regional autonomy by diminishing foreign penetration of the Middle 
East. As a result, both countries have put long-term interests ahead of short-term gains to advance 
their common agenda over the years. It is noteworthy that the US has very little leverage over them 
today, and they have both staved off isolation in the post-Cold War era. Although they have not 
always been successful in steering events in a desirable direction in the Middle East, their potential 
to thwart the ambitions of other actors such as Iraq, Israel and the United States cannot be denied. 
In this respect, the achievements of the Syrian-lranian alliance during the past two decades have
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been quite remarkable. Irrespective of how much longer this partnership endures, it has left its 
stamp on modem Middle Eastern politics.
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